4 Efforts to change
Changes
to the roles of the Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Defence
Staff
Levene Reforms
66. The roles of the Chiefs of Staff and the Chief
of the Defence Staff (CDS) have been altered as a result of an
inquiry into the Ministry of Defence, led by Lord Levene. This
Defence Reform report (2011), subtitled "independent report
into the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence",[115]
looked, among other things at the MoD's decision-making capabilities.
It criticised:
· the
'conspiracy of optimism' between industry, the military, officials
and Ministers;
· an institutional
focus on short-term affordability at the expense of longer-term
planning;
· a lack
of clarity over who is responsible and accountable for taking
decisions and an emphasis instead on reaching decisions by consensus
in committees to achieve coherence across defence, which can let
the best be the enemy of the good.
67. The critique of optimism, lack of long-term strategy,
and clear accountability, reflects our own conclusions. The central
remedy Lord Levene proposed was that the MoD should "provide
a simpler framework that […] makes senior individuals responsible
for [decisions], gives them the means and incentives to deliver,
and holds them robustly to account".[116]
This new framework was defined by two new bodies, the Defence
Board and the Defence Strategy Group. In respect of the objective
of clarifying and formalising decision-making relationships within
the MoD. Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence
told us that:
The primary responsibility inside the Department
for decision-making rests with the Defence Board, which I chair
monthly. Lord Levene draws attention to the increased influence
on the board of the non-executives, the regard in which it is
held compared with other Whitehall boards, and the way in which
it has been operating. As you are probably aware, alongside the
Defence Board we have the Armed Forces Committee and the regular
meetings that the Chief of the Defence Staff holds with the service
chiefs. In addition, I chair a weekly meeting on operational matters
with other Ministers and representatives of the various departments.
As far as the Ministry is concerned, I think decision-making works
reasonably well.[117]
68. To meet the Levene objectives of improving long-term
strategic thinking by leaders within the MoD, Jon Thompson, Permanent
Under-Secretary, told us that the MoD had created:
the defence strategy group, a strategy function
that thought some of those big thoughts. That is currently chaired
by the Chief of the Defence Staff and me. It includes [Vice Chief
of Defence Staff, Comd JFC, DG Security Policy, DCDS (Military
Strategy and Operations), DCDS (Military Capability) and DG Finance
as members][118]. It
meets on a regular basis and thinks about what the state of the
world will be in 2050, what will happen as and when the ice caps
of the north melt, and what that will do in terms of the security
position. It can think longer and it can think bigger thoughts,
and that has been a good development.[119]
Changes to the work of the Chiefs of Staff
69. One of the effects of the Levene Reforms was
to diminish further the roles of the heads of the three services
(the "Chiefs" including the Chief of the Defence Staff,
Chief of the Naval Staff, Chief of the General Staff and the Chief
of the Air Staff, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, and now joined
by the Commander of Joint Forces Command). Historically the Chiefs
formulated strategy and directed military operations with senior
political figures, including the Prime Minister. Over the years,
with the establishment of the Ministry of Defence, the rise of
the Senior Civil Service, and following major reforms including
the Heseltine reforms of 1984, and the Levene reforms of 2011,
the roles of the Chiefs of Staff, have been seriously curtailed.
70. Following the Levene reforms in June 2011, the
heads of the three services lost their places on the Defence Board
but were instead jointly represented by the Chief of the Defence
Staff, Lord Richards. Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, then Secretary of
State for Defence, was reported as saying that this would end
a situation in which the chiefs spent most of their time "trying
to influence policy and haggle over funding in London" and,
instead, would be "empowered" to determine their own
operational priorities once budgets were determined.[120]
71. The Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State
for Defence, described the primary role of the Chiefs' as "to
run their services". The deployment of services falls instead,
to the Government through the "principal structures of the
Cabinet and NSC".[121]
The Secretary of State endorses the idea that the Chiefs primary
role lies not in strategic decision-making, but rather in "generating
combat power", which includes responsibilities for "training"
and "morale".[122]
Peter Watkins cited the Levene report as the driver of the change,
so that the Chiefs were responsible for running their own services".[123]
72. The new structure was intended to allow the Chiefs
to concentrate on a Chief Executive role of operations, giving
them more control of budgets, and avoiding a situation where they
were able to push the particular interests of their own service.
Rather the validity of requests could be processed by the CDS
or PUS to try to determine an objective balance of ideas for proposal
to political leaders for decision. Jon Thompson, the Permanent
Under-Secretary told us that:
I do not hear any significant complaints [from
the Chiefs]. […] The new cadre of service Chiefs […]
have taken on the delegated model and the responsibility. If you
talk to General Carter, he would describe himself […] as
the chief executive of the Army. That seems to be the kind of
approach that we want. He is running an £8 billion organisation
with more than 100,000 employees, and I personally fundamentally
believe that the right place to take major decisions about the
Army is at the Army Board level, with the Defence Board standing
back and cohering it. There are different opinions about that
model, but so far, I think, over the past four years, it has been
very successful.[124]
73. Peter Watkins, the DGSecPol, told us that the
Chiefs were not responsible for delivering "strategic advice",
and that "the link between the chiefs as a group and the
NSC, through the NSC (Officials), is the Chief of the Defence
Staff".[125] The
ability of the Chiefs to advise and influence upwards is strictly
limited to operations.
74. The Chiefs do have the right to put their thoughts
directly to the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State. However,
when we put this option to former Chief of the Naval Staff, Lord
West, he told us that this was very much a last resort. He could
have gone formally to the Secretary of State and said:
"This is a really bad decision; I want to
go across the road and see the Prime Minister," which you
are entitled to do. You don't want to use that too often. I used
that threat only when it looked as though they might cancel the
carrier programme. On a couple of occasions, I made it very clear
to the Secretary of State that I would go across the road to see
the Prime Minister and make it public if that happened, but I
did not have the clout to change it myself.[126]
There is otherwise no formal way for the Chiefs to
explain their strategic concerns.
75. Some commentators have criticised the new structure
for removing the opportunity for the Chiefs to voice their concerns
about strategy and thereby influence national security. These
concerns were not lost on former CDS, Lord Richards, who increased
weekly meetings with the Chiefs of Staff from one hour to two
hours. Lord Richards thought that the Chiefs "absolutely
should be part of the strategy",[127]
and further that military advice should be their "principal
and primary role" and not as chief executive of the single
services. He claims that he did not accept that the Chiefs should
be excluded from strategy.[128]
Lord Richards was concerned, however, that these meetings now
happen far more rarely-only once per month.
76. The Chiefs of Staff secretariat has also been
described to us as "weak". Lord Richards told us that:
that is a reflection of cuts and so on. It sort
of works, but there is also a new committee called the Armed Forces
Committee which, on a routine departmental basis, is probably
more important than the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which has a
focus on the operational side of life.[129]
CDS
77. The 1982 Nott-Lewin reforms, rendered the CDS
as the "supreme strategic commander", which Major General
Chris Elliott labelled as a "major change" to decision-making
structures.[130] The
CDS is responsible for providing military advice to the Secretary
of State and the Prime Minister.[131]
The CDS also "ultimately has responsibility for the implementation
of the military strategy".[132]
78. Commentators have suggested scope for potential
rivalry between the CDS and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State
(PUS). The PUS has the:
most unlovely position, because he is wire-brushed
by Parliament if things are one penny out, which is an almost
impossible target to meet. So he is going around the whole time
trying to make sure that value for money is achieved.[133]
This work brings the PUS into "collision"
with the CDS.[134]
Major General Christopher Elliott told us that:
one person is trying to give the services as
much as they need and the other person is trying to do the same
thing but within the available budget. So they are both coming
from the right position, but it puts them into conflict. If you
are looking for authority, responsibility and accountability,
you cannot split them among other people, which is what is happening
at the moment.[135]
Major General Elliott thought that there should be
one single person with ultimate responsibility for both budgets
and carrying out military strategy.
79. A confusing aspect of the structure within the
MoD is that the CDS does not command the Chiefs. Lord Richards,
former CDS, noted that even the Prime Minister did not understand
that the CDS did not command the Chiefs.[136]
Major General (retired) Christopher Elliott told us that he had
spoken with two former CDSs, and he had found that both of them
had been unable to affect change because they were not in direct
command of the Chiefs of Staff. He said that:
When I spoke to General David Richards, […]
I asked, "Why did you allow these equipment things—the
carrier and so on—to go that way? Are you in favour of the
carrier?" I won't tell you what he said! These equipment
issues were big issues that were distorting the rest of the programme.
He told me, "Well, I don't have anything to do with the equipment
programme." I asked, "Where are the decisions taken?"
He replied, "The decisions are taken by the Minister, talking
to the single service Chiefs, who give advice. But they don't
come through me." When I said to Air Chief Marshal Stirrup,
"Why on earth didn't you bang the heads together, because
you had this period of dissension among the Chiefs?" He turned
around […] and said, "Well, I didn't command them. If
I had told them to do it, they could have ignored me." That
is an extraordinary situation to be in.[137]
The CDS does not command the three services, he can
only co-ordinate them. There is no chain of command from the CDS
down to the Chiefs. The CDS works directly to the Secretary of
State and likewise the Chiefs work directly to the Secretary of
State. The opinions of the CDS, who is meant to represent a single
service voice, will not always tally with the combined views of
the Chiefs. Lord Richards described the situation thus:
But look at the case of the carriers, for example.
I felt strongly that the acquisition of two huge carriers would
be pretty difficult for the rest of defence and, I have to say,
the Government were quite sympathetic to my view, but the three
services worked directly with the Secretary of State for Defence
on that separately, so it did not matter what the CDS felt, even
though people expected him to be able to deliver a single services
voice. He cannot, because that is not the way that it is constructed.
The Secretary of State for Defence, the single services and the
civil service were very happy with that, because it meant that
they could divide and rule—they regularly did.[138]
80. If the voice of the CDS, on some occasions is
not able to express the united opinions of the Chiefs within the
MoD, it begs the question of how the CDS might represent the single
services at NSC meetings. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach suggested
that the Chiefs were "confident" that the CDS was "offering
their view collectively".[139]
81. Lord Richards, former CDS told us that there
was "a lot of inter-service rivalry".[140]
The tension sometimes expresses itself when a competition arises
for the allocation of MoD resources. For example Lord West, former
First Sea Lord and Chief of the Navy, told us about a disagreement
between the air force and navy regarding aircraft for the carriers.
He told us that:
the Air Force wanted to have F-35As as their
standard attack aircraft, and the F-35Bs were going to be a small
adjunct to be put in the carriers and run by the Air Force and
the Navy […] I do not know what my predecessor's view on
this was—with people saying, "Hang on, this is a big
mistake."[141]
The question then arises, how the CDS might be able
to balance the competing interests of the services.[142]
National Security Council
| Membership of the National Security Council
|
Ministerial members of the NSC
· Prime Minister
· Deputy Prime Minister
· Chancellor of the Exchequer
· First Secretary of State/Leader of the House of Commons
· Foreign Secretary
· Home Secretary
· Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change
· Secretary of State for International Development
· Chief Secretary to the Treasury
· Minister for Government Policy, Cabinet Office
· Defence Secretary
Senior officials attending when required
· National Security Adviser (NSA)
· Cabinet Secretary
· Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
· Permanent Under-Secretary, FCO
· Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)
· Director of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
· Director General of the Security Service (SyS)
· Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
|
Source: Dr Joe Devanney and Josh Harris, The National
Security Council: National Security at the Centre of Government,
page 24, instituteforgovernment.org.uk, accessed 23 March 2015
82. The National Security Council held its first
meeting on 12 May 2010. According to the Government, the National
Security Council is "the main forum for collective discussion
of the government's objectives for national security and about
how best to deliver them in the current financial climate. A key
purpose of the Council is to ensure that ministers consider national
security in the round and in a strategic way. The Council meets
weekly and is chaired by Prime Minister David Cameron".[143]
The Chief of the Defence Staff and Heads of Intelligence Agencies,
"attend when required".[144]
The NSC is formally a sub-committee of the Cabinet. However, questions
remain about the exact relationship between this sub-committee
and the Cabinet. The question that this raises is whether this
structure has replaced "sofa Government" with circumvented
Government.[145] We
seek clarification on the relationship between the NSC and the
Cabinet, and further reassurance on how the Cabinet will be involved
in the formulation of national strategy and the next SDSR.
83. We are concerned that under the current arrangements
for decision-making, the Prime Minister could hypothetically "short-circuit"
the system and impose his own preferences for defence policy.
The Prime Minister must be answerable to the House of Commons
for all decisions which he wishes to enforce within defence. We
recommend that the Government explain to us how the Prime Minister
would be held to account, if (s)he chose to short-circuit the
system.
84. The concept of the NSC was developed before the
current Government took office, and was intended to address a
perceived weakness that internal and external security had always
been considered separately. Baroness Neville-Jones, a former member
of the National Security Council told us that:
Operationally, there are some real strengths.
We have managed, as a result of instituting the council, to talk
the language of national security, which we used not to. We used
to talk about foreign policy and defence, and that disabled us
from doing something—we did not link the external and internal
aspects of security—which was one of the reasons why I advocated
the creation of the council. When I heard the head of MI5 say
that, in the run-up to the Iraq war, the Government had been warned
that there was likely to be an increase in the terrorist threat
to the country but nothing had been done about it, I concluded
that there was something wrong with the machinery of government
if that situation could arise. That was really what propelled
me, more than any other single thing, into thinking that we really
have to do something.[146]
To achieve this, it was considered that an interdepartmental
approach would be the best way forward.
Assessing the impact of the new
structures
85. Would these new structures, created as a result
of the Levene Reforms and the introduction of the NSC, prevent
a repeat of the decision-making problems, exemplified in Helmand
or in the Carrier procurement?
POTENTIAL STRENGTHS
Structure
86. One of the main benefits of the NSC is that national
security is now given priority in a formal setting. Baroness Neville-Jones
told us that:
I think that the National Security Council has,
to some extent, driven policy. It has certainly enabled the agenda
to be more orderly, relevant and timely. There is a dedicated
secretariat, after all, to do that. The preparation is good because
officials prepare beforehand, and that used not to be the case.
When I was a deputy under-secretary in the Cabinet Office, my
job was to brief the Prime Minister. I would gather deputy secretary
officials around me for that purpose, but you could then have
the meeting and the Secretary of State concerned—often the
lead Department's Secretary of State—would come along and
say, "I don't want any of this," because what he sensed
was borders on his policy turf, so we had to start changing that.[147]
87. Observers have noted that one of the core strengths
of the NSC is its inter-departmental design.[148]
By bringing together decision-makers from across Government, the
NSC incorporates a range of considerations into the design of
national strategy. Jon Thompson, Permanent Under-Secretary at
the MoD, told us that:
A positive advantage of the National Security
Council is to integrate the whole of Government when thinking
about security and defence issues on a pan-Government basis, although
I understand that others may have a different view. My experience
of the National Security Council and the underpinning NSC officials,
which is the permanent secretary level, has been that it is generally
good at joining people together. It is rare to have a defence-only
issue because, in general, our approach to solving problems is
about governance, security and development. Unless you get those
three together, countries such as Afghanistan will not succeed;
they could be more stable, but they are not well-run.[149]
88. Baroness Neville Jones told us that the inter-departmental
element was an important element in designing the NSC. She told
us that "unity of government, and the unity of pursuit of
policy across the Government, have been greatly aided by the National
Security Council".[150]
Although she added, "it is not perfect, and one of the reasons
is money".[151]
Accountability and responsibility, including evidence
of an auditable trail for decisions made
89. The NSC has also addressed the issue of providing
an auditable trail for decision-making. The Prime Minister was
brought in to chair meetings, so that the programme would have
a clear leader, and clear driver. Baroness Neville-Jones told
us that:
If you look around the world, Heads of Government
now effectively run external relations of their countries. It
is the triumph of the presidential model. The Head of Government—the
Prime Minister for us—becomes an increasingly important
figure. He has to be across all the issues with things such as
the G20. That was another reason for making sure that the Prime
Minister was at the centre of it.[152]
90. Baroness Neville-Jones told us that "minutes"
were produced, and "these decisions are recorded properly,
so you would know where the locus of decision-making lay".[153]
91. The Secretary of State specified how he felt
this concept of accountability operated in the Ministry of Defence:
I do not think it is possible for a Secretary
of State to be accountable for every single item in the Department.
I am accountable for how the Department works—how its processes
work, whether they work efficiently and whether they work responsibly.
It is a very big organisation, which has gone through some quite
extensive change in the last three or four years. One of the ways
that I satisfy myself that that change is working reasonably well
is through Lord Levene's annual health check on how the reforms
are being implemented.[154]
Ability to challenge
92. The presence of representatives at the NSC provides
an opportunity to challenge military advice, or the general decisions
made at the Ministry of Defence. The Secretary of State, Rt Hon
Michael Fallon, told us that "there have certainly been many
occasions when you query the advice that you are given, ask for
more advice, or ask for implications or effects to be considered
that are not in the advice. That is part of the normal Whitehall
process of constantly testing the advice that is put to you".[155]
WEAKNESSES
93. The new NSC structure, level of interdepartmental
coordination, clear leadership, clearer accountability, clear
civilian control, and clear opportunity for challenge, are in
our view substantial improvements on the old decision-making systems.
But more needs to be done, if the MoD is to address some of the
other fundamental problems apparent in the Helmand and Carrier
decisions.
Expertise, knowledge and intelligence
94. The first of these is the continuing lack of
deep-country or subject expertise, and therefore, the lack of
high-quality information or evidence available to the decision-makers.
For example, no longer are civil servants required to have 'domain
competence' in the fields they administer. This has opened up
career opportunities to managerial 'generalists' who can transfer
between Government Departments, at the highest levels, with no
previous experience of the subject-areas for which they are taking
on responsibility.[156]
Thus, a Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence,
however intelligent, may have no background whatever in military
matters.
95. Inevitably, the senior figures sitting at the
NSC cannot themselves be expected to be deep experts in these
fields. They are, therefore, very dependent on advice from experts
in the rest of the system. We heard evidence that the members
of the NSC did not themselves hold the expertise to make key decisions
about the configuration of the aircraft carriers. Baroness Neville-Jones
told us that "the NSC and the membership that took [the decision]
were not tremendously well equipped to take those decisions and
did not really understand their full implications".[157]
The lack of expertise of many members of the NSC was noted by
witnesses, who saw that the involvement of more expertise and
challenge to Government thinking would be beneficial.[158]
96. There has not been a fundamental reform yet of
the structures of the Foreign Office, the Military, or the Intelligence
Agencies, sufficient to provide deep comprehensive on-the-ground
reporting from conflict theatres for example. Rather the reverse.
As our report, 'Towards the Next Defence and Security Review:
Part Two: NATO', noted, there has been a dramatic decline in understanding
of Russia and Crimea.[159]
As our report on 'The Situation in Iraq and Syria and the threat
posed by Islamic State in Iraq and The Levant (ISIL)' noted, there
are not sufficient UK assets outside Kurdistan to provide a deep
understanding of key players such as the Shia militia or the Sunni
tribal groups, and therefore insufficient understanding on which
to base an independent strategy, or even challenge in an informed
fashion the existing US-Iraqi strategy.[160]
97. We heard that the attendees at the NSC were provided
with briefing papers, but that these were often disregarded.[161]
Lord Richards, former CDS and attendee at NSC meetings, compared
the atmosphere to an "Oxford union" debate, where discussion
points were spontaneous, rather than based on evidence.[162]
Lord Richards told us that the NSC (O)[163]
(a meeting of officials) discussed the agenda and briefing papers
to be presented at NSC meetings.[164]
However he said that he was:
quite impressed by the way our political leaders
almost ignored their briefings and spoke from the heart, or from
whatever was driving them. Obviously they would have notes, I
am sure, but the discussion was quite spontaneous. In a way, you
could argue that it was not as good for that reason, because officials
would have prepared some quite well-informed points for good or
ill, which often seemed to go out the window, and we came back
to emotion and politics, but it was certainly a lively debate.
Someone once described it as Oxford Union—you know.[165]
The perceived strength of having the Prime Minister
drive the NSC is also one of its key risks, since the inclinations
of a single individual would be paramount to the success or failure
of the NSC. Baroness Neville-Jones admitted that the Prime Minister,
if he wanted to, could "short-circuit" the "whole
system".[166]
Traditionally, there was a healthy and creative tension between
Government, civil servants and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed
Forces. Without expert officials and military advisers to speak
truth to power and subject politicians' proposals to the anvil
of debate, the resultant 'strategies' will inevitably be built
on shaky foundations.[167]
Military Expertise
98. One particular, area of expertise, inadequately
represented on the NSC, is in military advice. A number of departments
are present at the NSC, and some discussions have focused on whether
the presence of a single person—the CDS—is enough
to express sufficiently the issues considered important by the
military. Lord Richards, a former CDS who attended NSC meetings,
was adamant that the CDS "alone is sufficient".[168]He
told us that "if I really dug my heels in, very rarely did
the committee go against my military advice".[169]
Jon Thompson, PUS, agreed with the supposition that the CDS could
sufficiently represent the military, along with the Secretary
of State for Defence. He told us that:
I don't find either the Defence Secretary or
the Chief of the Defence Staff to be shrinking wallflowers who
cannot express their views in the National Security Council. I
am absolutely defending the mechanism—I think it has been
successful—and I will continue to do so.[170]
However, the removal from the Chiefs of Staff of
their traditional role of having an individual and collective
responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole has left
a void at the heart of the decision-making machine. Inter-Service
rivalries do not disappear simply by excluding the heads of the
Armed Forces from the formulation of strategy. There may be a
risk that constituting the Chiefs of Staff as a sub-committee
of the NSC may re-introduce inter-service rivalry. This could
be mitigated by ensuring that civil servants have domain specific
expertise. It is important that the Chiefs focus genuinely on
strategic discussion in the public interest, rather than the pursuit
of single service interests. But disagreements are better thrashed
out in an orderly forum than driven underground for arbitrary
resolution.
99. A further constraint on the ability of the NSC
to consider expertise, is that the issues were considered under
tight time constraints. Baroness Neville-Jones told us that Ministers
have to have a "very rapid discussion and the documents then
have to take shape on the basis of that discussion".[171]
The limited amount of time set to consider complex issues of national
security plays against the ability of members to consider a detailed
exploration of issues and may lead to a superficial style of debate.
100. In the meantime, the system has not become markedly
better at substituting for the absence of in-house expertise,
by accommodating-in the way the US system for example does-external
expertise. Baroness Neville-Jones told us that:
network thinking and some challenge from outside
would stimulate the intellectual juices. It is a process of discussion
which allows people to identify what they are doing well, what
they are not doing well and what more they ought to be doing.[172]
Specific training and further education for those
working in strategy
101. Lord Richards told us that:
I know senior political leaders who do not want
to use the term "strategy". They do not like strategy.
It ties them in, and stops them veering and hauling according
to the latest opinion poll, or whatever it is. If I may, until
your political leaders actually recognise that this is a really
serious issue—I know you are doing a hell of a lot to draw
attention to it—and that when they don't the result is as
you describe, I do not think it is going to get much better, sadly.[173]
This goes to the heart of the problem: the disintegration
of a tightly organised strategic planning machine, incorporating
the heads of the Armed Forces, coupled with the decline in 'domain
competence' on the part of civil servants in what should be specialised
Departmental roles, provide politicians with too little rigour
to focus their attention.
102. It seems that more needs to be done to help
the key decision-makers to think more strategically. Baroness
Neville-Jones, former member of the National Security Council,
thought that strategy was the UK's "weakest point".[174]
Baroness Neville Jones told us that:
I hope that the Prime Minister won't mind me
saying this, but I don't think he is particularly strategic. I
think he is highly operational and that he thinks. "Strategy
is what we're going to do next".[175]
103. Baroness Neville-Jones echoed Lord Richards'
comments that senior political leaders "do not like strategy".[176]
She told us that:
I do not accept the notion that because the Prime
Minister is not particularly personally strategic, the machine
cannot help him or her be more strategic. As I said, I think that
the NSC secretariat needs greater strengthening in that area.[177]
104. Lord Richards questioned why the heads of MI6,
MI5 and GCHQ were suddenly put into a strategic role on the NSC,
having spent their entire careers, being asked to provide intelligence
rather than to analyse it. He said that "they need to start
being trained to think [strategically] earlier in their careers,
however bright they are".[178]
Major General (retired) Christopher Elliott, author of 'High Command:
British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghan Wars',[179]
made a strong recommendation that "the people who are going
to be the strategic commanders have education in strategy".[180]
He believed that the UK was much weaker than the US in ensuring
that senior leaders received the appropriate strategic education.[181]
105. A lack of training may also apply to the CDS,
the sole military representative on the NSC. Major General (retired)
Elliott told us that previous incumbents of the CDS role "did
not, […] have the education, training or familiarity with
strategic thinking".[182]
He called for those who were going to be strategic commanders
to be educated in strategy.[183]
He went on to tell us that:
I make the comparison between the lack of tertiary
education in the top people, compared with their American opposite
numbers. General Martin Dempsey, as a cavalry officer, had a science
degree and three masters, one of which was in strategy. I don't
mean to say that that necessarily makes you a better person, but
it does get you into a conceptual way of thinking. Nothing like
that exists in the present system which is actively used by those
who are going to be the Chief of the Defence Staff.[184]
106. The NSC itself does not seem to be adequately
staffed, or resourced to provide deep expertise or challenge.
The secretariat appears to lack the power to commission work.[185]
Lord Richards told us that there was a lack of military experience
on the NSC secretariat.[186]
He was not convinced that the secretariat contained the right
mix of skills, saying that:
They don't get on any courses. It is not like
in the military, when you get on the High Command and Staff course.
As far as I can see, they are just posted to the NSC. Maybe they
have some interest or background, but I do not think all of them
do.[187]
In contrast, in the American system, representatives
from the American NSC are out "on the ground and they are
articulate".[188]
Baroness Neville-Jones told us that:
I think the secretariat is still underpowered
in the sense of being overstretched. It has some very good people
in it, but they are stretched beyond where they need to be. They
do not have enough capacity to think or plan, and they do not
have much capacity to lead planning. One of the things that has
not happened is actually in the SDSR. If you look at the SDSR
carefully, there is a paragraph right at the end about having
a network of planning staffs and outsiders led by the National
Security Adviser. I do not believe that that has happened. I do
not think that he has the bandwidth, because he not only runs
the secretariat, but also acts as the Prime Minister's emissary.
He is stretched in many directions.[189]
Long-term thinking,
including a focus on strategy
107. The NSC could potentially provide an excellent
opportunity to discuss strategy, with a variety of expert voices
feeding into the conversation. Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary
of State for Defence, thought that the NSC presented an effective
forum for discussing strategically important topics. He said that:
I think that it does have a strategic look at
some of the big issues that we need to confront, and it certainly
did in the run-up to the decision to commit to military action
in Iraq…to move from humanitarian and political engagement
to military engagement, was a key strategic decision, not least
because of the past—because we had already been in Iraq.
That was one of the major strategic decisions of this Parliament.
I think it was taken in a very systematic and proper way because
of the new machinery that was available to us.[190]
108. However, Lord Richards intimated that recent
campaigns which had been discussed at the NSC, had not benefited
from strategic planning. He told us that:
On Libya, you can disagree with much of it, but
actually, in a narrow sense, that was a successful campaign. Was
it nested within a proper strategy? You can draw your own deductions.
On the whole I think it probably was not.[191]
109. Lord Richards told us that discussion at the
NSC tended to centre on tactical, rather than strategic issues:
How often does the term "UK's vital national
interests" become a key part of these debates? I have an
idea they may do a bit more now, but, when I was there, very rarely.
I used to rail against it: "Is this in our vital national
interests?" "Is this really what we want to do?"
It did not seem to matter whether that was a criterion or not.
It was whatever was driving the particular Minister or Department
that was driving that particular item on the agenda.—whatever
they had come up with. I understand your point, but I think that
on the whole it worked quite well. It was just rather tactical.[192]
110. Further criticism centred on the NSC behaving
as a reactionary body, reacting to current events, rather than
forecasting long-term changes and preparing for those. The Joint
Committee on the National Security Strategy wrote that "from
what we know, it seems to us that [the NSC] is mostly a reactive
body, rather than a strategic one, which seems to us to be a lost
opportunity".[193]
Philip Johnston, writing for the Telegraph spelt out the problem
with the NSC's lack of strategic thinking:
Defence matters are rarely discussed in Cabinet
any more and are principally the concern of the National Security
Council in a break with our age-old constitutional arrangements.
The problem with this arrangement is that the NSC seems to be
less interested in strategy and has become more "a reactive
national incident room" as one military organisation critical
of the cuts has called it. Surely with a serious threat re-emerging
in Eastern Europe and with the Middle East so unstable, the UK's
security, its national interests and how these are best defended
should be at the very heart of this election? Instead, all we
are told is that another spending review will be starting shortly,
so let's wait for that. Given the mess the last one caused this
is not an edifying prospect.[194]
In our report 'The Strategic Defence and Security
Review and the National Security Strategy', we recommended that
"measures be put in place to guard against any blurring"
of the responsibilities and roles between the NSC and COBR "in
respect of emergencies".[195]
It is for COBR to be the reactionary body and for the NSC to think
strategically. This distinction appears to be lost on the Government.
111. At every level of the NSC, long-term, strategic
thinking should be evident. Baroness Neville Jones thought that
"there should be a greater capacity inside the NSC secretariat
to think long-term and to lead long-term thinking".[196]
Since the NSC is the forum where the UK's strategic national interest
was supposed to be discussed, we were left wondering in which
Committee (if at all) strategy was actually addressed.
112. It was pointed out to us that there is an informal
sub-committee of the NSC "colloquially" called the "Super
Chiefs" which attempted to look at "longer term strategy",
as this had tended not to happen in NSC meetings.[197]
Lord Richards, former CDS set up the "Super Chiefs"
Committee. He told us that
In my frustration, I credit something that we
colloquially call the Super Chiefs, which was a meeting chaired
by the CDS at which sat the NSA—remember, the chair is the
CDS—the head of the SIS, the head of GCHQ, the head of the
Foreign Office, the head of DFID and the Chiefs. That never really
came properly to fulfil its potential, but it was allowed, and
Peter Ricketts and then Kim Darroch both attended it. My attempt
in it was also to look at longer-term strategy.[198]
However, Lord Richards told us that he did not know
whether his successor would still be using the Super-Chiefs Committee.
To ensure that the Chiefs of Staff would be able to have some
input into NSC considerations, Lord Richards told us that
the relationship between the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, the NSC secretariat and the NSC itself is not written
down—as far as I know, you will not find it anywhere on
paper. That is the bit that needs formalising. […] I do not
think that you need a new committee—I think we are agreeing—because
you have a committee that does it, and the Super Chiefs is also
a rather good innovation, […] because it is where you bring
in the other key Departments of State at a level between the two.[199]
Lord Richards said that the Super Chiefs did "not
have any special secretariat", but that they used the Chiefs
of Staff secretariat.[200]
He told us that:
We agree that there are bare bones of something
that can be made to work much better. The NSC secretariat certainly
needs up-gunning generally. It is very small. In the middle of
a war, they are told to cut; that is the very moment that they
perhaps should have been told to put a few more people in.[201]
ADDITIONAL WEAKNESS OF THE NSC
113. Our inquiries into decision-making surrounding
Helmand Province and the Carriers identified five characteristics
for decision-making, where improvement was required. Whilst inquiring
into whether the NSC was able to compensate for historic failings
in decision-making, a key flaw in the structure of the NSC was
identified. We were concerned to hear that implementation of decisions
made at the NSC was an area of weakness. Baroness Neville-Jones
thought that
There is meant to be something called the implementation
board, led by the National Security Adviser. Things tend to get
lost in the Departments. When Sir Kim Darroch came to testify
to the Lords Committee that I am on, he rather indicated that
he felt it was up to Departments to decide what came to the National
Security Council. Personally, I would like to see more drive out
of the NSC itself.[202]
She also told us that
I am not confident about […] the strength
of the implementation board, which the National Security Adviser
is meant to chair. It seems to me that that is precisely the place
where you need integration of representation of Departments, and
where the issues are very much cross-departmental. That will almost
certainly be the case in any kind of campaign, where the whole
business of winning the peace comes very early. That is where
I would like to see a strengthening of follow-up. I would also
like to see that backed by a greater capacity inside the NSC secretariat
to think long-term, and to lead long-term thinking.[203]
114. To resolve the issue, Baroness Neville-Jones
thought that "[the Government] need to focus on it. What
we need are more sub-committees that are concerned with follow-up,
that report into the central machinery and that have the job of
watching what is going on and alerting people to serious developments,
or to the potential of serious developments".[204]
Summary of the impact of the
Levene Reforms and the NSC
115. It appeared that the great strength of these
new structures is that they resolved previous problems of accountability.
They clarified the chain of command, dealt with the perceived
problems, particularly in Afghanistan, that military commanders
were not under sufficiently close civilian control, tightened
'job descriptions' and made it clearer who was responsible for
a particular decision, and facilitated coordination between different
government departments.
116. This is not an argument therefore for reversing
the Levene reforms, or the NSC, but more needs to be done. We
are not yet convinced that the necessary improvements have yet
been made in expertise and the evaluation of evidence. Nor in
the process-as opposed to the structure of decision-making. The
tone, and time-limits of the meetings, did not seem to provide
the right environment in which to define problems accurately,
prioritise objectives, evaluate alternatives, or manage the risk
of tentative decisions.
117. The Chiefs of Staff appear to have no formal
input into strategy formulation, severely diluting the influence
of military expertise at the table. The NSC secretariat is vastly
under-resourced. Those involved in long-term planning and strategy
formation lack the education and training necessary to help them
think in a strategic manner. This in turn limits the ability of
ministers and decision-makers to challenge advice confidently
and rationally.
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