The Green Deal: watching brief (part 2) - Energy and Climate Change Contents

2  Initial Assessment of the Green Deal and ECO

16. Emissions from buildings accounted for 37% of total UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2013, approximately half of which resulted from heating.[16] Increasing the energy efficiency of domestic and non-domestic buildings could therefore contribute significantly towards finding solutions to the energy "trilemma" of reducing CO2 emissions, while guaranteeing security of energy supply and ensuring affordable delivery. In theory, the Green Deal and ECO represent tangible means to meeting these aims.

Uptake of Green Deal plans

17. In response to our previous report, DECC stated: "The Government considers that saving carbon is the principal objective of the programme".[17] In March 2013, the Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, then Minister of State for Climate Change, anticipated that at least "10,000" people would have signed up to the Green Deal by the end of the year.[18] At the time of publication of this report, 300,259 Green Deal assessments had been carried out, but only approximately 4000 Green Deal plans had been or were in the process of being set up.[19] This "deeply disappointing"[20] level of uptake has meant that the programme has not made "any real impact up to now"[21] and "falls a long way short of the 10,000 by the end of 2013 that […] the Minister was anticipating".[22] This feeling of disappointment was shared across the range of contributors to this inquiry.[23] Dr Nick Eyre, from the University of Oxford, stressed that:

    Green Deal finance has perhaps been even more spectacularly unsuccessful than was predicted. Two hundred homes a month is an absolutely trivial contribution to carbon targets.[24]

The Green Deal and ECO are far from achieving the level of activity seen under their predecessor schemes CERT and CESP.[25]

18. In its latest report to Parliament, the Committee on Climate Change estimated that at the end of 2013, 4.5 million cavity walls and 7 million solid walls remained uninsulated, with a carbon saving potential of 2 MtCO2 and 5 MtCO2, respectively. An additional 0.7 MtCO2 could be saved as a result of addressing 9 million lofts that still required additional insulation filling.[26] The Government's latest statistics reveal that estimated lifetime carbon savings through Green Deal plans have so far been negligible, at 0.04 MtCO2 through Green Deal plans and 0.07 MtCO2 through Green Deal cashback.[27]

19. Mark Bayley, Chief Executive of the Green Deal Finance Company, indicated that the take-up had fallen short of initial expectations and that there were uncertainties going forward:

    We have had, over the past year, very significant changes in the energy efficiency landscape and we are now having to work the Green Deal in a very different way to that which we expected when the original forecasts were drawn[28]

The Minster agreed that his Department had been "surprised by […] the relatively low take-up to date of finance plans",[29] adding that the absence of the major energy companies on the Green Deal market had contributed to this slow start:

    The financing element is still very immature. The principal reason, I think, […] is very few of the major energy utilities offer it in a real sense. The growth is coming from the new entrants who have a genuine business model that earns them money by helping people save money on their bills.[30]

20. With such extremely low levels of take-up eighteen months into the life of the policy, the Green Deal has so far been a failure. It is very disappointing that the Government's flagship energy efficiency policy has been so slow to attract customers. We have been and will continue to be supportive of the principle of the Green Deal but the Government needs to set out a clear strategy to revive the failing scheme. The Government must urgently address the barriers which currently prevent wider and faster take-up of the Green Deal.

Barriers to take-up

21. We have identified three types of barriers that have made the Green Deal unattractive to customers: (1) financial barriers; (2) communication and trust barriers; and (3) behavioural barriers. We set out the main characteristics of these barriers below, and offer suggestions as to how they may be overcome in Chapters 3 and 4.


22. The cost of the assessment and the high interest rate attached to the Green Deal loan have been repeatedly cited as reasons for the poor take-up of the scheme.[31] Representatives from energy companies told us that the assessment is unpopular amongst customers[32] and that "the customer perception is that [the interest rates] are higher than is fair, given the availability of cheaper loans in the market".[33] Despite the projected savings being the "key selling point for the scheme",[34] consumers regard it as being too costly. Action with Communities in Rural England explained that:

    The interest rate on the loan was perceived as high and the process of potential increases by the Green Deal Loan company was seen as confusing. […] Cheaper sources of finance are available to householders, as demonstrated by the various websites that have advice on the schemes e.g. Which? website.[35]

23. The length and amount of individual Green Deal loans is determined by the Golden Rule, which in principle safeguards consumers against financial losses. The amount loaned under the rule is derived from the energy savings estimated to arise from the specific measures, following a careful assessment of the property.[36] However, we were warned that the methodology can lead to estimates that are too conservative.[37] Jenny Holland, Head of the Parliamentary Team at the Association for the Conservation of Energy, told us:

    the way in which the Golden Rule is assessed means that the level of energy savings is assessed quite conservatively and that reduces the amount that can be loaned to customers under the Green Deal. That is for a whole series of reasons, including the fact that the in-use factors reduce the level of anticipated energy savings by anything between 15% and 35%.[38]

24. Whilst designed to be protective, the Golden Rule is in practice also restrictive. In many cases, it deters potential customers from installing measures they need or desire because they require additional personal investment.[39] The UK Green Building Council told us:

    Limitations on the amount that can be borrowed under the Golden Rule also mean that some form of top-up finance is required to cover the cost of a package of measures. Due to the complicated application process for Green Deal finance, householders who are required to arrange additional top-up finance are more likely to fully fund the install by other forms of finance.[40]

Citizens Advice concluded that "in order for the Green Deal to attract significant levels of take-up there must be a clear financial incentive to do so, this is not currently the case".[41]

25. Which? also warned us that the Golden Rule calculation is based on what a "typical" household would spend on energy. This can disadvantage the fuel poor, who may use less energy and therefore run the risk of repayments exceeding financial savings.[42]


26. There are high levels of confusion, misunderstanding and mistrust surrounding the Green Deal. A number of contributors explained that the scheme lacked clarity for both consumers and the supply chain,[43] with "conflicting, contradictory and inaccurate information […] provided in the guidance documents and training materials for Green Deal Advisors"[44] and confusing messages from DECC.[45] Nick Chase, Director of Policy and Research at Action with Communities in Rural England, stated:

    The evidence that we have had coming back from Green Deal has identified there is confusion about what benefit it delivers. The fact that there is a loan attached to it, and the loan being attached to the property and the fuel costs in the future is a concept I think people find very difficult to grasp.[46]

27. In addition to a lack of understanding, instances of mis-selling have led to a widespread mistrust of Green Deal assessors.[47] Citizens Advice explained that "the majority of calls made to the Citizens Advice Consumer Helpline in relation to the Green Deal concern potential rogue traders and scams".[48] Installer companies themselves have sometimes found that "somebody had been into the area behind them".[49] The built-environment think-tank Edge told us that "the existing self-certifying regime by installers is insufficient" and that a more robust quality and assurance process is required to boost customer confidence.[50] A mystery shopping exercise carried out by Which? raised important questions about the quality of the Green Deal assessment[51] and several contributors noted the adverse impact of rogue traders.[52]

28. As a result, there has been negative press coverage, which has further contributed to its slow take-up.[53] Peter Broad, Policy Manager at Citizens Advice, judged that "clearer branding, tighter regulations on doorstep selling and co-ordination between DECC and Trading Standards and other organisations operating in the consumer protection landscape" were needed to tackle this issue.[54] Jonathan Harley, Head of Operations at the Green Deal Oversight and Registration Body (which manages the authorisation of the Green Deal scheme participants on behalf of DECC), assured us that issues of misconduct were promptly dealt with:

    A key part of the oversight and registration body, as well, is obviously to ensure that consumers are protected and we are responsible for maintaining the accreditation framework in relation to the Green Deal […]. We found that the issues that have been made known to us are of companies who have looked at the new scheme in terms of the Green Deal and tried to be opportunistic around taking advantage of consumers to make a "quick buck" as it were […] and where we have found concerns of rogue traders, we have dealt with them very quickly.[55]

29. Consumer Futures further raised concerns that, by lacking clarity, the Government's communications on the Green Deal had been misleading:

    They have conflated Green Deal finance, ECO, and energy efficiency measures in general, despite their different offers and levels of consumer protection. They have also misrepresented the nature of Green Deal finance: as recently as 18 January 2014, a DECC spokesman was quoted saying that "no one can borrow more than they will pay back in energy savings, so no one will lose money by taking out a Green Deal loan" which is a misrepresentation of Green Deal finance.[56]

30. Following two separate investigations into Green Deal advertisement, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) upheld claims of mis-selling on the part of the Green Deal Finance Company and DECC on 21 May and 27 August 2014, respectively.[57] Mark Bayley, the GDFC Chief Executive, assured us that the GDFC "accept the ASA's ruling and […] will make it clear that our loans are for long-term and we will make it clear in making comparisons".[58]

31. The Green Deal process is too complicated and has led to confusion and mistrust. The Green Deal Oversight and Registration Body plays an important role in regulating activities but better communication across the Green Deal stakeholder chain is necessary. Publication of misleading information by GDFC and DECC further undermines a programme that already suffers from poor public understanding and interest. Until consumer trust and understanding are improved, the Green Deal is unlikely to see any substantial increase in take-up. We address this further in Chapter 4.


32. As a market-based mechanism, the Green Deal relies on the commitment, engagement and action of individual customers. However, the attachment of the Green Deal loan to the property is an alien concept to most people and is frequently viewed as detrimental to owners should they wish to sell or rent their property.[59] This is exacerbated by a general unwillingness to take-on an additional loan and run the risk of becoming over-indebted in the face of financial and policy uncertainties.[60]

33. While consumers may be aware that insulation improvements can lead to financial savings, the perceived time, effort and disruption of energy efficiency improvements can be off-putting.[61] Several contributors told us that this 'hassle factor' was contributing to the poor take-up of the Green Deal.[62] Peter Broad, Policy Manager at Citizens Advice, suggested that incentivising the public was important in taking the Green Deal forward:

    you need to be looking at why consumers are not engaging more widely in energy efficiency; so bigger barriers, hassle, lack of awareness and things like that. While you can improve Green Deal finance per se, I think you need to look much more widely at how you incentivise consumers to take up energy efficiency wherever you can[63]

34. The Minister acknowledged that rolling-out the Green Deal to acceptable levels would require "significant behavioural change as well as innovation".[64] It has been suggested that, to help raise awareness and shift mentalities towards energy efficiency, the installation of Green Deal measures could be integrated within a wider spectrum of home improvements,[65] "rather than trying to separate energy efficiency from the rest of [what] goes on in the building stock".[66]

Identifying clear objectives

35. In our first report on the Green Deal, we recognised that it was too early to set hard targets for the scheme, as these might lead to mis-selling in order to meet goals. However, we stressed the importance of consistent and accurate monitoring of different aspects of the Green Deal. DECC publishes monthly and quarterly statistics for the Green Deal and ECO,[67] and monitors public awareness of the schemes.[68] We were pleased to see that a number of our previous recommendations regarding useful monitoring data[69] have been or are in the process of being integrated into these statistics.[70]

36. However, given such a low level of take-up eighteen months into the life of the scheme, it is important that objectives and projections be set against which progress on the roll-out of the programme can be judged in the years to come.[71]

37. During our previous scrutiny of the Green Deal, Mr David Thomas, Deputy Director, Green Deal Consumer Demand, DECC, told us that DECC expected one million Green Deals by March 2015, through "installations involving ECO, installations not involving ECO, people paying for things through Green Deal finance and people not paying through that".[72] During the present inquiry, the Minister told us that:

    That is something that we are still committed to and, broadly speaking, remain on track for by March 2015. We currently have succeeded in installing measures through the combination of Green Deal, ECO and its supporting programmes in about 660,000 homes as of March. It is significantly above that in real time now.[73]

38. However, these commitments still fail to set a framework through which the Green Deal itself will be assessed. The UK Green Building Council judged that:

    It is disappointing that no targets have been set for the delivery of installations or carbon reductions under Green Deal. This would help to clarify Government's ambitions for the scheme and provide more certainty to industry about the likely scale of delivery over time.[74]

39. Mark Bayley, Chief Executive of the Green Deal Finance Company (GDFC), explained that the ambition of the GDFC was to see Green Deal plans set up in "one million homes by 2020 or more".[75] He acknowledged that this number is a long way away from the number of plans set up or in the process of being set up to date:

    I have to be absolutely clear that the forecasts on which the investors set up the company have not been met. That is true. Those forecasts were prepared at the desktop. They were before engagement with the consumer.[76]

40. The Minister told us that:

    the aim of the Green Deal is not to sell finance plans. […] We are in the business of improving the energy efficiency of the housing stock of Great Britain; we are not in the business of simply saying, "Success for us is selling finance plans." Finance plans are a means to an end. Now, if the ends can be reached by other means that are acceptable to consumers, because they choose to self-pay rather than take a plan, that has to be, by any objective measure, success.[77]

The Minister further stated that "anything that stems from a Green Deal assessment must be counted as part of the Green Deal market".[78] While the installation of energy efficiency measures is, as many contributors have said, an important step in the achievement of the Department's goals,[79] it is surprising that the Minister was so dismissive of the Green Deal finance, when that had been presented as the selling point of the programme at its inception.

41. The Government needs to deal with the criticisms surrounding the poor take-up of the Green Deal. A lack of public commitment towards selling Green Deal plans is contributing to the increasing uncertainty surrounding the future of the Green Deal.

42. We recommend that DECC set out a robust framework through which the Green Deal can be assessed. In particular, DECC should be clearer about its ambition for the number of plans sold and CO2 saved through measures installed under Green Deal. The Government should also clarify its expectations of CO2 saved through other energy efficiency programmes. The Department and The Green Deal Finance Company should communicate a consistent message on what success will look like.

The Energy Company Obligation and the Green Deal

43. ECO originally obliged suppliers to install more costly measures such as solid wall insulation and hard-to-treat cavity wall insulation, with the market-based Green Deal facilitating the installation of low-cost measures under the Golden Rule.[80] However, the recent changes to ECO mark a return to a focus on lower-cost loft and cavity-wall insulation. While this move has been welcomed by the energy companies,[81] it has created uncertainty and stalled the market along the supply chain.[82] Dr David Kennedy, from the Committee on Climate Change, agreed that the focus of ECO on low-cost opportunities was sensible both "from a carbon-saving point of view" and "from a cost-effectiveness point of view".[83] However, others argued that the 33% cut to the carbon reduction target of ECO and the generous carry-over of points for measures installed early, [84] showed a lack of ambition.[85]

44. The changes to ECO risk undermining the Green Deal because whereas low cost measures can now be installed through ECO, the Golden Rule prevents the installation of higher cost measures using a Green Deal loan. There is a lack of clarity on how the relationship between the Green Deal and ECO will evolve, and what the Green Deal will now be used for.[86] Peter Broad, Policy Manager at Citizens Advice, warned that the changes to ECO will be detrimental to the Green Deal:

    The framework that DECC set out and which we supported was that consumers who can pay pay, and the ECO supports measures that either are too expensive to be cost effective, particularly solid-wall insulation, and also measures for low income households who cannot afford to install measures themselves. However, the Energy Company Obligation under the proposals put forward by DECC is being opened up to support cheap cavity wall and loft insulation for the able-to-pay sector. Those are measures that should be funded by consumers themselves. I think in that sense it very much does undermine the Green Deal.[87]

45. The question becomes: "Why would anybody do Green Deal if they can get those measures out of ECO"?[88] Mr Chris Nicholls, Head of the Green Deal and ECO analysts and economists at DECC, acknowledged that:

    By including low cost measures then this suggests that the households who would have otherwise taken out a Green Deal plan or other forms of self-finance to undertake the cheaper measures would now be able to get UK funding for those.[89]

46. The Minister suggested that customers faced a variety of options in terms of financing higher cost measures that cannot be solely funded by a Green Deal loan:

    There are three major sources. There is the Green Deal Communities, which can work in conjunction with Green Deal finance and ECO. There is ECO itself and there is the Green Deal Home Improvement Fund. Each of those offer in varying ways the opportunity for partial subsidy of measures, either to bring them into the Golden Rule or to bring them in to a level where self-finance is a sensible and affordable proposition, or in some cases to cover the whole cost where that household is in fuel poverty.[90]

47. The Green Deal and ECO have similar goals but are different programmes operating in distinct ways. They should be complimentary rather than competitive. Allowing loft and cavity wall insulation under CERO raises the question of what the Green Deal will now be used for. It is not clear what impact the recent changes to ECO will have on the take-up of the Green Deal.

48. We recommend that DECC clarifies what it expects the Green Deal to be used for during the lifetime of ECO and produces clear consumer guidance as to the different ways in which Green Deal finance can be used (for example in isolation or in combination with other schemes and incentives). A one-stop place for consumers to determine their options would greatly simplify the customer journey and encourage take-up where households may not be aware of the combination of options available to them.

49. The changes to the Energy Company Obligation so early in the life of the policy have created uncertainty across the Green Deal and ECO supply chain.[91] Having geared up for delivery under CERO, the solid wall insulation industry now faces a potential lack of demand for the years to come as "these measures will require significant amounts of top-up funding to be installed using Green Deal finance".[92] The use of top-up funds and other finance options are discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

16   Committee on Climate Change, 'Meeting Carbon Budgets - 2014 Progress Report to Parliament' (July 2014) p 31 Back

17   Energy and Climate Change Committee, Second Special Report of Session 2013-14, The Green Deal: watching brief: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2013-14, HC 607, p 2 Back

18   BBC Radio 4, 'You and Yours,' accessed 9 July 2014 Back

19   Department of Energy and Climate Change, Domestic Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation in Great Britain, Monthly report (August 2014), p 5 Back

20   Q35 [John Alker] Back

21   Residential Landlords Association (GRE 012) para 24 Back

22   Q2 [Jenny Holland] Back

23   Q2 [Jenny Holland], Q35 [Tim Moore], Q166 [Nick Eyre], UK Green Building Council (GRE 003), Heating and Hotwater Industry Council (GRE 007) para 46, Residential Landlords Association (GRE 012) para 24, Citizens Advice (GRE 018) para 2.3 and 5.1, Electrical Contractors' Association (GRE 020)  Back

24   Q167 [Dr Nick Eyre] Back

25   Q166 [Dr Nick Eyre] Back

26   Committee on Climate Change, 'Meeting Carbon Budgets - 2014 Progress Report to Parliament' (July 2014) p 162-163 Back

27   Department of Energy and Climate Change, Data tables: Green Deal, ECO and Insulation Levels, up to March 2014 (June 2014), Table 1.15. These estimates may be subject to revision (Department of Energy and Climate Change, Methodology Note (June 2014), p 22). Back

28   Q214 [Mark Bayley] Back

29   Q309 [Gregory Barker] Back

30   Q307 [Gregory barker] Back

31   Carillion (GRE 028), George Eckton (GRE 037), ScottishPower (GRE 054) para 13 and 36, British Property Federation (GRE 015) para 12, Anglian Home Improvements (GRE 004), Eastleigh Borough Council (GRE 021), Electrical Contractors Association (GRE 020) para 4, Edge (GRE 045) Back

32   British Gas (GRE 030) Back

33   RWE npower (GRE 024) para 37 Back

34   Action with Communities in Rural England (GRE 051) para 4.3 Back

35   Action with Communities in Rural England (GRE 051) para 4.1 Back

36   Standard energy savings are assigned to different measures installed in different types of properties. These cost savings are then adjusted downwards to reflect variation in buildings, products, installation techniques and occupant behaviour from those assumed in RdSAP, a factor that is known as the "in-use factor". Back

37   Q40 [John Alker], Anglian Home Improvements (GRE 004), Eastleigh Borough Council (GRE 021) para 20, British Council of Shopping Centres (GRE 059) Back

38   Q3 [JennyHolland] Back

39   UK Green Building Council (GRE 003) para 4.6, Anglian Home Improvements (GRE 004), Eastleigh Borough Council (GRE 021) para 13, Carillion (GRE 028), British Gas (GRE 030) Back

40   UK Green Building Council (GRE 003) para 4.6 Back

41   Citizens Advice (GRE 018) para 3.5 Back

42   Which? (GRE 019) para 23 Back

43   Action with Communities in Rural England (GRE 051) para 3.1, National Landlords Association (GRE 031) para 14. British Council of Shopping Centres (GRE 059), National Federation of Roofing Contractors (GRE 025) para 3  Back

44   Association of Residential Letting Agents (GRE 011) para 27 Back

45   Q11 [Peter Broad] Back

46   Q133 [Nick Chase] Back

47   Action with Communities in Rural England (GRE 051) para 4.3, Q137 [Nick Chase], Citizens Advice (GRE 018) para 2.5, Q25 [Peter Broad]  Back

48   Citizens Advice (GRE 018) para 3.10 Back

49   Q26 [Jenny Saunders] Back

50   Edge (GRE 045) Back

51   Which? (GRE 19) para 19, Q16 [Peter Broad] Back

52   Citizens Advice (GRE 018) para 3.10, Consumer Futures (GRE 026) para 20, Qq25-26 [Peter Broad] Back

53   British Gas (GRE 030), Carillion (GRE 028), Association for the Conservation of Energy (GRE 014) para 1 Back

54   Q26 [Peter Broad] Back

55   Q247 [Jonathan Harley] Back

56   Consumer Futures (GRE 026) Back

57   Advertising Standards Authority, 'ASA Adjudication on The Green Deal Finance Company Ltd' and 'ASA Adjudication on Department of Energy and Climate Change,' accessed 27 August 2014 Back

58   Q239 [Mark Bayley] Back

59   Action with Communities in Rural England (GRE 051) para 4.1, Residential Landlords Association (GRE 012) para 7, Sheffield LATAG (GRE 057) Back

60   Citizens Advice (GRE 018) para 3.7, Action with Communities in Rural England (GRE 051) para 4.1 Back

61   Rosenow and Eyre, "The Green Deal and the Energy Company Obligation", Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, vol 166 (2013), pp 131-132 Back

62   Edge (GRE 045), Citizens Advice (GRE 018) para 3.12, Association for the Conservation of Energy (GRE 014) para 12, Carillion (GRE 028), Q37 [Richard Lambert] Back

63   Q5 [Peter Broad] Back

64   Q305 [Gregory Barker] Back

65   Q13 [Jenny Saunders], Q54 [Richard Lambert], Q154 [Nick Chase] Back

66   Q194 [Dr Nick Eyre] Back

67   Department of Energy and Climate Change, 'Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation (ECO) statistics,' accessed 8 July 2014 Back

68   Department of Energy and Climate Change, 'Energy Saving Advice Service (ESAS) calls and Green Deal webpage views and Green Deal Home Improvement Fund (GDHIF) application data,' accessed 8 July 2014 Back

69   Energy and Climate Change Committee, First Report of Session 2013-14, The Green Deal: watching brief, HC 142, recommendation 16 Back

70   Energy and Climate Change Committee, Second Special Report of Session 2013-14, The Green Deal: watching brief: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2013-14, HC 607, Department of Energy and Climate Change (GRE 065) Back

71   Energy and Climate Change Committee, First Report of Session 2013-14, The Green Deal: watching brief, HC 142, para 72 Back

72   Oral evidence taken on 6 February 2013, HC (2013-14) 142, Q49 Back

73   Q305 [Gregory Barker] Back

74   UK Green Building Council (GRE 003) para 9.3 Back

75   Q234 [Mark Bayley] Back

76   Q214 [Mark Bayley] Back

77   Q308 [Gregory Barker] Back

78   Q313 [Gregory Barker] Back

79   Q2 [Peter Broad], Eastleigh Borough Council (GRE 021) para 6 Back

80   Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets - 2014 Progress Report to Parliament (July 2014), p 168 Back

81   British Gas (GRE 030), ScottishPower (GRE 054) para 19, RWE npower (GRE 024) para 35 Back

82   UK Green Building Council (GRE 003) para 8.3, Anglian Home Improvements (GRE 004), Heating and Hotwater Industry Council (GRE 007) para 44, British Property Federation (GRE 015) para 19, RWE npower (GRE 024) para 23, Consumer Futures (GRE 026) para 27, Carillion (GRE 028) Back

83   Q165 [Dr David Kennedy] Back

84   Q7 [Jenny Holland], Mark Group (GRE 017) para 6, Consumer Futures (GRE 026) para 37 Back

85   Q170 [Dr David Kennedy], Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets - 2014 Progress Report to Parliament (July 2014), p 11 Back

86   UK Green Building Council (GRE 003) para 10.1, Consumer Futures (GRE 026) para 34, Q170 [Dr David Kennedy], Insulated Render and Cladding Association (GRE 027) Back

87   Q6 [Peter Broad] Back

88   Q187 [Nick Eyre] Back

89   Q380 [Chris Nicholls] Back

90   Q381 [Gregory Barker] Back

91   Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets - 2014 Progress Report to Parliament (July 2014), p 169 Back

92   UK Green Building Council (GRE 003) para 10.1 Back

previous page contents next page

© Parliamentary copyright 2014
Prepared 15 September 2014