6 European Public Prosecutor's Office
| Committee's assessment
| Legally and politically important
|
| Committee's decision
| Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details
| State of Play/Orientation debate on the Draft Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)
|
| Legal base
| Article 86 TFEU; EP consent; unanimity
|
| Department
| Home Office
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
6.1 The Commission proposes to combat
fraud on the EU budget by establishing a European Public Prosecutor's
Office (EPPO) and produced its original draft Regulation to establish
an EPPO in July 2013. Since then, the original proposal has been
discussed in the relevant Council Working Group (COPEN),[9]
as well as in CATS[10]
and at several JHA Councils. The proposal is subject to a special
legislative procedure requiring the consent of the European Parliament
and unanimity in the Council. After the Council has exhausted
all options for obtaining unanimity, a group of at least nine
Member States may enter into enhanced cooperation.
6.2 The aim of the current document,
a partial alternative text to the Commission's original text,
is part of that effort on the part of the Presidency of the Council
to exhaust all such options. It aims to reflect previous discussions
in Council and also the views of national parliaments in their
Reasoned Opinions produced in response to the original proposal
(and which reached the "yellow card" threshold under
the subsidiarity protocol).[11]
Endorsed at the March JHA Council, the text adopts a collegial
model for an EPPO (consisting of a college of prosecutors originating
from Member States) and concurrent competences for the EPPO and
national prosecution services to investigate offences against
the financial interests of the EU (to be agreed in the PIF Directive),[12]
but with priority rights for the EPPO to investigate and prosecute
PIF offences.
6.3 We commend the Minister for Modern
Slavery and Organised Crime at the Home Office (Karen Bradley)
for her extremely detailed and comprehensive Explanatory Memorandum.
6.4 We note that although the alternative
text moves away from exclusive EPPO competence and towards more
action at national level, the uncertainty and complexity of the
rules regulating competence are of concern. We also think that
the new college model proposed for an EPPO, with its strata of
constituent bodies and post-holders, could undermine its operational
efficiency and efficacy. However, since the UK will not be participating
in any EPPO, our main concern rests with the potential impact
of the alternative model on the operation and remit of Eurojust
and OLAF. We therefore welcome the Government's continuing efforts
to ensure that the UK will not be disadvantaged by any reduction
in their roles.
6.5 Since the Minister's letter,
we note that the Press Release for the 5-6 June JHA Council[13]
states that:
"Ministers welcomed the
text set out in the document prepared by the Presidency (9834/1/14
REV 1) as a basis for future work, on the understanding that
the text may need further consideration by the working party.
Ministers confirmed, as the basis for further discussion, the
principles of a collegial organisation of the EPPO. They also
confirmed the principle that the EPPO has a priority competence
to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the Union's financial
interests."
"In March 2014 the Council
held a discussion on the structure of the Office, and on the delimitation
of its tasks and competences. Ministers generally agreed that
the European Prosecutor's office will be organised on the basis
of a college of prosecutors originating from the member states."
6.6 We would expect to hear from
the Government:
· if any significant progress
or outcome was achieved at the 5-6 June JHA Council beyond that
stated in the Press Release; and/or
· when the next significant
developments occur, particularly concerning any impact of the
alternative text on the roles of Eurojust or OLAF.
6.7 In the meantime, this document
remains under scrutiny.
Full details of the
document: Draft Regulation
on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office
— State of Play/Orientation Debate: (36044),
9834/1/14 REV1.
Background and previous scrutiny
6.8 In September 2013, we scrutinised
the original proposal for a Regulation to establish the EPPO.
Although it engaged the UK's JHA Title V opt-in rights, the Government
had made clear its intention not to opt into this measure in the
Coalition Agreement. Despite this, given the importance of the
proposal, we recommended that the opt-in aspects of the proposal
be debated, together with a parallel proposal to reform Eurojust,
in a debate which was held on the floor of the House on 29 October.
In any event, any participation in a proposal to establish an
EPPO is controlled, both pre and post-adoption, by the "double
lock" requirements set out in section 6 of the European Union
Act 2011 — approval by Act of Parliament and a Referendum.
6.9 On 11 September we also recommended
a Reasoned Opinion on the proposal (the corresponding debate on
the floor of the House was held on Tuesday 22 October). The Reasoned
Opinions submitted by national parliaments exceeded the "yellow
card" threshold (representing 14 votes, the required quarter
of the national parliament votes on a JHA proposal). We then scrutinised
the Commission's subsequent decision to maintain (rather than
amend or withdraw) the proposal on two subsequent occasions (our
Thirty-first and Forty-fifth Reports).[14]
We considered the Commission's review of the Reasoned Opinions
to be premature, hasty and automatic, driven by the political
imperative of establishing an EPPO and based on an overly narrow
view of the scope of the subsidiarity control mechanism.
The current document
6.10 This consists of the Council's
partial alternative text to the Commission's original proposal
together with an explanatory preface. The preface sets out:
· the background to, and progress
of, the negotiations of the original proposal;
· the rationale for the alternative
text;
· the status of the alternative
text: the document states that "Delegations thus now appear
in broad agreement on the text, although a few issues highlighted
in footnotes to the text as set out in the annex will need to
be revisited in the light of the results of future negotiations
on other chapters of the Regulation"; and
· two main issues identified
as being still very much "open" and subject to discussion
— the supervision of the operational work of the EPPO in
Member States and the meaning of the concept of concurrent competences
of the EPPO and Member States.
THE REVISED PROVISIONS - ARTICLES 1-19 ONLY
Overview
6.11 The document only provides revisions
of Articles 1-19 of the original proposal. Additionally, the recitals
for this alternative text have not yet been written, including
opening text which will carry the legal base (Article 86 TFEU),
explanatory notes on definitions, and clarification of key concepts
or features included in the new model.
6.12 Articles 1 and 2: These
cover subject matter and definitions and remain unchanged.
6.13 Article 3: The specification
that the EPPO structure is decentralised has been removed (but
is addressed by Article 7).
Tasks of the EPPO
6.14 Article 4: the alternative
'college' model's tasks are similar to those in the Commission's
original model: to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgement
perpetrators and accomplices who commit offences against the EU
finances, to direct and supervise cases, and to act as a prosecutor
in national courts. However, dismissing cases and lodging the
indictment in national courts has been removed from its tasks.
Basic principles
6.15 Article 5: laying out the
basic principles of the EPPO, builds on the text of Article 11
in the Commission's model but adjusted to the new aim of ensuring
that decision making is brought close to the national level. As
the issue of applicable law under the new structure has not yet
been addressed and this is affected by the nature of concurrent
(shared) competence within Articles 17, 18 and 19, the current
text of Article 5 is kept open as reflected by the footnotes.
6.16 Article 6: This is similar
to the Commission's original text, emphasising the importance
of independence and accountability to the EPPO's effectiveness.
Article 6(1) has been adjusted to reflect the 'college' model.
Structure of the EPPO
6.17 Articles 7 to 12: These
set out the new 'college' model and fully replace Article 6 of
the Commission's model. Article 7(1) states that the EPPO will
be a Union body with a decentralised structure (though organised
at a central and decentralised level according to Article 7(2)).The
Central Office of the EPPO will consist of a College, Permanent
Chambers set up under that College, and its administrative support
staff. The decentralised level will consist of European Delegated
Prosecutors located in Member States.
The "College"
6.18 Article 8: A European Chief
Prosecutor and deputies (established under Article 10) will chair
a College which consists of one European Prosecutor per participating
Member State (established under Article 11). Unlike the Commission's
model, the European Chief Prosecutor and his/her deputies do not
make operational decisions on individual cases at national level.
Nor will these decisions be taken by the College which will meet
regularly to monitor the overall activities of the EPPO, take
strategic decisions affecting the EPPO as a whole, and set up
and supervise the sub-structures which will oversee specific EPPO
cases. College decisions will be subject to simple majority voting.
Footnotes 14 to 18 indicate that there is still uncertainty about
the structure and voting regime of the College, including the
nature and extent of its monitoring and supervision roles.
Permanent Chambers
6.19 Article 9: Permanent Chambers,
at the next level in the structure, will consist of the European
Chief Prosecutor and deputies as chairpersons, and a small number
of the European Prosecutors from the College (numbers not yet
specified) to monitor and supervise particular cases allocated
to that Permanent Chamber. The European Delegated Prosecutor based
at national level (established under Article 12), who will lead
a case within the Member State where the prosecution will be taken
forward, will also be part of the Permanent Chamber's processes
directing and monitoring their case. This structure aims to deliver
independence while also bringing decision-making on cases close
to the national level. The Permanent Chamber will also coordinate
cross-border cases, will implement strategic decisions of the
College, and may give instructions in specific cases based on
information provided by the European Delegated Prosecutor. Permanent
Chamber decisions will be subject to simple majority voting. The
decisions the Permanent Chamber can take are not finalised. Footnote
22 indicates that there is still uncertainty about the division
of powers between the Permanent Chamber (as part of the Central
Office) and the European Delegated Prosecutor (acting within Member
States).
European Chief Prosecutor and Deputies
6.20 Article 10: In addition
to chairing College meetings, the text states that they will decide
which Permanent Chamber will take a case and they will assign
which European Prosecutor will supervise and/or which European
Delegated Prosecutor will lead the case operationally. But Footnote
22 reflects uncertainty about the powers of the Permanent Chamber,
and the impact on where such decisions lie. The European Chief
Prosecutor and his/her deputies will be the public face of the
EPPO and will act for the EPPO in all dealings with other Union
Institutions, Member States and third parties. A direct link with
national parliaments' role is also being considered (Footnote
32).
European Prosecutors
6.21 Article 11: European Prosecutors
will liaise between the College and Permanent Chambers, whether
on a full or part time basis, and will monitor and supervise the
implementation of cases by the European Delegated Prosecutors.
European Delegated Prosecutors
6.22 Article 12: There will be
at least two European Delegated Prosecutors per participating
Member State. They will still act through the so-called 'double
hat' contained in the Commission's model. Under their EPPO 'hat'
they will have a responsibility to identify offences, open a case
and refer that case to the Central Office. They will draw together
the facts of the case and present a report to the Permanent Chamber,
along with recommendations for action. They will then be party
to discussions in the Permanent Chamber, and will act on the decisions
made by the Permanent Chamber, keeping in close contact with their
monitoring European Prosecutor. Under their national prosecutor
'hat', they will perform national case duties but give priority
to EPPO cases under their EPPO 'hat'. If they are not able to
give priority to EPPO cases, then they may apply to the Permanent
Chamber to have the case reallocated to the other European Public
Prosecutor in that Member State. Footnote 48 indicates that there
is uncertainty about the 'double hat' model and whether the text
needs to include further clarification on the respective roles
and powers on which they can draw.
Appointment and dismissal of members of the EPPO
6.23 Articles 13-15 cover the
selection and dismissal procedures for the European Chief Prosecutor
(and deputies), the European Prosecutors and the European Delegated
Prosecutors respectively.
6.24 Article 13: The Council,
acting through simple majority after obtaining the consent of
the European Parliament, will select one of three candidates for
the post of European Chief Prosecutor. The College will select
the European Chief Prosecutor's deputies, as well as replacements
for all posts in the event of resignation. However, the final
decision to dismiss a European Chief Prosecutor because he or
she can no longer fulfil the conditions for his or her duties
or for misconduct will rest with the European Court of Justice.
6.25 Article 14: Member States
will send nominations for European Prosecutors to the Council
— for fixed-term appointments, for partial replacement after
three years, or for replacements due to resignation — and
the Council will decide appointments through simple majority voting.
However, as with the Chief Prosecutor, the final decision to dismiss
a European Prosecutor because he or she can no longer fulfil the
conditions for his or her duties or for misconduct will rest with
the European Court of Justice.
6.26 Article 15: Member States
will send nominations for European Delegated Prosecutors to the
College and the College will decide appointments. The final decision
to dismiss a European Delegated Prosecutor because he or she can
no longer fulfil the conditions for his or her duties or for misconduct
will rest with the College, not the Member State.
Internal rules of procedure
6.27 Article 16: Internal procedural
rules will be agreed within the College. They will be prepared
by the European Chief Prosecutor and agreed by a two-thirds majority
of the European Prosecutors. They will then need to be adopted
as implementing acts by the Council by simple majority voting.
Competences
6.28 Article 17: The EPPO's primary
competence is still defined by the so-called PIF Directive. Whilst
this primary competence is not in dispute, the footnote states
that "it raises complex legal issues". One of those
issues is how future changes to the PIF Directive should be reflected
and whether there should there be a static reference to substantive
law (some delegations preferring to see the offences defined directly
in the text) or a dynamic reference (which the footnotes state
is "the standard solution ensuring legal certainty). Delayed
implementation across different Member States, reflected in Footnote
55, may affect the effectiveness of the EPPO as it relies on the
PIF Directive being fully implemented into participating Member
States' national laws. Any delays to or gaps in national implementation
may undermine the work of the European Delegated Prosecutors to
take forward PIF offences through national law.
6.29 Article 18: Ancillary offences
have been designed with the aim of closing the gap between offences
listed in the PIF Directive and other offences which are deemed
to affect the EU's financial interests under the terms of Article
86 but which are not covered by the PIF Directive. However, the
EPPO may also have competence in relation to inextricably linked
offences where the PIF offence is "preponderant" (where
the PIF offence is the core offence or is the core objective of
the criminal activity). Where the PIF offence is deemed not to
be preponderant, then the Member State will be competent not only
for the ancillary offences but also the PIF offence. This will
be discussed between the EPPO and competent national authorities,
and if necessary the discussions will be facilitated by Eurojust.
In the current text, the final decision rests with the competent
national authorities but there is debate on whether it should
be the College or the Court of Justice. Regardless, this is an
important change from the Commission's model as the EPPO would
not have the final say on competence decisions.
Criteria for the exercise of competence
6.30 Articles 18(3) to (6) with Article
19(3) and (4): These cover the criteria and decision-making
processes governing preponderance which affects the allocation
of cases between the EPPO and national authorities. Article 19(1)(a)
adds territorial-based jurisdiction while Article 19(1)(b) adds
nationality based jurisdiction criteria to the decision-making
processes.
6.31 In the first instance, the PIF
offence and the ancillary offences will be considered to be EPPO
competence. Article 19(2) provides that if the EPPO decides to
exercise its competence, the national authorities shall not exercise
theirs. Where the case involves a Union official or member of
the Institutions, the EPPO will always lead the case. Then for
the EPPO to retain competence in other cases, the PIF offence
and, where applicable, the ancillary offence(s) will have been
committed wholly or partly on the territory of one or several
participating Member States; or have been committed by a national
of or Union official or member of the Institutions from a Member
State which has extra-territorial jurisdiction within its national
law. The offence must also have caused or be likely to cause more
damage to the Union than to the Member State or a third party,
or the sanction imposed for the PIF offence be more severe than
the sanction imposed for the other ancillary offence under a Member
State's law (Article 18(4)).
6.32 Article 19(4): This sets
a monetary threshold for damage to the Union's financial interests.
Where an offence will cause damage of less than 10,000 Euros the
EPPO will refrain from exercising its competence and the Member
State's competent national authorities will lead the case at national
level, unless there are as yet unspecified further repercussions
at Union level or the offence or case involves a Union official
or member of the Institutions. The monetary threshold of damage
is mirrored in "Article X", the text of which is contained
in Footnote 68.
6.33 Article X: This forms part
of further criteria affecting the practical processing of a case,
to be read together with Articles 19(2) and (3). In effect, national
authorities will inform the EPPO of all offences over a (not yet
set) threshold. At that point, all information on criminal investigation
already started at national level will go to the EPPO. On receipt,
the European Chief Prosecutor will decide within five days whether
the preponderance test laid out in Articles 18(3) to (6) with
Articles 19(3) and (4) means that the EPPO will retain competence
and open its case (which takes precedence over the national case
under the right of evocation and stops further investigation at
national level), or if it will not exercise its competence and
returns the case to the national level without EPPO involvement.
At all times, as new evidence comes to light, the EPPO should
be informed and may exercise the right of evocation and take over
the case.
The Government's view
6.34 After setting out a detailed summary
of the provisions of the alternative text, the Minister, in her
Explanatory Memorandum of 11 June 2014, first refers to the fact
that the UK will not participate in any EPPO (as per the Coalition
Agreement) and that the Government and Parliament agreed that
the UK would not opt in. But, the Government does welcome the
alternative text, albeit only partialy "as it aids transparency,
informs national parliaments of the current issues, and reassures
them that their concerns are being considered". The Minister
then comments on areas of main concern for the UK.
Impact on non-participating Member States
6.35 The Minister explains that although
the Presidency has made clear that a reference to 'Member State'
in the alternative text refers to a participating Member State
only, it is not clear whether the reference to 'Council', especially
in the context of voting on EPPO matters, means that only participating
Member States will have a vote. She says that the Government will
therefore seek clarity on UK voting rights.
6.36 She adds that it is only when a
complete text is available that work on safeguarding provisions
to protect the interests of non-participating Member States will
begin. This will be at a stage when the full implications can
be assessed for both participating and non-participating Member
States. This work is of "primary importance" for the
Government and all Member States recognise that the interests
of non-participating Member States require respect.
Alternative college model
6.37 The Minister says that:
"The Government understands
that the alternative 'college' model aims to deliver greater interaction
between the centre and the national level. Decision-making and
supervision procedures are meant to take account of both the EU
and national level interests and be clearer than the Commission's
model. However, the multi-layered structure is highly complicated
and it is still not clear where decision-making and supervision
should lie and how the current text should be interpreted for
transposition into national law. In particular, the complex array
of similar terms and the retention of a 'double hat' for the European
Delegated Prosecutors, combined with ongoing debate about powers,
do not satisfactorily address any of the Government's existing
concerns and requests for clarity throughout the text."
Concurrent competences
6.38 The Minister notes that the proposed
concurrent (shared) competence for EPPO and national authorities
overturns the EU exclusive competence originally proposed by the
Commission. S he comments:
"It is welcome that a majority
of EPPO cases are meant to be returned to Member State competence
for national level action. This may mean that many cases will
remain outside of the EPPO and the UK will be able to continue
our bilateral and multilateral cross-border work with other Member
States. However, the complex interplay between PIF Directive primary
competence, in our view a new 'grey area' of offences which may
not be covered by the agreed PIF Directive but which could still
be considered to affect the financial interests of the Union,
and ancillary offences creates confusion.
"For example, Article 2(c)
of this Regulation makes the PIF Directive the source of the EPPO's
primary competence, as the PIF Directive aims to set sanctions
for crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union. However,
the PIF Directive has still not been agreed and it is not yet
possible to define the EPPO's primary competence in practical
terms. We see a 'grey area' of offences; offences which may not
be covered by the agreed PIF Directive but which could still be
considered to affect the financial interests of the Union. It
is not clear if these will be deemed to be within EPPO competence
under the broad definition contained in Article 86 of the TFEU
applied to ancillary offences caught by Article 18."
Further exemptions
6.39 There is potential for confusion
with the proposed addition of further exemptions from the provisions
of the alternative text. The Minister explains:
"We are concerned that the
multiple overlapping competence sources and tests based on territorial
criteria, nationality criteria, and damage defined through monetary
thresholds will complicate how practitioners make day-to-day decisions.
The Government has concerns on the inclusion of a monetary threshold.
In the case of the EPPO, the concept of damage defined purely
in terms of a monetary value, which is relatively small, does
not reflect the seriousness of the offence due to the perpetrator's
position of trust at a national level. The Government will continue
to press for clarity and we will raise further concerns about
the nature of ancillary offences and inclusion of any offences
which are not covered by the PIF Directive."
Reliance on the PIF Directive
6.40 The Minister notes the reliance
of the new text on the "effective and timely implementation"
of the PIF Directive into national law and says:
"this raises new questions
on the effectiveness and added value of an EPPO, additional to
the concerns already raised by this Government and by the UK Parliament
as part of the 2013 subsidiarity process on the effectiveness
and added value of an EPPO."
The UK's non-participation
6.41 The unique position of the UK,
as the only Member State to have committed to no participation
in any EPPO, and its need for clarity as to how an EPPO will affect
it, is understood by other Member States. The Minister adds:
"They accept that the implications
for the UK and other non-participating Member States are unclear
and that this partial text fails to address any of the UK's concerns,
which are shared by Parliament. It also provides no reassurances
or text that safeguards against EPPO impacts on the UK. Member
States agree that work is needed to deliver text changes to mitigate
impacts on non-participating Member States, but believe that this
work can only be done once a whole text has been published. This
is because the important elements affecting non-participating
Member States directly - investigative powers, use of MLA measures,
the EPPO's relationship with Eurojust, OLAF and Europol, and the
EPPO's relationship with international agencies and third countries
- have not yet been explored and published by the Presidency.
The Government will continue to press for consideration of our
position as a non-participating Member State."
Implications for EU agencies: Eurojust and OLAF
6.42 The Minister notes the lack of
information about how an EPPO will affect agencies such as OLAF
and Eurojust and says:
"As part of separate negotiations
on OLAF and Eurojust, the Government will stress the importance
of the assistance given by OLAF and Eurojust to strengthen prevention
actions and processes as well as to tackle serious fraud, which
is of crucial importance to UK agencies as part of their work
with other Member State authorities. We continue to have concerns
over possible operational gaps and impact on operational effectiveness
that could result from the confusion and lack of clarity in this
area.
"We expect this text to form
the basis for future work. Structure and competence will need
to be reviewed alongside Articles (as yet unwritten) on investigative
and prosecution powers. How the EPPO will enter into relationships
with other EU agencies, international bodies and third countries
will impact on jurisdiction, yet these Articles are also unwritten.
We also expect the incoming Italian Presidency to start work on
the second half of the alternative text (Article 20 onwards).
This will cover the important issues such as powers, relationships
with Eurojust and OLAF, and international cooperation and third
country agreements; issues which directly affect how the UK will
be impacted by an EPPO. It is therefore important that the partial
text be kept open for future review, and that a full text is published
as soon as possible as a basis for full UK and Member State legal,
policy and financial analysis. Until that is possible, all the
UK concerns on the Commission's original proposal remain."
Enhanced co-operation
6.43 The Minister refers to the need
for the Council to exhaust all options for unanimity before the
dossier can move to enhanced cooperation of at least nine Member
States (at their own cost. She says:
"as the unanimous vote will
be taken on the EU Regulation text as it stands at the time of
that vote, Member States supporting the EPPO are keen to continue
negotiations for as long as it takes to secure consensus, acceptable
compromises and/or as many Member States as possible as participants.
So while ultimately there is a fair chance that an EPPO in some
form will happen through enhanced cooperation, it is unlikely
to happen soon."
Subsidiarity
6.44 Turning to the question of subsidiarity,
the Minister refers to the Commission's maintenance of its original
proposal in the face of the "yellow card" raised by
national parliaments and "in the absence of 'any new evidence
to support its case'". She notes that those Reasoned Opinions:
"focused on whether other
options had been examined fully and exhausted before moving to
an EU supranational model and if that would provide added value.
Several national parliaments also believed that action should
be brought closer to the national level and there should be clearer
respect for national legal systems.
"The alternative 'college'
model aims to address these issues, but there are currently no
subsidiarity, financial or impact assessments for this model.
Therefore the Government believes that the Council must examine
added value, costings and other impacts of the alternative 'college'
model fully as soon as a full text is available, and that there
is still a breach of the principle of subsidiarity by the Commission."
Fundamental Rights
6.45 As to whether the alternative college
model manages to address issues raised in the Reasoned Opinions
regarding fundamental rights, the Minister says:
"It clearly sets out that the
EPPO must ensure its activities respect the rights enshrined in
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the elements of
the old text covering safeguards and judicial review have not
yet been discussed or redrafted. As a result, our earlier assessment
and concerns remain."
Devolved Administrations and Gibraltar
6.46 The Minister says that the new
text fails to address the subsidiarity concerns of Scotland and
Northern Ireland.
"Scotland also maintains policy
concerns in terms of the independence of the Lord Advocate at
the head of their systems of prosecution and investigation of
crime. In their view, Articles 4 and 5 do not address this fundamental
issue. Northern Ireland has similar policy concerns in terms of
the independence of the DPP for Northern Ireland at the head of
the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland. They have
also confirmed that their prosecutorial and investigative functions
are separate and that prosecutors in Northern Ireland do not have
powers in relation to search, seizure, interception, surveillance,
monitoring financial transactions or covert video surveillance."
6.47 The Government is awaiting further
information from Gibraltar on the alternative text given their
previous concerns. Previously Gibraltar was concerned that the
EPPO would usurp the role, functions and authority of the Attorney
General and his Chambers (Gibraltar's public prosecutor service)
and the Royal Gibraltar Police (Gibraltar's Police Authority).
They were also concerned about any possible conflicts with the
written Constitution of Gibraltar.
Timetable
6.48 Given that the alternative text
was presented to demonstrate constructive progress during the
Greek Presidency and to provide "work in progress" for
the Italian Presidency, no vote was planned for the 5-6 June JHA
Council. The Minister says that "it is not clear at present
when the completed text will come to Council for agreement."
Previous Committee Reports
None; but see (35217) 12558/13: Nineteenth
Report HC 83-xviii (2013-14), chapter 6 (23 October 2013 and Fifteenth
Report HC 83-xv (2013-14), chapter 1 (11 September 2013); (35613)
17176/13: Forty-fifth Report HC 83-xl (2013-14), chapter 10 (2
April 2014) and Thirty-first Report HC 83-xxviii (2013-14), chapter
8 (22 January 2014).
9 Working Party on Cooperation on Criminal Matters. Back
10
Coordinating Committee in the area of police and criminal cooperation
in criminal matters. Back
11
Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality. Back
12
(34091), 12683/12, COM(12) 363: Draft Directive on fight against
fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal
law: http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/pif-report/pif_proposal_en.pdf. Back
13
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/143119.pdf. Back
14
Forty-fifth Report, HC 83-xl (2013-14), chapter 10 (2 April 2014)
and Thirty-first Report, HC-83-xxviii (2013-14), chapter 8 (22
January 2014) Back
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