Annex: Government response
The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence
Committee's Report (HC830) on the Camp Bastion attack of the 14-15
September 2014, published on the 16th April 2014.
Our formal response to its recommendations and conclusions
is set out below. The Committee's headings and findings are highlighted
in bold, with the Government's response set out in plain text.
For ease of reference, paragraph numbering in brackets refers
to the order in which they are presented in the Committee's Report.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) would like to reiterate
our sympathy to the families of Lieutenant Colonel Raible and
Sergeant Atwell for their profound loss and pay tribute to the
bravery of all UK and US personnel who defeated the enemy during
the attack on Camp Bastion that night.
The burning man incident
1. At the time of the attack the Memorandum of
Understanding between USCENTCOM and PJHQ had not been revised,
despite the fact that all parties appeared to agree on the necessity
to make revisions in the aftermath of the "burning man incident".
Witnesses were neither able to explain to us which members of
the Executive Steering Group rejected the revised draft MOU nor
what the reasons for the rejection were. The delays to the process
of revision allowed weaknesses in command and control arrangements
for force protection to persist. It is an enduring characteristic
of conflict that the enemy fights back. ISAF personnel were exposed
to unnecessary risk. In response to our report the MoD must explain
why the failure to revise the MOU prior to the September 2012
attack should not be regarded as an act of omission. (Paragraph
24)
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is a political,
high level document which records commitment but is not legally
binding. Often it defines a relationship, avoiding the formalities
of a treaty. In this particular instance, the MOU was designed
to provide a framework for the operation of the Bastion, Leatherneck
and Shorabak Complex at Theatre level, covering cooperation ranging
from infrastructure, the operation of the airfield, with force
protection being just one element. As with UK delegation of Command,
the day to day operation of this MOU was the responsibility of
the in Theatre Commanders enabling flexibility to adjust operations
accordingly. Therefore it would be inappropriate for CJO to do
anything other than provide operational guidance, leaving those
empowered in Theatre to make tactical decisions on the ground.
The attack on Camp Bastion, 14-15 September 2012,
was the result of a number of causal factors that contributed
to the vulnerability of the complex: the fact that the extant
MOU had not been revised was not one of these. Although the Deputy
Commander of ISAF stated that the command and control arrangements
detailed in the extant MOU at the time were sub-optimal, the Joint
Review Board documentation released by the US as part of their
investigation, states that command and control of the incident
was effective and well coordinated. The MOD believes that the
significant emphasis that the Committee has placed on the importance
of the MOU is therefore unwarranted.
The proposed revisions to the extant MOU in question
were never formally exposed to the UK command chain. The minutes
of Executive Steering Group (ESG) meetings at the time make no
mention of any formal discussions or decisions taken regarding
the MOU.
Security incidents recorded in Helmand Province
2. The inference we drew from the Chief of Joint
Operation's evidence was that the number of security incidents
was unusually high in Helmand Province in 2012. Unfortunately
the MoD declined to provide us with comparable details of the
level of security incidents recorded in Helmand for previous years
as this information was classified. This would have allowed us
to make an informed assessment of the relative threat levels in
the area at the time. (Paragraph 26)
The MOD apologises for the delay in sharing this
data and has provided a copy of the requested classified information
with this response.
Camp Bastion guard towers
3. The arrangements for manning of the guard towers
around the perimeter of Camp Bastion were exposed by the attack
as inadequate. The decision not to man Tower 16 on the night of
14-15 September 2014 contributed directly to the failure to detect
the insurgents at an early stage which might have limited the
impact of their assault. We note that all guard towers are now
manned constantly. (Paragraph 33)
As stated in the Joint Review Board documentation
released by the US as part of their investigation, Tower 17 also
had sight of the location where the insurgents broke through.
However, whilst Tower 17 was manned, due to that night's extremely
low light levels, of just 2% illumination and no moon, it was
assessed that the guards were unable to detect the attackers.
The attackers were obscured by a Wadi until the last 250m and
they struck 140m from Tower 16 and 200m from Tower 17 at the extreme
range of visibility from these towers.
The decision not to man all the towers at any one
time reflected the assessed nature of the threat at the time,
which was predominantly focused on vehicle entry points to the
complex. The UK position on guard tower manning was consistent
with measures implemented by ISAF forces across the complex.
Perimeter Security
4. We were concerned to learn of the number of
breaches of the perimeter fence of Camp Bastion in the two years
prior to the attack and the apparent tolerance of poppy cultivation
immediately outside the fence. We consider that the failure to
take concerted action to prevent these activities increased the
risk of surveillance and intelligence gathering by Afghan nationals
which could have assisted insurgent planning for an attack on
the base. (Paragraph 38)
Investigations of previous breaches concluded that
they were likely to be low-level criminal activity and scrap metal
theft, often conducted by unarmed juveniles and children.
Any identified breaches of the perimeter fence due
to scrapping activity were investigated immediately and the damage
to the fence repaired. As CJO said in the open session: "At
the edge of the camp, as you were right to point out, there were
settlements, but those settlements were not cleansed. Imagine
the circumstances in which you would have to find reason to do
that. Those people were going about their normal day-to-day business.
There was a mixture of criminality and silliness by children,
and the last thing we want to do if we find a kid trying to get
over a fence is to shoot him or her dead. In the balance of judgment
at the perimeter level, you have not only to be absolutely sure
that this is a terrorist intervention or an enemy intervention,
but to make sure that, in determining that, you do not mistakenly
kill an innocent person going about his normal business or who
may just be mischievous. Some of those judgments are really difficult.
Soldiers face difficulties every day when trying to come to those
judgments about whether or not an enemy threat is real.
Since the incident we have implemented measures to
improve force protection. This includes increased manning of towers
and patrolling within set sectors of the perimeter as was demonstrated
to the HCDC during their visit to theatre.
Force Protection projects and expenditure
5. Media reports suggested that prior to the September
2012 attack additional security measures at Camp Bastion were
denied funding by the MoD on cost grounds. We have seen no evidence
that proposals for improved force protection measures were turned
down by the UK chain of command. (Paragraph 45)
The MOD welcomes the Committee's agreement that there
is no evidence that MOD withheld authority for force protection
enhancement measures on cost grounds.
6. The "burning man" incident in March
2012 prompted a review of security measures around the perimeter
of the Bastion airfield. We consider that the decision by the
Executive Steering Group to create a ditch and berm defensive
obstacle rather than erect additional fencing was a proportionate
response to the threat of an insider attack through vehicular
incursion onto the airfield from within the base. It is unlikely
that additional fencing around the airfield perimeter would have
presented a significant impediment to the insurgents on 14-15
September 2012 and altered significantly the outcome of the attack.
(Paragraph 46)
The MOD welcomes the Committee's agreement that an
additional fence around the airfield perimeter would not have
had a material effect on the outcome of the attack on Camp Bastion
in September 2012, and that the installation of a ditch and berm
defensive obstacle was a proportionate response to the insider
threat to the airfield.
7. The MoD were wrong to refuse to share the report
on the attack prepared by Lieutenant General Bradshaw, in his
capacity as Deputy Commander ISAF. As this was the highest level
UK report into the attack, its status as an ISAF document should
not have prevented its release to us. The MoD has been obstructive
and unhelpful to us as we tried to establish the facts surrounding
the attack. (Paragraph 48)
The MOD has co-operated fully with the Committee's
investigation. Both the Defence Secretary and the Chief of Joint
Operations (CJO) have given oral evidence to the Committee and
CJO has provided the Committee with a classified briefing on the
events of 14-15 September 2012 in closed session. The MOD has
also responded in writing to a number of specific questions which
the Committee has raised. Furthermore, the MOD facilitated a visit
by the Committee to the site of the attack in Camp Bastion where
Committee members were briefed by commanders on the ground. The
MOD has been as open and helpful as possible whilst maintaining
operational security for the force protection of the Bastion,
Leatherneck, Shorabak complex. The MOD has also provided the Committee
with a redacted version of the RAF Force Protection Wing Operational
Learning Account and After Action Report which was produced in
the immediate aftermath of the incident.
Deputy Commander ISAF, Lieutenant General Bradshaw,
produced his report at the direction of Commander ISAF and on
behalf of HQ ISAF, not the UK MOD. This classified report is owned
by HQ ISAF and it is not within the MOD's gift to release it to
the Committee. It should be noted that this document was not part
of the documentation released by the US in the context of their
accountability review.
8. We are concerned that the perimeter security
and force protection measures in place at the time of the attack
were inadequate. We were told that the focus of ISAF commanders
had been on security incidents elsewhere in Helmand Province and
on threats from insider attack. Insufficient attention was given
to the fundamental requirement of defending Camp Bastion from
external assault. We believe that this was complacent. Given that
the attack took place in the British sector of the camp, British
commanders must bear a degree of responsibility for these systemic
failures and associated reputational damage. (Paragraph 49)
In September 2012 there were 37 UK bases across central
Helmand. ISAF troops still had lead responsibility for security
in much of the Province and ISAF troops were heavily engaged in
direct combat operations against the insurgents. The operational
priority was within Task Force Helmand's area of operations, and
the threat to UK forces in that area was assessed to be greater
than that in the vicinity of Camp Bastion. Contemporaneous threat
assessments did not indicate a direct threat of ground attack
on the Bastion, Leatherneck, Shorabak complex. Commanders in the
field constantly review the resources and range of assets under
their command against the threats and react appropriately to these
assessments. It is however, important to understand the nature
of the insurgency in Afghanistan; not least the Taleban's proven
ability to adapt tactics and techniques. Faced with such a resourceful
enemy no defensive system could eliminate our exposure to risk
entirely.
Notwithstanding the above, in the 12 months prior
to the September 2012 attack, a total of 21 infrastructure projects
had been completed at Camp Bastion, including installation or
modification of protective walls, CCTV, additional fencing, and
a range of other enhancements. A concertina wire barrier, a ditch
and berm (an artificial ridge or embankment) obstacle and a boundary
chain link fence were in place around Camp Bastion at the time
of this attack. The number of UK force protection personnel had
increased from 110 in 2009 to 293 in September 2012 and this number
was judged sufficient when set against the assessed threat at
the time. Force protection measures at the time of the attack
were coherent and applied to the same standards across the Bastion,
Leatherneck, Shorabak complex.
The UK MOD is not complacent and always seeks to
capture and learn lessons from current operations. There was no
one single causal factor in this incident. This was confirmed
by CJO during his appearance before the Committee, when he said
"the causal errors evident in the aftermath contributed to
that vulnerability. That vulnerability cannot be put down to a
single item that failed".
We are confident that we have identified all significant
lessons and acted upon them. Consequently, we are content with
our earlier assessment that no further UK action is required.
Force protection at Camp Bastion is kept under constant review
and is adjusted to provide appropriate levels of mitigation for
the assessed threat level.
9. We note the acknowledgement by the MoD that
errors were made which, collectively, created the vulnerabilities
which were so devastatingly exploited by the enemy. From the evidence
we have received, we are satisfied that as far as possible, these
vulnerabilities have now been addressed. (Paragraph 50)
The MOD welcomes and agrees with the Committee's
conclusion.
10. We recommend that the MoD capture the lessons
identified from this extraordinary attack as part of its wider
efforts to learn lessons from Afghanistan for future operations.
It should explain how it intends to do so in its response to our
Report. (Paragraph 51)
Lessons have been identified and captured following
numerous UK, US and ISAF reviews in the year following the attack
on Camp Bastion. As a result of these extensive efforts, there
have been further significant enhancements to force protection
at the complex: additional personnel have been deployed, command
and control arrangements improved and base surveillance measures
enhanced.
As we are still committed to ongoing operations in
Afghanistan, we have yet to agree plans for a detailed lessons
learned exercise beyond those already conducted on a routine basis
by all three Services. The MOD has already provided extensive
information on the Defence lessons process[1].
Lessons identified following individual instances such as the
attack on Camp Bastion are included in these processes as a matter
of routine business.
1 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defencecommittee/afghanistan/written/8957.pdf Back
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