House of Commons - Re-thinking defence to meet new threats

Re-thinking defence to meet new threats - Defence Contents

3 Response to Russia-First Steps

32. As we argued in our report on Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part Two—NATO this new threat required immediate reassurance measures, to reassure NATO allies, and reinforce our commitment to Article 5 protection of NATO allies. These included:

· Dramatic improvements to the existing NATO rapid reaction force;

· The pre-positioning of equipment in the Baltic States;

· A continuous presence of NATO troops on training and exercise in the Baltic;

· The re-establishment of large-scale military exercises;

· The establishment of headquarters structures at divisional and corps level focussing on Eastern Europe and the Baltics; and

· The re-establishment of a NATO standing reserve force along the lines of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force—Land, involving all Member States.

33. The subsequent NATO summit in Wales accepted many of these proposals. We welcome in particular the commitments made at the NATO Summit for the UK to provide a battle group and brigade headquarters to the new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); to facilitate a NATO presence in the Baltic States; and to increase levels of exercising at scale and, in particular, the US and UK leadership in securing a NATO commitment to spend 2% of GDP on Defence—a key mark of seriousness in the face of Russian expansion.

34. But fully supporting, and enhancing such reassurance measures, requires more work. Russia, for example, can deploy 150,000 troops at 72 hours' notice. NATO on current planning would take 6 months. Creating the VJTF—able to deploy 5,500 troops at 48 hours' notice—will take until 2016.[31] And even this will stretch the capacity of the framework nations. The UK would have to provide at any one time three battle-groups on varying stand-by times (to cover training and recovery), and restrict whether these battle-groups could be assigned to other operations. France has already indicated that it reserves the right to deploy the troops it has committed to the VJTF to other theatres should the need arise.

35. Although there is an aspiration to extend the scope of NATO exercises, they will still fall far short of the scale of the recent Russian exercises, deploying not 70,000 troops as Russia did in Zapad 2013,[32] but a fraction of that number. Early indications suggest that the UK would contribute 1,000 troops to the next exercise.[33] By comparison in 1984, the UK deployed 57,700 Service personnel to a single NATO exercise, Exercise Lionheart. Rebuilding the skills to conduct all-arms divisional, let alone corps-level exercises within NATO, after a 25 year gap, will require very substantial investment. Most serving NATO officers and soldiers have never participated in such an exercise.

Response to Russia—strengthening the alliance—and 2% of GDP

36. Responding to a Russian threat is, of course, a joint NATO-obligation, and not the sole responsibility of the UK. The UK has a GDP larger than Russia's but it is not necessary for the UK to attempt to match single-handedly all Russian capacity (despite its smaller economy, the Russian military currently has over a million people under arms, and a Defence Budget twice that of the United Kingdom).

37. It is realistic to expect the US to play a significant role (70% of total NATO defence expenditure is currently accounted for by the US). And it is generally assumed in attrition calculations that another nation—almost certainly the United States—would be able to compensate with its own forces for any losses to UK ships or planes.

38. But the US is increasingly asserting its responsibilities in Asia, and looking to European powers to lead on the Defence of Europe. Fragmentation, rivalries, lack of focus, and decades of underinvestment have left parts of NATO—although impressive on paper—much less than the sum of its parts.

39. One of the central tasks, therefore for the UK in responding to Russia-or indeed other threats—must be to ensure that it is able to sustain a close and constructive working relationship with coalition partners. And it must use this influence to ensure that NATO has the full spectrum of conventional forces, trained, exercised, and psychologically prepared to defend the European order against a threat such as that posed by Putin's Russia.

40. Future Force 2020 takes the existence of a robust alliance for granted, arguing that the UK would:

41. Within Europe, the strongest potential partner for the UK remains France. The French operation in Mali appears to have been an impressive example of combining long-term country-knowledge and defence engagement with the rapid deployment of combat troops to defeat state collapse, and a terrorist-affiliate take-over. The UK should study this example closely, and see if there are lessons which could be applied for other zones of instability—for example in Northern Nigeria.

42. UK-French co-operation has been emphasised since the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010. There have been some set-backs, (the hope that French jets would be able to fly from British aircraft carriers has been blocked by the decision not to install catapults on the carriers, and France continues to request more generous UK support for operations in the Central Africa Republic, for example) but the CJEF concept has potential. As the MOD asserted:

43. The MoD noted that 2015 would see the start of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) GRIFFIN series of exercises, building on the single Service exercises run with the French military in recent years.[36] These include a military strategic table top exercise; an operational planning exercise; and an operational and tactical level live exercise scheduled for April. This final exercise was expected "to provide full verification of concept by demonstrating the ability to plan, command and conduct a CJEF operation".

44. Meanwhile, the strongest example of joint UK-French operations was the intervention in Libya in 2011. The experience suggests that the coordination and cooperation on the initial air campaign was impressive, and ultimately successful. But the interpretation of the UN resolution has strained relationships with China and Russia, and the joint effort did not seem able, or perhaps willing, to really invest in understanding, or stabilising Libya after the initial intervention stage. Libya—currently fragmented between two warring governments and dominated by militia groups—is a powerful symbol of the continuing challenges to intervention and coalition operations.

45. The most powerful ally of the United Kingdom, however, remains the United States and again, much Defence Planning is based on the assumption that the UK would generally operate in coalition with the US, and that the US valued and admired the British contribution to operations, and would compensate for UK capability gaps, or for any attrition of UK assets. Despite, the tensions between the US and UK in operations from Suez, through Vietnam to the Falklands War, the default assumption continues to be that the UK could rely on the US in any major operations.

46. General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff told us:

47. Admiral Sir George Zambellas, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, argued that, given the difference in size between the US and UK military, the strength of the relationship was founded on the quality and credibility of UK forces:

48. Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford, Chief of the Air Staff, told us that:

49. But recent comments by the United States suggest that there are in fact growing tensions within the alliance. The US has become increasingly concerned by a situation in which it now contributes 70% of NATO spending—creating a 'moral hazard' of other countries no longer investing because they rely on US support.

50. General Raymond Odierno, US Army Chief of Staff used a statement in March 2015 to try to encourage NATO allies to increase their commitment:

51. He went on to express his concerns about the impact of UK defence cuts on the levels of UK-US military cooperation.[41] Robert Gates, former US Defence Secretary also warned that cuts in the UK Armed Forces were beginning to limit the country's ability to be a major player on the world stage. He singled out the cuts to the Royal Navy as particularly damaging and told the BBC:

52. It has also been reported in the press that President Obama has privately called on the Prime Minister to reaffirm his commitment to the 2% target.[43]

53. The US has made it clear that a central plank of the NATO alliance, and its respect for the role of the UK in the alliance is in its commitment to 2% of GDP. Following the NATO Summit in Wales, the Prime Minister announced the UK's commitment to spending 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence, with a fifth of the defence budget being spent on major new equipment.

54. UK defence spending, including that on operations, has been above the target 2% of GDP for many years.[45] However, Mark Urban told us that to meet the 2% target over the next ten years would require a substantial increase in defence spending.[46] Professor Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI, has also concluded that, on current spending plans and growth projections, UK defence spending will fall below 2% of GDP in 2015-16:

[…] UK defence spending is set to fall below the NATO 2% target for the first time next financial year, to an estimated 1.88% of GDP in 2015-16. Existing Ministry of Defence (MoD) planning assumptions (for modest real-terms growth in its budget after 2015-16) would, in the context of projected GDP growth, see spending falling to around 1.7% of GDP by 2020-21. Figure 3: UK Defence spending as percentage of GDP, 1990-2014

Source: HM Treasury, PESA 2014, Table 4.2

55. Professor Chalmers speculated that, in the context of wider plans for further cuts in expenditure after 2015-16, even this could prove "over-optimistic", suggesting that cuts of between 4-10% in real terms over five years could push defence spending down to between 1.5% and 1.6% of GDP in 2020-21.[47]

56. Given the Prime Minister's stated commitment to all NATO members meeting the defence spending target of 2% of GDP, we asked the Secretary of State whether the UK Government was going to continue to meet the target. He was equivocal in his answer telling us:

57. Admiral Sir Anthony Dymock, former senior military attaché to the USA and UK Military Representative to NATO, has said that the UK's relationship with the USA will be damaged if the UK fails to keep defence spending above 2% of GDP.[49] Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Ambassador to the United States up to January 2012, echoed this concern and called for the next Government to recommit to the 2% promise after the election.[50]

58. The US has made it clear that it perceives the UK's commitment as the lynchpin of the broader NATO commitment to increase Defence Spending. And, therefore, if the UK were to reduce expenditure, it would undermine the alliance as a whole.

59. We are concerned that, should defence spending in the UK fall below the NATO target of 2% of GDP in 2016-17, the impact on the UK's credibility as a military ally would be extremely damaging, particularly in the eyes of the US and our European partners. It would damage UK leadership in NATO and Putin's Russia will be looking very carefully for signs of weakness in NATO.

60. The committee congratulates the government on having led the commitment at the Wales Summit to pushing NATO expenditure above 2% of GDP. But as one of the major military powers in the alliance, it is also incumbent on the UK both for its own sake, and in order to encourage others, to invest in rebuilding its conventional military capacity.

Niche Capabilities

61. Reduced resources, and the existence of apparently reliable coalition partners, of course, raises the option of the UK choosing to specialise in a particular 'niche' set of capabilities, leaving other capabilities to other partners. Some of our witnesses implicitly conceded that the US relationship with the UK was no longer primarily based on a 'full-spectrum capability' and that instead, from the point of view of the Special Relationship, Defence Investment could be targeted on a narrower set of skills, less dependent, for example, on ships or planes.

62. General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb quoted President Obama as saying that the special relationship with the Americans rests with the "at-sea deterrent, special forces and the relationship with GCHQ".[51] Max Hastings has quoted Sir Michael Howard as emphasising the need for "spooks, geeks and thugs", suggesting an investment in intelligence services, cyber experts and special forces, in combating modern security threats.[52]

63. Such views, however, directly challenge Future Force 2020, which is based on the assumption that the UK's most useful contribution to operations in coalition or partnership is to provide a full spectrum capability. The government's decision to retain an independent Navy, Air Force, and Army, the Trident nuclear missile system, to procure two aircraft carriers, and seven nuclear submarines, are all indications that a strategic decision has been made not to specialise in a niche capability. Instead, the UK's global posture, its relationship with the US and NATO, continues to be predicated on the assumption that the Government still wants a 'full-spectrum capability.' This report, therefore, works on the assumption that this remains the strategic goal of the government, and proposes the UK acquires the necessary capabilities to perform across all capabilities, rather than assuming that an ally such as the United States will 'fill the gap.'

31 Article: NATO International, NATO Foreign Ministers announce interim Spearhead Force, 2 December 2014 Back

32 Stephen Blank, The Jamestown Foundation, What do the Zapad 2013 exercises reveal? Back

33 HC Deb, 2 March 2015, col 781 Back

34 The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7984, October 2010 Back

35 MoD supplementary memorandum, Q 13 (further questions which Committee did not have time to ask) Back

36 MoD supplementary memorandum, Q 261 (additional evidence) Back

37 Q 196 Back

38 Q 198 Back

39 Q 197 Back

40 Article: The Telegraph, US fears that Britain's defence cuts will diminish Army on world stage, 1 March 2015 Back

41 Ibid Back

42 BBC interview, 16 January 2014 Back