9 Global Navigation Satellite System
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision on security aspects of the European Global Navigation Satellite System:
|
| Legal base | Article 28 TEU; —; unanimity
|
| Department | Business, Innovation and Skills
|
| Document number | (36277), —, —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
9.1 The EU has a two-phase policy for developing a global navigation
satellite system, the GNSS. In 2004, Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP
established procedures for dealing with threats to the security
of the EU or Member States by the operation of the GNSS or to
the operation of the GNSS itself. Aspects of the Joint Action
needed amendment in the light of the Lisbon Treaty.
9.2 This Council Decision, adopted on 22 July, updating the provisions
of the 2004 Joint Action and repealing it, allows urgent changes
to be made to the configuration of the Galileo and EGNOS navigation
systems in the event of an emergency or international crisis.
The Council Decision also imposes additional constraints by the
Council on EU Institutions, particularly the High Representative.
9.3 The draft text of the Council Decision was designated Limité,
thus limiting its distribution and circulation and frustrating
parliamentary scrutiny.
9.4 Whilst we find the Council Decision itself unexceptional,
we are concerned about the process of its adoption and the Government's
seeming casual approach to this, particularly as this resulted
in a scrutiny override. So before considering this matter again
we should like to know from the Government what justification
there was for the Limité status of the draft text,
why adoption was concluded in an apparent rush, given that the
need for the Council Decision was identified in September 2013,
and whether the Government made any representations to the High
Representative or the Presidency on these points.
9.5 Meanwhile the document remains under scrutiny.
Full details of
the document: Council
Decision 2014/496/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on aspects of the deployment,
operation and use of the European Global Satellite System affecting
the security of the European Union and repealing Joint Action
2004/552/CFSP: (36277), —, —.
Background
9.6 The EU has a two-phase policy for developing
a global navigation satellite system (GNSS). The first phase,
GNSS 1, is the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System
(EGNOS) programme. The second phase, GNSS 2, is the programme,
named Galileo, to establish a new satellite navigation constellation
with appropriate ground infrastructure.
9.7 In 2004, Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP established
procedures for dealing with threats to the security of the EU
or Member States by the operation of the GNSS or to the operation
of the GNSS itself. In 2010 Regulation (EU)
No. 912/2010 established the European Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) Agency (GSA) to manage aspects of the GNSS programmes.
The Regulation set out the governance arrangements and roles of
the different components of GNSS programme management —
the Administration Board, the GSA itself and the Security Accreditation
Board.
9.8 In September 2013, the Security Accreditation
Board set a requirement for the 2004 Joint Action, having been
adopted prior to the Lisbon, Treaty, to be updated before the
next satellite launch in August.
The document
9.9 This Council Decision, adopted on 22 July, updating
the provisions of the 2004 Joint Action and repealing it, allows
urgent changes to be made to the configuration of the Galileo
and EGNOS navigation systems in the event of an emergency or international
crisis. Such emergencies might include the misuse of, or interference
with, the system which then affects the security of the EU or
one of its Member States. The Council Decision is an instrument
of last resort. As such its legal base rests on the Common Foreign
& Security Policy, rather than a transport legal base which
underpins other legislation related to the GNSS, which means Council
decision making under it requires unanimity instead of a qualified
majority.
9.10 The Council Decision provides that:
· the
normal process for managing a scenario under it would be for Council
to decide unanimously on the instructions that it should issue
to the appropriate authorities — this would result from
a proposal by the High Representative of the European External
Action Service (EEAS), on the basis of a threat notified by the
Commission or the GSA;
· the
High Representative is authorised to act unilaterally where the
urgency of the situation requires immediate action — in
extremis the High Representative has the right to unilaterally
switch off or order configuration changes to parts of the Galileo
or EGNOS systems;
· if
such a decision was ever required of the High Representative,
the Council would be required to confirm, modify or revoke those
instructions as soon as possible;
· in
any event, unilateral instructions from the High Representative
would expire after four weeks or after Council review —
this is a change with respect to the 2004 Joint Action and effectively
increases constraints on the High Representative's authority to
act;
· the
Council Decision reflects post Lisbon changes and takes account
of current control structures within the Galileo programme, including
the evolving role of the GSA and the Galileo Security Monitoring
Centre (GSMC) which is due to commence operations in 2016;
· the
EEAS prepare, within six months, internal administrative procedures
to manage a response to a security situation — this reflects
the fact that Galileo is moving towards full operational capability;
and
· the
EEAS may enter into administrative arrangements with third countries
which have been granted use of Galileo's Public Regulated Service
(PRS) under Decision 1104/2011/EU, the PRS Access Decision —
such arrangements could include limited intelligence sharing in
order to support a response under the Council Decision.
The Government's view
9.11 The Minister for Universities and Science, Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills (Greg Clark) says, in his
Explanatory Memorandum of 17 August, that:
· the
Government welcomes this Council Decision which needed to update
the Joint Action to reflect post-Lisbon changes to EU Institutions,
principally the role of the Secretary-General of the Council/High
Representative now being performed by the High Representative;
· it
agrees the need for the continuing existence of a "Crisis
Response Mechanism" for the Galileo and EGNOS systems and
welcomes the additional constraints that have been imposed on
EU Institutions; and
· the
Government recognises that as third countries gain access to Galileo
and particularly to the PRS, it may be necessary to establish
arrangements with them to ensure the effective implementation
of activities managed under the Council Decision — it therefore
welcomes the additional provision in this regard.
9.12 The Minister notes that the draft text of the
Council Decision was designated Limité.
9.13 In his letter of 17 August the Minister says
that "the need to override scrutiny … was regrettably
unavoidable due to the limitations on distribution and circulation
that were imposed by European institutions prior to the final
text being adopted".
Previous Committee Reports
None.
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