6 What more might the UK do?
81. Dr Douglas Porch suggested to us that the best
policy was, in fact, to refrain from any intervention in Iraq
or Syria. In his opinion, every time the West had intervened in
a crisis since the 1980s, it had made the situation worse with
the result being the creation of power vacuums, ungoverned spaces
and the alienation of the local population.[107]
He suggested that, in this case, the campaign of airstrikes would
result in collateral damage, the legitimisation of DAESH, the
radicalisation of the local population and an increase in the
number of foreign fighters.[108]
82. The option of 'doing nothing' is of course worth
examining. Such an approach could conceivably reduce the risk
of DAESH targeting UK citizens. It involves no commitment to long-term
re-engagement with the security problems of Iraq. It would involve
in the short term minimum cost for the UK.
83. It is our considered view, that the UK are
right to wish to respond actively to the threat and horrors represented
by DAESH and the current instability in Iraq. Failing to do so,
would mark a substantial departure from the UK's long-term security
partnership with both the United States and its partners in the
Middle East. It would heighten perceptions that the UK has stepped
back from its international role and could risk undermining wider
commitment to the US-led coalition, possibly weakening the effort
against DAESH. It would also make it harder for the UK to influence
political developments thereafter. Furthermore, it would undermine
the UK's national security interests through destabilisation of
the region, and through DAESH's sponsorship of terrorist attacks
and training of British foreign fighters in military tactics which
could be used upon the UK public following their return home.
We, therefore, believe that the UK should actively look for more
ways to contribute constructively to the stability of Iraq.
84. The UK Government also appears to agree with
our assessment of the importance of DAESH, Iraq, and the UK's
active involvement, to UK national interests. Lieutenant General
Sir Simon Mayall explained Iraq is:
[
] highly complex, highly complicated,
and encloses within it a very wide range of British interestspolitical,
diplomatic, military, commercial, financial. It is an area where
the United Kingdom cannot afford not to be engaged or not to approach
with a well-educated and long-term mindset. It will throw up both
threats and opportunities for many years to come, and I think
we happen to be a country that has both a history and responsibility
for being engaged there.[109]
Peter Watkins and Lieutenant General Gordon Messenger
both expressed support for this position, noting that relationships
between the UK and many Middle East states were heavily based
on military co-operation which allowed political relationships
to flourish and was therefore vital to the progression of UK national
objectives.[110]
85. Given the importance the Government apparently
attaches to Iraq, the UK could do considerably more which might
be constructive in Iraq without being pulled into combat operations,
or significantly risking UK lives. We suspect the Ministry of
Defence would be willing to do more, and if given the political
direction to do, so could generate many options. Here, however,
are some examples of opportunities for the UK which emerged in
the course of our evidence.
Formulate a strategy
86. The first priority is for the UK to develop
a clear assessment of the situation on the ground, and to be able
to provide a clearly formulated strategy and campaign plan. We
were shocked by the inability or unwillingness of any of the Service
Chiefs to provide a clear, and articulate statement of the UK's
objectives or plan in Iraq. We were troubled by the lack of clarity
over who owned the policyand indeed whether such a policy
existed.
87. When we asked the Secretary of State for Defence
whether our understanding of what was happening between the Sunni
and Shia factions on the ground was adequate, he acknowledged
that there had been intelligence failures earlier in the year
(particularly in regards to DAESH leadership and the group's deployments)
but suggested that such gaps could be remedied by surveillance
flights as opposed to increased intelligence-gathering on the
ground.[111] We remain
unconvinced by the remedy proposed by the Secretary of State and
would suggest that the problem is more fundamental and extends
to the whole nature of the UK Government's intelligence strategy
in Iraq, from requirement to assessment. We would suggest that
such intelligence failures can only be remedied through human
intelligence sources and political reporting, rather than a reliance
on technology which cannot provide any degree of context or cultural
understanding.
88. At present, it appears from witnesses that mission
analysis and planning has been left almost entirely to the United
States, and that the UK is currently simply supporting the US
plan, without attempting to arrive at any independent analysis
of its detail, assumptions or viability. This means that the British
military and public is being asked to support a plan, which the
UK is in no position to evaluate independently. It also means
that the UK does not have the detailed knowledge to debate credibly
the analysis with the United States, and Iraqi partners, and shape
and influence the strategy.
89. We believe it is unacceptable for the United
Kingdom simply to 'sign-up' to providing military support for
a campaign plan entirely developed and owned by another coalition
partnerin this case, apparently, the United Stateswithout
having any independent assessment or analysis of the assumptions,
detail and viability of that campaign plan. The UK does not,
of course, begin to have the resources of the US, but it is a
member of the P5 of the Security Council, has the fifth largest
economy in the world, and one of the largest defence budgets in
the world. It should, therefore, expect to play a full and responsible
role in coalition planning.
90. At the very least, it should have a full understanding
of the plan. British officials and policy-makers should
be expected to demonstrate a deep understanding of the nature
of the insurgency (the tribes, DAESH itself, and the broader battlefield);
a much better grasp of the strengths and weakness of the Iraqi
Security Forces, and the Peshmerga; a strong grasp of the actions,
intentions, and Iranian connections of the Shia militia; and a
much deeper sense of the local population in the Sunni areas (including
their views of DAESH and the Government, and their likely motives
and incentives). The lesson of our last engagement in Iraq is
that the absence of such 'granular' knowledge prevented the international
coalition then from designing a credible plan or monitoring its
performance.
91. Ideally, the UK should be contributing positively
to the development of the plan, and even influencing it. We doubt
that the British people are comfortable simply taking it on faith
that the current Iraq plan will succeed, and conducting military
operations in support of it, if we have no way of assessing or
judging that plan.
Training Iraqi Forces
92. The secondand most concreteopportunity
for the UK is to meet immediately Iraq's specific request for
UK trainers in counter-IED measures (made in November). Training
of Iraqi Forces is intended to be supported by eight nations[112]
and will take place in four bases across Iraq (with one located
in the Kurdish region where the Peshmerga will be trained) and
is described as focusing on building the training capacity of
the Iraqi Security Forces.
93. In Baghdad we heard the detail of the request
from the Iraqi Ministry of Defence (coordinated with the US First
Infantry Division), which was for a few hundred UK trainers to
train Iraqi soldiers in mine awareness. This was to take place
within the Al-Asad airbase North-West of Baghdad. One 15 December
2014, the Secretary of State appeared to be considering this request.
He told the House that:
In early November, I announced our intention
to provide further training to the Iraqi military. No decisions
on troop numbers, units or locations have been made, although
we expect to focus on providing expertise in countering explosive
devices. During Defence questions on 24 November, I also announced
our intention to advise and assist the Iraqi armed forces through
the secondment of advisory personnel to command headquarters.
We are considering what contribution we can make and the details
of any of these decisions will be announced to Parliament in the
usual way.[113]
On the same day the House of Lords was told that:
the "advise and assist" recce team
returned to this country on 7 December, and options are being
considered to set up a logistics headquarter and a ninth armoured
mechanical division.[114]
It was then thought that, overall, several hundred
British troops would be involved.
94. However, it has subsequently become clear in
press reports that even the relatively modest UK contribution
to training in Iraq has been delayed or reduced in number, if
not cancelled. While Australia, Spain and Italy have committed
troops to the new training package, the UK is yet to do so. Such
a deploymentto a remote desert base for counter-IED trainingdoes
not involve UK troops in combat, provides useful skills to the
Iraqi Forces, saves lives, and ensures that the UK retains some
involvement in the overall mission and some 'equity' and influence
in shaping future decisions.
95. At present, however, we would caution against
too much investment in broader training of the Iraqi Security
Forces. Twenty-five billion dollars was spent between 2003 and
2011 on training the Iraqi Security Forces, down to the very most
local level, including lengthy 'embeds' of international troops,
living and fighting alongside Iraqi troops.[115]
By 2009, it was common to hear international soldiers praise the
Iraqi Security Forces for its increasingly robust performance
at a large unit level.[116]
Unlike the formation of the Iraqi police force, the Iraqi Security
Forces were perceived as one of the 'successes' of Iraq (like
the Afghan National Army in Afghanistan).
96. However, when 3,000 DAESH fighters advanced against
the Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul in June 2014, an estimated
30,000 soldiers deserted, leaving behind equipment which was then
misappropriated by DAESH. Professor Toby Dodge has highlighted
the varying reasons for the collapse at Mosul:
· Corruption:
"Junior officers complain that defence officials demand bribes
of $3,000 for a place at the Officer Training Academy, and the
price of promotion to general is as high as $30,000. Repaying
the costs of gaining promotion leads to the existence of 'ghost
payrolls'which supply the names of fictitious soldiers
to the Ministry of Defence and have defrauded it of an estimated
25% of its annual wage budgetand the embezzlement of funds
earmarked for soldiers' food and fuel. Reports suggest that soldiers
in Mosul had to buy their own supplies from local markets and
cook the food themselves. This level of corruption would have
been obvious to frontline soldiers, undermining their ability
to fight effectively while sapping their morale and willingness
to defend the state."
· The then Prime
Minister's subversion of the chain of command and the promotion
of his close allies in to positions of power: "On 7 June
2014, Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan and Lieutenant General Abboud
Qanbar flew into the city to personally oversee the fight against
ISIS.22 As the commander of Iraqi ground forces and the commander
of joint operations respectively, they had benefited from their
close relationship with Maliki. However, as ISIS advanced on the
main army base in Mosul, Ghaidan and Qanbar quickly left the city,
fleeing to Erbil and then flying back to Baghdad. Reports that
they had made their escape disguised as civilians began to circulate
soon after, further undermining the rank and file's commitment
to defending the city."[117]
It was reported that inadequate training and limited
air support also contributed to the desertion of the soldiers
from their posts.[118]
It appears, at least anecdotally, that the senior commanders who
are now portrayed as corrupt and incompetent place-men, were almost
all trained by international forces. Dr Douglas Porch, in particular,
emphasised the futility of such training programmes, in the absence
of credible leadership and government. [119]
At the very least any training of the Iraqi Security Forces
should be related to institutional reform. The Iraqi Security
Forces have already been trained and equipped extravagantly and
repeatedly in the past decade. To do so again, without first addressing
the structural issues, would be a total waste of time and money.
Expanding current UK operations:
Extending air strikes
97. A third opportunity is to build on and expand
current UK operations. The air strikes currently being carried
out by the Royal Air Force are obviously improving morale amongst
our Iraqi allies, and should be continued. This is a relatively
minor commitment involving eight of Number 2 Squadron's sixteen
Tornadoes, of which it seems only two are flying at a time. But
it appears to be putting strain on the RAF. Number
2 Squadron, which was due to be disbanded this year, has had to
have its lifetime extended by a year[120]
and the Tornados' planned out-of-service date remains, as the
Secretary of State confirmed, 2019. [121]
Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford explained that the Tornado
could maintain their precision-bombing role throughout this year,
but noted that such operations in the future depended on the migration
of the Typhoon force into a multi-role combat aircraft. This was
due to be completed over the next six years and he expected the
Joint Strike Fighter to come into service towards the end of this
decade.[122]
98. We recommend that once the Iraqi Security
Forces and the Peshmerga show increased capability and are ready
for major offensives against DAESH, the UK should be prepared
to provide an increased level of support to those operations from
the air. This in turn relies on the UK providing the planes and
resources to be able to expand and maintain air support for the
military campaign.
99. The UK has not so far contributed to air strikes
into Syria. On 26 September, the Prime Minister signalled this
might be possible, but has so far refrained from acting.[123]
[I]f we were to act in Syria, I believe that
would be the legal basis too: collective self-defence against
ISIL which threatens Iraq. But my hon Friend is absolutely right
to say, and I have said this in the House before, that if one
is averting a humanitarian catastrophe, that is a legal basis
on which to act. Let me be clear again that although it is right
that we are having this debate and this vote, if there was a moment
when it looked as though there could be an urgent humanitarian
need for intervention, I would be prepared to order that intervention
and then come to the House and explain why.[124]
There is clearly an issuewhich has been raised
in the House of Commons[125]about
the UK continuing to strike only in Iraq when DAESH is able to
take sanctuary on the Syrian side of the border, and when our
coalition partners are conducting strikes in both Syria and Iraq.
The UK Government should be careful to explain the legal reasoning
and strategic logic of this restriction.
EXPANDING WORK WITH THE PESHMERGA
100. Recent Kurdish advances, in particular the seizing
of one of the main supply corridors into Mosul and the recapture
of much of Sinjar and the territory taken in August by DAESH has
restored confidence in the Peshmerga forces. The Kurdish President
has publicly stated however that more is required if the Peshmerga
are to counter DAESH effectively.[126]
The equipment which we were told that the Kurdish needed were
armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery that can penetrate
the armour on DAESH-modified trucks and tankers. We were also
told that the Kurdish Regional Government might be prepared to
purchase this equipment, rather than relying on donations.
101. Claims were made by many that it would be more
efficient to supply military equipment directly rather than through
Baghdad. Indeed, we note that the Foreign Affairs Committee were
informed that, as a result of the requirement for inspections
of the gifted equipment in Baghdad, there was often a delay of
several days in the equipment reaching the Kurdistan Region.[127]
We were, however, also told by UK representatives in Iraq that
the turnaround time for many items was, in practice, very short
and that such claims were likely to be motivated more by a desire
for greater independence for operations by the Kurdistan Regional
Government and its Peshmerga forces than by any identifiable hindrance
to supplies. They insisted that the greater problem for the Peshmerga,
initially, was the variable quality of some of the equipment supplied,
particularly some of the ammunition. There is a valid debate about
whether equipment should be gifted directly to the Kurdish Regional
Government or whether it ought to continue being routed via Baghdad.
Direct routing would certainly improve the timeliness of receipt,
however, it would be in tension with the coalition policy of strengthening
the unity of Iraqby routing assistance through Baghdad..
102. With regards to training, there are further
difficulties in that the Peshmerga are not only defending their
borders against DAESH, but are focused on advancing against them.
A number of Peshmerga fighters have also been dispatched to Kobani
to support the Syrian Kurds in their fight against DAESH. This
means that, in order to train troops, they will have to be pulled
off the front line. We were told that UK military (alongside coalition
partners) were working with the Ministry of Peshmerga to try and
devise training regimes which would best suit their needs. It
was hoped that the coalition training programme would be in operation
by February. We do believe that the expertise which UK troops
have gained in countering IEDs is one area where training of the
Peshmerga could prove decisive in the battle against DAESH.
103. Arguably, the most powerful contribution
which the UK could make to the Peshmerga is in structural reform:
· firstly,
the unification of the Peshmerga in to a central, cohesive fighting
force with a stated allegiance to the Kurdish Regional Government;
· secondly,
the confirmation that Peshmerga fighters would be made available
to be trained; and,
· thirdly
that the Peshmerga are willing to cooperate with the Iraqi Security
Forces.
If such commitments are set and adhered to, we
believe that the UK Government is capable of providing much greater
support to the Iraqi Government and for the Kurdish Regional Government
than it has done to date. The level of that support should increase
exponentially in terms of both gifting and sale of equipment and
the number of UK troops provided for training, particularly in
the area of command and control.
SPECIAL FORCES
104. It was suggested in evidence that part of the
UK contribution to the fight against DAESH, could be a counter-terrorism
strategy,[128] similar
to that carried out by the US Special Forces (outside of the NATO
operation) in Afghanistan.[129]
We assume that some of this is already in operation. Such a strategy,
would presumably rely on Special Forces operations and remotely
piloted air systems (RPAS) to kill or capture High Value targets,
and would aim to disrupt their capacity to organise and plan terrorist
strikes. The advantages of such an approach, is that it would
degrade DAESH leadership without excessive commitment of foreign
troops or resources. [130]
105. Critics of a counter-terrorism approach argued
that it did not always work towards the same goals as the overall
counter-insurgency operation and therefore undermined its nation-building
mission.[131] It was
also suggested that the lack of intelligence-gathering processes
on the ground in Iraq (which previously would have been carried
out by international troops, who had a legal mandate to do so
under the status of forces agreement, detaining and interrogating
local sources) would hamper any counter-terrorism strategy.[132]
Major General (retired) Shaw also suggested that any such strategy
would "seem to be mowing the grass as far as killing terrorists
were concerned" but not addressing any of the significant
problems which had acted as an ideological motivation for the
terrorist action.[133]
106. The concerns about the legality of such operations
would also have to be addressed, Professor Sir Adam Roberts told
us that:
Military operations with an anti-terrorist purpose
frequently result in legal violations, because identifying legitimate
targets in real time is inherently difficult, and the adversary
is often hard to distinguish from the general population.[134]
Combat troops are also often very important for providing
the tactical intelligence and support for counter-terrorism operations.
Finally, the significant legal obstacles to targeted killings;
and the absence of any agreed detention facilities in Iraq, and,
therefore, the impossibility of interrogating suspects for intelligence
on the terrorist networks, mean that a sustained Special Forces
campaign may also undermine the UK Government's ability to influence
the process of political reform in Iraq.
107. Special Forces operations will be of great
use to the Iraqi Government and a counter-terrorism strategy is
highly relevant to the UK's national security. The UK Government
must ensure, however, that such operations are not undermining
any political strategy and are in accordance with the law.
Defence Engagement and the Adaptable
Brigades
108. There is considerable potential for a large
and capable UK team of area specialists, developing a deep understanding
of the Iraqi theatre, helping to shape analysis, and planning,
and then contributing to influencing the actors on the ground.
They could be placed as staff and liaison officers to the US and
Iraqi systems; attached to Iraqi Divisions and Brigades; given
more significant roles in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, contributing
to Iraqi planning, the development of the mission and tactics;
and developing deep defence relationships with the Sunni community,
including helping to integrate them into the Iraqi Government
effort.
109. The UK should be ideally placed to provide this.
It has committed strongly to an international defence engagement
strategy, which appears designed (among other things) to enable
them to provide such 'thought-leadership'. The new Adaptable Brigades
have been designed specifically to "develop understanding
of the geography, culture and languages of their specified regions."[135]
The Chief of General Staff highlighted the opportunities presented
by the international defence engagement strategy:
[T]he idea of defence engagement is important
to us, because it sees young officers and NCOs having the chance
to be overseas, training individuals, doing the upstream capacity
building and all of that.[136]
And, in response to our report calling for (among
other things) "language skills required for effective engagement
with the local population and authorities,"[137]
the MOD has committed to "the development of [
] a professionalised
military diplomat with credibility and developed cultural, language
and other skills."[138]
The UK Military currently has 50 language students in Jordan and
has announced a new naval base in Bahrain as the centrepiece of
deeper Gulf Engagement. The Defence Centre for Languages and Culture
at Shrivenham has been expanded to provide for more linguistic
and cultural expertise.[139]
110. The current crisis in Iraq is an ideal opportunity
for all of this to be put to work. The UK Embassy in December
2014 had capacity for a substantial expansion in its staffing
levels with available accommodation units, which could be utilised
at only marginal extra cost and without additional outlay on security
and 'life-support' systems. The US forces indicated that they
would be willing to provide free life support to UK personnel
in theatre.
111. We recommend that there be an increase in
analytical capability in Iraq and at home, with the priority being
placed on a member of staff to monitor the progress of the Sunni
outreach programme on the ground. This is vital to ensure that
the conditions which have led to the current situation are not
recreated in the future.
Regional Solution
112. In addition to work in Iraq itself, there is
immense potential for such 'professionalised military diplomats'
to work on security structures across the region. The UK could
supplement existing staff with the many British citizens with
deep experience of Iraq. Central to their work would be the creation
of a 'regional solution' and, in particular, helping to reduce
conflict and resolve the many tensions between the major regional
players, in particular Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and
indirectly, Russia.
113. The dangers of the current regional confrontation
is clear. Witnesses have told us that the war in Syria has now
become a proxy war between (mostly Iranian) Shi'ites, supporting
the regime, and Sunni Arab Gulf States, supporting the opposition.[140]
Lieutenant General Sir Simon Mayall, the Defence Senior Adviser
for the Middle East, reiterated this, telling us that:
We can create the space for politics to gain
ground, but if the politics does not gain ground, we are conducting
a very difficult military campaign, which is, fundamentally, just
back into containment. There are elements of pressure in Ankara
not to encourage the KRG to split. There is pressure in Tehrantied
in, of course, to all sorts of other Iranian ambitions thereto
convince them that an inclusive Government that brings the Kurds
and the Sunnis in is better for them than being on the frontline
against ISIS in the long term. There is pressure in Riyadh and,
dare I say it, the Gulf states to help us do part of the Sunni
outreach and reach out a bit to Abadi, as long as he repays that
confidence by acting in a non-sectarian manner. In the mean time,
of course, [
] the key is to try to enable the Kurds, the
peshmerga in particular, and the ISF to regain the confidence
and have enough capacity and capability to take that fight.[141]
Although the Sunni Arab states and Turkey view both
the Assad regime and DAESH as a threat, Turkey views the Assad
regime as more of a threat and so has refused to engage unless
the coalition expands operations to attack Assad regime targets.[142]
114. All regional players should by now acknowledge
the significant threat posed by DAESH to the stability of the
region. The stated aim of DAESH is to create an Islamic Caliphate
in the Levantan area which encompasses Syria, Lebanon,
Israel, Jordan, Cyprus and Southern Turkey.[143]
There have also been suggestions that DAESH have aspirations to
move in to Saudi Arabia[144]
and that Jordan and Lebanon[145]
are vulnerable to DAESH incursions.
115. Joost Hilterman told us that there could be
a role for the West in facilitating dialogue amongst the countries
in the region. He referred to a previously held forum which could
act as a model:
There used to be such a thing as a regional security
conference that involved the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministers of the Interior from Iraq's neighbouring statesIran,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and othersand it could be revived.
That would be one way of lessening some of the tensions and I
certainly think that Western nations could help to facilitate
and encourage that. That requires good diplomacy and that is certainly
something that you have great experience in.[146]
There is certainly an appetite for a regional solution
among some members of the international coalitionin Jordan,
we were told that there was a desire to 'Arabise' the narrative
of the fight against DAESH and that bilateral discussions were
taking place amongst regional leaders. This idea was welcomed
by the Defence Secretary who said:
The extent to which our allies in the Gulf accept
that they and other regional parties have a regional responsibility
to help the Government of Iraq deal with this challenge is encouraging.
The recent conference in Kuwait on combating the ideology of ISIL
was an important illustration of that.[147]
As well as the conference, there is further evidence
of the neighbouring countries (including Jordan and Turkey) taking
responsibility by agreeing to host the training of moderate Syrian
opposition troops. However, as previously highlighted, the positions
of the key regional powersTurkey, Saudi Arabia and Iranremain
heavily polarised.
116. We recommend that the UK Government radically
increase their diplomatic and defence engagement with the key
regional powersparticularly Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iranto
develop a much more detailed picture of the potential benefits
and challenges of a regional solution.
The Political Dimension of Iraq
117. While all military activities will be (as they
should be) directed through the Government in Baghdad, it is vital
that the military and political strategy are intertwinedwithout
success in one, the other will surely fail. The importance of
this work was emphasised by witnesses. Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI
has commented that the
strategy of the campaign in Iraq is also becoming
clearto contain and then degrade ISIS, replacing it with
alternative Sunni leaders who command local support. This will
require the nurturing of these leaders, and a reversal of the
repressive and sectarian policies that helped ISIS to build its
support in the first place. Important steps in this direction
have been taken by the removal of Nouri al Maliki, and by the
broadening of the Iraqi Government.[148]
118. A similar point was made by Major General Jonathan
Shaw who noted that, although containment was a worthwhile objective,
current UK military actions may prove to be limited in supporting
any sort of political process.[149]
Peter Watkins informed us that containment was the first step
in the longer term strategy which was focused on a political solution.[150]
We heard in Baghdad from some very senior Iraqi leaders that there
would ultimately need to be a political settlement between the
Baghdad Government and the non-Islamist elements in the insurgency
includes former Saddam regime/Ba'athist officials and military
officers.
119. In particular, this could include playing a
role in reintegrating Sunni and Shia forces in a way that has
proved challenging for the Baghdad government. As a coalition
partner, we must take some responsibility for the actions carried
out against DAESH by Shia militias, especially when those actions
result in the gross violation of human rights. The UK Government
should use whatever influence it has available in Baghdad to underline
the necessity to curb the atrocities and influence of the Shia
militia.
120. In terms of engagement with the political endeavours,
Peter Watkins told us that the political strategy, focused on
seeing a more inclusive government in Iraq, would be carried out
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in conjunction with the
UN, the US and other coalition partners.[151]
However, during the most recent FCO questions in the House of
Commons, the Minister failed to mention any aspects of a political
strategy:
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op):
Do the Government recognise that the failure of reconstruction
after the last Iraq war shows that any military effort will be
insufficient unless the UK does far more to engage with its partners
and allies, to enable good governance in currently ungoverned
spaces in Iraq and Syria to prevail?
Mr Ellwood: The hon Gentleman raises a critical
point. The international community, especially Iraq's neighbours
and Iraq itself, must play a crucial role in providing assistance
and technical support and governance and stabilisation once the
fighting has happened. We are seeing successes: Iraqi forces have
liberated the key town of Bayji, and the National Guard programme
is formalising the militia structure, to improve security as well
as command and control. They are stopping ISIL in its tracks and
pushing it back, out of Iraq. This is a turning point.[152]
It would therefore appear that UK lacks a developed
political strategy.
107 Q48 Back
108
Q49 Back
109
Q286 Back
110
Q287 Back
111
Oral evidence taken on 17 Dec 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Qq344-7 Back
112
These are Australia, Germany, Denmark, New Zealand, Italy, Spain,
the UK and the US. Back
113
HC Deb, 15 Dec 2014, col. 1121 Back
114
HL Deb, 15 Dec 2014, col. 51 Back
115
Shashank Joshi (ISI0021) para 10 Back
116
Stiff test for Mosul as US pulls out, The Financial Times, 20
August 2010 Back
117
Dr Toby Dodge, Can Iraq Be Saved? Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy October-November 2014, Volume 56, pages 7-20 Back
118
The Iraqi Army Was Crumbling Long Before Its Collapse, U.S. Officials Say,
The New York Times, 12 June 2014 Back
119
Q56; 91-2 Back
120
RAF Tornado squadron saved from the scrap heap to bomb Isil, The
Telegraph, 2 October 2014 Back
121
Oral evidence taken on 17 Dec 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q301-3 Back
122
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q130-1 Back
123
HC Deb, 26 Sept 2014, col. 1259 Back
124
HC Deb 26 Sep 2014, col. 1263 Back
125
HC Deb, 16 Oct 2014, col. 484 Back
126
Iraqi Kurds say West not providing enough arms to defeat Islamic State,
Reuters, 19 November 2014 Back
127
Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2014-15, UK Government policy on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
HC 564, Para 102 Back
128
Q32 Back
129
U.S. Asks Allies for Counterterrorism Force in Afghanistan, Wall
Street Journal, 4 June 2014 Back
130
Q23 Back
131
Q23 Back
132
Q32 Back
133
Q111 Back
134
Professor Sir Adam Roberts (ISI 0001), para 26 Back
135
British Army, Transforming the British Army 2013, July 2013, p21 Back
136
Oral evidence taken on 5 Nov 2014, HC (2014-15) 512, Q99 Back
137
Defence Committee, Fourteenth Report of Session 2013-14, Intervention:
Why, When and How? HC 952, para 96 Back
138
Defence Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2014-15, Intervention:
Why, When and How? Government Response to the Committee's Fourteenth
Report of Session 2013-14, HC 581, Para 18 Back
139
Q289 Back
140
Q185 Back
141
Q317 Back
142
Q262 Back
143
What is Islamic State? The Wall Street Journal, 12 June 2014 Back
144
Q1 Back
145
MOD, (ISI 0016) Back
146
Q19 Back
147
HC Deb 15 Dec 2014, col. 1127 Back
148
RUSI, Western Operations Against ISIS: Holding Back in Syria,24
November 2014 Back
149
Q142 Back
150
Q314-5 Back
151
Q317 Back
152
HC Deb, 2 Dec 2014, col. 144 Back
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