Conclusions and recommendations
Response to Russia—First Steps
1. The US has made
it clear that it perceives the UK's commitment as the lynchpin
of the broader NATO commitment to increase Defence Spending. And,
therefore, if the UK were to reduce expenditure, it would undermine
the alliance as a whole. (Paragraph 58)
2. We are concerned
that, should defence spending in the UK fall below the NATO target
of 2% of GDP in 2016-17, the impact on the UK's credibility as
a military ally would be extremely damaging, particularly in the
eyes of the US and our European partners. It would damage UK leadership
in NATO and Putin's Russia will be looking very carefully for
signs of weakness in NATO. (Paragraph 59)
Rebuilding conventional capacity to deter an advanced
military nation
3. Maritime surveillance
remains a crucial gap in the capabilities of the Armed Forces
with extremely serious implications for the protection of other
capabilities within the Armed Forces. Bridging this critical capability
gap must be a very high priority for the next Strategic Defence
and Security Review. (Paragraph 66)
4. We are concerned
that bringing the second carrier into service will involve very
considerable additional costs, additional manpower, extra aircraft
and the considerable amount of support and protection needed to
make it viable. It makes little sense to maintain an additional
aircraft carrier without aircraft to fly off it and the necessary
aircraft, surface ships and submarines to protect it. In response
to this Report, the Government should set out its assessment of
the consequences of its decision to bring the second carrier into
service for the other capabilities that will be required by the
UK Armed Forces. It should also set out the consequences for the
personnel required in the Royal Navy. If there is to be no increase
in Royal Navy manpower, then it should set out how the second
carrier will be manned and what effect the manning of the second
carrier will have on the rest of the fleet. (Paragraph 88)
5. These are only
examples of the kinds of capability, which may be required to
provide firmer conventional deterrent against an advanced military
state such as Russia. But even this short list—maritime
surveillance aircraft, CBRN capabilities, Ballistic Missile Defence,
a comprehensive carrier strike capability, more Royal Navy vessels
and Royal Air Force planes, and enhanced divisional manoeuvre
and armoured capacity in the military and possible pre-positioning
of troops in continental Europe, will require a significantly
increased Defence budget.
(Paragraph 98)
Next Generation Warfare
6. We urge the MoD
to re-establish a Defence Historical Analysis and Conflict Research
Centre in order to address the lessons of recent conflicts and
to investigate current trends in warfare. (Paragraph 101)
7. We are unclear
as to how work on cyber warfare has developed in the Armed Forces.
The Government should tell us when it will finalise its doctrine
and guidance on the use of cyber defence and warfare. (Paragraph
110)
8. We welcome the
Armed Forces' focus on keeping pace with the developments of the
"information age" in gathering intelligence. The fast
pace of change requires the Armed Forces to exploit all areas
of expertise and we call on the MoD to examine opportunities for
work in partnership with academics and the private sector. However,
the gathering of intelligence represents only part of the picture.
Combating asymmetric subversion and understanding ambiguous Russian
tactics also requires a deep understanding of the country itself.
Re-developing and maintaining the capacity for proper analysis
and assessment of events in Russia and other areas where the UK
Armed Forces may be engaged is as important as the gathering of
intelligence itself. (Paragraph 114)
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