The Armed Forces Covenant in Action Part 5: Military Casualties, a review of progress - Defence Committee Contents


2  Mental health of Armed Forces personnel

Background

7. In our previous inquiry into military casualties, we found that the MoD did not have a complete understanding of the mental health needs of serving personnel or veterans. We recommended that the MoD identify the extent of mental health problems in the Armed Forces, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and alcohol misuse. We were also concerned about the higher incidence of mental health problems in reservists who had been deployed. We concluded that mental health was an area we needed to follow up with the Armed Forces and the MoD.[7]

8. In general, the mental health of the Armed Forces is good, and it is important that the public and Parliament recognise this fact. But, Service personnel remain particularly at risk from certain conditions. Professor Simon Wessely, Director of the King's Centre for Military Health Research told us:

    [...] in general, the mental health of the armed forces remains remarkably robust, all things considered in terms of what has been going on in the last 10 years and the nature of the post. It is important that the general public get that fact. This is not a crisis that we are facing, a catastrophic failure in morale or a tidal wave of problems. But […] we know that there are particular groups who are particularly at risk, and particular problems that are perhaps more prevalent in the armed forces than in the rest of the population. Plus, of course, being in the armed forces does not make you immune from the same problems that afflict all of us.[8]

Incidence of mental health problems

9. The MoD has commissioned extensive research from the King's Centre for Military Health Research into the impact of deployment on the mental health of Armed Forces personnel. The Centre has conducted two large cohort studies of some 10,000 personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and those not deployed. The studies were reported in 2006 and 2009.[9] The Centre has since been commissioned to undertake a further cohort study following up these individuals, with the inclusion of additional Armed Forces personnel to increase the sample size. In addition to written questionnaires, this study will involve interviewing and collecting more detailed clinical information from a subset of the sample, 1,500 to 1,800 Armed Forces personnel.[10]

10. Professor Wessely and Professor Nicola Fear, Director of KCMHR, told us that the cohort studies indicated a level of common mental disorder amongst Armed Forces personnel of some 20 per cent including 11 per cent suffering from depression and some three to four per cent experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), both in line with rates in the general population.[11] However, personnel deployed in combat roles, reservists and individuals whose cumulative length of deployment was 13 or more months in any three year period exhibited higher rates of PTSD at six to seven per cent.[12]

11. The majority of personnel who reported symptoms of PTSD in the KCMHR studies had not asked for medical treatment on return from conflict zones. The KCMHR is currently undertaking research for the US Government as to the value of post-deployment screening. Professor Wessely described it thus;

    We previously showed that screening for mental health problems before people deploy was ineffective. It basically doesn't work. It is much more interesting to see whether screening people when they come back, when they may have developed mental health problems—as opposed to predicting—has more utility. We are in the middle of the first ever such trial in the world, doing post-deployment mental health screening of more than 10,000 people, and that is ongoing. The results of that will definitely have an impact on policy one way or the other.[13]

Stigma

12. We asked Professor Wessely about the problems of stigma associated with Armed Forces personnel seeking help for mental health problems. He said that stigma was a problem in the general population as well as in the Armed Forces but that the level had been reducing in the Armed Forces.[14] Indeed, he argued that more people in the Armed Forces sought help than in the general population—he estimated that 40 per cent of those who needed help in the Armed Forces had asked for it compared to an estimated 25 per cent in the civilian population.[15] He noted that the degree of stigma was dependent largely on circumstances, explaining that the stigma associated with seeking help when in theatre was much greater than when at home:

    It is as though when people are on deployment, they really are very task-orientated, they want to know they can rely on their mates, so it is not the right time to be emoting and talking about your personal problems. Then, when they come back, it drops quite dramatically and it is a good time for talking about these things. So it is important not to see it as an innate quality that people have. In the military context, there are times when you can understand that and you can see why it might be so, so I think we have to have a more nuanced view of stigma.[16]

Treatment of regular Armed Forces personnel

13. Armed Forces personnel can access Defence Medical Services (DMS) mental health care support through their local medical centre which can refer them to one of the 16 UK Defence Community Mental Health teams (DCMH) or one of the five overseas departments.[17] If required, inpatient care has been provided under contract by South Staffordshire and Shropshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust since 2009.[18] Mental health support is available on operations from field mental health teams.

14. In 2008, the Armed Forces introduced a non-medical response to traumatic events, starting with the Royal Marines, called Trauma Risk Management (TRiM). TRiM is now the responsibility of the single Services and is delivered by trained peers not mental health professionals. The MoD told us that TRiM was judged by commanders to contribute to operational effectiveness as it ensured a timely and front line response to the needs of Service personnel exposed to traumatic events.[19] In addition, since 2009 all Armed Forces personnel undergo a mandatory period of decompression on return from operations. Decompression provides time for personnel to readjust before returning to family life in the UK.[20]

INCREASED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL SEEKING MENTAL HEALTH SUPPORT

15. The number of military personnel being treated for mental health problems has increased as has the rate of patients diagnosed with a mental disorder. Between 2007­08 and 2012-13, the number of new cases requiring care from Defence Community Mental Healthcare (DCMH) increased by a third (5,000 to 6,700) and the number of patients diagnosed with a mental disorder rose from 3,500 to 5,100 (45 per cent increase). The number of consultations conducted by the DCMH rose despite the reduction in the size of the Armed Forces over this period.[21] These figures do not include those personnel being treated by their GP. The MoD told us that the complexity and seriousness of the cases being treated had also increased as illustrated by the increase in the number of appointments per patient and the rise in the number of personnel medically discharged from the Armed Forces with a diagnosis of PTSD.[22]

16. The MoD told us that the increase in those seeking help might be partially due to the success of anti-stigma campaigns and TRiM, although it could also indicate an absolute increase in levels of mental illness.[23] The increase could also be due to personnel presenting earlier with mental health problems than in the past. Professor Wessely said that there had been a big drop in the length of time before personnel sought help and that this might be a good thing. He further said:

    [...] there is no doubt that within the Defence Medical Services and the charity sector, people are presenting earlier than they used to. Combat Stress, for example, used to say that it was 12 to 14 years before people would present. Now that is certainly not the case. Now we know it may be up to two years, so there has been a big drop in the length of time it takes before people will either come and get help or, as happens more often, be told to get help by their spouse or whatever.

    […] It might be a mark of the fact that some of the stigma campaigns and the outreach programmes are having an effect. We will have to see, and the longitudinal study that we are doing will help to separate out these various themes, but we should not leap to the conclusion that because the defence services are seeing more cases, something has gone wrong in theatre. It might well be that this is something we should be pleased about.[24]

17. Following the 2005 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the MoD increased the number of personnel providing mental health support by 25 including an additional 13 psychologist posts. The total number of defence mental healthcare staff across UK and overseas is approximately 250,[25] and the MoD is currently looking at recruiting additional mental health professionals and developing pilot schemes to exchange staff with the NHS to transfer skills.[26]

18. We welcome the introduction of the Trauma Risk Management system and the MoD's work in reducing the stigma attached to seeking help for mental health problems. We also welcome the fact that personnel are seeking help for mental health problems earlier than in the past. The Armed Forces have seen a significant increase in the number of personnel requiring treatment by the Defence Community Mental Healthcare Teams without a proportional increase in the number of staff. Given evidence that Service personnel are coming for mental health support sooner than in the past and while they are still serving, pressure on existing resources will only increase. In response to this Report, the MoD should inform us of its plans to deal with the increased volume of work and tell us how quickly it can ramp up its support for personnel in the event of any further acceleration in the number of personnel coming forward for help.

Reservists

Higher numbers of reservists report mental health problems

19. Reservists experience higher levels of reported mental health problems than regulars, experiencing double the rate of PTSD post-deployment compared to regulars in all roles and continuing to show higher rates five years after deployment. When asked about the higher incidence of mental health problems, Surgeon Captain Sharpley said that although reservists had a higher rate of PTSD, they had a lower risk of alcohol misuse and, therefore, the totality of the mental health problems of reservists were broadly equivalent to those of regular personnel.[27] Rear Admiral Williams told us that the culture of the command chain needed to change to be more effective at dealing with mental health problems, in particular to encourage personnel to seek support. He also said that this change had to be extended to ensure that those who work with the Reserve Forces were aware of the problems faced by reservists on their return from deployment.[28]

20. Air Vice Marshal Murray of SSAFA said that reservists were often isolated on return from deployment:

    Young soldiers understand where to get help from; Reservists—this goes back to the isolation point—don't really understand, and nor do their families. They don't really know how to hook into and how to get support from the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, which is there if they need it, but it is about getting into it. They are also pretty independent people running pretty independent lives, which is a strength. But when things go wrong, they can go horribly wrong and they are on their own.[29]

21. In its cohort study, the KCMHR asked reservists how they dealt with reintegration back into civilian life. Professor Fear said that the cohort study looked at:

    reintegration back into civilian life—how they coped with socialising with their civilian friends and their families, but also with reintegrating back into their civilian employment. We found that those Reservists who struggled—who had problems readjusting—were more likely to report mental health problems across the board, particularly PTSD and common mental disorders.[30]

22. We asked Professor Wessely what needed to be done to improve mental health support for reservists. He stressed that any solution had to involve informal support:

    […] The implications of what we are saying are fairly obvious all round, but these are very difficult things to do in reality. It is not just formal social support that you can deliver. You could deliver increased welfare services and provide more counsellors and more psychologists and all those things, but the evidence shows that just as important—some people think more important—are the informal networks that you cannot create because they come naturally. They are about mates being bonded together.[31]

23. In our last Report on military casualties in December 2011, we recommended that the MoD identify the factors leading to the difference in the rates of PTSD between reservists and regulars. The MoD is in the process of commissioning two pieces of research related to the mental health of reservists. The first one will explore the factors which determine why reservists are more at risk of mental health problems on return from combat operations and will assess the awareness of reservists of mental healthcare and support services. The MoD described the second project as follows:

    KCMHR research indicated that Reserves post deployment normalisation and reintegration experiences were different to that of their Regular counterparts. The requirement was identified to develop a Post Operational Stress Management (POSM) programme tailored to Reservists differing needs.

    This research programme will look to provide recommendations on the most appropriate POSM programme for improving Reservists reintegration and normalisation experiences and as a consequence improve their mental health outcomes.[32]

    Neither of these pieces of research have yet been formally commissioned but the MoD expect them to report in March 2015.

24. The MoD has introduced some specific support for demobilised reservists with mental health problems but it is still limited. Professor Fear said:

    We evaluated the Reserves mental health programme and showed that the individuals who were going through that were having good outcomes, so that was shown to be effective.[33]

25. The higher incidence of mental health problems developing in reservists deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan has been known for some considerable time. Given our earlier recommendation in 2011 that it investigate the factors contributing to that higher incidence, we are disappointed that the MoD is still in the process of commissioning this research. This has meant that the MoD has yet authoritatively to identify or to address these issues and provide support specifically tailored for reservists. This is of great concern to the Committee given that the importance of identifying and addressing the particular problems facing reservists is increased by the growing dependence on Reserve Forces in Future Force 2020.

Alcohol misuse

26. The MoD told us that KCMHR research "found that the misuse of alcohol in the military is substantially higher than that seen in the civilian population, particularly among 16 to 19 year olds, with males drinking over twice the hazardous levels and females over three times".[34] In addition, Professor Fear told us that male NCOs and Officers are more likely to die from alcohol-related causes than other occupational groups within the general population.[35]

27. The MoD described its policy on alcohol consumption as shown in Box 1 below. It stressed that it had breathalysing and discipline procedures for personnel with safety critical duties.Box 1: MoD policy on alcohol consumption
While social drinking can play a part in developing group cohesion within the military culture, the MOD recognise the benefits of this must be balanced against misuse which could be hazardous to the individual, families or colleagues and ultimately operational capability. Therefore the MOD strategy has a twin track approach of education (routine awareness campaigns and health fairs) and regulation (for example discipline procedures and breathalysing for those on safety critical duties), with medical and welfare support for those who require it, including intervention and rehabilitation programmes. The strategy works on the principle that alcohol misuse is preventable and recoverable, and even those who are alcohol dependent can be helped.

The single Services are responsible for delivering through-life alcohol prevention programmes designed to raise awareness of the dangers of excessive alcohol misuse, including how to drink within safe limits; additional training is also provided for those in command positions. Each Service approaches the through-life framework principle in accordance with their needs, resulting in variations in programme delivery. For example the Royal Navy delivers lectures every one or three years, dependent on age, while the Army runs health fairs and bespoke alcohol presentations. The single Services all take a firm stance against misuse and manage it through a process of counselling, administrative and disciplinary action. They promote, through awareness campaigns and education, the sensible use of alcohol in accordance with government guidelines, in order to develop a culture of positive attitude and behaviour towards health and wellbeing. Their aim is to rehabilitate individuals as quickly as possible so that they remain operationally effective. Responsibility for a successful rehabilitation lies with both the individual and the support services. Nevertheless, there are those individuals who, despite chain of command and medical support, combined with an extensive treatment and rehabilitation programme, cannot be rehabilitated; in these rare instances, these individuals are discharged from the Services.

Source: Ministry of Defence[36]

28. In our previous Report on military casualties, we expressed concerns that it was unclear whether the MoD regarded the misuse of alcohol as part of a pattern of reprehensible behaviour which required discouragement or a manifestation of stress which required treatment or a combination of both.[37] We recommended that the MoD carry out a study into what was driving the misuse and abuse of alcohol and what more could be done to change behaviour.[38]

29. In October 2012, the MoD commissioned research to explain the high rates of alcohol consumption in the Armed Forces and the disparity in consumption between military and civilian populations and to recommend improvements in the management and prevention of alcohol misuse in the Armed Forces. This study concluded in August 2014 and confirmed the findings of the KCMHR research that hazardous levels of alcohol consumption are the norm in the Armed Forces, regardless of Service or gender. The study reached some other worrying conclusions, in particular, that alcohol misuse continues to rise and is associated with criminal offences and violent behaviour causing problems to families and communities. It also pointed to an "attitudinal and cultural ambiguity regarding alcohol, it is considered by many to be a positive catalyst of group cohesion and to help Armed Forces personnel deal with the aftermath of deployment".[39]

30. The study made recommendations under the categories of prevention, intervention and treatment. The recommendations included limiting the availability of alcohol on Armed Forces premises and increasing its price; education of personnel; intervention for those with recognised alcohol problems; and better treatment options including the employment of alcohol misuse specialists. In addition, the study made overarching recommendations on the need to develop a clear alcohol policy highlighting clearly key approaches and responsibilities and a major campaign to ensure all officers are committed to reducing alcohol consumption across the Armed Forces.[40]

31. We questioned the charities as to whether some Armed Forces personnel were resorting to alcohol to help them with mental health problems, Bryn Parry, co-founder of Help For Heroes, said:

    What we are seeing is that all those who have had some life-changing injuries, so that they can no longer do the job that they wanted to do, are presenting with some mental condition. They have concerns. They are not sleeping, they have anxieties or depression, and they are turning to alcohol and so on.[41]

32. We welcome the MoD's acceptance of our previous conclusion that it needed to recognise the seriousness of the problem of alcohol consumption in the Armed Forces and that it has strengthened its response to the problem. However, we remain concerned that the MoD's response has not had any noticeable impact on the level of excessive and binge drinking in the Armed Forces. We are not convinced that sufficient focus has been given to dealing with the problem at every level of the chain of command. We also question whether the MoD has examined whether excess alcohol consumption may, in some Service personnel, be masking other mental health problems.

33. We are disappointed that the MoD took well over a year to commission research into the drivers of excessive alcohol consumption. The conclusions of the study are very worrying. Clearly, urgent action is needed to tackle the harm caused by the abuse of alcohol to both Armed Forces personnel and their families. In its response to this Report, the MoD should tell us how it intends to implement the study's recommendations and in what time frame.

34. The MoD should determine a comprehensive strategy and plan to tackle alcohol misuse, identifying how it intends to change the culture within the Armed Forces and identifying practical measures to reduce consumption including, if necessary, reviewing pricing policies and availability of alcohol on bases. The plan should incorporate the recommendations of the study on excessive alcohol consumption. It should also include performance measures which will indicate whether the plan is working in reducing excessive alcohol consumption.

Violence

35. The KCMHR has undertaken research on offending behaviour, linking data on Armed Forces personnel from its longitudinal cohort study to criminal records. The results showed that those who are serving or have served in the Armed Forces have a lower overall offending rate than the general population. Professor Wessely said:

    […] those who served in the forces have an overall offending rate that is lower than the general population. When you think about the fact that, as is known, the forces recruit some people from very disadvantaged backgrounds—some of whom already have criminal offences, and they may well have gone on to acquire more—that tends to speak to the idea that, overall, offending goes down when you join the forces.[42]

However, rates for violent offending are higher. Lifetime violent offending (ranging from threats of violence to serious physical assault or worse) was more common among male Service personnel—11 per cent compared to 8.7 per cent in the general population. A pre-Service history of violence, younger age and lower rank were the strongest risk factors for violent offending. Men who were deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan with direct combat exposure were 53 per cent more likely to commit a violent offence than men who served in a non-combat role on operations. Witnessing traumatic events on deployment also increased the risk of violent offending. Alcohol misuse, PTSD, and high levels of self-reported aggressive behaviour on return from deployment were also found to be strong predictors of subsequent violent offending. [43]

36. Professor Wessely said that rates of violent offending were higher in those who had been deployed:

    The exception is violence, and it is clear that that goes up. It is particularly clear that that goes up in the obvious groups—those who have previously offended, etc., with social deprivation and so on—but equally it goes up in those who have been in combat. So, for those in the teeth arms—in the infantry arms—who have been deployed and been in combat, it goes up. Remember that generally in life violent offending goes down. That is a specific deployment effect and it is massively compounded by alcohol and somewhat compounded by PTSD. If you are asking me honestly, I would say that the most significant negative effect of military service is in the rates of violence, but overall rates of offending are lower and overall there are fewer veterans in prison than you would expect from their size in the population. So it is a very specific effect.[44]

37. Increases in violent offending behaviour are linked to deployment in combat roles and subsequent misuse of alcohol and other risk taking behaviour. The MoD should identify those most at risk of such offending and put in place measures to assist these personnel to manage the aftermath of deployment in combat roles better.

Domestic violence

38. Domestic violence has a profound effect on families. The MoD told us that the Armed Forces do not tolerate domestic violence. It also said:

    Service personnel who are themselves experiencing violence and Service family members who are victims of violence have a comprehensive range of sources of help and information including single-Service welfare providers, welfare and personnel staff, Families' Federations and help-lines.[45]

The MoD wrote to us about the detailed policies on responding to domestic violence and supporting the victims of domestic violence led by each of the three Services.[46]

39. The research on violent offending discussed above did not separately identify domestic violence although Professor Wessely said that he thought domestic violence was also likely to be higher than the general population.[47] The KCMHR is currently undertaking a study of over one thousand children of military fathers on the impact of military life. Professor Fear described it thus:

    […]. We have got over 600 fathers who have been recruited into our study, so we have collected information from them on their health and well-being and on their family structure, their relationship with their partner or ex-partners and children and their view on the social, emotional and behavioural development of their own children.

    Through the fathers, we have access to the mother or mothers of their children, and we ask the mother the same questions about their mental health and well-being, their relationship with the father and the children and their views on the children's development from an emotional and social perspective. For those children who are 11 and older, we have contacted them directly and collected information from them, asking them, "What's it like having a father in the Military—the good things and not-so-good things?" We also ask them the same questions about their own development.[48]

This study has yet to report.

40. We asked the MoD what it was doing to track incidents of domestic violence. It told us that it had "seen no evidence that suggests domestic violence is a greater problem with the Service community than in the civilian community".[49] The MoD has limited information on the number and nature of incidents of domestic violence in the Armed Forces, and, in particular, in the Reserve Forces nor does it know how many of these incidents happen as a result of deployment in combat roles.[50]

41. The MoD needs to understand better the links between deployment on combat operations, alcohol misuse and domestic violence. The MoD must be more proactive at all levels and should re-examine its policies on domestic violence and develop plans to intervene to prevent domestic violence or, at least, reduce the incidence of domestic violence by Armed Forces personnel. These plans should deal with both regulars and reservists.


7   Defence Committee Report The Armed Forces Covenant in Action? Part 1: Military Casualties Seventh Report 2010-12, HC 762 Back

8   Q1  Back

9   King's Centre for Military Health Research: A fifteenth year report, September 2010 Back

10   Q52 Back

11   Q52  Back

12   Q3  Back

13   Q40 Back

14   Q19  Back

15   Q20 Back

16   Q19 Back

17   MoD (MIL0027) page 2 Back

18   MoD and Department of Health (MIL038) Back

19   MoD (MIL0027) page 6  Back

20   MoD (MIL0027) page 6 Back

21   MoD and Department of Health (MIL038) Back

22   MoD and Department of Health (MIL038) Back

23   MoD and Department of Health (MIL038) Back

24   Q53 Back

25   MoD and Department of Health (MIL038) Back

26   MoD and Department of Health (MIL038) Back

27   Q167 Back

28   Q167 Back

29   Q124 Back

30   Q10 Back

31   Q14 Back

32   MoD and Department of Health (MIL038) Back

33   Q40 Back

34   MoD (MIL0027) page 4  Back

35   Q57  Back

36   MoD (MIL0027) page 4  Back

37   Defence Committee Report The Armed Forces Covenant in Action? Part 1: Military Casualties Seventh Report 2010-12, HC 762  Back

38   Defence Committee Report The Armed Forces Covenant in Action? Part 1: Military Casualties Seventh Report 2010-12, HC 762 Back

39   MoD further evidence (MIL045)  Back

40   MoD further evidence (MIL045) Back

41   Q115  Back

42   Q66 Back

43   King's Centre for Military Health Research paper UK military personnel at risk of violent offending March 2013  Back

44   Q66 Back

45   MoD further evidence (MIL041) page 4 Back

46   MoD further evidence (MIL041) page 5 Back

47   Q77 Back

48   Q76 Back

49   MoD further evidence (MIL041) page 4  Back

50   MoD further evidence (MIL041) Back


 
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Prepared 30 October 2014