3 The ultimate goal
The
necessary characteristics for decision-making
51. 'Decision-making' is the act of identifying the
alternatives available, and choosing between those alternatives
based on the values and preferences of the decision-maker.[103]
Decision-making is notoriously prone to psychological bias, and
it is, therefore, essential that rigorous structures are put in
place to challenge and improve individual decisions. Decision-making
in defence has a distinctive need for clarity, because it is entrenched
in a three-tier level of decision-making: strategic, operational
and tactical, with different tiers of decisions typically made
at separate levels of the organisation.
52. Once high-quality, relevant information and evidence
has been gathered, effective decision-making in defence is dependent
on three further inter-related elements. The first is who
makes the decision. In the case of defence policy, the leading
decision-makers are the Prime Minister, Secretary of State (SofS),
Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and other military and civilian
figures (an outline of their decision-making roles is set out
in the box above).[104]
Individuals have the ability to change the direction of discussion,
according to their interests, priorities or force of character.
The personal qualifications, experiences and attitudes of the
decision-maker (including the needs, preferences and values of
that individual) are vital. General Lord Richards of Herstmonceux,
former Chief of the Defence Staff, stressed the significance of
personalities in decision-making, exclaiming that "personalities
really do matter". He emphasised the importance of "the
selection of the right person," and said that it was vital
to ensure that decision-makers possess "the right background
and the right temperament".[105]
So too does their education and training, and since tactical competence
is different from strategic wisdom, separate education and training
is needed for these different types of defence thinking.
53. Second, is the process used to make that decision.
A consideration of process examines the structure of the
organisation in which that decision-maker operates. In the case
of defence, this might be through the Defence Board, the National
Security Council (NSC),[106]
or other committees of the Civil Service. The box below shows
the current decision-making structures within the Government and
Civil Service that relate to defence.[107]
The 'process' of decision-making in turn relies on having the
right procedures or methodologies for decision-making, the right
organisational design, and sufficient high quality and up-to-date
information (decision-makers would need to be aware of the costs
and benefits of taking a particular decision).
54. The Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Michael
Fallon MP, insisted that:
Decision-makers need to be well informed. I know
where all our units, ships and aircraft are, and I know their
state of readiness. I know where we are in budgetary terms, and
in terms of the expenditure of each command. We know that and
see it on a systematic, monthly basis. If I did not have that,
coming from a business background I would certainly feel a bit
more unsighted.[108]
55. Finally, there is the question of whether
the option finally chosen was decided through a process of rational,
logical consideration of the risks and alternatives available.
Were appropriate options identified? Was there a logical, rational
deliberation on the options? Were alternatives ranked on the basis
of their costs and benefits?
The key expectations: criteria
for decision-making
56. Our case-studies in decision-making on UK operations
in Helmand Province in 2006, and decisions on the procurement
of the aircraft carriers, suggest there were problems in all these
areas. In summary, our evidence suggests the following:
1) Expertise included in deliberations, including
the input of relevant knowledge and intelligence
57. In both cases there was an absence of detailed,
reliable and proven evidence-based advice. Policy analysts did
not put together their advice by seeking out and including the
knowledge of experts in the field. Where experts provided advice,
this was often ignored, or set aside, without justification.[109]
58. In neither case did decision-makers appear to
be sufficiently informed, skilled experienced and able to admit
where they had gaps in their current knowledge. They were not
historically and culturally informed and aware of lessons learnt
from previous programmes or campaigns. They appeared to lack the
necessary education and experience in strategic thinking. We believe
that Ministers should be encouraged and supported to spend much
more time in operational theatres, with a broad range of contacts,
including local civil society, in order to develop their feeling
for ground realities.
2) Accountability and responsibility, including
evidence of an auditable trail for decisions made
59. The decision-maker, who was responsible for allowing
actions to happen, based on their preferences, was not identifiable.
Ministers, who were accountable to Parliament, were not able to
justify where they had delegated responsibility. It was difficult
to trace where, how and when decisions were made, as well as how
they were amended over time. As Major General Elliott has argued:
there should be transparency about who has taken
the decision […]. There has to be public accountability that
that decision has been taken. I suggest that much more formal
orders should be given and that there should be an auditable trail
as to how those things went down.[110]
3) Structure
60. The structure of decision-making at the Ministry
of Defence, did not allow for a clear chain of command, or provide
an appropriate route for the flow of information, including between
departments. This may be a particular challenge for the MoD as
it deals with so much classified information, but is still necessary.
As Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Robert Fry, told us, in Afghanistan
and Iraq:
there was a military chain of command that went
from the Prime Minister to the Chief of the Defence Staff to the
Chief of Joint Operations and into the deployed forces in the
field. That was entirely clear and it worked well within the military
dimension. What I think failed, and failed signally, was the ability
to combine that with all the other instruments of national power
which should have been part of a co-ordinated strategy.[111]
61. In Afghanistan, the chain of command was further
complicated through having a theatre commander in Afghanistan
who was generally an American. Lieutenant General (retired) Sir
Robert Fry told us that "Therefore, what you had was an American
campaign within which you had a British implant. This created
all sorts of complications".[112]
4) Ability to challenge
62. The advised information on which decisions are
made did not appear to be sufficiently open to debate and challenge
from within the Ministry of Defence, involving, where appropriate,
other Government departments, and outsiders such as academic commentators.
Ministers themselves did not appear able to challenge military
advice.
5) Long-term thinking, including a focus on
strategy
63. Decision-making did not seem to take into account
the long-term needs of the UK. This led to unanticipated costs
in the future that would have been unnecessary, had a long-term
strategy been identified at the outset.
64. In summary, we did not find in relation to Helmand
or the carriers that decisions were made by the right people,
within efficient and supportive structures, with rational assessments
of the costs and benefits of the available options. The Government
has since been relatively frank in conceding that there were serious
problems in the decision-making in both cases. The Secretary of
State, Rt Hon Michael Fallon, for example, has said that Government
was "not being properly recorded or prepared and was all
very loose and haphazard".[113]
65. But the Ministry of Defence appears to argue
such problems are now in the past, because of two key changes
since 2010: the Levene reforms and the introduction of the National
Security Council. The Secretary of State, for example, argued,
that the introduction of the NSC, had brought "real structure"
to decision-making.[114]
It is to these reforms that we now turn.
103 Robert Harris, Error! Bookmark not defined.,June
2009, virtualsalt.com, accessed 22 February 2015 Back
104
Error! Bookmark not defined., Gov.uk, accessed 02 February 2015;
Error! Bookmark not defined. [Ministry of Defence]; and Error! Bookmark not defined.
[Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP] Back
105
Error! Bookmark not defined. [Lord Richards] Back
106
The National Security Council will hereafter be referred to as
the 'NSC' Back
107
For example, Error! Bookmark not defined. [Ministry of Defence] Back
108
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109
For example, Error! Bookmark not defined. [Brigadier Butler],
Error! Bookmark not defined. [Dr Kim Howells], Error! Bookmark not defined.
[Dr Kim Howells], Error! Bookmark not defined. [Lord West] Back
110
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111
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112
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113
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114
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