5 Britain and Iraq
68. Despite its major role in Iraq from 2003-2007,
the British Government appears to have walked away from Iraq from
2007 until the summer of 2014. In 2009, it ceased to pay for Iraqi
officers to undertake officer training at Sandhurst. In 2011,
it closed the British Consulate General in Basra (despite Basra
being the base of all UK military operations and the major oil-producing
region of the country). In the spring of 2014, it seems that Iraq
was a low priority for UK intelligence, there was no Defence section
in Kurdistan, no DFID office in Iraq, and the political section
of the British Embassy in Baghdad consisted of three relatively
junior, although extremely able, employees on short-term deployments
leading to a frequent turnover of staff.
The current UK contribution
69. In his update to the House on the implementation
of the National Security Strategy the Prime Minister set out the
Government's actions in response to DAESH as:
In addition to providing UK humanitarian aid
to alleviate the suffering of those displaced by ISIL's violence,
the Government is working to: disrupt attack-planning against
the UK and our interests; counter ISIL's propaganda; isolate ISIL
by supporting inclusive political governance that can reach out
to all communities in Iraq and Syria; strengthen those moderate
forces fighting ISIL on the ground; cut off ISIL's access to funds
and fighters; help strengthen the resilience of neighbouring countries;
and bring the widest possible coalition of countries together
to degrade ISIL through diplomatic engagement. Following the debate
in Parliament on 26 September, the UK's response extended to include
UK air strikes in Iraq to support local security forces fighting
ISIL on the ground; and in October, the Defence Secretary confirmed
that UK aircraft would also begin surveillance missions over Syria
to gather intelligence. A sustained effort across all these elements
will be needed in order to defeat ISIL and its violent ideology.[94]
70. In written evidence to this inquiry, the MOD
set out what resources were currently deployed to the Middle East
in support of the international coalition effort to combat DAESH.
· Eight
Tornado GR4 aircraft;
· One C130 Hercules
transport aircraft;
· One Rivet Joint
surveillance aircraft;
· One Voyager
air-to-air refuelling aircraft;
· [MQ-9] Reaper
remotely-piloted aircraft; and
· Approximately
400 UK personnel in support of the above assets; as part of a
regional liaison network in coalition and partners' headquarters,
and as a contribution to the developing training presence in Iraq,[95]
(it subsequently emerged that the vast majority of these '400'
were not in Iraq).
The UK has also gifted equipment to the Peshmerga,
and run several three-week training courses for the Peshmerga.[96]
AIR STRIKES
71. The purpose of UK air strikes has been, it seems,
threefold. First, to 'contain DAESH' and prevent them from expanding
out of their existing territory by taking new areas of Iraq. Second
to 'degrade' DAESH by targeting their equipment, units and infrastructure,
and—according to General Messenger—to reduce their
morale and increase that of the Iraqi Security Forces and the
Peshmerga.[97] Third,
to support the ground troops of the Iraqi Security Forces and
the Peshmerga in retaking territory from DAESH—most recently
at Bayji and in Sinjar.
72. When we visited Iraq as part of this inquiry,
many of those we met were at pains to emphasise the value provided
by the airstrikes to both the Iraqi Security Forces and the Peshmerga,
both in terms of helping to retake territory and in challenging
the myth of infallibility which DAESH have cultivated. Lieutenant
General Gordon Messenger said that the effectiveness of the attacks
could be seen in DAESH resorting to more asymmetric tactics, including
the use of IEDs and using extensive measures to avoid being struck:
moving at night, using bad weather to provide cover and avoiding
grouping in open areas.[98]
73. On the 17 December, the Secretary of State for
Defence told us that, thanks to their commitment of surveillance
aircraft, the UK was also a major source of surveillance and intelligence-gathering,
second only to the US contribution.[99]
TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE PESHMERGA
74. We visited UK military personnel who comprised
the Short-Term Training Team based near Sulemaniyah. At that time
the team consisted of 48 UK personnel and 27 Danes, under the
auspices of the Central Joint Operations Centre (CJOC), run by
US General Kurilla. Training consisted of straightforward infantry
training and was designed to be sustainable, being carried out
using equipment already available to them, not equipment specially
provided by the UK.
75. The UK and Danish forces were to remain until
February, by when it was hoped a consistent plan for Peshmerga
training would be set out. It was explained that the uncertain
demand for training being put forward by the Peshmerga meant it
was difficult to plan for drawing on additional trainers. Additionally,
the locations for such training were undecided. The coalition
training plan also, at that time, included another coalition country's
force component to take on artillery training, as their troops
were expected to be allowed to the front line (unlike UK troops
who were not allowed within 20 km of front line). The quality
of the UK and Danish forces' work and commitment in Sulemaniyah,
in a basic facility, was appreciated by the Kurdish forces and
by the Committee and we commend them for their professionalism
and forbearance in carrying out their tasks.
76. The other method of supporting the Peshmerga
utilised by the coalition is providing the Regional Government
and the Peshmerga with military equipment, through arrangement
with the Iraqi Government, with shipments routed via Baghdad.
The UK has provided 40 Heavy Machine Guns and ammunition as well
as ration packs, sleeping bags, helmets, body armour and eye protection.[100]
Assessing the scale of the UK
contribution
77. The Secretary of State for the Defence has insisted
that the UK operations in Iraq are 'major'. The Prime Minister
implied that the UK contribution was second only to that of the
US:
If you look at the kinetic action—the bombing
that has been done of ISIL positions in Iraq—I think Britain
has taken the second largest role, after the United States. I
think we have done five times as much as, for instance, France.[101]
But, in reality, the UK contribution so far has been—in
comparison to actions taken between 2003-06 and even in relation
to other coalition partners—surprisingly modest.
78. In the House on Monday 12 December, the Defence
Secretary announced that only 99 air strikes had been carried
out since the UK started flying missions.[102]
This amounted to fewer than one a day. Six days prior, US CENTCOM
(which is coordinating strikes) announced that 1,676 strikes have
been carried out, meaning that the UK is responsible for just
6% of the strikes carried out so far.[103]
This refers to the number of strikes carried out rather than missions
(or sorties) flown, which will, of course, be much greater but
upon which there is no recent publicly available data, making
it difficult to draw a comparison.
79. In terms of weapons, the UK has only contributed
40 UK Heavy Machine Guns to the Kurdish Regional Government. The
Germans by comparison have provided:
· 8,000
G3 assault rifles with 2 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition;
· 40 MG3 machine
guns with 1 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition;
· 8,000 G36 assault
rifles with 4 million rounds of 5.56mm ammunition;
· 8,000 Walther
P1 pistols with 1 million rounds of 9mm ammunition;
· 30 MILAN anti-tank
guided missile launchers with 500 anti-tank rounds;
· 200 Panzerfaust
3 light anti-tank weapons with 2,500 rounds;
· 40 Carl Gustaf
84mm recoilless rifles with 1,000 battlefield illumination rounds;
· 100 flare guns
(signal pistols) with 4,000 battlefield illumination rounds;
· 10,000 hand
grenades;
· 4,000 sets
of personal protection equipment (helmets, body armour, ballistic
safety glasses); and
· 270 personal
medical kits[104]
The US have provided 393 up-armoured Humvees to Kurdish
Forces.[105] We were
also told that the German Government had provided the Kurdish
Regional Government with five Dingo armoured vehicles and that
the US had provided 25 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
(MRAPs).
80. The UK presence outside the Kurdish areas is
also remarkably small. At the time of our visit to Baghdad—six
months after the capture of Mosul—the entire UK military
presence outside the Kurdish regions amounted to three individuals
(outside of members of the UK Embassy defence section). By comparison
the Australians have offered up to 400 troops, the Spanish 300
troops, and Italy 280. The US has authorised up to 3,100 personnel
to be in Iraq.[106]
94 Cabinet Office, Annual Report on the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review,
18 December 2014 Back
95
MOD, (ISI 0016) Back
96
MOD, (ISI 0016) Back
97
Q320 Back
98
Q320 Back
99
Oral evidence taken on 17 Dec 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q348 Back
100
MOD, (ISI 0016) Back
101
Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee, 16 December 2014,
HC (2014-15) 887, Q66 Back
102
HC Deb, 12 Jan 2015, col. 590 Back
103
U.S.-led air strikes have hit 3,222 Islamic State targets: Pentagon,
Reuters, 7 January 2015 Back
104
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (John Hopkins
University), German Military Aid to the Kurdish Peshmerga,16 September
2014 Back
105
Iraqi train and equip programme gets under way, Jane's Defence
Weekly, 9 January 2015 Back
106
HL Deb, 15 Dec 2014, col 52, HC Deb 15 Dec 2014, col. 1129 Back
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