Appendix A: Government response
The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence
Committee's inquiry 'Future Army 2020' and the findings set out
in the Committee's report (HC 576), published on 6 March 2014.
Our formal response to its recommendations and conclusions
is set out below. The Committee's headings and findings are highlighted
in bold, with the Government's response set out in plain text.
For ease of reference, paragraph numbering in brackets refers
to the order in which they are presented in the Committee's Report.
Following what was known as the "three month
exercise", the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) was given
broad freedoms to structure the Army as he saw fit within the
limits of around 82,000 regulars and 30,000 trained reserves.
Upon completion of this analysis, CGS discussed his
revised Force Structure with the Defence Board and, subject to
a number of caveats such as the successful delivery of the New
Employment Model, confirmed that the outputs required of the Army
were achievable, with a level of risk which was judged acceptable
by the Board. The revised Force Structure is now known as Army
2020.
1. At the beginning of our Report, we wish to
pay tribute to Army personnel, including those who have left the
Services, for their bravery, dedication to duty and their contribution
to the nation's security. This has been an uncertain and worrying
time for the Armed Forces as they undergo major changes to their
structure and role while continuing to undertake operations in
Afghanistan and other parts of the world. We also recognise the
valuable role that their families play in supporting them as they
carry out their duties. (Paragraph 6)
We welcome the Committee's recognition of Army personnel,
past and present, who give so much to the nation. We also recognise
the contribution made by families who provide support to our serving
personnel. These have been uncertain times but, as we expected,
our personnel and their families have coped with the uncertainties
very professionally and in a way that can only reflect credit
and respect. As we move forwards towards 2020 the many improvements
and benefits which this Government has initiated for our Armed
Forces will be realised, providing stability and certainty for
our people.
2. We are surprised that such a radical change
to the Army's structure, reflecting a reduction of 12,000 personnel
from that announced in SDSR 2010, was not discussed at the National
Security Council (NSC). Even if the overall strategic vision had
not changed, as the Government claims, the military ways and means
of that strategy were considerably altered under Army 2020. We
are firmly of the view that the NSC should have considered the
Army 2020 plan. We recommend that the NSC should be involved in
the evolution and development of Future Force 2020 in the run-up
to the next SDSR in 2015. (Paragraph 15)
The Department refers to the Government response
to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy's Second
Report of Session 2012-13, highlighted in paragraph 19.
The National Security Council guided, discussed and
endorsed the 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence
and Security Review. In so doing, the NSC set the UK's overarching
strategy and directed individual government departments to implement
their respective elements within an agreed resource envelope.
The Future Reserves and Army 2020 initiatives were developed in
accordance with this direction, in order to transform and deliver
effective Armed Forces able to meet the UK's future security and
defence needs.
Departments have a range of mechanisms available
for consulting across Government, including the National Security
Council. In adjusting the Regular-Reserve balance and in determining
the future scale and range of tasks for the Reserve Forces, the
Government was broadly guided by an Independent Commission. The
Future Reserves 2020 consultative Green Paper, published in November
2012, recognised the Commission's findings and also considered
the wider implications of this initiative. The Green Paper was
endorsed by the National Security Council. Army 2020 did not change
the strategic direction agreed by the National Security Council
in the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
3. We have received no definitive evidence of
an active experimentation programme in the development and implementation
of Army 2020. Furthermore we note with concern that the Chief
of the General Staff's update on the implementation of Army 2020,
published in July 2013, provided no detail on experimentation.
The MoD should set out in more detail, with specific examples,
how the plans for Army 2020 were, and are, being tested and challenged.
(Paragraph 26)
The Strategic Defence and Security Review of October
2010 mandated a Regular Army of 94,000. An understanding of the
affordability and capability had been achieved through analysis
conducted during the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The
three month exercise then took guidance from the National Security
Council and developed eight indicative force structure options
that were shaped around the 'Adaptable Britain' posture and were
therefore in line with the Strategic Defence and Security Review
baseline. These eight options were tested against a wide range
of scenarios, including those used during the Strategic Defence
and Security Review, which aligned to National Security Council
priorities, including Standing Tasks, War-fighting and Non-Warfighting
Scenarios, both contingent and enduring in nature. These Force
Structure options were put forward to a senior judgement panel
chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, and were deemed
as achieving the requirements of an Adaptable Britain posture
(i.e. the ability to conduct UK standing commitments and expeditionary
operations concurrently with a stabilisation operation), with
varying levels of risk.
The Senior Judgement Panel concluded that the eight
force structure options took too much risk and therefore selected
a 'hybrid option' based on a Regular Army of 82,000. Following
this conclusion, and in line with the Independent Commission on
Reserves recommendation for a Reserve force of 30,000, the Chief
of the General Staff was invited to design a structure for the
Army with an 82,000 Regular and 30,000 Reserve Force that was
capable of meeting the requirements of the 'Adaptable Force' posture.
This structural analysis was undertaken on behalf of the Army
2020 Design Team by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory,
who 'stress-tested' the proposed force structure by examining
whether or not it contained the capability required for what was
envisaged to be the most challenging sequence of operations that
could reasonably be anticipated, namely a divisional-level 'best
effort' scenario, followed by an enduring brigade-level stabilisation
operation. In essence, this involved a UK division operating as
part of a coalition against a near-peer state adversary, and a
UK brigade operating as part of a NATO coalition in a complex
environment against a quasi-state threat. The use of scenarios
based around Defence Planning Assumptions has been the manner
in which the Department has tested its force structure capacity
for many years.
Further testing of the new structure has occurred
through a series of exercises that have, and continue to, test
concepts from Division to platoon level. This process is ongoing,
with a great deal of activity planned for the remainder of this
year and into 2015.
While experimentation is important, it is only one
element which contributes to analysis and judgement. Army 2020
was informed by AGILE WARRIOR, the Army's experimentation programme,
which seeks to provide applied concepts, direction and coherence
to the Capability Directorate's planning activity through a number
of bespoke programmes for Future forces (5 - 20 years) and Conceptual
forces (15 - 30 years). These programmes are designed to be dynamic
and to shift in priority and emphasis according to developing
themes or concepts.
Informing all programmes is the annual Army Future
Land Conceptual Wargame cycle. Designed to identify capability
requirements beyond the funded programme, it will use outcomes
as evidence to drive future force design and inform the direction
of each individual programme. The process is ongoing with a great
deal of activity planned for the remainder of this year and into
2015.
In different circumstances it might have been possible
to convene a series of judgment panels across the lower echelons
of the Army which would have advised and influenced the Army 2020
design. A judgment was made to not do that, however, to avoid
playing out in public, debates affecting future cap badges. At
a time when the Army was committed on operations, this was considered
inappropriate. The Army is now operating the most sophisticated
lessons learned process that it has ever had, based on that used
by the United States Army. All of these features played into the
design of Army 2020, as did the Future Character of Conflict doctrinal
work which was based on defence level experimentation and judgement
panels.
The Army also used the experience of operations in
both Iraq and Afghanistan to advise the development of the Army
2020 design.
4. We note that the Secretary of State for Defence
accepts that Army 2020 was designed to fit a financial envelope.
We are concerned that this consideration took primacy over the
country's abilities to respond to the threats, risks and uncertainties
contained in the National Security Strategy. We were also concerned
to hear that it was the Ministry of Defence's Permanent Secretary
who told the Chief of the General Staff the future size of the
Army under the Army 2020 plan. We call on the MoD to explain the
apparent lack of consultation and involvement of the Chief of
the General Staff in the decision-making process that has affected
his Service so fundamentally. (Paragraph 32).
Various options to restructure the Army around a
smaller number of Regular soldiers had been explored both in work
leading up to the Strategic Defence and Security Review and in
subsequent work. In particular, the work carried out subsequent
to the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which was designed
to deliver value for money by ensuring that the Defence programme
(including the Army manpower element) was delivered within the
available budget, was overseen by a tri-Service Senior Judgement
Panel chaired by the then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, General
Houghton. The panel also included senior military staff from the
Department's Head Office. The Chief of the General Staff was represented
on this panel by the Assistant Chief of the General Staff. These
panels are a well established and rigorous method of making military
capability judgements, where risks and benefits are robustly challenged
and debated. They were used throughout the Strategic Defence and
Security Review to give advice to Ministers on alternative approaches
to the delivery of military capability and are a standard method
of taking judgements about how best to deliver the required military
capability within resource limits. This is precisely what the
Senior Judgement Panel did in examining eight options for delivering
an Army of the future—to the extent of determining that
all of the initial solutions identified carried too high a level
of risk. Consequently a hybrid option was designed and recommended
and it was this option which was selected by the Department, and
which the Army is now delivering. The Army, at the most senior
levels, was therefore represented throughout the development of
the plans, including by the CDS who, like the VCDS, was also an
Army officer. That it was the Department's Permanent Secretary
who informed the Chief of the General Staff of the decision is
a matter of record. The Permanent Secretary is the Government's
principal civilian advisor on Defence policy and the size of the
Army is a matter of Defence policy. In addition, as the Department's
Accounting Officer, charged with ensuring the affordability of
the Defence Programme, it is only proper that the plans should
involve a significant role for the Permanent Secretary.
5. In its response to this Report, we recommend
that the MoD provide us with an assessment of how the Army 2020
plans will affect the "Fighting Power" of the Army providing
comparable assessments of both current fighting power and projected
fighting power following the completion of the Army 2020 plans.
(Paragraph 34).
The Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 derived
Defence Planning Assumptions stipulated the Army's requirement
to maintain appropriate levels of 'Fighting Power' to meet agreed
operational commitments. Defence Planning Assumptions require
the Army to be capable of conducting an enduring (more than six
months) stabilisation operation at around brigade level, while,
at the same time, conducting two smaller scale non-enduring operations;
or of conducting three non-enduring operations; or, at best effort,
conducting a non-enduring operation of up to three brigades within
a divisional context. These commitment and concurrency levels
set in the Strategic Defence and Security Review remain unchanged.
The Army 2020 force structure is able to deliver these concurrency
levels.
Under Army 2020, Regular units will continue to provide
the majority of the units required for small scale deployments,
but some specialist elements, such as medics, could still be drawn
from the Army Reserve. Enduring brigade level commitments will
require an increased contribution from the Army Reserve. In a
five brigade roulement cycle, the Army's Reaction Brigades, who
would be expected to deploy on the first three roulements, would
require up to 14% their strength to be made up of Army Reserve
personnel. The Adaptable Force would be expected to complete roulements
four and five, and these Brigades would require up to 34% of their
force elements to be drawn from the Army Reserve.
6. We agree with the Chief of the General Staff's
assessment that the security threats that the UK will face in
future are uncertain. We remain to be convinced that the Army
2020 plan represents a fully thought-through and tested concept
which will allow the Army to counter emerging and uncertain threats
and develop a contingent capability to deal with unforeseen circumstances.
The MoD needs to justify how the conclusion was reached that the
Army 2020 plan of 82,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves represented
the best way of countering these threats. We ask the MoD to clarify
if the proposals were fully considered by the Defence Board before
the decision was made. (Paragraph 41).
The background to the decision that the Army would
comprise 82,000 Regular personnel and 30,000 Reserves has been
covered in the answer to Q3 above. The proposals were not considered
by the Defence Board as they flowed directly from National Security
Council guidance before being considered by the Senior Judgement
Panel (which was a consequence of the three month exercise) and
were therefore in line with the Strategic Defence and Security
Review
After the SJP process, the Chief of the General Staff
(CGS) was then given broad freedoms to structure the Army as he
saw fit within the hybrid structure. Upon completion of this analysis,
CGS discussed his revised Force Structure with the Defence Board
and, subject to a number of caveats such as the successful delivery
of the New Employment Model, confirmed that the outputs required
of the Army were achievable, albeit with some risk which was judged
acceptable and agreed by the Defence Board.
7. We repeat our previous recommendation that
the Government should further develop a concept of "critical
mass" for the Armed Forces. We note that this is a concept
not only used by the Army General Staff, but also one that the
new Chief of the Defence Staff used in a recent speech. The development
of a concept of "critical mass" for the Armed Forces,
coupled with an assessment of the Army 2020 plan against the MoD's
"Fighting Power" doctrine, would enable a much better
informed understanding of whether Army 2020 will enable the Army
to fulfil its obligations and how it will contribute to Future
Force 2020. (Paragraph 42).
The concept of "critical mass" can be misleading
if it is not linked to Departmental outputs. Major General David
Cullen, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff (ACGS), was clear
in his evidence (HCDC Future Army 2020 Ninth Report of Session
2013-14, Volume 1 Oral Evidence 10 July 2013, Q105) that what
he termed critical mass must be linked to outputs for the concept
to have meaning. The MoD has an evidence-based process, Strategic
Force Development, which tests whether the force structure (which
includes manpower) delivers the outputs that the Department's
policy, informed by the National Security Council, requires. The
Army has conducted Command Force Development which further tested
the Army 2020 design to ensure it remains a balanced force that
is fit for purpose. Army 2020 modelling and testing, and which
has been described earlier in this response, has generated a balanced,
adaptable and agile force. Measured against Defence Planning Assumptions,
Army 2020 will deliver the currently mandated operational effect.
8. We note the acknowledgement by senior Army
officers that the continuing operation in Afghanistan and the
current high level of change in the Army will compromise its ability
to respond to unexpected events to some degree. We also note that
one of the drivers for the Army 2020 plan was the recognition
that the Army could not match in resource-terms the five Multi-Role
Brigade enduring operation envisaged in the Defence Planning Assumptions.
In an ever changing world, with uncertain and ever changing threats,
and continuing uncertainty about the resources available, we are
concerned that the Defence Planning Assumptions are adequate to
ensure the UK's national security. In its response to our Report,
the MoD should explain what account was taken of the possibility
of changes to the Defence Planning Assumptions during the development
of Army 2020 and how it has ensured that there is sufficient flexibility
in the plan and resources available to meet any such changes.
The MoD must ensure that this is taken into account as part of
the work on the 2015 SDSR and that contingency plans are in place
to deal urgently with this eventuality. (Paragraph 48)
The Defence Planning Assumptions against which the
Department examined various Force Structure options were set out
in Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010. While Defence Planning
Assumptions may undergo minor adjustments between Strategic Defence
and Security Reviews, material changes outside of such reviews
are rare. It would have been unrealistic for the Army to deliver
a structure that was financially taut while also trying to anticipate
future changes to Defence Planning Assumptions. Nevertheless,
the innovative work conducted by the Army 2020 Study Team under
Lieutenant General Carter has provided a more adaptable force
structure and informed subsequent Defence Policy, in particular
thinking on Defence Engagement and upstream capacity building.
The Department is now preparing for Strategic Defence
and Security Review 2015 and will be appropriately placed to react
to any Defence Planning Assumption changes.
9. Despite the current lack of public appetite,
we consider it to be a question of when, not if, UK Armed Forces
will have to undertake an expeditionary operation in the future.
In this context, it is essential that the Army maintains its ability
to undertake such operations at short notice. Any loss of such
capability would have serious implications for the UK's national
security. Given that, on most occasions, these operations will
be carried out in cooperation with the UK's Allies, in its response
to this Report we call on the Government to set out the current
status of the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. We
also call on the MoD to provide us with an update on progress
on the development of the new UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF),
including how it will train and operate and the extent to which
appropriate multi-national partners have proved willing to participate
in JEF planning and activity. (Paragraph 52).
Development of a UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary
Force is progressing well. Both countries are focussing their
exercise programmes to achieve Initial Validation of Concept in
2015 and Full Validation of Concept in 2016. Detailed planning
for the two key exercises that will benchmark the interim and
full capabilities is under way. Beyond 2016 the UK and France
plan further investment in training and equipment to maintain
an ability to respond rapidly and flexibly together in a crisis.
This planning is, of course, subject to continued political commitment
from both Governments.
The Joint Expeditionary Force achieved initial operating
capability in April 2014. It will deliver a return to a contingent
stance more quickly than previously identified in Defence policy.
At its initial operating capability the Joint Expeditionary Force
was able to deliver a range of operations from humanitarian assistance
through to war-fighting interventions.
The Joint Expeditionary Force will train as it will
operate—under a Joint Task Force Headquarters—with
training carefully prioritised to ensure that specialist capabilities
now managed by the Joint Forces Command (for example our specialist
intelligence teams), are fully integrated with, and validated
alongside, the most appropriate elements of the Joint Expeditionary
Force.
The Joint Expeditionary Force will provide the UK
with an expeditionary capability that is able to operate without
a reliance on support from other nations' forces, but it will
also be configured to allow partner nations to plug easily into
the construct as providers of additional capability. Multi-national
partners attended a briefing day in February 2014. The UK is planning
further workshops to develop plans to be able to integrate partners
into the Joint Expeditionary Force. The next stage of Joint Expeditionary
Force development is expected to be the signature of letters of
intent by Allied Defence Ministers at the NATO summit in September.
10. The smaller Army envisaged under Army 2020
needs to be innovative in the ways it works with the other Services.
We call on the MoD to set out in its response to our Report how
Army 2020 will improve this joint working and how it has tested,
or intends to test, the proposals. We also note Lieutenant General
Bradshaw's evidence regarding the Army's greater integrated activity
with other Government Departments and call on the Government to
set out details of this in its response to our Report. (Paragraph
54)
Joint working has been at the heart of UK defence
since the creation of a single Ministry of Defence in 1964. Today
this philosophy remains at the heart of UK Defence. The Army has
historically worked closely with the other Services as demonstrated
by joint organisations, such as the Joint Helicopter Command and
joint exercises and activities. Support to the other services
and civilian agencies remains a core function of the Army, and
UK Engagement at home and abroad is a key tenet of the Army 2020
Plan.
The Future Force 2020 and specifically the creation
of Joint Forces Command, to which the Army contributes around
6,500 Regular and 600 Reserve troops, means that such 'jointery'
and integration will need to continue and expand if, collectively,
we are to provide the levels of support and service that are required.
Liaison Officers within Government Departments, and Regional Liaison
Officers supporting the Department of Communities and Local Government,
have increased the Department's ability to integrate with military
and civilian services where appropriate. For example, at a policy
level, Army representation on the cross-government Strategic Regional
Implementation Group for Defence Engagement has reinforced Defence's,
and the Army's profile. While on the practical level, the Armed
Forces' deployment to support the civilian emergency services
during recent flooding in southern England demonstrated the importance
and adaptability of the Services' role in Homeland Resilience.
To test such operational scenarios, the Armed Forces
routinely sponsor and participate in exercises with the key civilian
agencies for UK focused emergency response operations.
11. It is disappointing that there was a year's
gap between the announcements of the Army 2020 plan and the outcome
of the Reserves consultation and the Reserves basing plan. This
raised the potential for a lack of coordination and hampered communications
regarding the plans for the Regular and Reserve Forces. Even though
the generation of Reserve Forces is complex, the number of Reservists
required for Army 2020 and the challenge to recruit them was well
known. We consider that the intervening time between announcements
could have been utilised in making progress in recruiting the
required number of Reservists. (Paragraph 59)
The Army continued to recruit in the year between
the announcements, but we took the view that launching a major
recruitment campaign for the Army Reserve ahead of clarity on
the Reserve "offer", as contained in the July 2013 White
Paper—Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued—and
the structure and basing proposition would not provide the clarity
necessary to encourage the right number of applicants with the
rights skills and motivation to apply to join the Army Reserve.
While we acknowledge the recruiting challenges that we continue
to face, we are now recruiting members of the Army Reserve who
have a clearer picture of what their future role and location
will be as well as the terms under which they will serve. Restructuring
the Army is a process that will run between now and 2020; the
increase in the trained strength of the Reserves is planned to
be delivered progressively between now and April 2019.
12. We note, but remain to be convinced by, the
Secretary of State's explanation as to why the reduction in the
Regular Army should not be dependent on the recruitment of the
necessary number of Reservists. The financially driven reduction
in the number of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army
short of personnel in key supporting capabilities until sufficient
Reserves are recruited and trained. In its response to this Report,
we call on the MoD to set out in detail its planning assumptions
for the transition, over the next five years, to a new Army structure
including specific examples of the different types of capability
which will fall within the domain of the Reserves and Regulars
in future. This would assist with gaining support for the Army
2020 plan among the Regular Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament
and the public. The Government must also set out its contingency
plans for the rapid recruitment of Regular Army personnel should
there be a need for the rapid expansion of UK Armed Forces. (Paragraph
63)
The transition towards Army 2020 is already well
underway. Good progress is already being made in transiting to
new structures and all units have now been assigned to the new
Reaction Force or Adaptable Force. As at June 2014, over 170 implementation
orders have been issued for the structural changes under Army
2020; Regular and Reserve units have been paired, in line with
the move to a fully integrated Army; and future unit locations
have been confirmed, taking account of the return of units from
Germany to the UK.
In addition, Headquarters Force Troops Command has
formed in its new role and Headquarters 1(UK) Div and 3(UK) Div
will commence their new roles from this autumn. Units will enter
the new annual training cycle from 1 January 2015.
If not permanently committed to an enduring operation,
the Army can be re-structured to allow graduated readiness. Some
Regular forces will be required to undertake short-notice, high-readiness
intervention tasks. This allows the remainder of the Army to be
configured on an adaptable basis in a pool capable of undertaking
standing commitments (such as Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, Brunei
and Public Duties), as well as providing the ability to expand
or adapt capacity and capabilities necessary to undertake the
full range of other Strategic Defence and Security Review tasks.
This approach routinely allows Army Reserves to undertake lower
readiness roles in the force structure that would previously have
been a Regular function. These include the following categories:
a) specialist capabilities that it is neither
possible, necessary nor cost effective to employ full time (such
as medical and cyber);
b) capabilities not requiring significant or
complex collective training to maintain readiness (such as logistic
roles in fuel support and transportation, some equipment support
and the provision of medical services);
c) Longer-term institutional resilience, providing
an essential ability to regenerate a larger Army in time of need.
The Army has made significant use of specialist Reserve
capabilities (such as medical skills) on recent operations, but
will increasingly depend on logistic support capabilities for
enduring operations. The Combat Arms will provide Reserve units
to supplement Regular combat units when they deploy. Mobilisation
could be through the provision of individuals, platoons and companies.
Regular combat units will not be permanently manned or established
to their full operational strength. So, a Regular light infantry
battalion will not be manned in peacetime to the expected operating
model of around 750 personnel on deployment. Instead, and only
when required, it could generate its fully manned requirement
through a relationship with its paired Reserve light infantry
battalion. For less complex tasks, a Reserve battalion could form
the basis of the deployed unit, with its paired Regular unit providing
augmentation.
The balance of capabilities between the Regular and
Reserve components of the integrated Army has been based on a
mix of readiness, likelihood of use and ability to prepare and
generate those capabilities. While there is a gap between the
reduction in Regular personnel and the growth of the Reserve,
the requirements placed on the Army by the Defence Planning Assumptions
allow for this.
Adaptability will afford the capacity to regenerate
mass and scale if required in different strategic circumstances.
By maintaining more, smaller units in the Adaptable Force rather
than fewer, larger units, the Army has therefore provided the
framework for rapid expansion in response to a major emerging
threat to National Security.
The Army published a comprehensive update on the
progress of transforming the British Army in July 2013[1]
and will publish further such reports as it continues to develop
towards its Army 2020 size, scale and shape.
13. While a level of 30,000 trained Reservists
in the Army might not appear a large number based on historic
levels, the current recruitment drive takes place against a backdrop
of falling recruitment levels over several years. We note the
scepticism of some of our witnesses that it will be possible to
recruit the required number of Reservists in the timescale envisaged.
The urgent challenge for the MoD is to ensure that it now employs
effective measures and sufficient incentives to recruit and maintain
30,000 trained Reservists by 2018. Otherwise there is a danger
of a gap emerging in the Army's required capabilities and real
fighting power. In its response to this Report, we also call on
the MoD to outline the different approaches it envisages if the
data shows that the plan is not on course to be delivered. (Paragraph
69)
The Defence Secretary and the Chiefs are confident
that the plan will be delivered. A number of measures have already
been implemented in order to achieve the target of 30,000 trained
Army reservists by April 2019.
As the previous Defence Secretary said in his evidence
on 5 November 2013,
'we are confident that we will meet the reserve recruiting
targets, but if we found that we were not building the reserve
force at the rate that was required, the Army would clearly have
to review how it utilised the components of force that it had
available in a way that delivered the military effect we require'.
In working towards the 30,000 target the Army, with
its partner, Capita, has launched an attraction campaign including
regular marketing surges to make it clear that the Army is recruiting;
improved employer engagement; a simplified application process
and streamlined medical process; financial incentives and a significant
manpower surge to support recruiting at the local level. The Army
is also working with Capita to target specific segments of the
population such as students, women and Ethnic Minorities, all
of whom have much to offer to, and gain from, the Army Reserve.
We also recognise the importance of 'gatekeepers' in attracting
young people to the Army Reserve.
The Army has also improved the recruiting process
to smooth the pathway for recruits. These include streamlining
the medical check process and the interface with GPs, making the
application form smart phone and tablet-compatible and providing
additional resources in the National Recruiting Centre.
Further to this, there is more involvement for Reserve
units in the process—sponsoring and supporting recruits
through the application process. Recruits are provided with a
uniform, participate in low level physical training and reimbursed
for some expenses all of which engenders a feeling of 'belonging'
prior to successful enlistment.
The Army is looking to make the initial training
process for reserve recruits more coherent, acknowledging that
these recruits have other demands on their time such as their
permanent job and their families. We are applying as flexible
an approach as possible.
14. We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence's
commitment to publish, through the Defence Analytical Services
Agency, data on the trained strength and recruitment levels of
Reservists. We also welcome the recruitment targets that the Secretary
of State has published. We look forward to seeing the additional
data that the National Statistician has agreed to publish. This
information is vital to reassure all interested parties, the Army
itself, Parliament and the public, that the plan is on schedule.
We hope that each of these data sets will develop over time to
include performance against targets and such information as gender,
age and place of recruitment. We will continue to monitor this
data to assess whether it provides sufficient information. It
is important that Parliament is provided with regular updates
on progress towards recruitment targets. (Paragraph 72)
Further to the National Statistician's advice on
what the Department may wish to consider publishing, Defence Statistics
continue to progress with work in this area on behalf of the Ministry
of Defence, with the aim of publishing further information on
recruitment to both Reserve and Regular forces in 2014. Currently
we are assessing the quality and availability of the data and
once we are satisfied that this meets the requirements set out
in the Code of Practice for Official Statistics, the Department
will put forward proposals for the publication of recruitment
statistics.
15. Despite the assurances we received from the
Army commanders and Capita executives responsible for the Army
recruitment process, we remain concerned that the targets for
recruiting both Regular and Reserve soldiers may not be met. We
are not convinced that the MoD's contract with Capita was properly
and thoroughly considered before its implementation. For example,
we were given no evidence that any trialling of it had taken place.
There would appear to have been a serious breakdown in the supervision
of the contract process, for which no one has been held accountable.
(Paragraph 78)
The MoD does not accept that there was a breakdown
in the supervision of the contracting process. The contract with
Capita was let in accordance with Departmental and Cabinet Office
policy and was written using specialist external commercial and
legal advice. The contract was also subjected to due diligence
before it was signed. It is being managed through a robust governance
process which involves high level engagement with the Capita Chief
Operating Officer down to weekly meetings at the operational level.
Prior to contract signature the Capita recruiting
process, which is based upon commercial best practice, was thoroughly
evaluated by a joint team of Army and Capita recruiting staff
along with specialist external advisors. Any subsequent changes
to the recruiting process are tested prior to implementation.
In line with Departmental and Cabinet Office policy,
it was agreed that the IT platform would be provided by ATLAS
through the MoD's Defence Information Infrastructure.
By late 2012 it was apparent that the hosting solution
would not be delivered by ATLAS in time for the launch of the
Recruiting Partnering Project in April 2013. This meant that Capita
were unable to run the recruiting process as planned. As the Defence
Secretary said on 14 January 2014 this was not a case of Capita
failing to deliver—rather it was ATLAS that did not deliver
the IT platform that would have allowed Capita to succeed. The
IT delivery was closely monitored by the Army, which held weekly
meetings with ATLAS to manage progress and delivery.
In December 2013, to mitigate the risk of further
delay in the provision of the ICT hosting environment, the MoD
contracted with Capita to supply the hosting solution and accompanying
recruitment software. This is now expected to be launched in summer
2015.
The Army has been unable to reduce its payments to
Capita on the basis of poor recruiting performance, since the
requirement to supply the hosting environment was not part of
Capita's remit. Capita has, however, agreed to an interim performance
regime, which is now in place.
16. We are concerned at the IT problems encountered
at this early stage in the recruitment campaign. We call on the
MoD and Capita to take urgent steps to rectify these problems
and the MoD should give a detailed account of the measures taken,
including detailing the number of servicemen and women diverted
from their normal duties in order to sustain the recruiting effort,
in its response to our Report. (Paragraph 79).
As the Defence Secretary set out in the House on
14 January (Official Report Column 715), we are taking steps to
rectify the issues surrounding the IT problems of the Recruiting
Partnering Project and to mitigate the effects.
The mitigation measures include the deployment of
around 1,000 serving personnel under Op FORTIFY to support regional
recruiting since mid-September 2013. These personnel have continued
to undertake their normal duties for the majority of the time,
but have been called upon as required to support regional recruiting.
As such, they will not have been diverted from their normal duties
for any significant length of time.
Until the Recruiting Partnering Project reaches its
full operating capability, the National Recruiting Centre has
been reinforced by 119 additional civilian personnel and eight
military personnel. Additional costs for this are being paid by
the Department.
A number of other measures have been implemented
to improve recruiting, and these are included to the response
to Q13 above.
17. We note the difficulties encountered by the
Army in obtaining the medical data of potential Reservists due
to their failure to comply with data protection regulations. Although
this difficulty has at last been resolved, the Army and the MoD
should have foreseen this problem and must learn lessons for the
future. (Paragraph 80)
The difficulties encountered in this area have not
been due to data protection regulations; rather it has been due
to difficulties in the provision of medical records of prospective
recruits in good time, and in setting up a system to pay GPs promptly.
The Department has worked hard with the Department of Health and
the General Medical Council to address the problems, including
through the direct engagement of Min(DPWV) and the Surgeon General.
This has helped speed up the process but we recognise that more
needs to be done. We are looking at whether we can accept more
risk on initial training, while individuals are going through
the medical process. We are mindful of the need to ensure that
our recruits are medically fit to undertake the rigours of military
training and service, without wishing to make the system too cumbersome
for all concerned.
18. We commend the MoD for employing a range of
media to attract and recruit both Regulars and Reserves but it
is no help when the technology does not work or applications are
lost in the system. Lessons need to be learned from the initial
failure of the contract with Capita, and the respective accountabilities
and responsibilities of both the contractor and the Army clearly
established. (Paragraph 81)
As stated in our response to Q15, the shortcomings
experienced are due to the inability of ATLAS to deliver the necessary
IT platform to allow Capita to succeed.
Roles and responsibilities between the Army and its
partner are clear with some important changes having been made
in recent months to ensure clarity for all. These changes include:
a) Demonstration of the continued commitment
from Capita Board-level management;
b) The replacement of most of the Capita posts
within Recruiting Group's senior management team over the last
four months including the MD, Commercial Officer, Finance Officer,
Marketing Director and Operations Director. This has been conducted
in a staged manner to ensure continuity. This gives us an opportunity
to re-set the team for the interim operation and to incorporate
fresh ideas and perspective;
c) The appointment of a Capita Attraction Director
to improve coordination of national marketing with Regional operations;
d) Much clearer separation of roles between the
RPP Project Manager, who will manage the remainder of the programme
to Full Operational Capability, and the Partnering Support Team,
who will undertake contract management.
At the end of June we produced a National Marketing
Strategy. Following this, a new segmented media strategy, targeting
key audiences such as students, women and ethnic minorities was
developed and will be rolled-out over the coming months.
19. We welcome the measures in the Reserves White
Paper and the related clauses in the Defence Reform Bill. We particularly
welcome the Secretary of State for Defence's agreement during
the passage of the Bill to the principle of making it a statutory
requirement for the Reserve Forces and Cadet Association to report
annually on the state of the Reserves. We will continue to pay
close attention to progress on this and look forward to receiving
more details on how this will be implemented and what the report
will cover. (Paragraph 94).
The Defence Reform Bill received Royal Assent in
May 2014 and commencement is scheduled for 1 October 2014. The
annual report will set out the Reserve Forces and Cadet Association's
view on the capability of the Reserves, with particular emphasis
on fundamental issues such as recruitment, retention and the mental
welfare of Reservists. The first report was laid in the House
before recess and we thank the CRFCA for their work in producing
it.
20. We recognise the support many employers have
given to the Reserve Forces over many years. We commend the Government's
intention to give greater recognition, building on the current
SaBRE scheme and the new Corporate Covenant, to leading supportive
employers of Reservists and look forward to receiving more information
on this proposal. We recommend that as part of the recognition
scheme the Government should publish additional information about
supportive employers, building on the information already published
by SaBRE on its website, highlighting good practice, and providing
examples of the ways individual employers support Reservists.
(Paragraph 95)
The Department is always seeking to publically recognise
those supportive employers we work with every day. On 17 July
this year, the new Employers Recognition Scheme was launched and
a number of organisations were acknowledged for the outstanding
support they have provided across a range of Defence personnel
matters, particularly to Reservists. The Prime Minister recognised
ten organisations from the private and public sectors—including
two Small & Medium Size Enterprises—with Gold level
awards. All of these organisations employ Reservists, have made
specific pledges through the Corporate Covenant to support Defence
and were selected from nominations received. The launch of this
scheme meets a commitment made in the Reserves White Paper.
The Employer Recognition Scheme is accessible online
and, once it is fully operational, will use a tiered approach
for awards. At the Bronze level, employers are able to state their
intent to support Defence, the regional Silver level recognises
employers who actively demonstrate support and, at the highest
national level, the Gold awards recognise those who have become
advocates. A dedicated website (
www.gov.uk/mod/employer-recognition) supports the Employer
Recognition Scheme, allowing organisations to declare their support
at Bronze level and for nominations to be made for both Gold and
Silver awards.
A number of regional Silver award events will be
held in the autumn of 2014, to recognise nominated organisations
for the levels of support they are demonstrating towards Defence.
The ten employers recognised by the Department with
Gold level awards are listed on the website as the initial award
recipients. There is a wide range of support for the Armed Forces
across the full breadth of UK employers. Using the online nomination
facility these employers can be recognised in future years at
both the national and regional level through our annual Employer
Recognition Scheme events.
21. It is too early to say whether the measures
in the White Paper and the Defence Reform Bill will prove sufficient
and be effective in encouraging the recruitment of Reservists
and ensuring the support of businesses of all sizes to achieve
Army 2020. We welcome the Secretary of State for Defence's commitment
to review these measures if recruitment falls behind target. In
response to this Report, the MoD should set out how it will assess
the effectiveness of the measures and the timescale for making
a decision on whether further action and incentives are necessary.
(Paragraph 96)
The effectiveness of measures taken to drive recruitment
is reviewed on a constant basis. The Department examines data
from periodic polling of the public and the main target audience
to measure attitudinal trends. We also monitor the trained strength,
recruitment and retention figures. All of this information is
carefully reviewed to determine what, if any, further action is
required to maintain progress towards recruiting targets. In June
we published the results of the first Reserves continuous attitude
survey and this, with future surveys, will help us to monitor
the effect on retention of the measures we are taking.
As the Committee is aware, the Department has introduced
a numbers of measures aimed at attracting more people to join
the Reserve Forces. The MoD plans to evaluate the impact of specific
measures, including the new financial incentives that were introduced
in April, at six to twelve month points.
In addition to this monitoring programme, the Defence
Secretary chairs monthly meetings about the Reserves and the Permanent
Secretary and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff chair a monthly
Programme Board, which is driving the delivery of the Future Reserves
20 programme within Defence. The Secretary of State's meetings
and the Programme Board provide the opportunity to consider, evaluate
and, if necessary, direct further measures across the Services
to ensure Reserve recruitment targets are met.
22. We welcome the Government's intention that
in future Reservists, where appropriate, will be able to undertake
the same tasks as Regulars. However we note the concerns expressed
by some employers regarding the potential for negative effects
on their businesses arising from the increased use of Reservists.
The MoD should continue to engage with the business community
to address employers' concerns as failure to do so will impact
on the Army's ability to generate and sustain the necessary capabilities.
The MoD should include in its reports to Parliament on Reserves
recruitment details of how many are employed by SMEs (small and
medium enterprises employing fewer than 250 employees) and any
difficulties encountered in recruiting from this sector. (Paragraph
103)
We understand employers have unique needs and there
are real challenges in a tough economic climate, particularly
for Small and Medium Enterprises. We are working closely with
them to make things easier for them so they know who their Reservists
are and can plan ahead for training and mobilisations. Commanding
Officers will write to their employers each year, providing them
with information about training that will be taken in that year,
and giving 12 months' notice if their employee is moving to a
high readiness state. This will allow the employer plenty of time
to plan for their employees' Reservist commitment.
The Department wants to ensure employers of small
and medium sized organisations are supported when a reservist
is mobilised. A payment of up to £500 per month per reservist
for Small and Medium Enterprises has been introduced, and will
be paid on a pro-rata basis for days mobilised in the month. (This
is a measure in the Defence Reform Act 2014, which will commence
in October 2014). This is an incentive payment and will address
some of the issues that Small and Medium Enterprises face.
The Defence Relationship Management team was set
up in April 2014, meeting the promise made in the Reserves White
Paper to create a national relationship management organisation,
at the request of employers. When at full capacity, the organisation
will be a single point of access for up to 200 key national companies
on defence personnel issues, with its main priority being employer
support for Reserves. It will also deliver other Defence employer
initiatives, for example the ongoing SaBRE campaign which provides
information and support for Reservists and employers. We will
consider releasing further statistical information as part of
the work mentioned at Q14.
23. We note the Army's intention to deploy formed
units and sub-units of Reserves. We ask the MoD to provide greater
detail on how this will be implemented, particularly given the
differing timescales for the reduction in Regular strength and
the increase in the size of the Reserves, and how it will ensure
that these changes deliver the required level of capability. (Paragraph
108)
The deployment of formed elements from the Army Reserve
will depend on the size and duration of a particular operation.
Given the demanding readiness at which the Reaction Force will
be held, its Reserve contribution will be limited to individuals
and predominantly Combat Service Support force elements up to
sub-unit level.
The generally lower state of readiness at which the
Adaptable Force will be held allows the Army Reserve to provide
greater support to Regular Combat, Combat Support, Command Support
and Combat Service Support units when they deploy, through the
provision of individuals and sub-units to their paired Regular
units. The nature of a particular task will drive the actual force
elements chosen and so, for less complex tasks, a Reserve unit
could form the basis of the deployed unit, with its paired Regular
unit providing augmentation.
Throughout the transition to Army 2020 structures,
the Army will continue to deliver its standing commitments such
as Cyprus and the Falkland Islands and will continue to be able
to generate forces for other tasks as required. There will inevitably
be a difference between the way in which capability is delivered
during this transition period and how it will be delivered following
the full implementation of the new structures by 2018. Reserve
units have been provided with the equipment which they need to
bring them to the required level of capability as soon as possible.
24. We welcome the increase in the number of training
days for Reservists as this is vital to their greater integration
with Regulars. In its response to this Report, we call on the
MoD to set out what further practical measures will be implemented
to enable Regulars and Reservists to train together. We are concerned
that this should not involve closing well-recruited units, or
those with a large number of potential new recruits to the Reserves,
to match Regular basing and welcome the Secretary of State's commitment
in the House of Commons on 14 January 2014 to be flexible on the
closure of such units. (Paragraph 109)
Within Army 2020, integration is the activity that
will foster shared values, common goals, trust and interdependency
between Regulars and Reserves at all levels. It is based on the
principle of harmonising policies and regulations to create a
single culture. This will be implemented over time.
The Army 2020 Formation Operational Readiness Mechanism
will be implemented in January 2015 and will formally integrate
Regular and Reserve units for the full range of activities through
the pairing mechanism. Pairing is the formal partnership, spanning
the conceptual, moral and physical components, between specified
Regular and Reserve units. Examples where this has already begun
include: coherent paired units' activity programmes, including
overseas exercises, adventurous training and in-barracks conceptual
training and development; administrative efficiencies; sharing
best practice and resources; effective links to local communities;
exchanges; combined social events; and sport.
The Army Reserve future laydown was based on a number
of criteria, which included the ability to recruit and train.
Manpower is only one aspect of capability, which also requires
Reserve forces to train with the Regular units with which they
will deploy. Access to the right equipment at the right time is
also a vital aspect, as is a sustainable estate footprint. The
reduction in Reserve liability from around 36,500 to around 30,000
necessitated a structural review, which had at least as much of
an impact on the laydown of the Reserve as pairing and training.
Following the Secretary of State's commitment in
the House of Commons on 14 January 2014 to be flexible on Reserve
basing, Commander Land Forces asked all Reserve Commanding Officers
to seek ways to unlock local potential, including retaining sub-units
and detachments for longer than anticipated under the announced
plan and to develop more local pairing arrangements where required.
Commander Land Forces has subsequently approved a number of minor
changes to the reserve structure announced in July 2013. Further
changes are being scoped, in consultation with the Chain of Command,
and if agreed, will be announced in due course.
25. The role of specialist Reserves is invaluable
to the Army and the UK's Armed Forces as a whole: we welcome the
commitment to them in the Reserves White Paper. We welcome the
establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserve which is of particular
interest to us given our previous inquiry work on Defence and
cyber-security. The potential recruits, with the required skills,
may not be those who would usually consider a career in the Armed
Forces. This represents both a challenge and an opportunity for
the MoD which will require a flexible approach if they are to
be integrated effectively. We ask the MoD to report to the Committee
in six months on progress on the establishment and the recruitment
of the Joint Cyber Reserve. (Paragraph 112)
The Government welcomes the Committee's support for
the Defence effort to engage additional experts in order to defend
against the growth in the cyber threat. The Joint Forces Cyber
Group was formed in May 2013 to deliver Defence's cyber capability
and will include the Joint Cyber Unit (Reserve) as its Reserve
component. The Unit provides support to the Joint Cyber Unit (Corsham),
Joint Cyber Unit (Cheltenham), and other tri-service Information
Assurance units. Its creation allows Defence to draw on individuals'
talent, skills and expertise gained from their civilian experience
to meet cyber threats. Building upon the significant interest
already generated in both the private sector and those leaving
the Services, the next two years will see the Cyber Reserve fully
operational, with personnel recruited, trained, and operating
alongside their Regular and civilian colleagues in the Joint Cyber
Units. The Unit represents a significant uplift in the number
of Reservists employed in cyber and Information Assurance; however,
detailed information on the numbers involved is not provided in
the interests of security.
As well as attracting those who work in cyber-related
companies, the Cyber Reserves have attracted a wide-spectrum of
society including Service Leavers, Government Departments, Academia,
private sector and individuals with backgrounds not normally associated
with the Armed Forces. The Cyber Reserve continues to attract
interest and applications from all areas and we are continuing
to successfully recruit. To date, MoD has attracted high-calibre
applicants: individuals who have the ability and desire to play
a key and unique role in promoting the UK's cyber security while
having the opportunity to be part of a proud history and ethos
of either the Royal Navy Reserve, Army Reserve, or RAuxAF. Being
more flexible with eligibility criteria has attracted those who
could not have been considered previously, or may not have volunteered
in the past. We have been able to accept individuals based on
their talent, skills and expertise to meet cyber threats. All
applicants to the Cyber Reserves are selected on merit and Cyber
Reserves remain subject to the same vetting process as other members
of the Ministry of Defence.
The Ministry of Defence will provide an update to
the Committee in six months on progress in this area.
26. We support the Government's intention to recruit
more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve as part of the
recruitment of 30,000 trained Reservists under the Army 2020 plan.
We note the £5,000 commitment bonus, payable over four years,
offered by the Army to Service leavers and ex-Regulars to incentivise
their transfer to the volunteer Army Reserve. We call on the Government
to review effectiveness of its efforts and the measures introduced
to attract more ex-Regulars into the volunteer Army Reserve in
six months and to share its findings with us. We also note the
Army's work on the Regular Reserve and call for an update on this
work in the Government's response to our Report. (Paragraph 116)
The Department is pleased that the range of initiatives
which have been implemented to encourage ex-Regular inflow (and
subsequent retention) are having a positive impact on Reserve
recruiting. The Army intends to examine the initial impact of
the financial incentive measures in September 2014 (following
the production and analysis of the Quarter 1 manning data) with
more detailed work being done following the Quarter 2 data release
in November.
a) In FY 13/14 1050 ex-Regulars joined the trained
strength of the Army Reserve; this exceeds the set target (757)
and is above the FY12/13 figure (615);
b) The TA Commitment Bonus Early Years scheme,
available from April 13 for ex-Regular soldiers and junior officers
to encourage inflow, has had (as at 14 March 2014) a total of
608 personnel accepted onto the scheme against the originally
funded target of 631. The enhanced scheme (which was announced
in April 2014, but backdated to January 2014) has seen further
applications;
c) The increased value of the (newly-named) Reserve
Commitment Bonus to £10,000 for ex-Regular Junior Officers
(Capts and below) and Other Ranks is intended to incentivise the
recruitment or direct transfer of the increased numbers required
for FY 14/15 (1,300);
d) The parallel scheme of Reduced Commitment
for ex-Regulars may also be having an effect but it is not feasible
to gather data on the numbers who have taken up this scheme as
it is a local arrangement at unit level;
e) Through pairing, support to the recruiting
effort and mobilisation of Reserves for operations, Regular soldiers
have greater awareness of service with the Reserve;
f) Support Command and Garrisons have included
briefings and displays in transition fairs delivered for soldiers
entering the last two years of service;
g) Reserves information has been made available
during Career Transition Partnership 'virtual' employment fairs.
These fairs regularly include a display and representation on
Reserve skills and units available in the area;
h) Career Transition Workshops now contain a
specific brief about the benefits available through Reserve service;
i) Regular Unit Regimental Career Management
Officers brief all Service Leavers and Commanding Officers include
the 'offer' in their final interview/letter as soldiers depart;
j) Redundancy notices contain information on
the benefits of Reserve service;
k) The Service Personnel and Veterans' Agency
includes the Reserves offer in the paperwork delivered to all
service leavers;
l) Recruiting Group advertises in civilian magazines
targeting resettlement training and opportunities for Service
Leavers;
m) Military in-house publications contain advertisements
for the Reserves. Regimental magazines are encouraged to support
the recruiting effort for their Regimental Reserve.
27. We support the Army 2020 plan for an enhanced
role for the Army in civil engagement. Although there is great
admiration and respect for UK Armed Forces, we recognise that
there is currently a disconnect between the Armed Forces and public
understanding of the operations they have been asked to undertake.
This must be addressed. We call on the Government to take steps
to ensure that the Armed Forces, particularly Reservists, play
a more active role in public engagement. In response to our Report,
we recommend that the Government outline the communication strategy
and practical steps it will implement to take forward its plans
for public engagement. (Paragraph 119)
The Department has taken many practical steps to
ensure the continued presence of its personnel in public engagement.
This type of activity has been undertaken for many years. Civil
Engagement is the responsibility of all Armed Forces personnel
and every time a soldier or officer appears in public in uniform,
they are conducting a form of civil engagement. However, the Department
recognises the disconnect between public perception and reality
with regard to operations and more widely.
Engagement across the country is typified by broad
representation such as homecoming parades, Armed Forces Day, regional
military shows and post operational presentations. Focused regional
engagement by Regulars and Reserves with local employers, health
providers, local enterprise partnerships and local authorities
continue to keep the Army and the Armed Forces in the public conscience.
For the Army, civil engagement has become more co-ordinated and
focused since the formation of Support Command in 2011.
The advent of Army 2020 and in particular the creation
of the Adaptable Force presents many public engagement opportunities
and will unify the command of the Reserves and Regular Army in
a manner that is absent presently. The Army is in the process
of reviewing its civil engagement strategy and priorities accordingly,
with the aim of closing the gap between public perception and
reality.
It is particularly important that the Services ensure
that reflections on the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan
do not underplay the achievement in that theatre of operations.
The Army is very focused on this. The upcoming commemorations
of the First World War will provide an important opportunity for
Defence. The Army has enacted a specific operation to ensure appropriate
commemoration and also engagement with the nation, notably engagement
with youth, those not in education, employment or training and
of course the Cadet movement.
28. We welcome the £1.8bn additional investment
in the Reserves, but call upon the Government to provide us with
a breakdown of how it plans to spend this money. We note the concerns
expressed as to whether this funding will be sufficient to achieve
the desired outcomes for the Reserves Forces. We note that Reservists
are cheaper to employ so long as they are not called up. This
will only prove to be a cost saving so long as future governments
are not required to undertake operations. This will need to be
closely monitored. It would be unacceptable if the UK decided
not to take part in any action because of the cost of deploying
Reservists. We recommend that the Government set out in detail
how it will assess and report on the cost effectiveness of, and
the value for money achieved by, its plans and how these outcomes
will be independently examined and verified. We would welcome
the involvement of the National Audit Office in this evaluation.
(Paragraph 125)
The Department developed its cost estimates on the
basis of peacetime costs, on the assumption that the Treasury
would fund the use of Reserves on operations in line with existing
Government policy. This is because the Department is funded to
generate Armed Forces ready for operations, and the extra costs
of any military operations are currently met from a range of cross-Whitehall
funding sources, including the Conflict Pool and HM Treasury Special
Reserve. Relying more on Reserves will help the Department to
make substantial savings on its staffing budget, but if Reserves
are used on operations there might be some increase in costs for
the Treasury for the duration of those operations.
Under the future Army Reserves structure, Reserve
Units will move round a training and readiness cycle. The structure
is designed to sustain a worst-case cycle of up to one six month
deployment in any five year period. The figure used for the purposes
of the Impact Assessment was the deployment of 3,000 Reserves
per annum, a figure 20% (500 deployments per year) above the status
quo. This was deemed to be the "high probability" figure;
all other options (the status quo, and 1,000 and 2,500 extra deployments)
were all classified as "low" or "very low"
probability. It is, of course, difficult to make assumptions about
specific future conflicts, but the proposed size and shape of
the future Armed Forces is based on the assumptions underlying
the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
The additional £1.8 Billion has been allocated
to the three Services, Joint Forces Command and the MoD Centre,
across a 10-year period. It is being used to increase and develop
the trained strength of the Reserves and to enhance their capability,
including increased spending on: recruitment, retention, enhanced
training at all levels, improved infrastructure and additional
and better equipment. Of this funding, around £550M is allocated
to cover the planned increase in Reserves manpower, £240M
is earmarked for investment in training for all three Services,
£207M is planned to be spent on equipment, nearly £50M
is aimed at managing and improving the relationship with the employers
of reservists. The bulk of the remaining funding, some £600M,
has been used to restore previously planned reductions in investment
in the Reserves, which predated the report of the Independent
Commission.
29. We note the evidence we have received on the
recruitment age for the Armed Forces. We commented on this in
our Report on the education of Armed Forces personnel and in response
the Government agreed that the Armed Forces would undertake a
cost benefit analysis of the recruitment of under-18s. We note
that the Army is undertaking this analysis on a tri-service basis
and that the work is continuing. However, we are disappointed
by the lack of clarity regarding the study's terms of reference
and the slow progress with the study. We call on the Government
to provide us with the terms of reference for the study and an
estimation of when it will be completed. We expect the Army and
MoD's cost benefit analysis to be thorough and robust and call
on the Government to set out how it might be independently scrutinised
and verified. This would ensure confidence in the outcomes of
the analysis. We also call on the Government to respond in detail
to the argument that the Army could phase out the recruitment
of minors without detriment to the Army 2020 plans. (Paragraph
130)
The Defence Secretary has recently written to the
committee on this issue (see Appendix B). His letter outlined
the findings of the study, including that these entrants currently
provide 15% of the Army's inflow requirement. Clearly, any potential
loss of this manning pool would have a considerable effect on
the Army's ability to provide the manpower envisaged in Army 2020.
It is also worth considering the value of Junior Entrant training
to the individual and society. As the Committee is aware, many
Junior Entrant recruits join with minimal educational qualifications,
at GCSE level or otherwise; the educational focus offered by Army
training allows some 85% to leave initial training with Level
2 qualifications in literacy and numeracy. In addition, from day
one every single recruit will begin an infantry apprenticeship,
later graduating towards specific trade apprenticeships. It remains
Government policy that no under-18 will be deployed in to a hostile
environment.
30. The plans resulting from the basing review
and the return from Germany are intricate and interdependent and
affect all three Services. The MoD must ensure this process is
managed appropriately so that it does not unravel. We call on
the MoD to keep us informed on its negotiations regarding training
opportunities in Germany, Canada and Kenya, and how the historically
close working relations with the German authorities are going
to be maintained during the drawdown period. (Paragraph 137)
The Army has a dedicated team, headed by a Senior
Civil Servant and reporting to a newly created 2* General appointment
responsible for ensuring that the Army's element of the wider
Defence basing plan is delivered. The team is actively managing
the dependencies and milestone deliveries of related programmes
such as Army 2020 and Future Reserves 20. The Army Basing Programme
is subject to validation and assurance reviews from both within
MoD and externally by the Major Projects Authority.
The UK and Germany have a close, pragmatic and long
standing Defence relationship; Germany is a long-standing friend
of the UK and Ministers are looking for ways in which to deepen
the relationship across Government. The MoD is committed to withdrawing
British Forces in an orderly and timely manner, and sustaining
our historically close working relationship with German authorities
both during the drawdown period and beyond. The MoD manages that
relationship at a number of levels, through: ministers and officials
in the UK; the Defence Attaché in the British Embassy in
Berlin; and the General Officer Commanding British Forces Germany,
other regional British Commanders and a network of in-country
specialist liaison officers. Collectively, they keep German authorities
informed on the MoD's activity in Germany, including drawdown
plans. The Defence Infrastructure Organisation and our in-country
legal team liaise with their German counterparts to support them
to find alternative uses for the facilities that will be vacated
by the British Forces.
While it is true that the German authorities will
be sorry to see the British Forces leave, they understand our
reasons for doing so and are working closely with us to ensure
the transition is as smooth as possible. The Government is grateful
for that support.
No decision has yet been taken on the future use
of training facilities in Germany, but the Army continues to train
in Canada, Kenya and elsewhere and maintains close relationships
with those countries and their Armed Forces. The ongoing use of
Kenya for training depends on continued stability within the country
and the successful conclusion of a new Memorandum of Understanding,
to replace the existing one which expires in April 2015.
31. We are concerned that the Army 2020 plan would
unravel in the face of any further MoD budget reductions or further
reductions in Army personnel. It is essential that the MoD's budget
settlement allows for the delivery of Army 2020. If this is not
the case, it must be accepted that the Army will be capable of
doing less than envisaged under Army 2020 and the UK's vision
of its place in the world and the Defence Planning Assumptions
will have to be revised accordingly. We are also concerned about
the Army's capability to expand its numbers rapidly, both Regulars
and Reserves, should a national emergency require it to do so.
Any plans for the structure of the Armed Forces must be flexible
enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. For the reasons
already set out in this Report we have little confidence in the
Government's capacity to rapidly expand Army numbers should the
need arise. The Government must set out its contingency plan for
doing so. (Paragraph 142)
The Government remains committed to an Equipment
Plan growing at 1% a year in real terms after the next Spending
Review.
Defence cannot operate outside the context of the
economic health of this country, and a Strategic Defence and Security
Review must balance strategic and fiscal perspectives to find
a sustainable solution for Defence. The budget for Defence will
be decided under the next Spending Review, in consultation between
departments.
A key tenet of our Defence posture is to be flexible
and adaptable to meet the UK's strategic objectives. This includes
financial flexibility, and we have shown how resilient we are
when the financial means available to Defence change unexpectedly.
But our ability to meet our strategic ambition is not solely related
to our financial resources. Though we plan to spend £160
billion over the next ten years on state-of-the-art equipment,
and to regenerate the Armed Forces for the requirements of the
post-Afghanistan defence and security environment, in the last
Strategic Defence and Security Review we also said that closer
co-operation with allies and partners would be increasingly important
to our security and prosperity. We are increasing the depth and
breadth of our co-operation with our key allies to improve our
policy and strategy alignment, and interoperability to ensure
we can work increasingly effectively together and deliver greater
effect from our respective defence budgets. We continue to develop
our relationships with new international partners to enhance our
global influence.
Any significant future budget reductions, which cannot
be absorbed by non-front line savings alone, do, however, run
the risk of impacting our strategic ambitions.
We note the Committee's concern about the Army's
ability to expand its numbers rapidly. In the event that there
is an urgent requirement for extra manpower, the Army could draw
upon the Regular Reserve, which is a pool of around 30,000 qualified
and experienced individuals who have relatively recently left
regular service.
32. Army 2020 represents a radical vision for
the future role and structure of the British Army. It departs
significantly from the announcements made in SDSR 2010 and we
have considerable doubts about how the plan was developed and
tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the UK's national
security. The evidence presented to date has been far from convincing.
Our principal concerns are twofold:
· First,
the MoD has failed to communicate the rationale and strategy behind
the plan to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament or the
public.
· Second,
we remain concerned that the financially driven reduction in the
numbers of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short
of personnel particularly in key supporting capabilities until
sufficient additional Reserves are recruited and trained. (Paragraph
143)
The Department does not accept the Committee's points.
The last National Security Strategy and Strategic
Defence and Security Review confronted the issues facing Defence
and National Security in 2010. It articulated a clear over-arching
vision to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence
in the world and strengthen our security in the face of the changing
strategic environment and risks to our security. Recognising our
national security depends on our economic strength, and vice versa,
it set out strategic objectives of ensuring domestic security
and resilience, and shaping a stable world.
The rationale and strategy behind Army 2020 has been
communicated clearly to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament
and the public through announcements in Parliament, media engagement
and internal briefings. While we accept that there is always more
that can be done to communicate our strategies and plans, we believe
that a considerable amount has already been done, particularly
in terms of communicating with our own people.
The Department accepts that there are some risks
involved in manning and recruiting. We are content that the building
blocks are now in place to produce the required results. This
is a plan for 2020. We have never expected the required numbers
to be reached immediately and it is inevitable that there will
be a transitional period, particularly as it was important to
proceed quickly with the redundancy programme both to remove uncertainty
for individuals and to enable progress to be made as quickly as
possible with the structural changes required.
As far as the case for greater use of the Reserves
is concerned, we believe that Members of Parliament, and Parliament
as a whole, also have an important role to play in shaping public
perceptions around the case for Reserve service.
The public shows great interest in understanding
the role of the Armed Forces in the contemporary strategic environment.
Armed Forces Day attracts wide support nationally and TV programmes
in recent years, like 'Our War', the documentary about operations
in Afghanistan shown on BBC 3 in 2011, have attracted record audiences
and reviews across a broad section of British society, particularly
amongst younger audiences.
With the focus on operations in Afghanistan, we have
put great effort in recent years into communicating the broader
role of the Armed Forces and Defence. The 2010 Strategic Defence
and Security Review connects the plan to develop Future Force
2020—the requirement for an adaptable, sustainable future
posture able to project power, build stability through upstream
engagement, and work with allies—to the broad range of tasks
required to mitigate the strategic risks the UK faces, as set
out in the National Security Strategy.
Much of the wider work Defence does—contributing
to UK national interests and prosperity, and building stability—is
well reported. Our support to humanitarian efforts in the Philippines
after Typhoon Haiyan was widely reported and the visits of HMS
Daring to South East and East Asia, supported the building of
Defence links and UK prosperity with powers in the region. More
recently, the military contribution to flood relief in the UK
has received wide and positive coverage, raising our public profile
in a UK contingencies role.
In addition we report to Parliament, and publicise
in the media, a broad range of routine activity—supporting
the French with airlifts into the Central African Republic, evacuation
of UK nationals from South Sudan, routine deployments to assure
the security of overseas territories, counter narcotics patrols
in the Caribbean, our contribution to multinational counter-piracy
operations off the Horn of Africa, and most recently our efforts
to support the search for the missing Malaysian airliner. This
is about preventing terrorism, building stability, and supporting
UK prosperity and interests.
33. The Government has said Army 2020 has to work
and that there is no Plan B. The Government owe it to the Army
to ensure it does work, but, crucially, if the situation changes,
then the Government must be prepared to respond decisively by
providing additional resources in order to guarantee the nation's
security. Although we have concerns about the Army 2020 plan,
we recognise that it also provides opportunities, for example
in addressing the role of Reservists and developing the public
defence engagement role of UK Armed Forces which will help to
resolve the current disconnect between the Armed Forces and the
public. (Paragraph 144)
We welcome the Committee's support for our plans
to enhance the role of Reservists and to develop greater levels
of engagement between the Army and the general public. The Government
is putting significant effort and resource into ensuring the successful
implementation of Army 2020. Significant progress has already
been made in putting the new structures in place; the re-basing
programme is under way; and, as explained elsewhere in this response,
there is significant focus on achieving our targets on Reserve
recruitment.
34. While we welcome the Government's commitment
to publish more data on the Reserves and to put into statute a
requirement on the Reserves Forces and Cadets Association to produce
an annual report on the state of the Reserve Forces, we believe
the Government should go further and give a commitment to provide
regular updates to Parliament on progress on all aspects of the
Army 2020 plan. Oral and written statements while helpful are
not sufficient; a detailed annual report on the Army's Fighting
Power should be laid before Parliament setting out progress and
setbacks in implementing the Army 2020 plan. The first of these
reports should be laid before Parliament in January 2015 to allow
consideration and debate before the 2015 General Election and
to inform the 2015 SDSR. (Paragraph 145)
As stated in the Department's response to the HCDC
Report Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part One
Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session
2013-14 (HC 197), we will explore the method behind an assessment
of 'Fighting Power' and if a measure is both feasible and useful,
although there are no current plans to publish any such analysis.
1 http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_Report.pdf Back
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