Annex: Government response
The Government welcomes the House of
Commons Defence Committee's interest, engagement and recommendations
on the future of deterrence and is pleased to present its response
to its Eleventh Report of Session 2013-2014 Deterrence in the
21st Century.
As the Committee recognised in its report,
deterrence forms an integral part of the UK's defence; indeed,
it is the primary peacetime role of the armed forces. As a result
of the difficult decisions taken in the 2010 Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR), the defence budget is balanced for
the first time in a generation and we have a highly effective
and scaleable contingent capability that provides a deterrent
effect, utilising both conventional forces and the nuclear deterrent.
The Defence contribution to deterrence is an essential component
of the full range of options, including political, economic and
diplomatic, that the UK has at its disposal to deliver a deterrence
effect.
The Committee's report draws a number
of conclusions on the changing nature of the threats that the
UK faces, and the complexities that this introduces to the UK's
ability to deter. We recognise these complexities and note the
Committee's recommendations. Our priority remains the delivery
of the current SDSR; however, work is now beginning on the next
National Security Strategy for 2015. Led by the Cabinet Office,
the MOD, alongside other departments across Whitehall, is also
taking forward initial preparatory work for the 2015 SDSR. As
the work for the next National Security Strategy and SDSR will
span the period of the next election, no decisions have yet been
taken on their final scope.
Our formal response to the Committee's
recommendations and conclusions is set out below. The Committee's
headings and findings are highlighted in bold, with the Government's
response set out in plain text. For ease of reference, paragraph
numbering in brackets refers to the order in which they are presented
in the Committee's Report.
Introduction
1. The concept of deterrence remains
fundamental to the way in which the UK seeks to manage the threats
to its security. Deterrence must be credible to be effective.
This means that it must be possible to both scale the threatened
response to be proportionate to deter the attack in question and
it must be possible to carry out the threatened response. Any
proposed reductions in conventional capabilities must be considered
in this light. Communication of will and intent is also an essential
component of deterrence. (Paragraph 10)
The Government recognises the importance
of capability, credibility and communication to effective deterrence.
Britain has some of the finest and best equipped Armed Forces,
underpinned by the second largest defence budget in NATO and backed
up by the nuclear deterrent, the ultimate guarantor of our national
security. With NATO and our allies, we will continue to play our
part on the world stage and are ready to deal with threats, whatever
they may be.
2. We recommend that the MoD set
out in the 2015 Defence and Security Review the contribution provided
by the NATO Alliance to the deterrence of threats identified in
the National Security Strategy and focus on how the UK can best
contribute to the Alliance's continued effectiveness and overall
deterrent capability. Recent events in the Ukraine illustrate
that this remains of profound importance (Paragraph 11)
The UK is an integral and influential
part of the Alliance, with our strategic nuclear deterrent committed
to its defence. The 2010 SDSR confirms NATO as the basis for the
UK's territorial defence and deterrence and demonstrates how such
co-operation is natural for the UK. NATO remains the world's most
successful, and unrivalled, military Alliance, based on a shared
set of democratic values. The UK government recognises that deterrence
is, and has been, fundamental to NATO's success as a military
Alliance. The situation in Ukraine has only served to emphasise
this truth. Following NATO's proposed package of Immediate Assurance
Measures, the UK demonstrated its commitment to the organisation's
deterrence posture though a significant and comprehensive offer
of support that ranged from Typhoon aircraft to augment NATO's
peacetime Baltic Air Policing mission, through to increasing the
UK's participation in a number of NATO exercises. The Government
recognises that deterrence and reassurance are two important elements
for ensuring the Alliance remains responsive in the future.
Taking forward the interoperability
culture and practices gained by Allies and partners is vital if
we wish to address the future threats to NATO. The Connected Forces
Initiative (of which the UK is a major contributor) aims to maintain
and improve upon these interoperability gains that NATO Allies
and non-NATO Partner Nations developed during recent operations,
such as the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan.
International terrorism
3. The Contest counter-terrorism
strategy draws on the concept of deterrence in seeking to deny
terrorists the benefits and outcomes that they expect from their
actions, in punishing those responsible, including their sponsors
and financers, and in addressing the ideological convictions of
potential terrorists. There are evidently limits in the effectiveness
of deterrence by punishment when dealing with ideologically driven
or genuinely irrational actors, or when faced with an adversary
whose precise identity may be difficult to establish. The increasing
difficulty of deterrence of such asymmetric threats, whose connection
to hostile states may be uncertain, heightens the importance of
the role of intelligence and diplomacy in seeking to understand
the motivations of such groups. (Paragraph 18)
4. Communication is fundamental to
the concept of deterrence in all its forms, and the difficulty
of communications with terrorists and non-state actors makes the
challenge of looking to deter these actors even greater. The 2015
Defence and Security Review provides an opportunity to build on
the UK's messaging about its resilience in the face of attack
and the determined measures that it is prepared to take to punish
terrorists and those that assist and finance them. We also look
to the Government to set out in the 2015 Defence and Security
Review its thoughts on the role of strategic messaging in deterring
terrorist threats. (Paragraph 19)
Understanding the world views, motivations,
and objectives of potential adversaries is a key element of effective
deterrence in relation to both state and non-state actors. Intelligence
and diplomacy are important tools for achieving this understanding
and for communicating the UK's ability and willingness to act
in response. In seeking to deter terrorist threats, it is important
to maintain and develop the capacity to bring to justice terrorists
and their supporters, whoever they are and whatever their motivation.
Communication is one of the core elements of effective deterrence
in relation to any potential adversary and the UK is active in
messaging aimed at deterring terrorist threats. Whilst no decision
has yet been taken on the scope of the next SDSR, we note the
Committee's comments on the opportunity it affords to convey important
messages about UK resilience and determination and to refer to
the role of strategic messaging.
Cyber attack
5. At one level, once a destructive
cyber attack has been launched, deterrence has de facto already
failed. However, if Government is unable to respond to an attack
because it does not know for sure who was responsible, the ability
to deter future attacks will be undermined. The costs of retaliation
against the wrong target might be high. (Paragraph 24)
6. The potentially increased difficulty
of identifying the source of a cyber-attack on the United Kingdom
or its interests, given the proliferation of non-state actors
or the potential for rogue states using proxy actors, raises the
question of whether the burden of proof needs to be revisited
to ensure that the UK's deterrent capability in this field remains
credible. This might require the UK Government to state that it
would consider a response where evidence existed of the strong
possibility of the source of an attack. (Paragraph 25)
The Government agrees that the difficulty
of identifying actors involved in a potential or actual cyber
attack is a particular and significant challenge to achieving
deterrence in the Cyber area although the means of attributing
responsibility need not be limited to the cyber area. The 2011
UK Cyber Security Strategy recognised the need to enhance our
capability to defend against and deter cyber threats. Our National
Cyber Security Programme exists to help meet the objectives of
the Cyber Security Strategy. We are working across and beyond
government to improve our defensive capabilities in order to deny
or minimise the opportunity for adversaries to attack.
International understanding of norms
of state behaviour in cyberspace are at an early stage. The UK
is working with international partners to shape cyberspace norms,
including through a UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE).
The 2012/13 UNGGE agreed that international law applies in cyberspace;
also that 'States must not use proxies to commit internationally
wrongful acts' and that 'States should seek to ensure that their
territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use
of Information and Communication Technologies'. Early agreement
on these issues provides a foundation for further discussions,
likely to include how to respond to the difficulties associated
with attribution and, in particular, how international law applies
in practice.
7. We welcome the emphasis that the
Government places on the importance of cyber defence and we note
the commitment of resources to a new cyber strike capability.
We are concerned that the difficulty in identifying actors in
a cyber attack makes the ability to deter that much harder as
hostile parties may feel more confident that they can mount an
attack with impunity. Another challenge for deterrence is that
question marks over the proportionality and legality of a response
to a cyber attack may have a bearing on a hostile actor's calculations
about the UK's readiness to deploy its own offensive capability,
adding to this sense of impunity on the part of a potential aggressor.
(Paragraph 26)
As the Committee have noted, the MOD
announced in September 2013 that, to supplement our defensive
capability, the UK will build a cyber strike capability; an offensive
capability to deter adversaries from attacking us. Any use of
these cyber capabilities will be in accordance with national and
international law, and the use of any UK military capability is
subject to strict ministerial oversight. Our national security
interests must also be balanced with our legal obligations and
policy approaches in other areas such as international humanitarian
law and international human rights law.
8. We call on the MoD to set out
in more detail in the 2015 Defence and Security Review the Government's
thinking on how it can deter cyber attack from both state and
non-state actors and what messaging it can employ to make it clear
that an attack on vital national assets will elicit an appropriate
and determined response. Where it is not possible to deter a cyber
attack by threatening a response against the interests of a hostile
actor, emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring that critical systems
are resilient to attack and contingency plans for recovery are
in place. (Paragraph 27)
The Committee will understand that the
content and conduct of the next Review remains to be confirmed
as it spans the period of the next election, and that cyber deterrence
is a cross-government issue, rather than one specific to the MOD.
However, the Government recognises that cyber threats and the
deterrence of them are emerging issues which are continually evolving,
and we are determined that we will respond to these changing threats.
Attack by another state using CBN weapons
9. To remain credible, an effective
nuclear deterrent relies on conventional forces that are able
to deter threats to the UK and its Overseas Territories short
of those that threaten the very continued existence of the state.
This is a more fundamental test of the adequacy of our Armed Forces
than whether they are sufficient to meet the demands of the Defence
Planning Assumptions. We call on the MoD to show how this essential
test will be factored in to the outcome of the 2015 Defence and
Security Review. (Paragraph 36)
10. There may come a point where
further reduction in the size of the UK's conventional capabilities
brings into question the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent.
The next Defence and Security Review must be conscious of this
risk. (Paragraph 37)
While the Government agrees with the
Committee's statement that the UK's nuclear deterrent capabilities
remain the ultimate deterrent against a nuclear-armed state, it
does not agree that the nuclear deterrent requires substantial
conventional forces to defend it (paragraph 29). Conventional
assets can be deployed to assure the security of the submarine
as it moves to and from its patrol area, in addition to those
assets that routinely support or facilitate its operation. A ballistic
missile submarine at sea is designed to be self-sustaining and
operationally independent. Its stealth, operational profile, intelligence
support and the ocean environment are its key strengths.
We note the Committee's comments that,
in order to be credible, the UK's ability to deter a range of
threats needs to be underpinned by a strong mix of conventional
and nuclear capabilities. The UK's nuclear deterrent and its posture
of Continuous At Sea Deterrence exists to deter the most extreme
threats to our national existence and to prevent nuclear blackmail.
In addition, our updated Negative Security Assurance to non-nuclear
weapon states in 2010 also made clear that states pursuing significant
chemical or biological weapons programmes might lose the guarantees
of that assurance. The nuclear deterrent is not designed to deter
the full range of threats that face this country; those threats
are countered by other activities including conventional military
capabilities.
There is not a smooth continuum between
conventional and nuclear capabilities. There must be a gap between
high-end conventional capabilities and nuclear capabilities in
order to ensure that all parties to a conflict are aware of the
implications of crossing the strategic threshold into nuclear
use. But that gap must not be so large as either to lower the
threshold whereby nuclear use may be currently contemplated or
question the credibility of nuclear deterrence. We believe the
UK has, and continues to invest in, the right balance of conventional
and nuclear capabilities. The Government remains committed to
an Equipment Plan growing at 1% a year in real terms after the
next Spending Review to deliver this.
11. The blurring of lines between
state and non-state actors poses a particular challenge in seeking
to deter attacks using CBRN weapons. It may not be possible to
deter a hostile state intent on launching attacks by threatening
punishment where that state is confident that it can successfully
cover its tracks. Circumstances in which the hostile actor is
not clear or where it is not clear that a hostile state can be
held to be responsible to an acceptable standard of proof pose
a particular challenge to the concept of deterrence. Such a threat
is akin to an act of international terrorism and the similar difficulties
in attribution and in determining a proportionate response raise
the same challenges for the concept of deterrence. (Paragraph
38)
The Government notes the Committee's
comments. As set out in response to conclusions three and four,
we recognise that identifying and understanding potential adversaries
is a key element of effective deterrence in relation to both state
and non-state actors. Intelligence and diplomacy are key tools
for achieving this understanding and key vehicles for communicating
the UK's ability and willingness to act in response.
Tier three risks
12. The deterrent strength of the
UK armed forces against conventional military threats is reliant
on the credibility of the Armed Forces to project military power.
Fighting power is the key calculation in measuring this deterrent
strength; this includes not only the physical capabilities of
the Armed Forces, but also the conceptual and moral components
reflecting a readiness to undertake operations. We call on the
MoD to describe the fighting power of the UK's conventional forces
in contributing to deterrence. (Paragraph 43)
We have a global power projection capability
second only to the US, and among the most capable troops, aircraft,
ships and submarines. We are investing over £160bn over the
next decade in modernising our capabilities; bringing the Queen
Elizabeth class carrier and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft into
service are a clear demonstration of that. The Future Force we
have designed will be well equipped, capable and deployable, and
more sustainable.
As the Committee recognises, fighting
power defines the Armed Forces' ability to fight and is about
more than just capability. It consists of a conceptual component
(the thought process), a moral component (the ability to get people
to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight). As British
Defence Doctrine points out, fighting power should always be considered
relative to that of other parties, and the notion of effectiveness
itself will change over time as the strategic context and our
national objectives change, making comparisons challenging. Given
the diversity of scenarios in which the Armed Forces may become
involved, fighting power should be applied in a way that best
suits the prevailing situation and conditions. In some circumstances
the UK may seek to deter and the components of fighting power,
alongside our continued investment in new capabilities, give us
the capability and credibility to do so.
Conclusions on deterrence of National Security
Strategy risks
13. Deterrence of asymmetric threats
is more complex than deterrence of another state either by conventional
or nuclear means as it is more difficult to communicate with potential
adversaries; may be difficult to identify them; and is likely
to be difficult to identify interests against which a response
can be legitimately threatened or targeted. However, the concept
of deterrence is still key to countering these threats. Questions
around the attribution of hostile acts (or the degree of responsibility
of a hostile state) raise questions about the proportionality
and legality of any response and risk bringing the credibility
of the use of force into question, undermining the ability to
deter such acts. We call on the MoD to set out more of its thinking
on how it can act to deter such asymmetric threats, overcoming
these challenges, in the 2015 Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph
44)
14. There will be risks to the nation's
security and vital interests, and to the collective security and
interests of our allies and friends, that are not covered satisfactorily
by the existing definition of risks in the National Security Strategy.
These risks may not necessarily amount to a direct attack against
the UK, but may involve a hostile state seeking to deter, contain
or otherwise constrain the country's actions either through their
conventional military forces or through economic or diplomatic
pressure. Strong conventional forces provide the UK with a contingency
against the unexpected and, as yet, not quantified threats that
may emerge. In a rapidly changing global environment, there is
unlikely to be much warning of events that might require the reconstitution
of conventional forces, once cut back, to adequately deter new
and emerging threats. Recent events in Ukraine illustrate the
speed with which new threats, and indeed the reappearance of old
threats, can manifest themselves (Paragraph 45)
The Government agrees that it is important
to have a strategy for all risks to security. The next National
Security Risk Assessment is due this year and will inform the
next National Security Strategy and SDSR. Initial preparatory
work is underway and the Government notes the Committee's recommendations.
15. We call on the MoD to ensure
that the 2015 Defence and Security Review articulates a more coherent
and convincing policy of conventional deterrence, based on a balance
of capabilities of UK Armed Forces, and placed in the context
of the military capability of our allies. Deterrence, after all,
is based on achieving the credibility, in the eyes of those that
we seek to deter, that we have the capability and will to employ
armed force (Paragraph 46)
As stated above, no decision has yet
been taken on the final scope of the next National Security Strategy
or Strategic Defence and Security Review. However, initial preparatory
work, including on the role of conventional deterrence, is underway
and the Government notes the Committee's recommendations.
Nuclear deterrence
16. We note, however, that while
the potential range of emergent threats is significant, they do
not preclude either the re-emergence of tensions with an existing
nuclear power, nor the emergence of a new power whose interests
are inimical to those of the United Kingdom with the capacity
to deliver a CBRN attack on the UK or its interests. (Paragraph
57)
17. The fourth of the deterrent roles
identified in the White Paper is to provide potential retaliation
against threats that may emerge over the next 50 years. Nuclear
proliferation is not under control and many of the sources of
future insecurity could in themselves contribute to state-on-state
conflict, creating an ever more unstable, and increasingly nuclear-armed,
future strategic context. The assessment of future threats is
as important as the assessment of current threats in considering
the case for the nuclear deterrent (Paragraph 58)
The Government notes the Committee's
comments that we cannot rule out the emergence of a nuclear threat
to the UK or its interests in the future. We believe that in this
uncertain world, and with the procurement and in-service life
of military equipment spanning decades, it is right to maintain
and renew a minimum, credible and effective nuclear deterrent
that underpins our own national, and NATO's collective, security
against the most extreme threats.
The opportunity cost of the nuclear deterrent
18. The operation of a nuclear deterrent
clearly does not obviate the need for substantial investment in
other approaches to security, including the diplomatic, and measures
to tackle risks at source. As we have noted, the nuclear deterrent
cannot be used to deter all threats to national security. Given
the importance of communication to the concept of deterrence,
investment in diplomatic and intelligence assets must be integral
to the UK's security apparatus. However, it would be naive of
us to assume that a decision not to invest in the nuclear deterrent
would release substantial funds for investment in other forms
of security. We believe that the decision on the retention of
the nuclear deterrent, and whether its retention is still merited
as a means of deterring existential threats to the UK, should
be made on its own merits, rather than on the basis of what else
could be bought with the money saved. (Paragraph 63)
The Government notes the Committee's
comments. The Government's nuclear posture and commitment to the
Trident system, and its successor system, is clear. It is not
designed to deter the full range of threats that face the country,
but to deter the most extreme threats to our national existence
and to prevent nuclear blackmail.
Implications of advanced conventional weapons
for nuclear deterrence
19. It is possible to foresee an
environment in which the core role of nuclear deterrence - to
protect a state from attack - is achieved by the deployment of
advanced conventional weapons, providing both offensive and defensive
capability. However, we are not yet in a position to evaluate
any viable technical options. This will be a matter which our
successor Committee may wish to examine further. (Paragraph 71)
We note the Committee's comments and
will assist any successor Committee should they wish to examine
this issue further.
20. It is not the purpose of this
report to re-open the question of the future of the UK's nuclear
deterrent. We did not re-examine the evidence in the detail that
our predecessor Committee did. The 2015 National Security Strategy
will identify a new order of threats and we will look to the 2015
Defence and Security Review to identify which of these threats
the nuclear deterrent will be expected to deter. (Paragraph 72)
As stated above, the UK's nuclear deterrent
and its posture of Continuous At Sea Deterrence exists to deter
the most extreme threats to our national existence and to prevent
nuclear blackmail. As the Committee suggests, it is not designed
to deter the full range of threats that faces this country; those
threats are countered by other activities including conventional
military capabilities. Whilst no decision has yet been taken on
the scope of the next National Security Strategy and SDSR, the
Government notes the Committee's comments.
Conclusion
21. Although the concept of deterrence
is most commonly thought of in respect of the nuclear deterrent,
the ability of the Armed Forces to deter threats worldwide to
the UK's interests is integral to the National Security Tasks
and applies to all branches of the UK's security apparatus. (Paragraph
73)
The Government notes the Committee's
conclusion. The deterrence of threats to the UK's security, influence
and prosperity is the primary peacetime role of the Armed Forces;
though deterrence is in fact most effective when it harmonises
effects across government, drawing together and using all the
instruments of national and international power, political, economic
and diplomatic.
22. The deterrence of threats to
national interests is made more complex by the greater significance
of asymmetric threats compared to the Cold War strategic context,
but is still a concept fundamental to national security. We call
on the Government to use the opportunity of the 2015 Defence and
Security Review (DSR) to set out more of its thinking on the role
all parts of Government play in deterring asymmetric threats,
including those from the ideologically driven and radicalised.
(Paragraph 74)
As noted in response to previous conclusions,
the Government agrees that it is important to have a strategy
for all risks to security, and this strategy will be most effective
when it draws on instruments from across Government. Whilst no
decision has yet been taken on the scope of the next National
Security Strategy and SDSR, the Government notes the Committee's
comments.
23. It also needs to be emphasised
that, even in this new strategic context, NATO remains the cornerstone
of UK deterrence and we call on the Government to ensure that
the 2015 Defence and Security Review focuses also on how the UK
can best contribute to the Alliance. Recent events in Ukraine
not only illustrate the importance of NATO to UK security, but
bring into question the continued relevance of the categorisation
of threats in the current National Security Strategy. The 2015
National Security Strategy must reflect that threats to UK security
include the re-emergence of state threats that we may have been
tempted to think had diminished with the end of the Cold War.
These state threats may become manifest in a range of ways, including
through attack with CBRN weapons, conventional forces, terrorist
proxies or cyber capabilities. We will return to this point in
our overarching report on Towards the next Defence and Security
Review, later in the year. (Paragraph 75)
The next National Security Risk Assessment
is due this year and will inform the next National Security Strategy
and SDSR. The Government notes the Committee's recommendations
and welcomes their intention to further explore this point in
the overarching report.
24. The UK Armed Forces have a deterrent
capacity dependent on calculations of their capability and on
perceptions of the UK's readiness to use force when the need arises.
We are concerned that recent comments by Robert Gates, former
US Defence Secretary, about the UK's value as a military partner
for the US in the wake of defence cuts, illustrate a deterioration
in perceptions abroad of the UK's military capabilities. The 2015
Defence and Security Review must be drafted with reference to
the Armed Forces' continuing deterrent capability and decisions
around the MoD's financial settlement in the next Comprehensive
Spending Review must be made in the light of the need to retain
a credible deterrent capacity in the country's Armed Forces. A
failure to do so could have significant implications for the country's
security. Credible conventional forces are also essential to maintain
the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 76)
Defence cannot operate outside the context
of the economic health of this country, and a Strategic Defence
and Security Review must balance strategic threats and fiscal
perspectives to find a sustainable solution for Defence. The overall
budget for Defence will be decided under the next Spending Review,
in consultation between departments, although the Government remains
committed to an Equipment Plan growing at 1% a year in real terms
after the next Spending Review.
A key tenet of our Defence posture is
to be flexible and adaptable to meet the UK's strategic objectives.
We have shown how resilient we are when the financial means available
to Defence change unexpectedly. But our ability to meet our strategic
ambition is not solely related to our financial resources. Although
we plan to spend more than £160 billion over the next ten
years on state-of-the-art equipment, and to regenerate the Armed
Forces for the requirements of the post-Afghanistan defence and
security environment, in the last Strategic Defence and Security
Review we also said that closer co-operation with allies and partners
would be increasingly important to our security and prosperity.
We are increasing the depth and breadth of our co-operation with
our key allies to improve our policy and strategy alignment, and
interoperability to ensure we can work increasingly effectively
together and deliver greater effect from our respective defence
budgets. We continue to develop our relationships with new international
partners to enhance our global influence. All of this contributes
to the UK's credible deterrent capability.
Any significant future budget reductions,
which cannot be absorbed by non-front line savings alone, run
the risk of impacting upon our strategic ambitions.
25. We conclude that deterrence,
both nuclear and conventional, has an important place in the defence
philosophy of the UK but will increasingly form part of a more
complex security strategy alongside greater need for resilience
and recovery as the world becomes more multi-polar and less stable
and where the certainties of identifying an aggressor may be reduced.
(Paragraph 77)
We agree that deterrence has an important
role in the defence of the UK, but we recognise that it is not
always possible to prevent disruption. The Government has continuing
programmes to develop robust response capabilities to ensure that
disruption is minimised when it does occur, and that recovery
is as quick as possible.
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