The situation in Iraq and Syria and the response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH) - Defence Contents


7  Conclusion

121. The Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee that:

    [T]his is not a terrorist body that has found a willing host. It is a terrorist body that runs a state, has oil revenues, has weapons, has land, has money and all the rest of it. So we will not deal with the problem of the Islamist extremist terrorist narrative unless we quite aggressively deal with ISIL. So it is a priority.[153]

He added:

    We should work out: where does Britain have some expertise and some heft that we can bring to bear?[154]

122. We believe that Britain has significant interests in the defeat of DAESH and in a more stable Iraq. The UK military is still one of the largest and most capable forces in the world and its experience of Iraq is second only to that of the United States. Britain still has considerable expertise on Iraq from its recent operations in Iraq—when it contributed significantly for example to Sunni engagement. The recent investment in Defence Engagement, language training and the adaptable brigades should have strengthened this skill base.

123. The first step of the UK must be to develop a serious independent assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq (including individual specialists posted immediately to Iraq to focus separately on the Sunni communities, the Iraqi Security Forces, the Peshmerga, the Shia militia, and DAESH). It must develop a much more complete picture of the current coalition strategy, and be in a position to assess its costs, benefits and risks and to use this understanding to influence that strategy, and ensure that it is more than simply a repeat of the 2007 'surge' strategy conducted with a fraction of the resources.

124. There is no demand from the Iraqi Government for combat troops; nor any question of the UK deploying such troops. But Iraqi forces continue to have significant requirements for air support and training in IED awareness and disposal. Both the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces are in need of structural reform, which the UK is in a position to support. In the absence of such reform, we question whether broader training is worthwhile. There is a pressing need to study, analyse, and reach out to Sunni communities, and integrate them into the fight against DAESH. It is essential that the Iraqi Government reins in the influence of the Shia militia. We fear, however, that Sunni reconciliation and the taming of the Shia militia may prove impossibly difficult. There is considerable scope for Special Forces operations provided that they are able to operate within the increasingly stringent legal constraints. And there is an urgent requirement for regional support for Iraq, both politically and militarily.

125. These are all areas in which the UK can assist. And they are an ideal opportunity for a broader 'comprehensive approach', bringing in the best of UK international development expertise, intelligence, Special Forces, and diplomacy; all with an aim of decreasing the probability of an ongoing civil war, and increasing the chances of a political settlement, however distant these objectives may be.

126. Such activities would require only the deployment of a few hundred personnel, the cost would be relatively modest, and it would not entail the risks inherent in deploying UK troops in combat roles. These roles are also consistent with the scale of the £38 billion Defence budget, commensurate with its global presence, the expectations of Iraq and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, its status as a P5 member of the Security Council, and its traditionally close relationship to the United States.

127. We are not calling for combat troops, still less for an attempt to repeat the counter-insurgency and state-building agendas of Iraq in 2007. Any contemporary intervention must be far more focused and incremental. But this is not a reason for the UK to lurch from over-intervention to complete isolation. We face a situation in Iraq, where we have significant interests, history, and obligations, where our closest allies have requested our assistance, and where we have the expertise, and resources to influence the country in a positive direction. Given the deep polarisation and structural weaknesses of the Iraqi State, we wonder whether containment and suppression of DAESH would not be a more realistic goal than total elimination. There are, however, many highly constructive tasks we could be performing, which do not entail combat operations. The foreword to the 2010 SDSR begins with the lines "Our country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions. We have a proud history of standing up for the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come." We question whether the UK actions in Iraq begin to match such ambitions.


153   Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee, 16 December 2014, HC (2014-15) 887, Q1  Back

154   Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee, 16 December 2014, HC (2014-15) 887, Q66 Back


 
previous page contents next page


© Parliamentary copyright 2015
Prepared 5 February 2015