7 Funding the assumptions and plans
of SDSR 2010
Funding of
the Armed Forces
135. We have laid out a series of arguments on why
it is necessary to rewrite and reconceptualise the underlying
assumptions of SDSR 2010, and Future Force 2020. We believe that
a changed world requires new force structures and resources to
match a threat from an advanced military state, such as Russia,
and to respond to the ever-expanding set of threats from failed
states, and terrorist-affiliates. But even without reconsidering
the fundamental assumptions in a changed world, there are some
risks in even sustaining the current force structure and security
assumptions.
136. We asked the Service Chiefs whether the current
level of resources would enable them to achieve Future Force plans
by 2020. They replied that funds were adequate if they were given
the uplift in resources currently planned for 2015-16 and beyond,
that is an increase in current expenditure in line with inflation
and a 1% increase above inflation for the equipment budget. They
also recognised that wider financial constraints had been an important
factor in determining the available resources for SDSR 2010 which
had created some capability gaps.[102]
In particular, Air Chief Marshal Pulford said:
we look forward to SDSR15, as planned, answering
some of the risks that we are still carrying from that 2010 review.
All four of us are acutely aware that you cannot have adequate
defence without taking into account the resources available to
you.[103]
137. However, Admiral Zambellas warned that, if the
Royal Navy did not get the resources it expected to deliver Future
Force 2020, it would need to say to the Government:
We now cannot do what we are mandated to do,
what do you wish us to give up". That, frankly, is something
that is going to be tested vigorously in the comprehensive spending
review next autumn.[104]
138. We asked the Secretary of State whether he thought
that the Chiefs of Staff were content with the available financial
resources. He argued that resources were:
Adequate to do the jobs that have been thrust
on us. You have seen this year how we have responded, particularly
how the Royal Air Force has responded to the demands put on it
in terms of countering ISIL, and you have seen all three services
in action down in Sierra Leone helping to combat Ebola. Nobody
turned round to me and said, "We haven't got the capability
and we haven't got the budget. We're not able to do these things."
In fact, we were able to deploy a ship, three helicopters and
several hundred men within 10 days of being asked, and send them
a very large distance. Very few countries can do that.[105]
139. We are not reassured by this statement. We note
that the operation to combat the spread of Ebola in Sierra Leone
was funded by the Department for International Development. In
our report on The situation in Iraq and Syria and the response
to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH) we also
argued that the UK's contribution to date to operations countering
the threat from ISIL had been "strikingly modest".[106]
Personnel
140. In his speech to RUSI in December 2013, the
Chief of the Defence Staff drew attention to his concerns about
the Armed Forces having 'exquisite technology' without the personnel
to operate it:
Indeed, the one bit of Defence's future funding
that has political commitment to real growth is the equipment
programme. But the dawning reality is that, even if we maintain
the non-equipment budget in real terms, rising manpower costs
raise the prospect of further manpower and activity cuts. Unattended
our current course leads to a strategically incoherent force structure:
exquisite equipment, but insufficient resources to man that equipment
or train on it. This is what the Americans call the spectre of
the hollow-force. We are not there yet; but across Defence I would
identify the Royal Navy as being perilously close to its critical
mass in man-power terms.[107]
141. Professor Sabin told us that to be adaptable,
the Armed Forces needed the right personnel. He told us that "kit
can be made adaptable, but only by people. If you invest too much
in the technology and you lose out on the people, you really are
in trouble".[108]
142. Following the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Review and as part of the restructuring of the Armed Forces under
Future Force 2020, the MoD instituted a redundancy scheme. So
far there have been four tranches: tranches 1 and 2 were across
all Services but tranche 3 applied only to the Army. A fourth
and final tranche was announced in January 2014. 1,060 service
personnel have been selected for redundancy in this tranche, predominantly
Army personnel, plus approximately 50 medical and dental officers
and nurses in the RAF and 10 in the Royal Navy.[109]
The following table gives a breakdown of the number of personnel
selected for redundancy under each tranche for each Service.Table
2: Redundancies by Service
| Service
| Tranche 1
| Tranche 2
| Tranche 3
| Tranche 4
| Totals
|
| Royal Navy | 1,020
| 160 | 0
| 10 | 1,190
|
| Army | 920
| 2,880 | 4,450
| 1,000 | 9,250
|
| Royal Air Force | 920
| 720 | 0
| 50 | 1,690
|
| Total | 2,860
| 3,760 | 4,450
| 1,060 | 12,130
|
Source: UK armed forces redundancy program statistics:
index[110]
Note: Due to appeals, transfers and personnel leaving
for other reasons, this may not reflect the number of personnel
who will eventually leave the Armed Forces.
143. The Secretary of State acknowledged the necessity
of instituting redundancies in the Armed Forces, arguing that
[…] Getting the budget in order meant some
painful decisions, both on the investment side, on the maritime
patrol capability and, indeed, on the people side.[111]
144. He did, however, acknowledge that more needed
to be done to recruit and retain personnel to man the equipment,
noting that he had given evidence to the Armed Forces Pay Review
Body, who were also focused on this question:
You can have the best aircraft carrier in the
world, but you do need the engineering ratings and officers to
man it, and we need the pilots to pilot our aircraft and so on.[112]
145. In response to our question about the manning
crisis in the Royal Navy, Admiral Zambellas acknowledged the challenges
to the Royal Navy in retention:
[...]It is a highly technical service and that
is a product of the design and operation of our ships. That group
of people are highly desirable outside the service. The pressures
on the individuals, largely through work-life balance, getting
more and more out of the platforms over the years, pushing outwards
all the time, has created the difficulties that we now face.[113]
146. The Royal Navy had received support from the
US coastguard who had offered engineers on secondment and would
be seeking support from other navies. The Royal Navy had also
been using Royal Marines to do more engineering work allowing
naval engineers to work on ships.[114]
The MoD informed us that the Royal Navy's voluntary outflow rate
for the 12 months up to 31 October 2014 was 5.6%, above the five-year
average rate of 4.7%, but that the outflow rate in pinch-point
trades, such as surface ship and submarine engineers, was a "particular
challenge".[115]
All three Services have significant shortages in technical trades,
with the worst problems in the Royal Navy.
147. The Royal Navy has introduced longer deployments
of nine months for those on some frigates and destroyers as many
of these ships are reported to be more reliable.[116]
The Chief of Naval Personnel told the Naval Families Federation
that longer deployments would result in greater minimum periods
between deployments for all ships.[117]
Role of Reserves
148. The 2010 SDSR announced a reduction of 7,000
Army personnel to leave a Regular force strength of 94,000 by
2015.[118] The planned
size of the Regular Army was subsequently further reduced to "a
trained strength of 82,000 Regulars" with a force of "at
least 30,000 Reserves, with a training margin of 8,000[119]
Reserves".[120]
The Army expects to reach this level by 2018.[121]
149. In March 2014, we published a report on the
Army 2020 plans[122]
raising a number of concerns, in particular that
· that the MoD had failed to communicate
the rationale and strategy behind the plan to the Army, the wider
Armed Forces, Parliament or the public and that the decision to
reduce the size of the Regular Army from 94,000 (as announced
in SDSR 2010) to 82,000 had not even been discussed by the NSC;
· that the financially driven reduction
in the number of Regulars had the potential to leave the Army
short of personnel, particularly in key supporting capabilities,
until sufficient Reserves were recruited and trained; and
· that the Army 2020 plan could unravel
if there were further reductions in the MoD budget or Army personnel.
150. General Carter told us that the proposed size
of the Army was adequate for what the Government currently required
of it.[123] When pressed,
he added:
We have now withdrawn from Helmand and the British
Army has some people committed, but not in the numbers we have
been accustomed to over the past five to 10 years. It is always
a question of what you want the Army to do, and then from that
you can determine its shape and size.[124]
151. However, General Dannatt, former Chief of the
General Staff, has recently argued that, given the situation in
Ukraine, the Army needed a further brigade of 3,000 soldiers.
Such an increase would signal that the UK took its defence responsibilities
seriously, not only on behalf of its own citizens but on behalf
of EU and NATO allies too.[125]
152. At the time of our inquiry into Future Army
2020, the Government's intention was that Reserve Forces would
participate in operations overseas and in the UK and undertake
tasks as set out below.Table 3: Tasks that
the Reserves will be required to undertake
| Abroad:
· Short term operations such as the evacuation of UK citizens from Lebanon in 2006 and the 2011 Libya operation.
· Longer term stabilisation operations such as in the Balkans, UN missions, Iraq and Afghanistan.
· Standing commitments abroad such as the Cyprus garrison and the defence of the Falkland Islands.
· Deployments overseas aimed at Defence engagement, conflict prevention, security sector reform and capability building in priority countries, such as the British Peace Support mission in East Africa and the EU operation in Mali.
| At Home in the UK:
· Playing a general role in homeland security, including activities such as support to the Olympics and Paralympics, or specialist roles such as cyber.
· Delivering national resilience such as responding to the foot and mouth crisis, flood relief, and communications support to crisis management.
· Standing national commitments, such as defence of the UK's airspace.
|
Source: Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future
Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Cm 8655 July 2013, page 17
153. We note that this statement of the role of Reserves
makes no mention of Reserves being used to complete the order
of battle in a national crisis. The MoD also told us that Reserve
Forces would be deployed as formed units and sub-units. In the
Government Response to our Report on Future Army 2020[126]
the MoD restated the policy of using Reserve Forces in formed
units in the Adaptable Force.[127]
General Lamb emphasised the value of the Reserve Forces in providing
resilience in dealing with uncertainty, supporting operations
and bringing expertise into specialist areas.
154. However, we drew attention in our report on
Future Army 2020 to problems in the recruitment of reserves.
General Lamb said of the planned increase in reserves recruitment:
It started off really badly. There was, no question
about it, a reluctance on the part of a number of people to introduce
the Reserves. They wanted to keep the Regular component as high
as they could for as long as they could. I understand the reasons
why, but the truth of the matter is that it was not about taking
a long-term view.[128]
155. He hoped that the current CDS, who had led the
original Reserves Review, and the current CGS would be able to
re-establish the proposed relationship between the regulars and
reserves and to
put energy behind it and, therefore, to crush
over what has been an institutional inertia about making this
happen.[129]
156. General Carter acknowledged that there had been
delays in processing applications to join the Reserve Forces.
The process had been streamlined and the capacity at the assessment
centres had also been increased.[130]
On whether the Army could meet the recruitment target for reservists,
he said:
[…] the target this year is around 3,200.
Already, at the six-month point, we have got to 2,100, and it
is my sense that we will increase the numbers beyond the target
in this year, which is better than where we were last year, but
it is a long project. It is not something that will be solved
overnight, because we have had the last 10 or 15 years when we
have not invested in the Reserve in the way that we are now investing
in the Reserve.[131]
157. General Carter described his thinking on the
use of Reserve Forces in the Army. The focus would be on providing
three aspects of support: specialists such as medics or cyber
experts (who were acknowledged to be better found in the Reserve);
capabilities such as logistics which did not require a lot of
collective training; and combat arms and combat support. For those
reserves in this last category, General Carter noted that "their
commitment is to training, but the obligation only really cuts
in when there is a sense of national emergency".[132]
Joint Forces Command
158. In his written evidence, Peter Roberts told
us that the JFC has a far wider breadth of responsibilities than
the three Service headquarters and has fewer staff. He also told
us that the JFC is not well supported by the other Services in
terms of manpower provision, with a large number of unfilled posts.[133]
We asked the MoD what the challenges were in ensuring that JFC
got the staff it needed. The MoD told us that the gapping of posts
within JFC was running at similar levels to the single Services,
however, certain specialist roles, particularly in the medical
and intelligence domains were difficult to fill with suitably
qualified and trained personnel. It further told us what it was
doing to address the problem:
JFC is actively managing pressures on regular
military personnel by drawing more widely upon the services of
reserves, civilians and contractors as part of a whole force approach.
There is a continuous dialogue between the Chief of Staff at JFC
and the Principal Personnel Officers with the services to ensure
a full appreciation at senior level of the priority manning requirement
and any possible structural changes within JFC, in order to minimise
the incidence and impact of manpower gaps.[134]
159. General Lamb expressed concern about the position
of the JFC in Future Force 2020:
[…] I have two concerns. One is that the
new Joint Forces Command is not seen as it probably should be,
which is as the tri-service driver—the joint driver that
delivers the capabilities set out by the National Security Council,
the Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, Government,
Parliament and all the rest, in terms of what they wish their
armed forces to do.[135]
160. General Lamb considered that the Joint Forces
Command was working but was concerned that it did not own the
joint capabilities. He also believed that JFC needed a senior
champion, calling for an individual
with a genuine responsibility and accountability
for the delivery of the joint capability that he or she is so
presented with, and the ability to deliver that.[136]
161. The latest review of implementation of the Levene
Reforms found that Joint Forces Command had made good progress
and that there was clear evidence that it had provided an improved
focus to "the key technological enablers of modern warfare"
and that the relationship between JFC and the single Services
had developed well. However, the review identified a challenge
for JFC to build on its progress to date
To reinforce further its overall position within
Defence (including improving its current manning level of only
84%), and to work with Head Office in giving prominence in the
SDSR to both the importance of joint enablers, and key new areas
of potential JFC growth (eg. Strengthening various intelligence-related
capabilities, not least in response to the advent of "big
data").[137]
102 Qq 118, 123 and 124 Back
103
Q 118 Back
104
Q 127 Back
105
Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, Q 20 Back
106
The situation in Iraq and Syria and the response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH),
Seventh Report, Session 2014-15, Summary. Back
107
CDS speech to RUSI,
18 December 2013 Back
108
Q 43 Back
109
HC Deb, 23 January 2014, cols 461-463 Back
110
Government website Back
111
Q 225 Back
112
Q 225 Back
113
Q 187 Back
114
Q 187 Back
115
MoD supplementary memorandum following evidence on 17 December 2014 Back
116
Naval personnel are expected to spend 660 days every three years
away from home (harmony guideline); breaches are running at some
1% Back
117
Naval Families Federation article, Message from Second Sea Lord: Nine Month Deployments,
7 August 2014 Back
118
The Strategic Defence and Security Review Cm 7984, October 2010,
p 32 Back
119
The 8,000 would be additional personnel in training to sustain
the overall number of 30,000 trained Reservists. Back
120
HC Deb, 19 January 2012, col 939W Back
121
The MoD expects to reach its target for 30,000 trained Reservists
by 2018, see British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable
future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012, p 9. The
reduction in Regular Army personnel to 82,000 is expected to be
completed by mid-2015 with the restructuring of the Regular component
by 2016, Q 67, Q 125 and Q 271 Back
122
Defence Committee, Future Army 2020, Ninth Report of Session 2013-14,
HC 576 Back
123
Q 105 Back
124
Q 106 Back
125
The Telegraph, Armed Forces: Britain needs another brigade, 23
March 2014 Back
126
Future Army 2020, Ninth Report of 2013-14, HC 576 Back
127
Future Army 2020: Government Response to the Defence Committee's Ninth Report 2013-14,
Seventh Special Report 2014-15, HC 387 Back
128
Q 30 Back
129
Q 30 Back
130
Q 155 Back
131
Q 108 Back
132
Q 108 Back
133
Written evidence, Peter Roberts, RUSI, FUT0014 Back
134
MoD further memorandum, FUT0018 Back
135
Q 1 Back
136
Q 35 Back
137
Letter: Lord Levene to Secretary of State for Defence, 5 December
2014 Back
|
