9 EU Special Representative for the South
Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important
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| Committee's decision
| Cleared from scrutiny
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| Document details
| Council Decision: European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
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| Legal base
| Articles 28, 31 (2) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
9.1 The EU established a Special Representative
(EUSR) for South Caucasus in 2003 and for the crisis in Georgia
in September 2008. In 2011, the positions of EUSR for the South
Caucasus and EUSR for the crisis in Georgia were combined. The
mandate was extended in February 2014 for 12 months and will run
to 28 February 2015. A budget is already in place covering the
period until 30 June 2014.[18]
9.2 The draft Council Decisions proposes:
— the budget for the remaining
eight months of the mandate; and
— the appointment of Ambassador
Herbert Salber to replace Ambassador Philippe Lefort, who stood
down as EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the
crisis in Georgia (EUSR-SC) on 31 January 2014.
9.3 The six-month budget for January-June
2014 was €1,040,000. The eight month budget for June
2014-February 2015 would be set at €1,390,000.
9.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) supports Ambassador Salber's appointment. He notes
that he:
— is currently Germany's Deputy
Permanent Representative to NATO;
— has extensive knowledge
of the former-Soviet region and the conflicts in the South Caucasus;
and
— was previously the OSCE's
Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which leads
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the OSCE, at the time
of the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia.
9.5 The Minister underlines the importance
of the EUSR's work with regard to the EU's work concerning the
conflicts in Georgia and his advisory role to the EU Monitoring
Mission (EUMM), which helps to ensure that the EU's work in Georgia
— where the EU continues to be the main international actor
on the ground — is joined-up.
9.6 The Minister also underlines the
strategic importance of the region to the UK and the EU, with
Georgia being a vital transit route for Azerbaijani oil and gas.
9.7 We have reported on a series
of previous occasions developments both with regard to other EUSR
mandates and in general — most recently in the First Report
of this session.[19]
9.8 The appointment of a new EUSR-SC
plays into the much wider issue of whether, post-Lisbon, the EUSR
as a "concept" is to be continued or (as the EU High
Representative has proposed) absorbed into the European External
Action Service (EEAS) — the consequence being that Member
States would no longer be able to approve the mandates of what
are effectively the Council's special envoys to a variety of trouble
spots affecting EU and national interests, or the job holder.
Instead, such "special envoys" would effectively represent
the High Representative/EEAS, and not the Member States through
the Council.
9.9 As our previous Report relates,
the final decision has been put off until a new HR is in post
(from 1 November) and virtually all the present mandates have
been timed so that they come up for renewal next February: yet
some mandates have already effectively been taken over by the
EEAS pro tem, or have been effectively suspended while
the incumbent has been appointed as the HR's Special Envoy.[20]
9.10 With regard to the EUSR-SC,
the Minister, subsequent to Ambassador Philippe Lefort's (as yet
unexplained) resignation, reported that Baroness Ashton had agreed
exceptionally to identify a replacement without delay, with a
mandate until February 2015 to coincide with the other EUSR appointments.
9.11 Once a new HR has been appointed,
in November 2013, we have already asked the Minister to write,
(no later than mid-January 2015 and sooner if appropriate) with
his own thoughts on the February 2015 round of mandate renewals
and his assessment of the likely way forward for the EUSR concept
as a whole. In the meantime, the Committee again endorses what
the Minister has said thus far about the need for Member States
to retain at least their present degree of control over the establishment
of each position, the mandate and the job-holder.
9.12 We also now clear the Council
Decision.
Full details of the
documents:
Council Decision amending and extending the mandate of the European
Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis
in Georgia: (36143) —.
Background
9.13 The EUSR for the South Caucasus was
first appointed on 20 February 2006. He was tasked with supporting
the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
and the Council in: assisting Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
in carrying out political and economic reforms; preventing conflicts
in the region and contributing to the peaceful settlement of conflicts,
including through promoting the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons; engaging constructively with main interested
actors concerning the region; encouraging and supporting further
cooperation between States of the region, including on economic,
energy and transport issues; and enhancing EU effectiveness and
visibility in the region. 18 months ago, the "Georgia Crisis"
mandate was transferred from that of EUSR to Central Asia.
9.14 The present mandate runs until
28 February 2015. The incumbent was, until 31 January 2014, Mr
Philippe Lefort, a senior and experienced French diplomat (most
of whose career has been dedicated to the Caucasus and Russia,
including as Ambassador to Georgia in 2004-2007).
The Minister's Explanatory Memorandum of 17 June
2014
9.15 The Minister says that the UK supports
the work of the EUSR.
9.16 He continues his comments as follows:
"The EUSR has regular access
to the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The EUSR relays concerns of EU member states to counter periods
of rising tensions and has delivered messages of restraint including
around concerns of the opening of Nagorno-Karabakh airport. The
EUSR has also engaged with key stakeholders in Moscow and Ankara.
"The EUSR leads the EU's work
in respect of the conflicts in Georgia and makes frequent trips
to Georgia, including the breakaway regions, and is one of the
co-chairs of the Geneva peace talks. He also continues to have
an advisory role to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). This is
important as it helps to ensure that the EU's work in Georgia
is joined-up. The EU continues to be the main international actor
on the ground in Georgia.
"The region is of strategic
importance to the UK and the EU. Continued stability is also
key for the UK's prosperity and energy security goals. BP is the
single largest investor in the Azerbaijan economy investing more
than £20 billion in the Shah Deniz gas field alone. BP also
has significant market position in Azerbaijan operating one of
the largest oil fields, which is a cornerstone of the Azerbaijani
economy, and three of the four major oil and gas export pipelines.
BP as part of the Shah Deniz Consortium (SDC), with a 28.8% stake,
is the current operator of the Shah Deniz I gas field, one of
the world's largest gas condensate fields. The SDC are looking
to invest substantially to extend the field to supply gas to the
EU and to expand the South Caucasus Pipeline (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey).
Georgia will remain a vital transit route for Azerbaijani oil
and gas."
9.17 Noting that the EUSR is paid for
through the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget, the Minister
outlines the Financial Implications as follows:
"The 6 month budget for January-June
2014 was €1,040,000 (€173,333 per month). The eight
month budget for June 2014 — February 2015 was set at €1,390,000
(€173,750 per month) this represented an increase of 0.24%
on a month by month comparison. The UK secured a reduction of
€10,000 to €1,380,000 (€172,500 per month) resulting
in an overall reduction in the budget per annum of €833 per
month.
"The reduction in the budget
was secured from the contingency funds for the mandate which had
risen to 1.31% from 0.58% in the previous budget. This has since
been reduced down to 0.60%. Other noteworthy changes in the most
recent budget include an overall €1,300 per month increase
in personnel costs. As salary costs are controlled by the EU,
this was not an area where we were able to negotiate a reduction.
However, due to the UK successfully securing new guidelines for
the financing of EUSRs this increase was offset by a €4,300
monthly reduction in the EUSRs salary and allowances.
"Other significant payments
included a one off purchase of new IT equipment to replace obsolete
and out of warranty hardware (€1000 per month). The lack
of other one off payments from the previous budget such as a 'team
retreat' (which the UK seriously questioned at the time) has also
helped keep costs down resulting in a further reduction averaging
€3,100 a month."
Previous Committee Reports: None, but see: First
Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014) and (35626):
Twenty-eighth Report HC 83-xxv (2013-14), chapter 17 (18 December
2013).
18 For the full background to this mandate, see Twenty-eighth
Report HC 83-xxv (2013-14), chapter 17 (18 December 2013). Back
19
First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014). Back
20
The exception being the EUSR for Bosnia, whose mandate runs until
June 2015. Back
| 
