Re-thinking defence to meet new threats - Defence Contents


6  Terrorism and failing states

115. Perhaps, however, an even more fundamental challenge than a resurgent Russia, is the emergence of concurrent threats from failing states, increasingly dominated by radical jihadist groups. The SDSR concept acknowledged the threat posed by such situations—quintessentially in Afghanistan—but it presumed that they were sufficiently infrequent to be dealt with, one at a time, and with the investment of massive resources, over a prolonged period. The Iraq and Afghan campaigns cost the US and its allies over a trillion US dollars, and involved the deployment of over a million individual soldiers in a twelve year period.

116. Now, 'Afghan-style" threats—of failing states, or "ungoverned space", providing safe-haven to terrorists, or even governed by terrorist groups—have emerged in half a dozen countries simultaneously. Afghanistan is still unstable, terrorist groups continue to thrive in Pakistan and in Somalia. But the problem has metastasised. There are now terrorist groups controlling large swathes of Northern Nigeria, of Libya, of Yemen, of Syria and Western Iraq. And the number is likely to grow—spreading from Nigeria towards Chad or Niger, from Libya into Mali, and from Syria potentially to Lebanon or Jordan. All this coexists with severe humanitarian crisis and conflict in Darfur, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

117. The Future Force 2020 Structure—based on the assumption of deploying 6,600 soldiers into a single country for a decade, in order to conduct counter-insurgency operations, as part of a hundred thousand strong coalition—is manifestly the wrong structure for this new environment.

118. One option—potentially tempting to planners would be simply to refuse to design a structure suitable for tackling this volume of threats. They could argue either that failed states, dominated by terrorists were not an existential threat to the UK (this would involve rethinking the fundamental rationale for operations in Afghanistan); or that the UK no longer wanted to be a global power, and would leave tackling such threats to the US and others; or potentially that no-one had the capacity to deal with such threats regardless of whether they were a threat, or whether the UK wanted to deal with them.

119. Assuming, however, that the UK still believes such states to pose a substantial threat to the global order and to the United Kingdom itself; that the UK still sees itself as a global power; and that the UK believes it is possible to improve the situation in these countries, a radically new doctrine, approach and force structure would be required.

120. The nature of this structure, would require very profound thought in the next SDSR, and is beyond the scope of this committee. But it would seem worth considering in this context, re-examining the successes of Sierra Leone and Bosnia, and asking what capabilities might be required to improve the chance of success in current crisis zones such as Libya, Yemen, Ukraine or Iraq. A model should reflect the fact that resources are unlikely to allow British troops to control large sections of territory, or attempt to hold population areas in the future; and that operations are increasingly likely to be in support of a host government. Even training missions are unlikely to be able to be conducted on the scale of training in Afghanistan (where training the Afghan police and army involved 12 billion dollars of expenditure in the single year 2008).

121. All this calls into question whether the brigade is likely to remain the central unit of operations. Force structure is an immensely complex issue, deeply related to complicated questions of resources, basing, enablers, command and control, and even career structure. We would not, therefore, presume to try to micromanage the details of force structure. But it is worth at least pointing out that, if the threats and operations change, the force structures may have to change accordingly. We have already made the point that the current focus on brigades may have to be replaced by increasing capability at a larger divisional level to counter an advanced military threat in Europe. But the need to deal with concurrent terrorist-linked failed states also implies a need to develop increasing capability for independent operations at a smaller battle-group and even company level.

122. Two examples may illustrate this potential requirement. First, recent French operations in Mali suggest not only how a reinforced battle-group (of 1,000 as opposed to 6,600 men) can be a very suitable format in a world of multiple concurrent threats, but also how it requires a very particular support mechanism in country. Second, pre-posting troops in military assistance or training missions to places such as Northern Nigeria (for operations against Boko Haram) could possibly require even smaller deployments. So too, if the military wished to commit to developing and sustaining deep defence relationships and country knowledge through basing units (perhaps even with ISTAR and RPAS enablers) in countries such as Jordan or Tunisia. Again these are simply indicative examples, but they suggest very substantial thought needs to go into ensuring that the new force structure is highly flexible in sustaining units of very different sizes in very different theatres.

123. All this puts an increasing focus on deep-country knowledge and expertise, and strong defence relationships. Both of these seem to have been a critical component in the French operations in Mali, where a thousand troops were able to build on a pre-existing Embassy and Defence footprint to achieve a remarkable and rapid impact.

Defence Engagement

124. We, therefore, strongly welcome the fact that in July 2013, the Army announced that the adaptable force brigades, and some Force Troops Command brigades would have assigned responsibilities for particular regions of the world, enabling brigade units "to develop understanding of the geography, culture and languages of their specified region".[94] It was added that "Adaptable Force brigades [would be] the default choice to conduct overseas exercises; provide short term training teams in their allocated region; and coordinate the participation of troops from other parts of the Army".

125. Air Chief Marshal Pulford said that the RAF was fully participating in defence engagement.[95] General Carter and General Barrons emphasised the need for a whole Government approach to defence engagement including the Foreign Office, Department for International Development and the military, coming together under the National Security Council.[96]

126. The development of deep relationships over a substantial period with key decision-makers, and future decision-makers, in a given country is central to this process. One important challenge will, therefore, be to identify how limited numbers of personnel can be best deployed to develop these deep relationships when it may not be possible to predict where the future security priorities for the UK will be. 2014 highlighted threats emerging in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa, but new threats may emerge in 2015 and beyond. Mark Urban said:

    We know that language skills and analytical skills take years to grow, and if you are suddenly yawing around saying, "Actually, this week's priority is west Africa", the number of people who can speak the right dialects for northern Nigeria would clearly be tiny when you have spent the past five or 10 years investing in Arabic, Urdu or Pashto and the previous 40 years in Russian and other east European languages.[97]

127. General Barrons recognised the importance of language training and acknowledged its previous neglect in the Armed Forces:

    […]it is absolutely recognised that an important future role for defence is how we are able to interact in UN and other operations where language is a core skill. We may have been guilty in the past of just speaking English slowly and loudly and hoping that that would work, but that is clearly not going to cut it in future, so the way we train people through staff college, where language is now an option, and the way we select people with an eye to producing a career stream focused on defence engagement, will all help. […]I see that as part of the professional armed forces in the future.[98]

128. We were impressed on our visits to Iraq and Jordan by the determination of British Military officers who were clearly committed to learning Arabic and working very closely alongside local forces.

129. But an admirable concept, appears to still be some way from being fully realised in practice. There were at the time of our Baghdad visit, only 3 British officers in Iraq outside Kurdistan. The following table outlines the numbers trained by the Defence Academy in the principal languages since 2011-12.[99] This table illustrates a substantial decline in recent years in those studying Russian and Arabic, two languages which should be a priority in the context of the changing threats that we have discussed.
Number of people being trained (per academic year)
Training Year
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15

Level
Lower

(SLP 1-2)
Upper

(SLP 3-4)
Lower

(SLP 1-2)
Upper

(SLP 3-4)
Lower

(SLP 1-2)
Upper

(SLP 3-4)
Lower

(SLP 1-2)
Upper

(SLP 3-4)
French17 171 290 243 25
Russian3 92 110 30 2
Arabic32 1836 1225 123 20
Spanish4 91 160 160 7
German2 01 40 40 3

130. The UK needs to plan to play a role again in intervention—even if it involves following the French model and choosing to take responsibility for a particular place, rather than working as a small part of a smaller coalition (the UK could, for example, take the lead role in Northern Nigeria). Defence Engagement and all the associated training in language and culture would be vital to any success in the future. Any solution also needs to address the fundamental gap—identified by this committee in its reports on Afghanistan-between the military and other government agencies. This was the heart of the 'comprehensive approach' designed to combine the FCO, DfID, and the military.

131. But a related gap also exists in the information and intelligence sphere. The Foreign Office has increasingly turned away from area expertise, and deep political reporting. The era of 'Oriental secretaries' and the IRD in the Foreign Office is long-past. SIS continues to be required to focus on single-source, strategic reporting, in response to Joint Intelligence Committee requirements, and has neither the mandate, nor the resources, to collect either overt or tactical information. UK Special Forces and the Intelligence Corps continues to focus on the most tactical level. This leaves a significant gap, as was found in Helmand, for example, in mapping tribal, criminal and patronage networks, connecting the politics in the capital to instability on the ground, or developing a workable strategy of stabilisation. This too is an area where the NSS, and the SDSR should focus, and where the MoD—along with others—should play a role.

132. Other options, which would need to be explored in a new force structure might range from an increasing focus on Military Assistance Teams, to a much more developed and extensive Defence Intelligence Service and Defence Attaché capacity, and potentially the development of second-tier Special Forces (on the US Green beret model). And again, consideration needs to be given to the potential role of reserves, military contractors, and even civilians in this new approach.

133. Related to these issues, are those more broadly of 'soft power'. The National Security Strategy 2010 stressed the importance of soft power stating that the UK needed to draw together, and use, all the instruments of national power. Admiral Zambellas emphasised the value of the deployment of soft power in support of broader objectives.

    […]we are invited to understand that the way out of recession is a trade-led performance of the UK. That means a global footprint, and that means using military soft effects, as they are called, in support of strategic objectives. I can only speak for my own service, but we would look to co-ordinate across defence for a combined defence engagement strategy that maximised the total value across defence of Navy, Army and Air Force.[100]

134. Professor Cornish warned, however, that soft power relied on the ability to exercise hard power and could not be a substitute for hard power. Other countries would only look to build links with the UK Armed Forces if the UK retained the ability to deploy and project substantial "hard power" forces:

    […] we talk a lot about defence engagement and the value of foreign militaries training with us, or in our academies, staff colleges and all that sort of thing. That is a very important part of soft defence power, but my point is that soft defence power is a proxy for hard defence power, not a substitute for it, and that you will not have that soft defence power, which I guess is your primary interest here, if you do not have the hard power as well behind it. [101]


94   Transforming the British Army, An Update - July 2013 Back

95   Q 191 Back

96   Q 212 Back

97   Q 24 Back

98   Q 158 Back

99   SLP = Standardised Language Profile. The levels are not accredited outside Defence but roughly read across as follows:

1 = GCSE; 2 = A Level (basic); 3 = A level (advanced); 4 = Post graduate, non-native speaker.

In addition to the above the MoD offer further training in operation specific languages such as Dari and Pasto. Back

100   Q 191 Back

101   Q 52 Back


 
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Prepared 24 March 2015