Government response
The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence
Committee's interest in the rationale for, and conduct of, interventions
and is pleased to present its response to its Fourteenth Report
of Session 2013-14 Intervention: Why, When and How?
Our formal response to the Committee's recommendations
and conclusions is set out below. The Committee's headings and
findings are highlighted in bold, with the Government's response
set out in plain text. For ease of reference, paragraph numbering
in brackets refers to the order in which they are presented in
the Committee's Report.
Introduction
1. We note that the Ministry of Defence defined
intervention "as the projection of military force (augmented
by other agencies as required) outside UK sovereign territory
to achieve an effect in securing, protecting or promoting UK national
interests through the use or threat of force". However this
definition seems to us to be very narrow, as it takes minimal
account of the UK's wider responsibilities as a UN Security Council
member or as a member of NATO or other alliances where national
interests might have to be balanced by wider global responsibilities.
We also note that several of our witnesses have referred to humanitarian
intervention which does not appear to fit within the Government's
definition. We call on the Government to develop definitions of
the terms "intervention" and "humanitarian intervention"
which can be used across Government Departments and be included
in the next iterations of the National Security Strategy and the
Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 7)
We believe that meeting the UK's wider global responsibilities
is an intrinsic part of the UK's national interest. As set
out in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS):
"Our national interest requires us to stand
up for the values our country believes in—the rule of law,
democracy, free speech, tolerance and human rights … we must
continue to advance them, because Britain will be safer if our
values are upheld and respected in the world.
To do so requires us to project power and to use
our unique network of alliances and relationships—principally
with the United States of America, but also as a member of the
European Union and NATO, and a permanent member of the UN Security
Council."
In order to protect and further our enlightened national
interest (the principle that our security, prosperity and freedom
are interconnected, mutually supportive and constitute our national
interest), the 2010 NSS established that our response must encompass
two complementary strategic objectives: ensuring a secure and
resilient UK; and shaping a stable world. The shaping of
a stable world and tackling the drivers of instability involves,
amongst other instruments of Government, the use of the Armed
Forces (i.e. intervention) for humanitarian purposes. We
therefore believe that the broader concept of intervention desired
by HCDC, including intervention for humanitarian purposes, is
already contained in the 2010 NSS and it does inform MOD's actions.
However, we will consider the value of making this more explicit
in future iterations of the NSS and SDSR.
Strategic rationale for intervention
2. A strategic and well-articulated vision of
the UK's position in the world would lead to more rational decisions
on whether or not to intervene as well as a better public understanding
of the rationale for any future decision. It would also assist
in identifying the strategic objective of such operations, contributing
to a more coherent UK foreign, defence and security policy. (Paragraph
21)
As we have stated in our response to the Committee's
recent report Towards the Next Defence and Security Review:
Part One, the 2010 NSS set out a clear over-arching vision
to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity,
extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen our
security. Part II of the NSS referred to "Britain's distinctive
role", which addressed the UK's economic position, our place
at the heart of many global networks and our role in international
affairs. Following on from that vision, the 2010 NSS also set
out the National Security Tasks which identify the ways in which
the UK will act to achieve the objectives of ensuring a secure
and resilient UK and shaping a stable world. SDSR 2010 also gave
details of the policies to be pursued to achieve those objectives.
3. We remain concerned about the lack of realism
in the Government's assertion that there will be no shrinkage
of UK influence when resources are still being reduced. We call
on the Government to set out in the next National Security Strategy
whether it still maintains this assertion and, if so, how it could
be achieved. (Paragraph 22)
Global influence is not just about the size or even
the capability of a country's armed forces. The UK exerts influence
in a variety of ways: diplomatic and economic, development assistance,
and technological and cultural exchanges, in addition to our capability
and willingness to use military force. Through the work of the
National Security Council (NSC), the NSS, and the Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR) the Government has sought to coordinate
these different aspects so the sum of the whole is demonstrably
greater than the sum of the individual parts, looking to ensure
that the UK's influence does not automatically shrink as our proportion
of the world's economy and population naturally reduces. As the
National Security Strategy will be produced after the next election
it would be inappropriate to make assertions at this time.
4. The next National Security Strategy should
consider the case for the UK developing a regional strategic focus,
particularly in light of new or re-emerging threats to European
defence and security. We acknowledge that there will be times
when the UK would have to act beyond this regional focus. The
next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security
Review should also include a discussion on the UK's future role
in NATO and its resourcing by its members. (Paragraph 23)
We remain committed to delivery of the 2010 SDSR
with NATO as the bedrock of our defence. NATO's responses
to the current security environment and its priorities for the
future will be discussed at the Wales Summit and the outcome of
these decisions will shape both the NSS and SDSR. The Summit agenda
is still being developed but defence spending is expected to be
part of the debate.
5. We continue to support the Government's adoption
of an "adaptable posture" in the 2010 Strategic Defence
and Security Review. The threats to UK national security remain
uncertain and unpredictable and it is important that the Government
and UK Armed Forces retain the flexibility to deal with them.
The 2010 National Security Strategy said that the national security
apparatus had focused on non-state actors and that the current
main national security threat was from international terrorism.
We agree that these threats remain, but call on the Government
to ensure that the next National Security Strategy gives due weight
to the likelihood of a return to an increased threat of state
versus state conflict and that the force structure, manpower,
equipment and capability decisions in the next Defence and Security
Review ensure that UK Armed Forces are able to meet all these
threats. (Paragraph 24)
We welcome the Committee's continued support for
the adaptable posture adopted in the 2010 SDSR. As the Committee
notes, the threats we face remain uncertain and unpredictable
and it is important to retain the flexibility to deal with them.
However, we must also ensure that our force structures, and indeed
all tools of Government, are balanced to face those threats we
deem most likely or most severe. It is for this reason that we
are currently reviewing the National Security Risk Assessment
(NSRA). The NSRA will in turn inform the NSS and SDSR.
6. We agree that intervention in its many forms
has an important role to play in the UK's national security and
maintaining the national interest. We note the MoD's statement
that military intervention remains an option of last resort in
the UK's national security strategy and should only be considered
when other means have failed. Unfortunately, but understandably,
the last resort is often seen by the public as the first resort
due to the Government's failure to communicate the other means
it has employed prior to a decision to intervene. In addressing
this perception, the Government should set out how it determines
that other means have failed and that intervention is the best
option. The Government should consider building on the so-called
"Chicago doctrine" from 1999 by including in the next
National Security Strategy a statement of the criteria for when
and whether to intervene. (Paragraph 31)
The UK uses a variety of means to pursue our national
security objectives: diplomatic and economic, development assistance,
and technological and cultural exchanges, in addition to our capability
and willingness to use military force. Through the NSC, the Government
coordinates these instruments to seek to achieve our objectives.
The 2010 SDSR set out broad criteria for our use of the Armed
Forces: "deploying them decisively at the right time
but only where key UK national interests are at stake; where we
have a clear strategic aim; where the likely political, economic
and human costs are in proportion to the likely benefits; where
we have a viable exit strategy; and where justifiable under international
law."
7. We call on the Government to include in the
next National Security Strategy (NSS) and the next Defence and
Security Review a description of interventions that it regards
as non-discretionary and the rationale behind this view. This
would give a good indication of UK intent in terms of its national
security interests. We note that the Ministry of Defence recognises
that some interventions can be regarded as discretionary. While
we understand that the Government will need to be selective in
undertaking discretionary interventions, it should consider developing
a base criteria for these types of interventions to be included
in the next NSS. Such criteria would assist the Government in
deciding whether an intervention was in the UK's national interest
and also assist in communicating and engaging with the public
on intervention decisions. The next NSS should also detail what
types of discretionary intervention operations the Government
envisages the UK would be able to undertake on its own and those
which it would undertake with allies. (Paragraph 32)
The uncertainty and unpredictability of the world
makes it difficult to draw any hard line between what should be
considered discretionary or non-discretionary. Any decision to
undertake a 'discretionary' operation would be based around the
criteria set out in the 2010 SDSR and on our response to the Committee's
recommendation six above.
Defence Planning Assumptions, set out in the 2010
SDSR to underpin our force structures, envisage the UK being able
to undertake a non-enduring simple intervention, a non-enduring
complex intervention, and an enduring stabilisation operation
concurrently[1], or for
a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our
effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with
maritime and air support. But, as the 2010 SDSR made clear, we
rarely act alone internationally and will work in alliances and
partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger responses.
Alliances and partnerships are thus a fundamental part of our
approach to defence and security. This is unlikely to change in
the future.
8. We have welcomed the establishment of the National
Security Council (NSC) and support its attempts to bring greater
coordination and focus across Government on security matters to
lead to greater operational effectiveness. National security requires
a whole government joined up approach. However, we are concerned
that the NSC becomes too involved in operational matters and short-term
imperatives rather than giving the strategic lead on questions
such as intervention policy. (Paragraph 34)
As set out in our response to the Committee's recent
report Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One,
while the National Security Council does discuss strategy, its
primary role is to determine policy, agree actions and then evaluate
the implementation of those actions. The balance between strategic
and operational discussions will always fluctuate according to
need. More strategic discussions have examined the UK's relationships
with China, Russia and India, alongside strategic work on the
Emerging Powers, a cross-cutting look at how government spends
resources overseas, and, currently, a strategy for long term relationships
with and interests in the Gulf region. Discussions have been much
more operational at critical moments on topics such as Libya,
Afghanistan and Ukraine.
9. The legal justification for military intervention
will continue to be controversial. We note the Government's statement
that when there is no UN Security Council Resolution for action,
there is a legal basis available under the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention which would permit the UK under international law
to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate a humanitarian
catastrophe providing certain conditions are met. We question
whether the Government's position is generally accepted by the
international community or the British public. The Government
should set out in detail in the next iterations of the National
Security Strategy and the Defence and Security Review the principles
of its legal position, including its relationship with the UN
Charter, international law and the concept of the Responsibility
to Protect, on the deployment of UK Armed Forces for intervention
operations. This would assist with providing the public with greater
information on, and understanding of, the Government's position
on the use of UK Armed Forces rather than waiting to the heat
of debate immediately prior to a potential deployment. (Paragraph
49)
We note the Committee's recommendation to set out
the principle of our legal position in the next NSS and SDSR.
The Government's position on humanitarian intervention as a legal
basis for the use of force was set out in Appendix A to the Right
Hon Hugh Robertson MP's letter to the Right Hon Sir Richard Ottaway
MP in his capacity as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
which is attached as Appendix A to this response.
10. We welcome the Government's publication of
summaries of its legal position on the deployment of UK Armed
Forces. We note the Government's view that the confidentiality
of the Attorney General's full legal advice needs to be upheld
and that legal privilege is an essential component of the UK's
legal system. We hope that the publication of summaries of the
Government's legal position on the deployment of Armed Forces
will continue to be regarded as normal and best practice. We recommend
that these notes should always state how this position was formulated
and who was consulted. We further recommend that the Government
should undertake to continue to publish its legal position on
the deployment of the Armed Forces. (Paragraph 51)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation
on the publication of the Government's legal position on the deployment
of the Armed Forces. The publication of summaries of the Government's
legal position on the deployment of the Armed Forces will need
to be considered on a case by case basis taking into account the
confidentiality of the Attorney General's full legal advice.
11. The role of Parliament in conflict decisions
is a contentious issue. The House of Commons' decision in August
2013 to reject the potential deployment of military force to Syria
(despite provisions in the Government's resolution that would
have required efforts to secure a UN Security Council Resolution
authorising such action and a further vote in the House of Commons
on direct UK involvement) has significantly added to the debate
on what the role of Parliament should be in conflict decisions
and its relationship with the Royal Prerogative on such matters.
The Government should intensify its efforts to resolve this matter.
We regard Parliament's role as one of a strategic inquisitor on
military deployments. As a first step, we call on the Government
to clarify its position on whether it wishes to legislate to formalise
the requirement to consult Parliament on military action or whether
it favours codifying the role of Parliament in a Parliamentary
resolution. We do not consider it appropriate for the Government
to wait until the next possible military deployment to resolve
this issue. We conclude that, wherever possible, Parliament should
be consulted prior to the commencement of military action, but
recognise that this will not always be possible such as when urgent
action is required. We call on the Government to commit to ensuring
that a summary of the legal justification on military action is
available to Parliament in advance of any such debate. (Paragraph
65)
Having considered in depth the evidence submitted
by both the Constitutional Committee and the PCRC and reflected
thoroughly on the performance of the current convention, not least
in respect of the Parliamentary debate and vote on Syria, the
Government has concluded that the existing constitutional arrangement
provides an effective mechanism by which to engage Parliament
in conflict decisions.
The Government remains committed to the existing
convention that before UK troops are committed to conflict, the
House of Commons should have the opportunity to debate and express
its view through a vote, except where there was an emergency or
such action would not be appropriate. We also expect that future
Governments will observe this convention.
The publication of summaries of the Government's
legal position on the deployment of the Armed Forces will need
to be considered on a case by case basis taking into account the
confidentiality of the Attorney General's full legal advice.
12. We understand and acknowledge the current
lack of appetite for military operations given the experiences
and tensions of the past decade for operations in countries such
as Afghanistan and Iraq. However, it is also necessary to understand
and acknowledge that there are consequences to decisions by the
UK and the international community not to intervene in humanitarian
or non-humanitarian situations. Non-intervention decisions have
implications for the UK's place in the world and its influence
which are as profound as a decision to undertake an intervention
operation. Decisions not to intervene could have wide global implications
for efforts to deter hostile actions by other states or non-state
actors. The Government should be more forthright in stating the
consequences of non-intervention when it proposes intervention
actions. The next National Security Strategy and the next Defence
and Security Review should also include an indication of how the
Government balances and decides between these two choices. (Paragraph
70)
13. We welcome the Government's intention that
any deployment of UK Armed Forces should have a clear strategic
aim. While conscious that deployments will differ and some will
be of an urgent nature we repeat our call that the Government
should develop this concept by undertaking a more detailed, comprehensive
and strategic assessment before deciding to intervene. This should
address the strategic ends, ways and means, including generating
the necessary parliamentary support. We call on the Government
to set out in the next Defence and Security Review how it determines
and measures success against the strategic aims set for the deployment
of UK Armed Forces. We have seen no sign that its approach has
resulted in a more strategic use of the Armed Forces since the
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 74)
We recognise the impact non-intervention can have
on deterrence and this is taken into account when undertaking
strategic assessments on the costs and benefit of intervention.
Whilst no decision has yet been taken on the final scope of the
next National Security Strategy or Strategic Defence and Security
Review, initial preparatory work is underway. The Committee's
recommendations will be thoroughly considered as part of this
work.
Interventions: How?
14. The Government must ensure that the plans
and resources for Future Force 2020 enable the Armed Forces to
carry out the roles intended for them, including that of undertaking
intervention operations. We note the commitment to a 1% real terms
increase in the equipment budget from 2015 but this must not be
achieved by further manpower cuts. We also note the concepts listed
in the 2010 SDSR (readiness, reconstitution, reinforcement, regeneration
and dependency) as being central to achieving the optimal effect
for Future Force 2020. We will explore the MoD's progress in fulfilling
these concepts as part of our forthcoming inquiry into Future
Force 2020. (Paragraph 80)
The Government remains committed to the delivery
of Future Force 2020 and notes the Committee's recommendations.
We look forward to assisting the Committee with their forthcoming
inquiry into Future Force 2020.
15. We agree that the UK will be required to work
closely with allies and partners in interventions, not just in
terms of military capability and force size but as a means of
maintaining and demonstrating legitimacy. We note the Ministry
of Defence's statement that it may sometimes be necessary to limit
or modify the objectives of a possible intervention to achieve
the broadest possible support from the international community.
However, this must not be at the risk of undermining the strategic
aim of the intervention operation. We agree with our witnesses
that regional ownership of interventions can on occasions be important
and desirable. The next National Security Strategy and the next
Defence and Security Review should set out how the Government
plans to develop regional partnerships which will help in delivering
the UK's national security objectives. (Paragraph 86)
We agree with the Committee that the objectives of
a possible intervention should not be modified to the extent that
they risk undermining the strategic aim, but the importance of
working with allies and partners should not be underestimated.
In most scenarios the involvement of regional partners and other
allies provides attributes (be it regional knowledge, military
capability or demonstration of political will) that make the strategic
aim far more achievable than if the UK were to act alone. Under
the International Defence Engagement Strategy we are already doing
much to develop regional partnerships and build capacity for regional
ownership of security challenges, contributing to the UK's strategic
national security objective to shape a stable world. The future
development of regional and other partnerships is an important
issue for consideration in the next NSS and SDSR.
16. We note the US's stated intention to have
a greater strategic focus on the Pacific region. However, the
level to which the US will reduce its strategic focus on, and
interest in, European affairs is unclear, particularly in the
light of recent events in Ukraine. We call on the Government and
other European NATO countries to develop a strategy for the future
role of NATO and its resourcing that takes this into account.
This should include a vision of the leading role to be played
by the UK in encouraging European NATO states to take on a greater
degree of responsibility in NATO operations. The NATO summit in
September 2014 provides an opportunity for consideration of such
matters. The summit also provides an opportunity to discuss the
role of non-NATO countries in NATO-led operations. We call on
the Government, in its response to this Report, to set out how
it intends to take these matters forward at the summit. (Paragraph
87)
The NATO Summit in 2014 comes at a crucial time for
the Alliance and Trans-Atlantic security as the security challenges
we face become more unpredictable and less easy to manage. The
Wales Summit will be a critical opportunity to shape the future
of the Alliance and ensure that NATO has the right posture, capabilities
and partners to continue its vital role in defending against the
full range of global security threats facing us in the 21st Century.
The bedrock of our security remains an unbreakable
bond between North America and Europe in NATO. However, it is
right that the US should increasingly be a security partner with
Europe, rather than a provider of security for Europe. The UK
is in a unique position to lead and influence the debate in NATO
on a more equitable way of sharing the capability and operational
burden within NATO, building on our privileged relationship with
the US and our leading role in Europe.
In recent years, NATO partners have considerably
augmented NATO's capabilities by bringing greater political legitimacy
and additional capacity to operations, including by providing
10% of the air campaign in Libya, and by constituting almost half
of the nations participating in the NATO-led campaign in Afghanistan.
The Summit is an opportunity to re-affirm the value we attach
to partnerships and to maximise our cooperation with our partners,
particularly with those willing and able to make force and financial
contributions to operations and capability initiatives.
17. The development of new capabilities, such
as the ability to take offensive cyber action, has profound implications
for the way the UK intervenes. Although these capabilities bring
with them advantages, in terms of not putting UK Armed Forces
personnel in harm's way, their use also raises a number of questions.
The next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and Security
Review should consider the implications of these capabilities
and their use in future interventions. (Paragraph 89)
As the Committee has noted, the MOD announced in
September 2013 that, to supplement our defensive capability, the
UK will build a cyber strike capability: an offensive capability
to deter adversaries from attacking us. Any use of these cyber
capabilities will be in accordance with national and international
law, and the use of any UK military capability is subject to strict
ministerial oversight. The UK Government position is that International
Humanitarian Law, following the principles of humanity, proportionality,
and military necessity and ensuring that only appropriate military
targets are selected, applies equally to cyber operations in the
course of an armed conflict as to any other military operation. The
threat posed in the cyber domain will be considered in the NSRA
review, the findings of which will inform the NSS and SDSR.
18. We welcome the Government's commitment to
a "Comprehensive Approach". We also welcome the emphasis
on conflict prevention envisaged in Building Stability Overseas
Strategy (BSOS) and the International Defence Engagement Strategy
(IDES) and the involvement of UK Armed Forces with other agencies.
It is important that the Armed Forces and other actors understand
the context in the countries in which these activities are taking
place, including the development of the language skills required
for effective engagement with the local population and authorities.
The Government should also outline the metrics it has developed
to measure the effectiveness of both the BSOS and the IDES. In
interventions where the purpose is not for humanitarian reasons,
care must be taken to ensure that the coercive or deterrent action
taken is proportionate and that the risks are fully assessed.
(Paragraph 96)
We recognise the importance of increasing the Armed
Forces' understanding of the culture, language and context of
the countries in which they serve. In order to develop this,
Defence Attaché (DA) career management and training are
currently being reviewed to ensure that attachés are best
equipped to deliver the IDES. It is envisaged that this will include
the development of a Defence Engagement career stream that will
deliver a professionalised military diplomat with credibility
and developed cultural, language and other skills that can subsequently
be re-cycled back into the DA Network later in a career. In a
similar vein, the placing of UK Loan Service teams alongside the
Armed Forces of a number of foreign nations is becoming increasingly
recognised as key to IDES delivery and a range of measures have
been recommended to optimise this approach.
Looking beyond the DA and Loan Service Network, under
the auspices of the Defence Language and Cultural Capability Management
Board, there has been significant progress in reinvigorating cultural
and language skills. The Defence Centre for Languages and Culture
opened in September 2013, and the reintroduction of culture modules
in language training, including where appropriate for spouses,
has already taken place. Further single Service initiatives
seek to record accurately both language and cultural skills, and
thus allow them to be better exploited by the MOD.
When measuring the effectiveness of international
defence engagement, it is usually impossible to link progress
towards UK goals to specific activities (such as the attendance
of an individual on a UK defence training course). The MOD
has therefore taken an outcomes-based approach, using a metric
(the "Maturity Model") to measure overall progress against
UK MOD objectives, including in securing access, basing and over
flight rights; capacity building; building influence; supporting
UK trade and exports; and defence industry cooperation. Like most
of the benefits of defence engagement, the outcomes we measure
are long term, and subject to buffeting by events, and so while
we measure the maturity of our outcomes against our objectives
now, the real importance of these metrics is the change we will
see in the next 5 to 10 years.
19. Strategic communications are vital for intervention
operations. The perceptions of local populations affected by such
operations are crucial to the success of these missions. Success
also requires the strategic aims and objectives of the mission
to be understood by the public in the UK. We call on the Government
to develop coherent and understandable meanings for the terms
used across Government Departments for its intervention policy
and defence engagement strategy. It should also develop methods
to increase public understanding of them as this will assist in
improving public understanding and perceptions of the use of the
Armed Forces. (Paragraph 101)
The Armed Forces are held in high esteem by UK society
at large, as demonstrated by regular polling and the public support
shown at events held nationwide around Armed Forces Day. But we
recognise that support for the Armed Forces is not always the
same as support for the aims and objectives of an operation. The
new communication strategy for Defence will emphasise the role
of the Armed Forces at home and abroad, underpinning the security,
prosperity and global success of the UK. With regard to the channels
used to communicate with the public, we shall be increasing the
use of social media.
20. We welcome the intention to plan for viable
exit strategies for deployed UK Armed Forces although we recognise
that this risks sending signals to adversaries that intervention
is bound in time, space, military force or desired effect. However,
it is vital that consideration of an exit strategy should commence
at an early stage, perhaps even prior to deployment. (Paragraph
108)
21. Interventions bring with them responsibilities
in respect of exit strategies and end states and these will invariably
take longer than anticipated. Securing the peace is as important
an objective as winning the war. The Government should set out
in the next National Security Strategy and the next Defence and
Security Review how it defines and assesses successful exit strategies
and end states, including how long they should take for each of
the actors involved and how it measures the success of the transition
from exit strategies to the desired end state. Exit strategies
must also ensure safety of Armed Forces personnel remaining in
country and that of other UK agencies such as DFID. (Paragraph
109)
Interventions must not be open-ended and it is only
right that we have a strategy for what we seek to achieve and
how this will be maintained once forces withdraw, though of course
it is also essential to retain flexibility and the capacity to
adapt to events. By defining a clear strategic aim from the outset—as
part of an integrated cross-Whitehall approach—we would
expect Government to have a common understanding of the circumstances
that would trigger an end to a military deployment and the shift
to a civilian-led post conflict engagement. We note the Committee's
recommendation to consider end states and exit strategies in the
next National Security Strategy or Strategic Defence and Security
Review.
22. Lessons learned from military deployments
are vital and the Government must ensure they take place in a
timely manner. We note that the Ministry of Defence says it works
with other Government Departments in capturing best practice.
The Government must ensure that a unified vocabulary is used across
Government. As well as ensuring the capture of good practice,
the lessons learned process must capture mistakes so that future
operations can be appropriately informed and planned. The Government
should outline what steps it is taking to engender a culture of
openness and willingness to share mistakes and the lessons learned
from them across the various participants involved in such operations.
(Paragraph 117)
As a consequence of the MOD's lessons learning process
to date, notable improvements have been made in tactical and technical
areas, such as the Op HERRICK Theatre Capability Review, development
of our doctrine, counter-Improvised Explosive Device training,
urgent operational requirement procurement and flight safety. Where
appropriate, lessons reports are shared with other government
departments, such as DFID in the case of Typhoon Haiyan. MOD,
together with other Departments, also works closely with the
Stabilisation Unit, which identifies lessons learned on conflict,
security and stabilisation across Government, so that performance
can be improved. Defence has identified the need for a more effective
overall approach to learning, so that at the operational and strategic
levels we critically learn from history, training, education,
operations and strategic events, and routinely apply what has
been learnt to future activity. To do this we are developing
a Defence Organisational Learning Strategy (DOLS). The DOLS
involves developing the right behaviours, processes and tools
across Defence to achieve lasting improvements, so that we systematically
apply the acquisition, analysis and use of knowledge to our full
range of activities. This initiative is, therefore, not
primarily about learning the lessons of a specific operation,
but instilling a culture of learning across Defence.
23. We welcome the Government's use of Global
Strategic Trends and the Future Character of Conflict as part
of the work on the next National Security Strategy (NSS) and the
next Defence and Security Review (DSR). We call on the Government
to include in the next NSS and the next DSR an outline of the
contribution of this work to improvements in the UK's national
security. In response to our Report, the Government should set
out the use it has made of external academic and research resources
as part of its analysis of future global trends and national security
requirements.
The MOD is working closely alongside broad partnerships,
including academia, as part of its strategy work. An example
is a current seminar series funded by the Economic and Social
Research Council, which seeks to connect the academic community
to British defence and security policy. Such seminars bring together
speakers and participants from across academia, civil society,
government, the MOD and Armed Forces to consider key challenges
facing British defence. Subjects covered to date include the 'UK's
place in the world' conference held at Kings College London and
'the UK and the Changing Character of Conflict and Intervention'
conference held at the University of Birmingham. In addition,
we have sought specific support for a series of strategic studies
in the last two years from the academic community and broader
communities including NGOs and think-tanks (examples include
RUSI, RAND, Chatham House, and IISS).
The recently published 'Global Strategic Trends—Out
to 2045' and the forthcoming 'Future Operating Environment 2035'
will inform the next NSS and SDSR and we note the committee's
recommendation in respect of the important role of these documents
in providing context.
Conclusions
24. Intervention policy and decisions have the
potential to be controversial and to polarise opinion. This Report
is intended to assist the articulation of the rationale for an
intervention strategy in the next National Security Strategy and
the next Defence and Security Review which might make for better
decision making by Government and assist in alleviating some of
the controversy on decisions to intervene. (Paragraph 120)
25. As a starting point the Government must articulate
a realistic vision of the UK's place in the world, its level of
strategic influence and the way the world is changing as well
as the identification and prioritisation of the risks to it. The
next Defence and Security Review should then translate this vision
into defence planning assumptions and the development of the appropriate
force structure. This would assist more strategic decisions on
why, when and how to intervene. (Paragraph 121)
26. The next National Security Strategy (NSS)
and the next Defence and Security Review (DSR) should define and
communicate the circumstances in which the UK might intervene
and the role of interventions, and set out the legal basis for
the UK's interventions. The NSS and the DSR should also set out
what interventions the Government regards as non-discretionary
and those which are discretionary. The Government should also
outline the different approaches it might use such as defence
engagement, conflict prevention and the projection of military
force and how it ensures coordination and unity of purpose between
the different Government Departments and agencies and ensures
that appropriate lessons are learned from previous interventions.
This will lead to more effective intervention operations in the
future. (Paragraph 122)
As the work for the next National Security Strategy
will span the period of the next election, it would be inappropriate
to make decisions on its final scope at this time. However, we
note the Committee's conclusions and these points will be considered
carefully as part of the ongoing preparatory work.
1 Operations of up to 1,000, 2,000 and 6,500 personnel
respectively. Back
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