12 CFSP: EU support for security sector
reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important
|
| Committee's decision
| Cleared from scrutiny (reported to the House on 4 September 2013); further information provided; drawn to the attention of the Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees
|
| Document details
| Council Decisions: mandate extensions for the EU police mission (EUPOL DRC) and the EU security sector reform Mission (EUSEC DRC)[55]
|
| Legal base
| Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
12.1 Following elections in the DRC
in 2006, on 12 June 2007 two Joint Actions were agreed by the
Council, which aimed:
· to establish a police mission
leading on Security Sector Reform and its justice interface in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL DRC); and
· via a new and revised mandate,
to build on the progress made during the previous two years and
continue to contribute to the integration of the different armed
factions in the DRC, and assist Congolese efforts to reconstruct
the army (EUSEC RDC).
12.2 As our previous Report recalls,[56]
a June 2012 Strategic Review concluded that the Security Sector
Reform process could no longer be best delivered by means of a
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission and recommended
moving towards a more long term approach. The Minister for Europe
(Mr David Lidington) said that, in the light of this review —
and despite misgivings from some partners who wanted CSDP work
to continue for longer — the UK had secured agreement on
closure in September 2014 and that during the final year the missions
would work up and implement a plan for closure and transition.
12.3 These Council Decisions accordingly
continued the present mandate for a final year and provided funding
for this and for a short "liquidation period" to cover
essential administration and auditing tasks which could not be
completed during the mission mandate (see our previous Report
for details).[57] In
both cases, the Minister said that the challenge now would be
to ensure that progress was sustained after closure in 12 months'
time.
12.4 With regard to EUPOL DRC, the EU
had identified areas that it would like to continue working on
post-closure: implementation of the police reform process; the
modernisation of the police administration; and the establishment
of a nationally-owned police education and training system. However,
transition planning on how EUPOL activities would be handed
over to other EU bodies and international partners had "to
date been disappointingly slow". The European External Action
Service (EEAS) and the Commission were cooperating closely on
handover and had agreed that a continued EU presence was necessary
to sustain the achievements made by EUPOL. However, they were
still working on a detailed matrix of activities, to include activities
to be conducted by the Commission, the UN and other international
partners, in line with the priorities set out in the Congolese
government's five year plan. The Minister had instructed
UK officials to press for this plan to be presented to Member
States in early autumn 2013. A not dissimilar degree of uncertainty
applied to EUSEC RDC also (see our previous Report).
12.5 The Committee noted that, by the
time they had been completed, these missions would have been running,
in one form or another, for between six and eight years, and cost
over $50 million. They had struggled for most of their existence:
only in the past three years had they begun to show even the sort
of limited results that the Minister now provided. Even so, much
of what the Minister reported was in the form of activity analysis,
rather than an assessment of what the difference these years of
EU assistance had made to the security and human rights of DRC's
citizens vis à vis the security forces to whom it
had been provided
12.6 The complexity of the fragile state
environment of the DRC is widespread. Once the missions had been
closed, a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of EU assistance
was needed, so as to identify the outcomes, and what worked and
what did not; and thus the lessons that needed to be applied to
existing and future missions in the many conflict-affected and
post-conflict countries where the multi-actor approach was now
the norm. This was too valuable a case study for this not to
happen. The Committee therefore asked the Minister to report
in a year's time, with information on:
· the results of the last year's
work of each mission;
· what subsequent assistance
was being planned (by whom, over how long, costing how much, etc.);
and
· what the position was then
regarding the sort of assessment that we regarded as essential.
12.7 The Minister now explains that
since the closure decisions were made, significant developments
on the ground have led to a review of this decision — particularly
sustained high levels of conflict in eastern DRC, leading to the
capture, by M23 rebels, of Goma (a city with a population of over
1,000,000 people) in November 2012, which brought renewed international
attention and a range of initiatives that provide an important
opportunity to address the complex cycles of conflict in eastern
DRC. Efforts to stabilise the eastern part of the country require
(he says) a reformed army, police and justice sector that can
provide effective security across the whole of the country.
12.8 EUPOL will close as originally
planned in September 2014 and work requiring further support is
in the process of being handed over to other development actors,
including a police reform programme managed by DFID (the Department
for International Development) and a policing component within
a wider SSR support programme run by the European Development
Fund (EDF).
12.9 Plans for continued work on defence
reform are more complex: the Commission will run a military reform
programme within the EDF programme for the period 2015-20, costing
€50 million from the middle of 2015; the EEAS has therefore
proposed, and the Minister supports, a final nine month extension
of EUSEC's work from September 2014 to June 2015 to cover the
gap; EUSEC, as it now stands, will then close.
12.10 The Minister also identifies two
areas of work that the Commission cannot fund, as they fall outside
of ODA definitions: strategic advice on reform; and support to
military schools. His assessment of the value of these two areas
of work is as follows:
· full time EUSEC officers
support the Ministry of Defence/Military Command providing strategic
military advice on reform. This is not work that the UN or security
expertise at the EU Delegation can replicate. This advice has
been part of a bigger programme of support which has seen three
major pieces of legislation come in to force, including the statut
militaire (putting the army on a legislative footing). This
has been the major success of the reform programme and constitutes
the framework needed to professionalise the army. The next step
is full implementation. We believe that it would be wrong to
end support in 2015, jeopardising the substantial amount that
has been achieved so far and missing the opportunity to support
the Congolese government to take forward such an important reform
programme.
· EUSEC supports military schools,
including the military academy for officers as this is building
the leadership of the future. EUSEC has helped reopen the academy
and supporting recruitment curriculum formation (with Belgium),
recruitment of teachers, English language (with UK) and exams/graduation
process. We believe that a further two years of CSDP work would
establish a realistic prospect of full hand over to the Congolese.
12.11 The EU's plan now, which the Minister
supports, is that "a very small CSDP mission should continue
to operate from mid-2015 to mid-2016 to fill the gap". Initial
estimates are that the mission would require seven to ten staff
and cost approximately €1.3 million per year. As planning
for this "micro-mission" emerges,
"my officials will closely
scrutinise it for essential work only and an appropriate budget
which should not go higher than this estimation. Synergies and
burden sharing between the small CSDP mission and the larger Commission
programme should be optimised and we will encourage this."
12.12 We are grateful to the Minister
for this explanation of what is now proposed beyond September
2014, and the reasons why — especially the unclassified
summary of the key discussion paper on security sector development
in the DRC that he encloses with his letter (the Conclusion and
5-Year Objectives section is reproduced at the annex to this chapter
of our Report), which makes a compelling case for the further
EUSEC RDC extension and the proposed short-term successor "micro-mission".
We look forward to receiving his Explanatory Memorandum on the
proposed extension in due time for proper prior scrutiny.
12.13 Looking back, the Minister's
letter includes some evidence of EUSEC DRC's achievements, which
he sums up thus: "As a result of the gains that have been
made in recent years, the DRC now has a body resembling an army.".
But there is no equivalent for EUPOL DRC. We look forward to
receiving this as previously requested (c.f. paragraph 12.5 above),
including what support is to be handed over to other development
actors, including the DFID-managed police reform programme and
the policing component and wider EDF SSR support programme. It
would be helpful if it were to accompany his Explanatory Memorandum
on the EUSEC DRC extension.
12.14 In the meantime, we are drawing
these developments to the attention of the House because of the
degree of interest in the DRC.
12.15 We are likewise also drawing
this chapter of our Report to the attention of the Foreign Affairs
and International Development Committees.
Full details of the
documents: Council Decision
amending Council Decision 2010/576/CFSP on the European Union
Police mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security
sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL DRC): (35273), —;
Council Decision amending Council Decision 2010/565/CFSP on the
European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security
sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC DRC):
(35274), —.
Background
12.16 Our 2012 Report recalls and summarises
(and the other Reports referred to therein detail) the Committee's
and its predecessors' intensive scrutiny of these long-running
missions, endeavouring to do vital work in a deeply-troubled and
strategically important country in the face of great difficulties,
but yet to demonstrate fully that the considerable expenditure
involved thus far has been worthwhile.[58]
12.17 EUSEC DRC aims to assist the DRC
authorities to set up a defence apparatus capable of guaranteeing
the security of the Congolese people, while respecting democratic
standards, human rights and the rule of law, as well as the principles
of good governance and transparency. The mission is tasked to
work in close cooperation and coordination with other actors in
the international community, in particular the United Nations
and its Stabilization Mission in the DRC — MONUSCO —
to promote security sector reform.
12.18 The key objectives of EUPOL are:
to support the Congolese National Police (PNC) and the Ministry
of Interior and Security in the implementation of police reform;
enhance the operational capacity of the PNC, through mentoring,
monitoring, advising and training; and support the fight against
impunity in the fields of human rights and sexual violence.
12.19 The Council Decisions that we
cleared in 2012:
· established a budget of €6.75
million for the first year of a final two-year extension of EUPOL
RDC's mandate until 30 September 2014 (see our 2012 Report for
details); and
· established a budget of €11
million for the first year of a similar, final two-year extension
to EUSEC's mandate (ditto).
12.20 The major development was the
emergence of a clear exit strategy. A review at the end of the
first 12 months would focus on the transition of tasks from each
mission to the Congolese authorities, where possible, and otherwise
to other EU instruments or other bilateral or international stakeholders;
detailed handover plans were to be prepared and would include
a timetable for exit and provisions for continued expertise if
necessary.
12.21 The Minister of Europe (Mr David
Lidington) provided a number of "notable achievements"
by each mission over the previous 12 months, which the Committee
welcomed, along with mention, for the first time, of a government
that at least professed to be supportive of the mission's goals
and activities, and of willingness to move forwards on Security
Sector Reform.
The Minister's letter of 2 June 2014
12.22 The Minister begins by noting
that, since the decision to in July 2012 to extend the work of
EUPOL and EUSEC DRC for a final two years, following which it
was planned both missions would close in September 2014, "there
have been significant developments on the ground that has warranted
a review of this decision."
12.23 The Minister continues thus:
"Sustained high levels of conflict
restarted in eastern DRC in mid-2012, leading to the capture,
by M23 rebels, of Goma (a city with a population of over 1,000,000
people) in November of that year. The fall of Goma brought renewed
international attention and a range of initiatives that provide
an important opportunity to address the complex cycles of conflict
in eastern DRC. Efforts to stabilise the eastern part of the country
require a reformed army, police and justice sector that can provide
effective security across the whole of the country."
12.24 The Minister then says:
"The UK's Stabilisation Unit
has recently carried out an assessment of security sector reform
(SSR) in DRC with a view to examining how best to provide support
to the UK's wider investment in DRC, a summary version of which
is attached. DfID currently runs a 4 year programme worth £790million.
The UK contributes approximately £57 million per annum of
MONUSCO's[59] annual
budget and additionally 15% of the EU's €250million per annum
development programme to DRC. As you can see, we have a lot invested
in improving the lives of those in the region. The Stabilisation
Unit report concluded that SSR is crucial to stabilisation in
the Great Lakes and will help to ensure that money spent on development
programmes makes the necessary difference."
12.25 The Minister then draws on a discussion
paper enclosed with his letter, which is based on the assessment
of security sector development and reform undertaken by the Stabilisation
Unit for HMG in September 2013, and which presents the key findings
from the assessment and outlines areas that are particularly important
for international discussion:
"While progress on SSR has
been slow, EUSEC has made some significant gains in a very challenging
and fragile environment. There is growing engagement on the part
of the Congolese authorities and this is delivering results. There
is now an authoritative list of who is in the armed forces and
members of the armed forces have biometric ID cards. They are
more likely to be paid on time, so have less reason to use violence
or to steal to provide for their families. In other work, progress
has also been made in relation to military academies. The mission
has supported the creation of an officer training programme at
the Kananga Military Academy, providing material support to the
academy that has enabled it to be largely rebuilt but also helping
set its entrance exams thereby ensuring that the right staff benefit
from the Academy. It has also supported the Logistics School which
has ensured that the army now has a relatively good inventory
of the weapons it possesses and a plan that determines how to
provide soldiers with food, weapons, uniforms etc. An international
expert provides training to new recruits on human rights and sexual
violence, which is helping to change attitudes and ways of operating
although there is still a long way to go. The military benefit
from strategic advice on reform plans and the development of a
strategy for the future of the military is beginning to be seen
and is a key part of EUSEC's work. While the mission has improved
the approach of senior military leaders, progress was initially
slow, hampered by vested interests and a lack of strong leadership
to push through reforms and remains an area where more work is
needed.
"As a result of the gains that
have been made in recent years, the DRC now has a body resembling
an army. Much progress in this sector has been due to the efforts
of EUSEC. I believe that it is important that there is no roll-back
on what has achieved so far. The circle of violence, instability
and poor development has festered for 20 years; yet since the
fall of the M23, a limited but rare opportunity exists to bring
stability to the region. We need to ensure that we continue to
support SSR, and in the most effective manner that will best support
UK wider commitment to the DRC. SSR is incredibly important as
it is crucial to the future stability of the region and underpins
all the other activity we support. We have worked hard to come
up with a solution for CSDP in DRC which I think will achieve
this."
EU PLANS FOR CSDP
"EUPOL will close as originally
planned in September 2014 and work requiring further support is
in the process of being handed over to other development actors,
including a police reform programme managed by DfID and a policing
component within a wider SSR support programme run by the European
Development Fund (EDF).
"Plans for continued work on
defence reform are more complex. The Commission will run a military
reform programme within the EDF programme for the period 2015-2020,
costing €50 million. Specifically this will:
· "Support implementation
of the army's reform plans, with a particular focus on compliance
with international human rights law, women and children.
· "Support financial management
and human resources procedures of the Congolese Ministry of Defence.
· "Strengthen training
policy and recruitment.
"The Commission has indicated
that it will be ready to assume responsibility for work in these
areas from the middle of 2015. The EEAS has therefore proposed,
and I support, a final 9 month extension of EUSEC's work from
September 2014 to June 2015 to cover the gap. EUSEC, as it now
stands, will then close.
"But there are two areas of
work that the Commission cannot fund, as they fall outside of
ODA definitions: strategic advice on reform; and support to military
schools. Our assessment of the value of these two areas of work
is as follows:
· "Full time EUSEC officers
support the Ministry of Defence/Military Command providing strategic
military advice on reform. This is not work that the UN or security
expertise at the EU Delegation can replicate. This advice has
been part of a bigger programme of support which has seen three
major pieces of legislation come in to force, including the statut
militaire (putting the army on a legislative footing). This
has been the major success of the reform programme and constitutes
the framework needed to professionalise the army. The next step
is full implementation. We believe that it would be wrong to
end support in 2015, jeopardising the substantial amount that
has been achieved so far and missing the opportunity to support
the Congolese government to take forward such an important reform
programme.
· EUSEC supports military schools,
including the military academy for officers as this is building
the leadership of the future. EUSEC has helped reopen the academy
and supporting recruitment curriculum formation (with Belgium),
recruitment of teachers, English language (with UK) and exams/graduation
process. We believe that a further 2 years of CSDP work would
establish a realistic prospect of full hand over to the Congolese.
"The EU's plan now,
which I support, is that a very small CSDP mission should continue
to operate from mid-2015 to, mid-2016 to fill the gap. Initial
estimates are that the mission would require 7-10 staff and cost
approximately €1.3 million per year. As planning for this
micro-mission emerges, my officials will closely scrutinise it
for essential work only and an appropriate budget which should
not go higher than this estimation. Synergies and burden sharing
between the small CSDP mission and the larger Commission programme
should be optimised and we will encourage this.
"I believe that the Stabilisation
Unit's assessment sets out a strong case for further work on defence
reform. We clearly would not wish to jeopardise the effectiveness
of the UK's significant aid programmes in DRC. As a result, I
believe that closing EUPOL and agreeing further activity on defence
reform, as outlined above, represents a good outcome for the UK."
Previous Committee
Reports: Thirteenth
Report HC 83-xiii (2013-14), chapter 51 (4 September 2013) and
(34200) — and (34201) —: Twelfth Report HC 86-xii
(2012-13), chapter 17 (12 September 2012).
55 The operating language is French; thus
the official titles in EU documentation. Back
56
Thirteenth Report HC 83-xiii (2013-14), chapter 51 (4 September
2013). Back
57
Thirteenth Report HC 83-xiii (2013-14), chapter 51 (4 September
2013). Back
58
See Twelfth Report HC 86-xii (2012-13), chapter 17 (12 September
2012). Back
59
The UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC; see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/
for full information. Back
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