7 Conclusion
121. The Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee
that:
[T]his is not a terrorist body that has found
a willing host. It is a terrorist body that runs a state, has
oil revenues, has weapons, has land, has money and all the rest
of it. So we will not deal with the problem of the Islamist extremist
terrorist narrative unless we quite aggressively deal with ISIL.
So it is a priority.[153]
He added:
We should work out: where does Britain have some
expertise and some heft that we can bring to bear?[154]
122. We believe that Britain has significant interests
in the defeat of DAESH and in a more stable Iraq. The UK military
is still one of the largest and most capable forces in the world
and its experience of Iraq is second only to that of the United
States. Britain still has considerable expertise on Iraq from
its recent operations in Iraq—when it contributed significantly
for example to Sunni engagement. The recent investment in Defence
Engagement, language training and the adaptable brigades should
have strengthened this skill base.
123. The first step of the UK must be to develop
a serious independent assessment of the situation on the ground
in Iraq (including individual specialists posted immediately to
Iraq to focus separately on the Sunni communities, the Iraqi Security
Forces, the Peshmerga, the Shia militia, and DAESH). It must develop
a much more complete picture of the current coalition strategy,
and be in a position to assess its costs, benefits and risks and
to use this understanding to influence that strategy, and ensure
that it is more than simply a repeat of the 2007 'surge' strategy
conducted with a fraction of the resources.
124. There is no demand from the Iraqi Government
for combat troops; nor any question of the UK deploying such troops.
But Iraqi forces continue to have significant requirements for
air support and training in IED awareness and disposal. Both the
Peshmerga and the Iraqi Security Forces are in need of structural
reform, which the UK is in a position to support. In the absence
of such reform, we question whether broader training is worthwhile.
There is a pressing need to study, analyse, and reach out to Sunni
communities, and integrate them into the fight against DAESH.
It is essential that the Iraqi Government reins in the influence
of the Shia militia. We fear, however, that Sunni reconciliation
and the taming of the Shia militia may prove impossibly difficult.
There is considerable scope for Special Forces operations provided
that they are able to operate within the increasingly stringent
legal constraints. And there is an urgent requirement for regional
support for Iraq, both politically and militarily.
125. These are all areas in which the UK can assist.
And they are an ideal opportunity for a broader 'comprehensive
approach', bringing in the best of UK international development
expertise, intelligence, Special Forces, and diplomacy; all with
an aim of decreasing the probability of an ongoing civil war,
and increasing the chances of a political settlement, however
distant these objectives may be.
126. Such activities would require only the deployment
of a few hundred personnel, the cost would be relatively modest,
and it would not entail the risks inherent in deploying UK troops
in combat roles. These roles are also consistent with the scale
of the £38 billion Defence budget, commensurate with its
global presence, the expectations of Iraq and the Kurdistan region
of Iraq, its status as a P5 member of the Security Council, and
its traditionally close relationship to the United States.
127. We are not calling for combat troops, still
less for an attempt to repeat the counter-insurgency and state-building
agendas of Iraq in 2007. Any contemporary intervention must be
far more focused and incremental. But this is not a reason for
the UK to lurch from over-intervention to complete isolation.
We face a situation in Iraq, where we have significant interests,
history, and obligations, where our closest allies have requested
our assistance, and where we have the expertise, and resources
to influence the country in a positive direction. Given the deep
polarisation and structural weaknesses of the Iraqi State, we
wonder whether containment and suppression of DAESH would not
be a more realistic goal than total elimination. There are, however,
many highly constructive tasks we could be performing, which do
not entail combat operations. The foreword to the 2010 SDSR begins
with the lines "Our country has always had global responsibilities
and global ambitions. We have a proud history of standing up for
the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for
our country in the decades to come." We question whether
the UK actions in Iraq begin to match such ambitions.
153 Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee,
16 December 2014, HC (2014-15) 887, Q1 Back
154
Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee, 16 December 2014,
HC (2014-15) 887, Q66 Back
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