4 The Iraqi Security Forces and Government
Iraqi
Security Forces
39. The central role in the fight against DAESH is
expected to be played by the Iraqi Security Forces. Their capacity
is, therefore, the key to the campaign. Their performance in June
2014 was deeply troubling. When approximately 3,000 DAESH fighters
attacked the Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul in June 2014, an estimated
30,000 soldiers deserted, leaving behind equipment which was then
appropriated by DAESH. Since December 2013, the Iraqi Security
Forces have lost much of the territory of Western Iraq to insurgents
who—at least initially—they massively out-numbered,
and out-gunned. Shashank Joshi summarised the weakness of the
ISF in his evidence to the inquiry:
In June, four entire divisions of the Iraqi Security
Forces (out of 14) disintegrated in the face of the ISIL advance,
despite the militants' relatively feeble numbers.
A team of US advisers later concluded that just
half of Iraq's 50 brigades were "reputable partners",
with the remainder suffering from "infiltration and leadership
and sectarianism".
In mid-November, the Government replaced 36 commanders
to "combat corruption", including the chief of ground
forces, the chief of staff and commander of operations in Anbar
Province. Even prior to the ISF's collapse in June 2014,
they had struggled to recapture insurgent-held territory in Anbar
Province from December 2013 onwards, notably in Fallujah.
In late November, the Iraqi Security Forces was
found to have been paying salaries to 50,000 non-existent soldiers,
at the cost of around $318m per year.[63]
We met the new Iraqi Defence Minister, General Obeidi.
He had established a good reputation in his short time in the
role, and we saw him on his return from the frontline where, after
heavy fighting, the Iraqi Security Forces and the Shia militia
had cooperated in the successful recapture of much of Bayji.
40. However, the deep structural weakness in the
Iraqi Security Forces—the corruption, the sectarianism,
the loss of morale and reputation, and the poor leadership—are
not things which we believe will be easy to overcome. Most fundamentally,
even if the Iraqi Security Forces prove able to recapture Tikrit,
Mosul and Fallujah, there is little evidence, on the basis of
their performance over the last two years, that they would be
able to successfully win back the 'hearts and minds' of the local
population, and thus bring a real end to the DAESH insurgency.
Shia Militia
41. The second component in the fight against DAESH
are the dozens of Shia militia, who filled much of the military
vacuum left by the disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces.
The largest militias are invariably associated with Iran or with
leading Iraqi political or religious figures. Some have been newly
formed, but many existed prior to the DAESH advance.
42. The most prominent militias include Kata'ib Hezbollah
and the Badr Organization (both of which are directly sponsored
by Iran); and Saraya al-Salam, (associated with Muqtada al-Sadr).
Other prominent groups include Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Saraya
al-Khorasani (again associated with Iran); Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar,
Liwa al-Shabab al-Risali (both indirectly associated with the
Sadrist family); and the militias associated with the political
parties the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda
and Saraya Ashura) and the Da'wah party (Kata'ib al-Ghadab).[64]
43. It is estimated that there may be as many as
a million Iraqi Shia militia fighters. The militias are not a
homogenous bloc although there is evidence of them working together
and with the Iraqi Security Forces. They have powerful political
connections. The Badr militia are allied to a political party,
whose leader, Hadi al-Ameri, is active on the frontline, and whose
aide is now the interior Minister. They have also appeared publicly
alongside Qasem Soleimani, the Commander of the Iranian Quds Force,
who appears to be funding, and equipping some of the militia.
They appear to have had some military success. The militias helped
the Iraqi Security Forces to break the siege of Amerli and to
recapture Bayji. Militias were also responsible for recapturing
the town of Jurf al-Sakher.[65]
44. The Shia militia are, however, an aggressively
sectarian force, who have brutally cleared Sunni populations out
of recaptured areas, inflamed Sunni suspicion of the Baghdad Government
and become a useful propaganda tool for DAESH (who have shown
films of militia atrocities in Fallujah). The militias too often
appear to treat Sunni Muslims who have remained in DAESH territory
as being enemy combatants.[66]
It is reported that over 130,000 Iraqis, the majority of them
Sunni Muslims, have been displaced in the fight against DAESH
and, despite the stated intention of the Government that they
should be able to return to their homes, many are unwilling or
unable to.[67] In the
areas which the Iraqi Security Forces and the militias have retaken
from DAESH there are numerous reports of these militias kidnapping
and murdering Sunni Muslims,[68]
razing their houses in order to prevent them from returning to
the areas they had fled in order to escape the DAESH onslaught[69]
and summarily executing those it believes to be DAESH fighters.[70]
Both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have highlighted the abuses
carried out by Shi'ite militias.[71]
45. On our visit to Baghdad we met tribal leaders
from Jurf al-Sakher at a meeting who confirmed, in considerable
detail, militia atrocities in the area. We heard how during the
offensive against Jurf al-Sakher, civilians who fled the fighting,
apparently holding white flags high to show surrender, were detained
by militiamen. The women and children were separated from the
men, of whom there is no record. The women and children are being
detained by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) indefinitely despite
not having been tried for any crimes. There are concerns that
this is part of a wider campaign to punish and further subjugate
Iraq's Sunni population.[72]
Kurdish Forces
46. The third element in the Iraqi forces are the
Kurdish Peshmerga militia—a group with strong reputation,
but whose performance was initially mixed and has since improved
significantly. Following the capture of Mosul by DAESH fighters
in June 2014, the Kurdish Regional Government sent their fighting
force, the Peshmerga, into areas previously held by the ISF. When
the DAESH forces advanced towards the Kurdistan region of Iraq
in August 2014, the Peshmerga were forced out of minority areas
around Sinjar, were driven back from the Mosul dam, and briefly
lost control of a new frontline at Makhmour and Gwer, only twenty
miles from their capital at Erbil. The Peshmerga managed to hold
back DAESH fighters from Kirkuk but an estimated 1.5 million internally
displaced persons (IDPs) were pushed into Kurdish territory. The
launch of US air strikes helped to prevent DAESH advancing any
further, and by January 2015, the Peshmerga had regained much
of the territory they lost the previous August.
47. The Peshmerga attributed the success of DAESH,
to their possession of Iraqi Security Forces equipment which had
been abandoned in Mosul, including long-range artillery, tanks,
armoured vehicles, rocket launchers, and sniper rifles, as well
as large supplies of ammunition—a far superior armoury to
the Peshmerga who relied on older weapons, many appropriated from
the Iraqi Security Forces following the 2003 invasion. [73]
48. On our visit to the Kurdistan region, we saw
the current training taking place and spoke to both UK military
personnel and Kurdish political and military figures. It was clear
that, whilst the Peshmerga is an impressive fighting force, it
faces a number of organisational challenges besides a lack of
sophisticated weaponry. A significant number of the Peshmerga
are allied to (and, it seems, are paid through) the two main political
parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK), rather than the Kurdistan Regional
Government. This has created problems with communication between
brigades and has hindered the cohesion of the Peshmerga as a unified
force. There are also concerns about corruption within the Peshmerga
force with a large number of 'ghost soldiers' (that is, cash salaries
that are paid to soldiers who do not exist). Moreover, we were
told that at least a quarter of Peshmerga fighters were beyond
retirement age and some are disabled.
49. When we met with the Minister of Peshmerga he
told us that he and the Kurdish Regional Government were in control
of the Peshmerga overall and the co-ordination of their supply,
support and deployment. Varying claims were given to us by different
groups about the numbers of Peshmerga employed and how many were
deployable as fighters; beyond being 'reserve' forces. What is
clear is there are larger numbers of people being paid than can
be actively deployed. The figures of the total number of Peshmerga
seem to be estimated as being between 150,000 and 160,000, including
security forces and volunteers, with the actual frontline force
being estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000. Roughly 40,000 Peshmerga
are linked to the Ministry of Peshmerga (14 brigades) with the
remainder linked to the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan party.
50. A number of these issues are being addressed
through the reform of the Peshmerga—the Kurdish Regional
Parliament passed a law in July 2014 which set the Minister of
Peshmerga a six month deadline to institute reforms (although
these have yet to be fully implemented). It was notably the division
of the Peshmerga along political lines which it is claimed had
prevented the US from carrying out extensive training programmes
with its forces prior to the 2011 departure of US soldiers from
Iraq.[74]
51. We visited the Central Joint Operations Centre
(CJOC) in Erbil, including the UK training personnel there, and
saw how air strikes in support of Peshmerga fighters and the supply
of weaponry have helped the Peshmerga to regain much of the territory
which they had lost to DAESH. Significantly, they have captured
one of the main roads between Mosul and the Syrian border which
had acted as a major supply route for DAESH.[75]
The Foreign Affairs Committee has highlighted its concerns that
the Kurdish Regional Government would not expect the Peshmerga
to work with the Iraqi Security Forces in areas that it did not
consider to be Iraqi Kurdistan.[76]
However, representatives of the Kurdish Regional Government have
suggested that it might ultimately be in a position to participate
in an offensive to re-take Mosul from DAESH provided that it had
Iraqi Security Forces (and Sunni fighters) alongside them in order
to ensure the success of such an operation.[77]
Whilst we recognise the significance of the Kurdish Regional Government's
concern about Mosul, we question their capability to recapture
non-Kurdish areas of Iraq.
52. As DAESH fighters have failed to exploit their
advance, they have employed different tactics, notably the laying
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in towns they have retreated
from.[78] We were told
that 60% of injuries caused to the Peshmerga were as a result
of IEDs and that counter IED training and equipment would be welcome,
as would training in the evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield.
These are skills which were honed by UK troops in Afghanistan
and are considered to be an area of UK expertise. In addition
to military support in counter IED, it is clear there is a need
for mine and IED clearance in areas of former conflict. Whilst
in Erbil, we met with the NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and discussed
the ways in which such support might be provided to complement
the military and other UK Government support to the Kurdistan
Regional Government. MAG highlighted that many of the areas that
had been won back from DAESH would need to be cleared of unexploded
ordinances before the IDPs could return. The return of IDPs is
seen as vital to retaining the land and alleviating pressure on
the Kurdistan Regional Government. We were told that such a programme
would cost an estimated £2 million with the opportunity for
the NGO to train security and civil defence forces on IED awareness
and search.
The National Guard
53. Many in Baghdad confidently promoted the idea
of a 'National Guard' as the key to winning Sunni tribes over
to the fight against DAESH. The model appeared to be based on
the experience of the Sunni Awakening in 2007—which employed
Sunni tribes to fight Al Qaeda—but, the difference being,
as we heard in Iraq, that, in the new National Guard, money would
not be going through the tribal chiefs. All the weapons would
be accounted for, all the fighters carefully documented, and the
units would be loyal to the Iraqi State.
54. A number of challenges were identified. First,
Shashank Joshi questioned whether Sunni tribes would again trust
the Iraqi Government after it reneged on commitments given to
the Sunni Awakening during the previous surge.[79]
Second, it appeared from discussions with senior Iraqi officials
that the National Guard appeared to be very different in scale
and objectives from the Sunni Awakening. It was emphasised that,
if there were to be a National Guard, they would not be on anything
approaching the scale of the Sunni Awakening (perhaps 5,000 for
Anbar province, rather than 100,000 people); and that many of
the places would be given to the Shia militia—or 'patriotic
volunteer groups'—as a way of ensuring regular government
funding for the militia. If the National Guard concept were to
be implemented, the cost of the programme was estimated to be
many hundreds of millions of dollars a year for units which were
neither police nor army, and would have an uncertain function
after the insurgency. In a country already struggling for money,
it seemed difficult to believe these units would be long continued—and
if they were disbanded there seemed a serious possibility of a
repeat of the problems of bitter Sunni Awakening members re-joining
the insurgency.
55. At the time of our visit only 270 men had been
recruited into a prototype of the National Guard in the Anbar
region. There seemed to be considerable problems in getting the
Iraqi National Security Adviser to guarantee salaries, or to get
the Ministry of Defence to issue weapons. The Baghdad Government
appeared less enthused about the idea of the National Guard units
than its foreign backers. The timetable for passing a law authorising
the National Guards has been repeatedly delayed.[80]
The Iraqi Prime Minister and
State
56. In Baghdad a key reason for optimism was faith
in the new Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi. He was seen as a far
more inclusive, effective, and legitimate leader than his predecessor
Nouri al-Maliki. He had surpassed expectations by agreeing a generous
oil and budget deal with the Kurds, thus lessening, for the moment,
tensions with the Kurds.
57. But the Prime Minister is only one man, and the
highly limited capacity of the Iraqi state is unlikely to be transformed
simply by removing Mr al-Maliki, and replacing him with Mr al-Abadi.
The drop in oil prices has dramatically eroded the resources of
the Baghdad Government at its time of greatest need. Corruption
is so deeply embedded in every crevice of the Iraqi state and
military that its elimination would seem to be a task of decades,
and certainly not an immediate solution to the problem posed by
DAESH.
58. Professor Toby Dodge emphasised that the Iraqi
Government was unpopular across the whole of the country. He suggested
that this unpopularity was a result of the abject failure of the
political system set up since 2003 and called for the reformation
of that political system to rebuild trust in all the communities:
We can look at the Kurdish Regional Government
and the people they represent and say that they have turned their
back, or sought to turn their back, on Baghdad, for very good
reasons. Then we can look at the revolt through 2014 in the Sunni
majority areas as something similar. But then if we go down into
the south and look at the Shia majority population, there are
no great fans of the Government there. The Government, because
of its corruption, has squandered its oil wealth and undermined
the institutional capacity of the state and is broadly unpopular
across the whole of the country. It just does not have the calibre
of political parties or politicians or state institutions to deliver
those resources in a meaningful way to any of the population and
tie them back into the state on the basis of citizenship.[81]
59. Mr al-Maliki clearly exacerbated the problems
in Iraq, but his removal will not in itself overcome them. Although
he is now blamed for many of the problems, he was initially a
popular partner of the international coalition, credited with
leading 'the charge of the knights' in Basra, against the 'Mahdi
Army' militia. The US supported his taking over in a disputed
election in 2010,[82]
and he won by a large majority in an internationally acclaimed
election in 2014. His personal following was much greater than
Mr al Abadi's (for example Mr al-Maliki received 700,000 'write-in'
votes in the last election, when Mr al-Abadi received almost none).[83]
Whatever the failings of Mr al-Maliki, if the entire strategy
of counter-insurgency and state-building, conducted over so much
time and at so much cost, was unable to survive the democratically
elected Prime Minister of Iraq (whom the US knew well and had
worked with for years) then Iraq remains remarkably fragile.
SECTARIAN CONFLICT
60. Mr Al-Abadi, we were also told in Baghdad, would
be re-engaging the Sunni minority through a number of initiatives:
· the
de-centralisation of power to the provinces;
· the repeal
of legislation including de-Ba'athification and counter-terrorism
law (particularly a 2004 Counter-Terrorism law very focused on
Sunni terrorism);
· the release
of political prisoners; and
· the creation
of a National Guard.
61. Chuck Hagel, the US Secretary for Defence, cited
the appointment of a Sunni Defence Minister, the proposed creation
of a National Guard and the replacement of 36 senior commanders
in the Iraqi Security Forces, including the integration of senior
Sunni leaders, as proof that the Iraqi central Government was
becoming more inclusive.[84]
These measures, it was hoped, would consolidate Sunni support
for the Baghdad state, help to ensure that the Sunni local population
would rise up against DAESH, and effectively welcome Iraqi troops
as liberators. This was echoed by the UK Secretary of State for
Defence's statement that
the biggest difference between now and 2007 is
that we now have a genuinely inclusive Government in Iraq, who
represent both Shia and Sunni, and, indeed, Kurdish elements in
Iraq.[85]
62. There is no doubt that there is movement in the
direction of inclusiveness, as the appointment of a new, more
inclusive, Cabinet and the replacement of senior Commanders in
the Iraqi Security Force demonstrates. But, in other meetings,
it became clear that new measures are yet to be given a clear
timetable and that there is significant opposition to these inclusive
measures from the Shia political parties (and their Iranian supporters).
There have been reports that the legislation to create the National
Guard is unlikely to pass through the Iraqi Parliament[86]
and that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, does not believe
that the leaders of Sunni tribes in Anbar province are trustworthy.[87]
63. Perhaps more importantly, the depth of suspicion
that now exists between the communities following a civil war—which
led to perhaps 50,000 deaths,[88]
followed by the recent experience of the surge, and the perceived
betrayal by Mr al-Maliki—will be very difficult to overcome
simply through new legislation. The Sunni population in the DAESH
areas remain deeply suspicious of Kurds, the Shia-dominated Baghdad
Government, and, most significantly, of the Shi'ite militias who
are doing much of the fighting. Militias have the freedom to act
with near-impunity and many are feared not just by Sunnis but
by Kurds and Shi'ites too.[89]
Even if the Iraqi state were nominally able to recapture cities
like Mosul and Fallujah, it would struggle to secure those cities,
let alone rebuild them, and win back the trust of the local population.
If they fail to rebuild, DAESH will only re-emerge in a new form.
DAESH
64. Meanwhile, the insurgents continue to be surprisingly
resilient: in terms of propaganda, international recruitment,
and local finance. They are able to exploit an open border for
safe haven in Syria. They have been able to recruit many people,
keen to oppose the brutality of the Assad regime, and others who
perceive Baghdad as an Iranian stooge. They have established powerful
local sources of funding (including property portfolios, and utility
taxes) and are not primarily dependant on foreign grants, or even
the sale of oil (which they continue to smuggle with some success
through Syria). They have proved themselves adept in the use of
social media, sending 90,000 messages a day. In evidence to the
Home Affairs Committee, Dr Thomas Hegghammer stated that:
Syria is the most socially mediated conflict
in history and there is an enormous amount of audio-visual documentation
produced by rebels themselves, documenting the things they do
[…] social media affects recruitment simply by linking people
up—Facebook, for example. When someone travels to Syria
and posts pictures from there and his friends see those pictures,
those friends are more likely to be inspired to go. That is not
really propaganda; that is just regular information conveyed through
online social media that then facilitates recruitment.[90]
65. Regional players including Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Qatar and Turkey continue to be deeply suspicious of or even hostile
towards each other and seem to be perpetuating in Syria, a proxy
war. Turkey has been reluctant to turn against DAESH until there
is a campaign against Bashar al-Assad. Joost Hilterman told us
that for many Sunnis, DAESH are seen as the lesser of two evils,
compared to the Baghdad Government. The Sunni tribes in Iraq have
been marginalised since 2003 and, even when efforts were made
to integrate them, they have not been followed through. He gave
us the example of the treatment of Sunni fighters who took part
in the 'surge,'
Efforts to bring them back into the political
game have not been made in good faith, with the actual absorption
of Sunni elements into the Iraqi security forces not having taken
place and salaries not paid. Essentially, there has been a continuation
of the shutting out through the surge and until June of this year
when in many cases they chose the side of Islamic State. To bring
them back out is the game and that is a long-term political game
and cannot be done fast.[91]
66. The sense of grievance is further compounded
by the perception that the current Iraqi regime is overly close
to the Iranian Government. Aymann Jawad al-Tamimi told us that
a number of influential Sunni insurgent groups had issued statements
following the DAESH advance which suggested that:
[T]here is no point in trying to work within
the political system, because it is discriminatory against Sunnis
and it is a 'Safavid' Government, meaning that they see it as
just a stooge of Iran. The result of that is that any scheme that
the Government tries to issue now in the hopes of winning over
Sunnis to form a wider pushback against Islamic State, analogous
to the Sahwa of 2007 onwards, is derided as a mere lackey project
for the Safavid Government.[92]
These problems are only exacerbated by the atrocities
committed by the Shia militia. Other witnesses have consistently
emphasised that DAESH cannot be destroyed through military means
alone. Professor Sir Adam Roberts told us:
It is very, very rare in dealing with terrorist
movements that they be completely annihilated. In fact, I think
it never happens. The interesting question is how such movements
are defeated or run out of steam, absent that possibly desired
goal of complete annihilation. They do; they regularly suffer
from fission, fusion and exhaustion. We have to envisage a richer
array of possibilities than complete annihilation.[93]
67. Given the deep polarisation and structural weaknesses
of the Iraqi State, we wonder whether containment and suppression
of DAESH would not be a more realistic goal than total elimination.
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65
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66
The Middle Eastern impasses (1): The problems of the Shias in responding,
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67
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79
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Q1 Back
82
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93
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