5 Next Generation Warfare
99. As we argued in our report on Towards the
next Defence and Security Review: Part Two—NATO,
however, the most likely threats to NATO member states would not
be of a Soviet armoured invasion, but would instead come from
ambiguous or asymmetric warfare—cyber-war, propaganda, subversion,
and deniable special forces.[81]
Again, such a threat—supported by the full weight of the
Russian state, including the deployment of the most up-to-date
military hardware, such as T-90 tanks—was not envisaged
in the SDSR. And it requires the development of very particular
skills in addition to conventional capabilities.
Strategic Understanding
100. The development and maintenance of capabilities
for strategic understanding must be a priority in combating next
generation warfare. This requires the investment in both historical
analysis and contemporary conflict research; such a capability
would consider political statements, military doctrine and concepts
as well as organisational and technical issues. The demise of
the ARAG (which subsumed the Conflict Studies Research Centre),
for example, reduced the MoD's ability to understand Russian military
doctrine and development, not least in the realm of ambiguous
warfare. Such a capability needs to be rebuilt.
101. We urge
the MoD to re-establish a Defence Historical Analysis and Conflict
Research Centre in order to address the lessons of recent conflicts
and to investigate current trends in warfare.
Strategic Communications
102. The first area in which Russian actions in Ukraine
and even the Baltic States have proved strongest is in strategic
communications—and in particular the use of Russian language
television, to stir up support for 'separatism', blacken the reputation
of the central government, confuse the narrative, and attack critics
or their actions at home and abroad. The recent activities of
DAESH in Syria and Iraq, however, show that such a threat does
not only come from Russia. Instead, the recruitment of almost
20,000 foreign fighters has been driven by a very sophisticated,
and omnipresent campaign on social media. Such threats were still
in their infancy at the time of SDSR 2010.
103. During our inquiry into Deterrence in the
twenty-first century, we were told by Paul Bell of Albany
Associates, a specialist in the use of communications to counter
terrorism and extremism, that
As asymmetric warfare becomes the global mode
of violent engagement, increasingly the psychological and sociological
domain is becoming the real "battle space". These conflicts
are promoted, amplified, judged and, as a result, effectively
fought through the media.[82]
104. General Barrons conceded that this was an area
in which the UK military needed further development:
In the whole arena of information, we should
acknowledge that we are broadly on the approach march into the
information age. The debate that is coming in intelligence, command
and control, and operations is how those advances, which will
be led by the commercial sector, are adopted in the military space.
How do we adopt big data and the internet of things? How do we
do big data analysis at the heart of how we plan operations or
conduct intelligence? All those things will produce wholly different
ways of doing business.[83]
105. The Independent reported on 31 January plans
to develop a capability in strategic communications within the
proposed new 77 Brigade:
They will specialise in "non-lethal"
forms of psychological warfare, using social media including Facebook
and Twitter to "fight in the information age". The Chief
of the Army, General Sir Nick Carter, believes that the radical
new plan is essential to face the "asymmetric" battlefields
of the 21st century.[84]
Cyber
106. The second new threat—raised in part by
Russia's apparent involvement in the 2007 cyber attack on Estonia,
a NATO member state—is in cyber. In our report on Defence
and cyber security, we concluded that
The cyber threat is […] one which has the
capacity to evolve with almost unimaginable speed and with serious
consequences for the nation's security. The Government needs to
put in place—as it has not yet done—mechanisms, people,
education, skills, thinking and policies which take into account
both the opportunities and the vulnerabilities which cyber presents.
It is time the Government approached this subject with vigour.[85]
107. The UK has declared that it has a cyber capability
within the Armed Forces and that it has an offensive capability
led by the RAF with reservists forming a major element. However,
General Lamb noted that there was, as yet, no doctrine on the
use of a cyber capability. Our report on Deterrence in the
twenty-first century noted questions around the proportionality
and legality of responding to a cyber attack on the UK.[86]
In our report on UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework
for Future Operations we also called on the Government to
inform us of its work in
Determining the legal framework of possible cyber
operations and its plans to incorporate such work into training
of personnel and the preparation of appropriate manuals.[87]
108. We asked General Lamb how he saw cyber being
merged into the Future Force 2020 structure. He described it as
a "complicated space", admitting that "we have
left it unattended, probably since we first saw it emerging".[88]
Peter Roberts was concerned that the cyber capability was not
being delivered in an integrated way.[89]
109. General Lamb stressed that the nature and broad
extent of the cyber security threat had to be recognised:
Do not underestimate the nature of the people
on the other side. We always put them into the radicals or into
the Russian or Chinese camp, but beware the criminal camp, because
they can afford people who would leave you cold.[90]
110. We are unclear as to how work
on cyber warfare has developed in the Armed Forces. The Government
should tell us when it will finalise its doctrine and guidance
on the use of cyber defence and warfare.
Intelligence
111. In any battlefield, intelligence is essential.
But the nature of Russian asymmetric subversion and warfare—relying
on Russian intelligence agencies—makes intelligence particularly
central to a NATO response. The same is true for a DAESH threat
which is now spreading from Libya to the edge of Pakistan.
112. General Lamb told us that the crucial aspect
about intelligence was the quality rather than the quantity of
information and the depth of understanding. He told us that the
problem would not be solved by throwing money and personnel at
it but needed more imaginative solutions, in particular, the use
of external experts including those working in the commercial
sector.[91] He also emphasised
the need "to understand the unreasonable men":
Most people in government are decent fellows
and women. Actually, you need to find the unreasonable people
who can sit there with a warlord, a drug baron or some other scallywag
and recognise him or her exactly for what they are and what they
will be prepared to do, because they do not fit into the norms
of life.[92]
113. Mark Urban made a number of suggestions about
how to obtain the right focus for intelligence collection:
Could there be a case for extending the type
of partnerships that GCHQ has on crypto and cyber with certain
universities, in terms of language and regional skills with academia?
Is that an approach for DIS, SIS or central intelligence machinery?[93]
114. We welcome the Armed Forces'
focus on keeping pace with the developments of the "information
age" in gathering intelligence. The fast pace of change requires
the Armed Forces to exploit all areas of expertise and we call
on the MoD to examine opportunities for work in partnership with
academics and the private sector. However, the gathering of intelligence
represents only part of the picture. Combating asymmetric subversion
and understanding ambiguous Russian tactics also requires a deep
understanding of the country itself. Re-developing and maintaining
the capacity for proper analysis and assessment of events in Russia
and other areas where the UK Armed Forces may be engaged is as
important as the gathering of intelligence itself.
81 Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part Two-NATO,
Third Report of Session 2014-15, HC 358. Back
82
Ev w43 Back
83
Q 189 Back
84
The Independent, New British Army unit 'Brigade 77' to use Facebook and Twitter in psychological warfare,
31 January 2015 Back
85
Defence and Cyber-Security Sixth report of Session 2012-13, HC
106 Back
86
Deterrence in the twenty-first century Eleventh Report of Session
2013-14, HC 1066, para 26 Back
87
UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future Operations
Twelfth Report of Session 2013-14, para 101. Back
88
Q 26 Back
89
Q 76 Back
90
Q 28 Back
91
Q 23 Back
92
Q 24 Back
93
Q 24 Back
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