House of Commons - Re-thinking defence to meet new threats

Re-thinking defence to meet new threats - Defence Contents

1 The Existing Assumptions and Force Structure

Introduction

Underlying Assumptions of UK Defence policy 1998-2014

1. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review was the first full defence review undertaken by the UK Government since 1998. But the fundamental assumption remained unaltered between the two reviews. This was that—with the end of the "Cold War"—there was unlikely to be state-on-state conflict again and that "Cold War" capacities, relevant for fighting an advanced military state, were no longer a high priority.

2. The second set of assumptions was that the greatest risk in the early 21st century was expected to come from crises in 'fragile states', that the adversaries would be lightly-armed insurgents or terrorists, and that these should be addressed through intensive, long-term stabilisation operations. The overall troop numbers required for stabilisation operations was considerable. But the UK contribution to such missions was expected to be relatively modest (less than 10% of the total troop numbers in interventions such as Iraq or Afghanistan). The unstated assumption was that such humanitarian or security crises would happen sufficiently infrequently for the UK and its allies to be able to tackle them in turn.

CONTEXT

3. The 2010 SDSR also emerged in the specific context of a financial crisis and significant cuts in public spending. Inherited defence spending plans were then considered "unaffordable" both for reducing the public sector deficit, and in terms of a large unfunded liability in the equipment programme, claimed to be in the 10s of billions of pounds,[1] although the Committee has been unable to substantiate a precise figure.[2] The SDSR also identified a "legacy of overstretch", arguing that between 2006 and 2009, the UK had been deployed in both Afghanistan and Iraq at medium scale, in excess of the existing planning assumptions. The SDSR therefore said it would make:

4. The SDSR re-emphasised working in coalition with other countries (implicitly mainly the US). But it continued to assume that the UK's most useful contribution to operations in coalition or partnership would still be to "broadly" retain a full spectrum of capabilities. In other words, despite the spending reduction, the UK would not choose to develop niche skills, or specialise in particular capabilities, while leaving other tasks to allies. Instead, it would continue to try to maintain every capability of an advanced military power-with three full Services, employing everything from tanks, and the latest fighter jets, to submarines, nuclear weapons, and air-craft carriers. It also assumed that, rather than focusing on a particular region (Europe and the Middle East for example), the UK would continue to engage globally from the Pacific to sub-Saharan Africa. In recognition of resource constraints, however, the SDSR emphasised that there would be a greater focus on "tackling risks before they escalate, and on exerting UK influence, as part of a better coordinated overall national security response".[4]

5. On the basis of such arguments, the 2010 SDSR set out new Defence Planning Assumptions, envisaging that the UK Armed Forces should be structured to be able to conduct:

a) An enduring stabilisation operation at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime and air support as required, while also conducting:

· One non-enduring complex intervention (up to 2,000 personnel), and

· One non-enduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel);

b) Or alternatively:

· Three non-enduring operations if we were not already engaged in an enduring operation;

c) Or:

· For a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all [UK] effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000 personnel, two thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003).[5]
Figure 1: Future Force 2020 structure

Source: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, page 20

6. The Army component of the Future Force 2020 structure outlined in the 2010 SDSR was to comprise 16 Air Assault Brigade plus five Multi-role Brigades. The notion of the Enduring Stabilisation Operation was central to the design of the Force Structure. It provided for pre-deployment training, deployment, post-deployment, and recovery cycles to sustain a single Brigade of 6,600 for a period of many years in a theatre, akin to Afghanistan.

7. Two new aircraft carriers were procured to support 'intervention operations'-providing a 'sovereign' platform far from the UK.[6] Meanwhile the Royal Navy now operates with a surface fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers. The number of these vessels was, it seems, kept relatively low, again because it was assumed that, since the enemy was likely to be lightly armed insurgents, there was no need to calculate for attrition or loss of these vessels. The Royal Navy also retained some of its traditional assets, including the Trident force, the seven Astute-class nuclear submarines, a maritime helicopter force, resupply and refuelling vessels, mine counter-measure vessels, maritime ISTAR capabilities, an oceanographic survey capability, an ice patrol ship, and maritime strategic transport. Curiously, however, despite the new emphasis on 'small wars' against lightly armed insurgents, the UK decided not to invest in smaller 'corvette-type' vessels for lighter coastal operations, or to maximise helicopter landing-strips in its new frigate design.

8. Since 2010, six Type 45 destroyers have been introduced into service, with HMS Daring being the first. There are now thirteen Type 23 frigates, the first of which was commissioned in 1991. The Type 23s are due to be replaced by the Type 26 Global Combat Ship in two variants, anti-submarine warfare and general purpose vessels. The procurement of the Type 26 moved from the assessment to the demonstration phase on 1 April 2015.

9. The Maritime Patrol Aircraft programme, Nimrod, was cancelled, and a successor was not procured between 2010 and 2015, presumably again, because the types of operations envisaged in the 2010 SDSR put less emphasis on maritime surveillance. Air capabilities were to include the fast jet fleet (of Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter), strategic and tactical airlift (C-17, A400M, Airbus A330 and tanker aircraft), Chinook helicopters and strategic surveillance and intelligence platforms. The increasing focus on the counter-insurgency (COIN) environment had given an increasing prominence to Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) in Afghanistan. But the COIN environment did not lead the Royal Air Force, to adopt slower, (and cheaper) air-platforms, such as the US Marine propeller planes, for supporting troops in a counter-insurgency context.

10. The RAF currently has seven combat squadrons-four Typhoon squadrons and three Tornado squadrons. The RAF has a total of 125 Typhoons and 102 Tornadoes. However, these numbers do not indicate numbers of aircraft that are currently deployable. The Typhoons are in the process of being converted to a multi-role aircraft from the current air to air capability. As a result, for air to ground combat, such as current operations in Iraq, the RAF is reliant on the Tornado squadrons. By 2020, the RAF will have six Typhoon squadrons and one F-35 squadron with the Tornado fleet no longer in service.

11. The 2010 SDSR was required to implement an 8% cut in the defence budget; it has been estimated that this reduced the conventional capabilities of all three UK services by 20-30%.[7]

Developments since the 2010 SDSR in Future Force 2020

12. The 2010 SDSR foresaw an army of 94,000, a reduction of 7,000 in Regular Army personnel. However, the SDSR was then followed by two studies: a three-month exercise to close the remaining post-SDSR gap in the Department's funding; and a study into the future role and structure of the UK Reserve Forces. The three-month exercise resulted in the trained strength of the Regular Army being reduced by a further 12,000 to 82,000. The Reserves review, which was not linked to the three-month exercise, announced that the Reserves would be 30,000 with a training margin of 8,000[8] Reserves.[9]

13. The components of the Army 2020 structure outlined in 2012 were to be:

A Reaction Force (RF): a higher readiness force of three armoured infantry brigades undertaking short notice contingency tasks and providing the Army's conventional deterrence.[10] It would be trained and equipped to undertake the full spectrum of intervention tasks and would provide the initial basis for any future enduring operation.

An Adaptable Force (AF) comprising a pool of Regular and Reserve forces that would consist of seven infantry brigades and a logistics brigade. This would be used for a wide range of tasks, including providing headquarters and units for enduring operations, acting as the primary source of capability for Defence Engagement at home and overseas,[11] as well as meeting standing tasks in the UK and abroad (e.g. Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Brunei and Public Duties).

Force Troops[12] would brigade Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Command Support in 'functional' formations, under a 2* HQ, to maximise efficiency and sustainability.[13]

The Army 2020 structure is illustrated below:[14]Figure 2: The Army 2020 Structure

Source: British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012, p4

14. In June 2011, a review chaired by Lord Levene of Portsoken recommended[15] the establishment of Joint Forces Command (JFC), see Box below:Table 1: Levene Report recommendation on the creation of Joint Forces Command

Key recommendation 7
Some military capabilities have to be integrated on a 'joint' basis to effectively enable operations. Such enabling capabilities need more effective proponency within Defence. To that end, a Joint Forces Command should be created to manage and deliver specific capabilities and to take the lead on joint warfare development, drawing on lessons and experimentation to advise on how the Armed Forces should conduct joint operations in the future. Certain joint and Defence capabilities should continue to be delivered on a 'lead Service' basis.
(a)  The Joint Forces Command should be led by a military 4 star, and should have responsibility for commanding and generating the joint capabilities allocated to it and setting the framework for joint enablers that sit in the single Services.
(b)  As a result, a number of military organisations currently managed by the Central TLB should pass to the Joint Forces Command.
(c)  The Permanent Joint Headquarters should sit within the Joint Forces Command, but report for operational purposes direct to the CDS.
(d)  In implementing the Joint Forces Command, the Department should systematically review joint or potentially joint capabilities and functions across the Services against the criteria set out below to determine which might be rationalised, the merit of further joint organisations, which should transfer to the Joint Forces Command and which should transfer to a lead Service.

Source: Levene Report June 2011[16]

15. The JFC was established in April 2012. The MoD told us that the establishment of the JFC had brought greater coherence to the delivery of joint enablers such as C4ISR, cyber and medical capabilities.[17] The aim of JFC is described by the MoD as:

16. Our inquiry into Future Force 2020 builds on our earlier inquiry into Future Army 2020.[19] We took oral evidence from: Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb; Mark Urban, BBC correspondent and military historian; Professor Paul Cornish, Exeter University; Peter Roberts, senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute; Professor Philip Sabin, King's College, London; Admiral Sir George Zambellas, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff; Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford, Chief of the Air Staff; General Sir Richard Barrons, Joint Forces Commander; Peter Watkins, Director General Security Policy, Ministry of Defence; Air Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Military Capability ; and Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence. We would like to thank all these witnesses who gave oral evidence to us. We would also like to thank all those who provided written evidence to our inquiry.

1 The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7984, October 2010, page 15, para 2.4; Back

2 The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, Sixth Report, Session 2010-12, HC 761 paragraph 204; and Ninth Special Report, Session 2010-12, HC 1639, paragraph 44. Back

3 The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7984, October 2010, page 16, para 2.8 Back

4 The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7984, October 2010, page 17, para 2.10 Back

5 Ibid page 19, para 2.15 Back

6 The SDSR 2010 said that this would be based around a single new operational carrier with the second planned to be kept at extended readiness. Back

7 Brigadier (Retired) Ben Barry OBE, Senior Fellow Land Warfare, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Future Army 2020, Ninth Report of Session 2013-14, Ev 36 Back

8 The 8,000 would be additional personnel in training to sustain the overall number of 30,000 trained Reservists. Back

9 HC Deb, 19 January 2012, col 939W Back

10 The Reaction Force will be designed to deploy rapidly to respond to events anywhere in the world and is designed to deter adversaries from acting against UK interests. Back

11 Overseas defence engagement is the use of defence assets and activities short of combat operations building to achieve influence. In the UK it is the Armed Forces' contribution to homeland resilience, for example supporting civilian emergency organisations in times of crisis. Back

12 Force Troop Brigades would provide a broad range of Regular and Reserve capabilities. These would include engineer, artillery and medical support from a centralised pool as well as a coordination and control function for key tasks such as overseas capacity building. Back