3 The policy of the UK Government
24. Although a UK intervention has been authorised
by Parliament and, we were told, would be legal under international
law, it is immensely difficult to define the nature of the UK
strategy. Indeed, in evidence to the committee, the Service Chiefs
implied that there was not an overall military strategy or campaign
plan, at least as yet. In the words of Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew
Pulford, the Chief of the Air Staff:
So, in terms of, "Have we got a campaign
plan from here to success?" I think this is a situation where
the international community, the Iraqi Government and all the
other players within it are developing the plan as they go.
From my own viewpoint, this doesn't lend itself
to the traditional, "This is where we are. We've thought
it all through. This is where we're going to and this is the end
state we're looking for.[29]
Admiral Sir George Zambellas, the First Sea Lord
and Chief of Naval Staff, concurred:
You can't define precisely how long an operation
is going to take. You certainly can't select the end state.[30]
25. In the previous interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
senior UK military and civilian figures did define clear missions,
end-states, roles, responsibility and tactics, and summarised
them in documents such as the April 2009 'comprehensive strategy
for Afghanistan'.[31]
In this case, however, senior figures seemed to go out of their
way to downplay the UK contribution, and the military contribution
in particular: to emphasise that they were only one part of a
large coalition. Peter Watkins, Director General of Security Policy
at the Ministry of Defence, told us that the UK "should not
expect to be doing everything" and that "we are only
one country that is contributing to a large international coalition"[32]
and the Chief of the Air Staff stressed the complexity of the
situation and the fact that there were lots of "moving parts".[33]
26. A frequent refrain was the 'small' nature of
the UK contribution. Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford described
what the UK was doing as "merely a small part" or "a
very small part";[34]
General Sir Richard Barrons, Commander Joint Forces Command, talked
of the UK "doing a number of very small things as part of
this coalition"; [35]
"a small niche contribution";[36]
"really quite small scale"; and again "we expect
that contribution to be small".[37]
27. The Chiefs of Staff emphasised the insufficiency
of military action. To the question 'what is the mission in Iraq?'
General Sir Richard Barrons, had the response:
We are very clear that we are making a contribution
to a coalition military operation in the full expectation that
the military line of effort is not decisive. [38]
The Chief of the Air Staff added:
The nature of military utility here is very difficult.[39]
Service Chiefs were also insistent that one of the
reasons they could not describe or define the mission, was that
it was not their mission to define. In the words of the Chief
of the General Staff:
I think the trouble is you are not really addressing
it to the people who are going to be able to answer it. It seems
to me it is fundamentally a question for somebody from the Foreign
Office to answer, or even from Downing Street.[40]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford was also reluctant
to define the exact role of the other players in the coalition:
You were looking for: who owns this? Well, the
answer is that there are probably about 20 different players who
own different elements of the comprehensive approach that needs
to be applied in Iraq, in Syria and right around the region, because
of the multifaceted and multi-natured nature of the ultimate solution,
and all the moving parts that need to go into place.[41]
Shashank Joshi suggested that in reality the UK had
simply signed up to a US strategy, without questioning it, or
attempting to formulate any independent view.[42]
Peter Watkins was asked repeatedly by the committee to describe
the resources which would be invested in the mission, and to offer
metrics, to allow us to judge performance, or the UK commitment,
but declined to do so.[43]
28. Insofar as it is possible to define a UK mission
in Iraq and Syria, it appears to combine a narrow focus—the
elimination of a terrorist group—with a very broad definition
of how to achieve it: no less than the fixing of the Iraqi and
Syrian states. In the words of the Prime Minister:
[T]his alliance has a strategy which is very
simple and straightforward, which is, we want a Government in
Iraq and a Government in Syria that are capable of representing
all of the people of those countries, and have security forces
that can keep the security and stability of those countries, and
not allow terrorists to thrive. That is the strategy. That is
the aim.[44]
29. The full theory of the UK Government appears
to be as follows:
a) In
the words of General Sir Richard Barrons: "The objective
of the coalition is to remove ISIL from Iraq."[45]
Or, more exactly, the final goal is to disrupt, dismantle and
defeat DAESH in Iraq and Syria, and to prevent their return to
either country in the future.
b) But the
UK and other international forces cannot be deployed in combat
roles. (In Lieutenant General Sir Simon Mayall's words: "Everybody
has been absolutely clear that nobody wants western combat boots
on the ground."[46])
c) The combat,
therefore, will be undertaken by Iraqi Security Forces, who will
have the task of countering the DAESH insurgency, and recapturing
and holding the DAESH strongholds in Western Iraq.
d) But this
effort is hampered by the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces,
the sectarian divisions within Iraq, and the profound corruption,
and unpopularity of the Iraqi State, particularly in Sunni areas.
e) So this
requires: the formation of a new Iraqi Security Forces, a new
non-sectarian policy, the elimination of corruption, and the regaining
of the trust of the Sunni population (so they too can turn against
DAESH).
f) This, in
turn, relies on adopting a more comprehensive approach, aiming
at—in the Prime Minister's own words—"the creation
of a new and genuinely inclusive Government in Iraq".[47]
g) Finally,
the situation in Iraq cannot be addressed without addressing the
situation in Syria: and again in the Prime Minister's words, the
creation of "a new representative and accountable Government
in Damascus."[48]
State-building
30. State-building appears, therefore, to be at the
heart of this military-political strategy. This was closely reflected
in the House of Commons debate. The Prime Minister opened the
debate saying his strategy depended on "'the creation of
a new and genuinely inclusive Government in Iraq [and] a new representative
and accountable Government in Damascus."[49]
Andrew Mitchell MP argued that the solution to DAESH was to "focus
on local governance and accountability";[50]
Dan Jarvis MP noted that "there needs to be a wider, encompassing
political framework, with a plan for humanitarian aid and reconstruction,
which will ultimately lead us to create a stronger and more accountable
Iraqi Government."[51]
The close connection, which some Members of Parliament seemed
to draw between the narrow task of counter-terrorism, and the
broader task of state-building was most neatly summarised in the
debate by Gisela Stuart MP quoting UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon:
"missiles may kill terrorists. But good governance kills
terrorism."[52]
This phrase had already been enthusiastically endorsed by the
Prime Minister.[53]
31. This theory of counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency/state-building
raises issues well beyond the scope of this report. But, it is
worth noting in passing that there are in fact no self-evident
connections between the key objectives. You can create a stable
legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign—as
India has done—or you could win a counter-insurgency campaign
without creating a 'legitimate' and 'inclusive' state—as
Syria did in 1983. Strong states can sometimes harbour terrorists,
weak states may seek to exclude them. We would question the capacity
of the international community to create democratic states in
the short term in either Iraq or Syria. Given those challenges,
we would also question whether such things can be created and
would question a strategy based upon the assumption of success,
in state building.
The current strategy and comparison
to the 'Surge Strategy of 2007'
32. The clearest way, however, of analysing the current
strategy is by comparing it directly to its predecessor—the
counter-insurgency doctrine of the 2007 surge—which has
been laid out in very considerable detail. The enemy we were fighting
then, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), is the precursor of DAESH. DAESH
are occupying much of the same territory in Anbar that AQI occupied
then. Fallujah, for example, which is now a major target for the
operation, was captured, at immense cost, by the coalition in
2004, and subsequently lost again. The same party, the Da'wah
party, is in power in Baghdad and almost all the Iraqi politicians
and US commanders in control today were involved in the previous
campaigns in Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the current 'Caliph' was
then an Al Qaeda in Iraq fighter, and was held in US custody.
His movement draws its energy from many of the same political
and sectarian divisions.
33. The 2007 strategy was based on a military counter-insurgency
campaign in which international troops were deployed: to clear
and secure neighbourhoods, to help the Iraqi Security Forces protect
the local population and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces
left behind were capable of providing security.[54]
This was then paired with many of the aspirations of the current
strategy (economic development; state-building; devolution of
power to local leaders; Sunni outreach through de-Ba'athification;
training of the Iraqi Security Forces; using Sunni tribes against
DAESH; controlling supplies to DAESH; creating a regional solution
embracing neighbouring states). President Bush's 2007 presidential
address could almost be used verbatim in 2015:
A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military
operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations
are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods
and communities. [The Iraqi Government must] show that it is committed
to delivering a better life, to empower[ing] local leaders. And
to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life,
the Government will reform de-Ba'athification laws
We'll help the Iraqis build a larger and better-equipped
Army and we will accelerate the training of Iraqi forces […]
help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen
the moderates and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.
Recently, local tribal leaders have begun to
show their willingness to take on Al Qaeda.
We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran
and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing
advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq. We will
work with the governments of Turkey and Iraq to help them resolve
problems along their border. We will use America's full diplomatic
resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the
Middle East. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the
Gulf States need to understand that an American defeat in Iraq
would create a new sanctuary for extremists and a strategic threat
to their survival. These nations have a stake in a successful
Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors, and they must step up
their support for Iraq's unity Government.[55]
34. When asked to define the differences between
the 2007 strategy and the current strategy, the Defence Secretary
declined to specify any difference in terms of counter-insurgency
doctrine or Sunni outreach. Instead he implied the nature of difference
was in the role and composition of the Iraqi Government:
[T]he biggest difference between now and 2007
is that we now have a genuinely inclusive Government in Iraq,
who represent both Shia and Sunni, and, indeed, Kurdish elements
in Iraq.[56]
The central difference, therefore, between the 2007
and the current strategy is not in the objectives—which
remain almost identical—but in the actors. This time these
tasks are not to be performed by 130,000 US troops, 100,000 international
contractors and consultants, dozens of Provincial Reconstruction
teams, US-financed 'Sunni Awakening' councils and $815 billion
dollars of US money. Instead it is to be led by the Government
in Baghdad. There are to be no foreign combat troops on the ground.
Unlike the period between 2003-2011, training of the Iraqi Security
Forces and the Peshmerga is to take place at secure bases, well
behind the front line, and is not to include embedded trainers
working alongside Iraqi troops.
35. The formal international coalition role is limited
to air-strikes in Iraq (UK) and Syria (others), the training of
local security forces, 'capacity-building' of the Iraqi state,
and an aspiration to create 'a regional solution' (and, we presume,
special forces operations—although these remain classified).
This is not because of a conclusion that the deployment of 130,000
US troops was ineffectual—indeed, the conventional wisdom
continues to be that their deployment was essential to the apparent
success of the 2007 campaign. Instead, the decision to do it this
time without international combat troops, reflects first, the
absolute opposition of the Shia political parties, and, in particular,
the Iranian-backed Shia militia to any Western combat deployments
in Iraq (they have in fact implied that they would attack Western
troops were such deployments to occur).[57]
Secondly, it represents a totally changed political environment
in the US, and the UK, in which there is no political appetite
for combat troops.
36. During the course of our evidence sessions it
became clear that regional partners were unlikely to deploy ground
troops in Iraq, nor was it considered wise to suggest that they
did so.[58] Instead,
we were frequently told that any troops deployed would need to
be Iraqi ground troops and that those troops would have to have
the trust of all Iraqi citizens, a highly optimistic notion under
the prevailing circumstances.[59]
Lieutenant General Sir Simon Mayall told us:
Everybody has been absolutely clear that nobody
wants western combat boots on the ground, but we are also clear,
as we have been in a number of these conflicts, that the enabling
activity we bring in terms of intelligence, strike assets, counter-IED,
for instance, and just general training is what will actually
allow the ISF—ultimately, we hope, non-sectarian—plus
the Peshmerga, plus the national guard drawn from the tribes,
plus the Shia militia drawn into the Iraqi security forces, to
take the fight back to ISIL.[60]
37. A more limited coalition role is also reflected
in the US strategy. In the evidence to the United States House
Armed Services Committee on 13 November, US Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel said that the coalition's strategy was:
[F]ocused on supporting inclusive governance,
sustaining a broad-based regional and global coalition and strengthening
local forces on the ground. It also includes undercutting ISIL's
flow of resources, countering ISIL's messaging, constricting the
flow of foreign fighters, providing humanitarian assistance and
our intensive regional and global diplomatic effort.[61]
The challenges of the strategy
38. We heard in Baghdad that Iraqi Security Forces
will be expected to recapture Tikrit, Mosul and Fallujah. There
appeared to be an expectation that Kurdish Peshmerga forces would
capture the part of Mosul on the East bank of the Tigris, and
that the Iraqi Security Forces would take the main part of the
city, and then rapidly transfer control to the local police and
a 'National Guard'. A number of interlocutors were confident that
Mosul would be recaptured in 2015.
As stated above, Lieutenant General Sir Simon Mayall
identified the actors in this assault:
[T]he ISF—ultimately, we hope, non-sectarian—plus
the Peshmerga, plus the national guard drawn from the tribes,
plus the Shia militia drawn into the Iraqi security forces.[62]
This strategy therefore relies heavily on certain
key assumptions about Iraqi forces (the Iraqi Security Forces,
Kurdish Peshmerga, Shia Militia, and a putative 'National Guard'),
about the Iraqi Government, about the Sunni population, and about
DAESH itself. We will analyse these factors in turn.
29 Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15)
512, Q210 Back
30
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q220 Back
31
Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009-10, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace,
HC 224, para 36 Back
32
Q354; Q352 Back
33
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q210 Back
34
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q130; Q210
Back
35
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q208 Back
36
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q205 Back
37
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q199 Back
38
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q199 Back
39
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q220 Back
40
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q207 Back
41
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q210 Back
42
Shashank Joshi (ISI0021) para 3 Back
43
Q353; 355 Back
44
Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee, 16 December 2014,
HC (2014-15) 887, Q66 Back
45
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q200 Back
46
Q317 Back
47
HC Deb, 26 Sep 2014, col. 1258 Back
48
HC Deb, 26 Sep 2014, col. 1258 Back
49
HC Deb, 26 Sep 2014, col. 1258 Back
50
HC Deb, 26 Sep 2014, col. 1299 Back
51
HC Deb, 26 Sep 2014, col. 1327 Back
52
HC Deb, 24 Sep 2014, col. 1307 Back
53
HC Deb, 24 Sep 2014, col.1257 Back
54
Bush address on Iraq, BBC, 11 January 2007 Back
55
Bush address on Iraq, BBC, 11 January 2007 Back
56
HC Deb, 12 Jan 2015, col. 591 Back
57
Iraqi cleric al-Sadr re-emerges, 60 Minutes, CBS News, 25 September
2014 Back
58
Q6; 9-11; 47; 171; 241 Back
59
Q36 Back
60
Q317 Back
61
US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, Statement on the Administration's Strategy and Military Campaign Against ISIL Before the House Armed Services Committee,
13 November 2014 Back
62
Q317 Back
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