6 Terrorism and failing states
115. Perhaps, however, an even more fundamental challenge
than a resurgent Russia, is the emergence of concurrent threats
from failing states, increasingly dominated by radical jihadist
groups. The SDSR concept acknowledged the threat posed by such
situations—quintessentially in Afghanistan—but it
presumed that they were sufficiently infrequent to be dealt with,
one at a time, and with the investment of massive resources, over
a prolonged period. The Iraq and Afghan campaigns cost the US
and its allies over a trillion US dollars, and involved the deployment
of over a million individual soldiers in a twelve year period.
116. Now, 'Afghan-style" threats—of failing
states, or "ungoverned space", providing safe-haven
to terrorists, or even governed by terrorist groups—have
emerged in half a dozen countries simultaneously. Afghanistan
is still unstable, terrorist groups continue to thrive in Pakistan
and in Somalia. But the problem has metastasised. There are now
terrorist groups controlling large swathes of Northern Nigeria,
of Libya, of Yemen, of Syria and Western Iraq. And the number
is likely to grow—spreading from Nigeria towards Chad or
Niger, from Libya into Mali, and from Syria potentially to Lebanon
or Jordan. All this coexists with severe humanitarian crisis and
conflict in Darfur, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.
117. The Future Force 2020 Structure—based
on the assumption of deploying 6,600 soldiers into a single country
for a decade, in order to conduct counter-insurgency operations,
as part of a hundred thousand strong coalition—is manifestly
the wrong structure for this new environment.
118. One option—potentially tempting to planners
would be simply to refuse to design a structure suitable for tackling
this volume of threats. They could argue either that failed states,
dominated by terrorists were not an existential threat to the
UK (this would involve rethinking the fundamental rationale for
operations in Afghanistan); or that the UK no longer wanted to
be a global power, and would leave tackling such threats to the
US and others; or potentially that no-one had the capacity to
deal with such threats regardless of whether they were a threat,
or whether the UK wanted to deal with them.
119. Assuming, however, that the UK still believes
such states to pose a substantial threat to the global order and
to the United Kingdom itself; that the UK still sees itself as
a global power; and that the UK believes it is possible to improve
the situation in these countries, a radically new doctrine, approach
and force structure would be required.
120. The nature of this structure, would require
very profound thought in the next SDSR, and is beyond the scope
of this committee. But it would seem worth considering in this
context, re-examining the successes of Sierra Leone and Bosnia,
and asking what capabilities might be required to improve the
chance of success in current crisis zones such as Libya, Yemen,
Ukraine or Iraq. A model should reflect the fact that resources
are unlikely to allow British troops to control large sections
of territory, or attempt to hold population areas in the future;
and that operations are increasingly likely to be in support of
a host government. Even training missions are unlikely to be able
to be conducted on the scale of training in Afghanistan (where
training the Afghan police and army involved 12 billion dollars
of expenditure in the single year 2008).
121. All this calls into question whether the brigade
is likely to remain the central unit of operations. Force structure
is an immensely complex issue, deeply related to complicated questions
of resources, basing, enablers, command and control, and even
career structure. We would not, therefore, presume to try to micromanage
the details of force structure. But it is worth at least pointing
out that, if the threats and operations change, the force structures
may have to change accordingly. We have already made the point
that the current focus on brigades may have to be replaced by
increasing capability at a larger divisional level to counter
an advanced military threat in Europe. But the need to deal with
concurrent terrorist-linked failed states also implies a need
to develop increasing capability for independent operations at
a smaller battle-group and even company level.
122. Two examples may illustrate this potential requirement.
First, recent French operations in Mali suggest not only how a
reinforced battle-group (of 1,000 as opposed to 6,600 men) can
be a very suitable format in a world of multiple concurrent threats,
but also how it requires a very particular support mechanism in
country. Second, pre-posting troops in military assistance or
training missions to places such as Northern Nigeria (for operations
against Boko Haram) could possibly require even smaller deployments.
So too, if the military wished to commit to developing and sustaining
deep defence relationships and country knowledge through basing
units (perhaps even with ISTAR and RPAS enablers) in countries
such as Jordan or Tunisia. Again these are simply indicative examples,
but they suggest very substantial thought needs to go into ensuring
that the new force structure is highly flexible in sustaining
units of very different sizes in very different theatres.
123. All this puts an increasing focus on deep-country
knowledge and expertise, and strong defence relationships. Both
of these seem to have been a critical component in the French
operations in Mali, where a thousand troops were able to build
on a pre-existing Embassy and Defence footprint to achieve a remarkable
and rapid impact.
Defence Engagement
124. We, therefore, strongly welcome the fact that
in July 2013, the Army announced that the adaptable force brigades,
and some Force Troops Command brigades would have assigned responsibilities
for particular regions of the world, enabling brigade units "to
develop understanding of the geography, culture and languages
of their specified region".[94]
It was added that "Adaptable Force brigades [would be] the
default choice to conduct overseas exercises; provide short term
training teams in their allocated region; and coordinate the participation
of troops from other parts of the Army".
125. Air Chief Marshal Pulford said that the RAF
was fully participating in defence engagement.[95]
General Carter and General Barrons emphasised the need for a whole
Government approach to defence engagement including the Foreign
Office, Department for International Development and the military,
coming together under the National Security Council.[96]
126. The development of deep relationships over a
substantial period with key decision-makers, and future decision-makers,
in a given country is central to this process. One important challenge
will, therefore, be to identify how limited numbers of personnel
can be best deployed to develop these deep relationships when
it may not be possible to predict where the future security priorities
for the UK will be. 2014 highlighted threats emerging in Eastern
Europe and the Middle East and North Africa, but new threats may
emerge in 2015 and beyond. Mark Urban said:
We know that language skills and analytical skills
take years to grow, and if you are suddenly yawing around saying,
"Actually, this week's priority is west Africa", the
number of people who can speak the right dialects for northern
Nigeria would clearly be tiny when you have spent the past five
or 10 years investing in Arabic, Urdu or Pashto and the previous
40 years in Russian and other east European languages.[97]
127. General Barrons recognised the importance of
language training and acknowledged its previous neglect in the
Armed Forces:
[…]it is absolutely recognised that an important
future role for defence is how we are able to interact in UN and
other operations where language is a core skill. We may have been
guilty in the past of just speaking English slowly and loudly
and hoping that that would work, but that is clearly not going
to cut it in future, so the way we train people through staff
college, where language is now an option, and the way we select
people with an eye to producing a career stream focused on defence
engagement, will all help. […]I see that as part of the professional
armed forces in the future.[98]
128. We were impressed on our visits to Iraq and
Jordan by the determination of British Military officers who were
clearly committed to learning Arabic and working very closely
alongside local forces.
129. But an admirable concept, appears to still be
some way from being fully realised in practice. There were at
the time of our Baghdad visit, only 3 British officers in Iraq
outside Kurdistan. The following table outlines the numbers trained
by the Defence Academy in the principal languages since 2011-12.[99]
This table illustrates a substantial decline in recent years in
those studying Russian and Arabic, two languages which should
be a priority in the context of the changing threats that we have
discussed.
| Number of people being trained (per academic year)
|
| Training Year
| 2011-12
| 2012-13
| 2013-14
| 2014-15
|
Level | Lower
(SLP 1-2)
| Upper
(SLP 3-4)
| Lower
(SLP 1-2)
| Upper
(SLP 3-4)
| Lower
(SLP 1-2)
| Upper
(SLP 3-4)
| Lower
(SLP 1-2)
| Upper
(SLP 3-4)
|
| French | 17
| 17 | 1
| 29 | 0
| 24 | 3
| 25 |
| Russian | 3
| 9 | 2
| 11 | 0
| 3 | 0
| 2 |
| Arabic | 32
| 18 | 36
| 12 | 25
| 1 | 23
| 20 |
| Spanish | 4
| 9 | 1
| 16 | 0
| 16 | 0
| 7 |
| German | 2
| 0 | 1
| 4 | 0
| 4 | 0
| 3 |
130. The UK needs to plan to play a role again in
intervention—even if it involves following the French model
and choosing to take responsibility for a particular place, rather
than working as a small part of a smaller coalition (the UK could,
for example, take the lead role in Northern Nigeria). Defence
Engagement and all the associated training in language and culture
would be vital to any success in the future. Any solution also
needs to address the fundamental gap—identified by this
committee in its reports on Afghanistan-between the military and
other government agencies. This was the heart of the 'comprehensive
approach' designed to combine the FCO, DfID, and the military.
131. But a related gap also exists in the information
and intelligence sphere. The Foreign Office has increasingly turned
away from area expertise, and deep political reporting. The era
of 'Oriental secretaries' and the IRD in the Foreign Office is
long-past. SIS continues to be required to focus on single-source,
strategic reporting, in response to Joint Intelligence Committee
requirements, and has neither the mandate, nor the resources,
to collect either overt or tactical information. UK Special Forces
and the Intelligence Corps continues to focus on the most tactical
level. This leaves a significant gap, as was found in Helmand,
for example, in mapping tribal, criminal and patronage networks,
connecting the politics in the capital to instability on the ground,
or developing a workable strategy of stabilisation. This too is
an area where the NSS, and the SDSR should focus, and where the
MoD—along with others—should play a role.
132. Other options, which would need to be explored
in a new force structure might range from an increasing focus
on Military Assistance Teams, to a much more developed and extensive
Defence Intelligence Service and Defence Attaché capacity,
and potentially the development of second-tier Special Forces
(on the US Green beret model). And again, consideration needs
to be given to the potential role of reserves, military contractors,
and even civilians in this new approach.
133. Related to these issues, are those more broadly
of 'soft power'. The National Security Strategy 2010 stressed
the importance of soft power stating that the UK needed to draw
together, and use, all the instruments of national power. Admiral
Zambellas emphasised the value of the deployment of soft power
in support of broader objectives.
[…]we are invited to understand that the
way out of recession is a trade-led performance of the UK. That
means a global footprint, and that means using military soft effects,
as they are called, in support of strategic objectives. I can
only speak for my own service, but we would look to co-ordinate
across defence for a combined defence engagement strategy that
maximised the total value across defence of Navy, Army and Air
Force.[100]
134. Professor Cornish warned, however, that soft
power relied on the ability to exercise hard power and could not
be a substitute for hard power. Other countries would only look
to build links with the UK Armed Forces if the UK retained the
ability to deploy and project substantial "hard power"
forces:
[…] we talk a lot about defence engagement
and the value of foreign militaries training with us, or in our
academies, staff colleges and all that sort of thing. That is
a very important part of soft defence power, but my point is that
soft defence power is a proxy for hard defence power, not a substitute
for it, and that you will not have that soft defence power, which
I guess is your primary interest here, if you do not have the
hard power as well behind it. [101]
94 Transforming the British Army, An Update - July 2013 Back
95
Q 191 Back
96
Q 212 Back
97
Q 24 Back
98
Q 158 Back
99
SLP = Standardised Language Profile. The levels are not accredited
outside Defence but roughly read across as follows:
1 = GCSE; 2 = A Level (basic); 3 = A
level (advanced); 4 = Post graduate, non-native speaker.
In addition to the above the MoD offer
further training in operation specific languages such as Dari
and Pasto. Back
100
Q 191 Back
101
Q 52 Back
|
