19 ESDP: Piracy off the coast of Somalia:
Operation ATALANTA
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
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| Document details | Draft Decision on EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast
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| Legal base | Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | (36501), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
19.1 The attached document seeks to extend the mandate of the
EU Naval Force's (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA until 12 December
2016 in accordance with recommendations made in the mission's
Strategic Review.
19.2 The EU launched Operation ATALANTA in 2008 in
response to the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off
the Horn of Africa in the Western Indian Ocean. It now plays a
critical role in deterring and disrupting piracy off the coast
of Somalia and in protecting World Food Programme vessels delivering
humanitarian aid to Somalia. It works alongside and together with
other counter piracy missions in the Indian Ocean, including NATO's
Operation Ocean Shield and the US-led Combined Maritime Force's
Task Force 151.
19.3 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
notes that, though incidents of piracy have greatly reduced in
the region — from 47 ships captured in 2010 to none since
2012; 154 suspected pirate operations disrupted, and 128 of them
now —"the piracy business model remains intact together
with the drivers of piracy, which include legal impunity for the
kingpins of piracy and unemployment"; Operation ATALANTA
is therefore a key part of tackling the legal impunity that exists
for pirates, complementing legal capacity building work inside
Somalia to develop legislation and courts. It is the only naval
mission operating in the Indian Ocean allowed to disrupt pirate
logistic dumps ashore and with agreements in place to enable suspected
pirates to be prosecuted in the region. The conditions on land
that allow piracy continue to include a lack of Somali capacity
to police their own waters; and alternative livelihoods to piracy;
until these issues are addressed, progress is fragile and reversible.
He describes the next two year as being critical in building a
more sustainable solution. Extending Operation ATALANTA until
December 2016 will both allow the continuation of the mission's
mandated activities and also provide the stability necessary to
develop capacity building efforts to tack the root causes of piracy
on land.
19.4 The Minister also highlights the role played
by the UK (UK 2* Operation Commanders and the Headquarters at
Northwood) and the size and nature of UK interests involved (UK's
maritime industry directly contributes £13.8 billion to the
UK economy, and often operates off the Somali coast; 65% of the
UK's oil and natural gas supplies pass through the Gulf of Aden).
19.5 Although we have yet to receive a response
to our request for an explanation as to why this and other such
European External Action Service (EEAS) Strategic Reviews of ESDP
and CSDP missions (see paragraphs 19.14-19.17 below for full details),
which then lead on to Council Decisions such as this, cannot be
deposited for scrutiny once they have been completed and accepted
by Member State governments, there is no doubt that in this instance
the case for this further extension is compelling.
19.6 Operation ATALANTA is part of what the EEAS
describes as the EU's "comprehensive approach" to Somalia,
based on "active diplomacy and support to the political process,
security support, development assistance and humanitarian aid",
and involving the EU Special Envoy, the EU Delegation team and
the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, and which
aims to "allow the EU to accompany the new political dispensation
and to develop a close partnership with all the Somali stakeholders"
and, following the "completion of the transition and the
appointment of the new Somali leadership", to "engage
in a regular dialogue with the Federal Institutions as well as
with the regional authorities on a renewed partnership in respect
of Somali ownership".[83]
19.7 Another key component is EUCAP NESTOR, which
was launched in July 2012 with the aim of enhancing the maritime
capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western
Indian Ocean: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania.
As our consideration of its latest mandate extension demonstrates,
it has failed to make any real impact over the past two years
because of the lack of any local "buy-in". The ringing
words above are thus as much an article of faith as a description
of reality. Making a reality of EUCAP NESTOR will depend crucially
on that reality coming to pass, as it refocuses its activities
squarely on Somalia. As the Minister notes in that context, EUCAP
NESTOR is now mandated to engage with regional organisations and
Operation ATALANTA, which will extend EUCAP NESTOR'S reach by
enabling them to use other organisation's resources, such as security
and transport equipment. This is one of the many ways in which
the EU's "comprehensive approach" will be put to the
test on the ground.
19.8 The Minister makes no mention of any sort
of mid-term review of Operation ATALANTA's next mandate, despite
describing the next two years as being crucial. Elsewhere, he
has referred to a possible EEAS Strategic Review encompassing
all three Missions in the middle of next year. In any event, we
would be grateful if the Minister would write to us in a year's
time, with his assessment of what has happened on the ground and
at sea, and including what is being done to tackle the root causes.
19.9 In the meantime, we now clear this Council
Decision.
Full
details of the document:
Council Decision amending and extending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP
on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence,
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery
off the Somali coast: 36501, —.
Background
19.10 Operation ATALANTA[84]
was established on 8 December 2008, via Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP,
as an EU Naval Force to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.
It is the first EU maritime operation and aims to protect World
Food programme humanitarian deliveries and to deter and disrupt
pirate attacks on other vulnerable shipping. The previous Committee
was much involved in various changes to its mandate since then.
The present Committee also cleared an extension of its area of
operation, reflecting the operation's success in displacing some
of the pirates from the Gulf area to further south, and a two-year
extension, which was due to run until December 2012.
19.11 In March 2012, the Minister for Europe (Mr
David Lidington) said that 2011-12 has seen a marked reduction
both in the number of pirate attacks and the number of successful
hijackings. He attributed this success to the continued presence
of naval forces in the region, increased compliance by the shipping
industry with agreed self-protection measures (Best Management
Practices) and an increase in the use of private armed security
teams on board merchant shipping; to date, the Minister noted,
no ship transiting the high risk area with a private armed security
team embarked had been successfully hijacked. But pirate attacks
nevertheless continued, with two successful hijackings in February
2012, and the circumstances at sea could not yet be judged as
sufficiently benign as to allow the withdrawal of naval forces.
Given that Operation ATALANTA's current mandate expires in December
2012, in order to allow Member States to generate the required
forces to allow the operation to continue, an early decision on
extending the operation was required; once extended, Operation
ATALANTA's mandate would expire in December 2014.
19.12 The Minister also noted that the Council Decision
also extended Operation ATALANTA's Area of Operations to include
the coastal territory and internal waters of Somalia. Such an
extension would allow EU naval forces to take increased disruption
activity to reduce the capabilities of pirates before they put
to sea, including possibly taking action against pirate logistics
dumps on land. Although naval forces and the shipping industry
had worked hard to prevent and avoid attack whilst at sea, military
operations had not yet prevented pirates from building up their
logistics and putting to sea in the first place.
19.13 The Minister also drew attention to the UK's
continuing significant direct contribution, including: the provision
of the Operation Headquarters and the Operation Commander (Rear
Admiral Duncan Potts); and an influential role as the Chair of
a working group of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, with responsibility for Operational Coordination and
Regional Capability Development.
19.14 Looking at the wider context, the Minister
said that the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February highlighted
again the importance the Government placed on countering piracy,
and noted that:
— in
the days surrounding the Conference, the Government was able to
take a number of steps forward, including the signature of a bilateral
Memorandum of Understanding with Tanzania to allow for the transfer
of suspected pirates for prosecution, and the establishment of
a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Coordination
Centre, which will coordinate action to pursue and bring to justice
the leaders, financiers and organisers of piracy; and
— in the margins of the Conference, the
Somaliland authorities had also agreed with the Government of
Seychelles to accept the transfer of 19 pirates convicted in the
Seychelles to serve their sentences in Somalia.
19.15 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister said:
— in
2011, the common costs totalled €11 million, of which the
UK contributed €1.15million;
— the UK's contribution is expected to
remain broadly consistent if the mandate is extended and will
be funded from the Government's Peace Keeping budget; and
— extending the Area of Operations will
have a negligible effect on the common costs of the operation.
19.16 No questions arose, and we therefore cleared
this Council Decision from scrutiny. However, given the degree
of interest in the piracy issue, the Committee nonetheless drew
this further extension of the scope and duration of Operation
ATALANTA to the attention of the House.[85]
19.17 The Minister then wrote to the Committee on
14 January 2014. Operation ATALANTA had continued to play a critical
role in deterring and disrupting piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Piracy had greatly reduced in the region — from 47 ships
captured in 2010 to none in 2013 — but "the business
model" remained viable and the piracy threat had been suppressed
rather than eliminated. EU Naval Forces played a vital role in
mitigating threats while efforts continued to build local capacity
in Somalia and the neighbouring regions to tackle piracy and its
underlying causes. Operation ATALANTA worked alongside other naval
missions, namely NATO OCEAN SHIELD and Combined Maritime Forces
(CMF) Task Force 151. However, the Minister said, it played a
unique role as the only counter-piracy mission allowed to disrupt
pirate logistic dumps ashore — for example, in May 2012,
a dump was disrupted, with "great strategic impact".
19.18 The Minister then referred to a recent EEAS
Strategic Review of Operation ATALANTA, which had recommended
a two year extension to December 2016 and minor changes to the
existing mandate. He supported the Review's recommendations as
an important means of containing the significant threat piracy
poses to UK citizens and the shipping industry. After further
discussion in working groups and the Political and Security Committee,
the Minister expected a further Council Decision, providing for
the mandate extension, to be tabled in February; the Minister
undertook to keep the Committee up to date on the progress of
the Review and provide an Explanatory Memorandum with fuller details
on the mission and the review in due course. In the meantime,
the Minister notes that if the two year mission extension passed
scrutiny:
— the
UK would continue to provide the 2* Operation Commander and the
Headquarters at Northwood;
— the proposed changes to the mandate would
be met from within existing means and capabilities; and
— as a military led mission, Operation
ATALANTA's common funding elements came from the ATHENA mechanism;
the UK funded its contributions to this mechanism through the
tri-departmental (MoD, FCO, DFID) Peacekeeping budget; the common
costs in 2013 were €7.5 million, of which the UK
contribution was approximately €1.15 million or 15.4%; costs
would be similar year on year for 2014 to 2016.
19.19 In thanking him, the Committee encouraged the
Minister to provide further such updates in the case of other
missions, both individual and regional, in the run-up to mandate
renewals and proposed shifts up or down the scale of deployment.
19.20 The Committee also recalled an earlier letter
to him about such Strategic Reviews, reflecting the Committee's
determination to enhance the role of parliament in the control
of CSDP, and thus to improve "upstream" scrutiny: not
simply receiving information such as this prior to legislation,
helpful and appreciated as it is, but receiving the documents
themselves upon which major initiatives such as this are based
at a point at which the House can express its own views. With
that in mind, the Committee had asked him to task his officials
with taking a hard look at three other such exercises, and to
explain what the really good reasons were — other than custom
and precedent, and administrative convenience for the European
External Action Service (EEAS) and Commission — as to why
they could not be subject to scrutiny. The Committee asked the
same question about this Strategic Review.
19.21 In his reply of 6 February, the Minister simply
responded that the Review was a "RESTREINT EU/EU RESTRICTED"
document, which he could not therefore deposit for scrutiny. However,
he provided a short summary of its findings, viz:
— the
Review noted the mission's central and successful contribution
to the wider international response to Somali piracy; highlighted
the continuing threat piracy posed to shipping off the coast of
Somali and the need to maintain naval operations in the region
in the medium term while the root causes of piracy were tacked
ashore, and consequently recommended an extension of the mission
mandate until December 2016; and
— pending acceptance of that recommendation,
suggested that ATALANTA explored opportunities to enhance security
in Somalia, while remaining focussed on its core counter-piracy
tasks; e.g., supporting the activities of other EU and international
missions in Somalia; supporting the activities of the Somalia
and Eritrea Monitoring Group, by possibly boarding and searching
vessels engaged in illegal activity that funded piracy networks,
such as charcoal smuggling; and supporting information-sharing
on fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.
19.22 The Minister said that he would continue to
update the Committee on the progress of the Review and provide
an Explanatory Memorandum with fuller details on the mission and
the Review in due course.
The draft Council Decision
19.23 The draft Council Decision seeks to extend
the mandate of the EU Naval Force's (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA
until 12 December 2016 in accordance with recommendations made
in the mission's Strategic Review.
19.24 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 November
2014, the Minister recalls his earlier analysis and says that
the full set of recommendations in the Strategic Review, which
the attached Council Decision seeks to implement until December
2016, are as follows:
a) "Transmit data on piracy suspects to
the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL);
b) "Provide logistical support, expertise
and/or training at sea to the other EU missions operating in Somalia
(EUCAP NESTOR,[86] EUTM
Somalia,[87] the EU Mission
to Somalia and the EU regional maritime security effort named
EU MASE)[88] upon their
request and within the mission's means and capabilities;
c) "Gather information on fishing activities
off the coast of Somalia to inform the Somali authorities and
support the licensing and registration scheme for artisanal and
industrial fishing in waters under Somali jurisdiction developed
by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), when in place,
at the exclusion of any enforcement activity;
d) "Liaise with the private sector active
off the coast of Somalia to better understand their activities;
and
e) "Support the activities of the Somalia
and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG)".
The Government's view
19.25 The Minister comments as follows:
"The extension of Operation ATALANTA's mandate
will allow the mission to continue to deter and disrupt piracy
off the coast of Somalia and in doing so the mission will provide
the stable conditions necessary for maritime security capacity
building efforts, such as work to develop a Somali coastguard,
to progress on land.
"Operation ATALANTA under the leadership
of UK 2* Operation Commanders and the Headquarters at Northwood
has been successful at preventing pirate attacks in the Indian
Ocean. It is the only naval mission operating in the Indian Ocean
allowed to disrupt pirate logistic dumps ashore and that has agreements
in place to enable suspected pirates to be prosecuted in the region.
The mission has disrupted 154 suspected pirates and 128 of them
are now in jail for their crimes. Operation ATALANTA is therefore
a key part of tackling the legal impunity that exists for pirates,
complementing legal capacity building work inside Somalia to develop
legislation and courts. Operation ATALANTA also complements NATO's
counter-piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield, and the US-led
Combined Maritime Force's Task Force 151 working to tackle piracy
off the coast of Somalia.
"Extending Operation ATALANTA until December
2016 will both allow the continuation of the mission's mandated
activities, such as providing information on illegal fishing to
organisations such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and on
illegal trade to the Council Monitoring Group for Somalia and
Eritrea (SEMG); and also provide the stability necessary to develop
capacity building efforts to tack the root causes of piracy on
land. Since
2012 no merchant vessels have been captured by pirates. This situation
contrasts sharply with the picture four years ago: in 2010 there
was a total of 174 attacks, of which 47 were successful, and pirates
held 404 hostages. The continued attempted attacks show that the
piracy business model has been suppressed not broken. It is the
international naval presence off the coast of Somalia and self
protection measures by industry (including the use of armed guards)
that successfully mitigate the risk that pirates will attack a
merchant vessel. The UK's strong maritime industry, which contributes
directly £13.8 billion to the UK economy, often operates
off the Somali coast. Some 65% of the UK's oil and natural gas
supplies pass through the Gulf of Aden. It is vital for the security
of seafarers and UK prosperity that piracy is not allowed to resurge.
"The conditions on land that allow piracy
to flourish remain. These conditions include a lack of Somali
capacity to police their own waters; and alternative livelihoods
to piracy. Until these issues are addressed, progress is fragile
and reversible.
"The next two years will be critical in
building a more sustainable solution. Operation ATALANTA's presence
is especially important given that the NATO counter-piracy mission,
Operation Ocean Shield, will re-balancing its operations in the
Indian Ocean this year.
"As recognised by the UN Security Council
in its resolutions concerning piracy, piracy and armed robbery
at sea off the coast of Somalia contributes to wider instability
in the country. The assistance of Operation ATALANTA in protecting
World Food Programme shipments and in deterring and disrupting
piracy are part of wider efforts to stabilise Somalia, while upholding
UK prosperity and security."
19.26 The Minister also notes that, with regard to
Fundamental Rights:
"No persons suspected of intending to commit,
committing or having committed acts of piracy or armed robbery
in Somali territorial waters and internal waters or on the high
seas, who are arrested or detained by Operation ATALANTA may be
transferred to a third State unless the conditions for the transfer
have been agreed with that third State in a manner consistent
with relevant international law, notably international law on
human rights, in order to guarantee in particular that no one
shall be subjected to the death penalty, to torture or to any
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."
19.27 Finally, with regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says:
— common
costs for the operation are met by all EU Member States. As you
will be aware, budget negotiations for EU military missions are
a Ministry of Defence (MOD) lead. The common cost of the mission
from 12 December 2014 until 12 December 2016 shall be €14,775,000
as outlined in the Council Decision. MOD officials have pushed
hard to ensure value for money during negotiations on Operation
ATALANA's budget. Successful UK interventions ensured that the
budget proposal has been reduced by €70,000;
— the common costs for 12 December 2014
to 12 December 2015 shall be €7.456 million. Other costs
are met by participating nations. Common costs are paid through
contributions by Member States via the financial mechanism "ATHENA",
based on the Gross National Income (GNI)) of each nation. Based
on current UK GNI figures, the UK's contribution is 15.66% of
the total cost of the mission. The UK's contribution is therefore
€2,313,765.00 from 12 December 2014 until 12 December 2016,
pending agreement of the Scrutiny Committees to the mandate extension.
This contribution will be funded from the Government's Peacekeeping
budget. It must be noted that this figure is reviewed annually
in line with changes to GNI.
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (33741), —: Fifty-ninth Report
HC 428-liv (2010-12), chapter 13 (14 March 2012) and all the associated
Reports referred to therein.
83 According to the EEAS website, the EU is engaged
in Somalia "through a comprehensive approach based on active
diplomacy and support to the political process, security support,
development assistance and humanitarian aid", involving the
EU Special Envoy, the Delegation team and the EU Special Representative
for the Horn of Africa, which aims to "allow the EU to accompany
the new political dispensation and to develop a close partnership
with all the Somali stakeholders" and, following the "completion
of the transition and the appointment of the new Somali leadership",
to "engage in a regular dialogue with the Federal Institutions
as well as with the regional authorities on a renewed partnership
in respect of Somali ownership". See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/eu_somalia/index_en.htm.
Back
84
In Greek mythology, a renowned and swift-footed huntress. Back
85
See (33741), -: Fifty-ninth Report HC 428-liv (2010-12), chapter 13
(14 March 2012). Back
86
On 16 July 2012, the EU has launched EUCAP Nestor, to enhance
the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa
and the Western Indian Ocean: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles
and Tanzania. See for full information, and (36438) - at chapter
?? of this Report for the Committee's consideration of the latest
mandate extension. Back
87
On 10 April 2010, the EU launched a military training mission
in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in order to contribute to strengthening
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions
of Somalia. Since 2010, EUTM Somalia has contributed to the training
of approximately 3,600 Somali soldiers with a focus on the training
of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Junior Officers, specialists
and trainers. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/
for full information. Back
88
Under the 10th European Development Fund, the regional Maritime
Security Programme (MASE) will support the implementation of Eastern
and Southern Africa - Indian Ocean Regional Strategy and Action
Plan, which was adopted in October 2010 in Mauritius to fight
piracy and promote maritime security by strengthening the capacity
of the region. The EU is supporting the implementation of the
regional strategy with approximately €37 million, mainly
to develop a strategy to tackle piracy on land in Somalia; enhance
judicial capabilities to arrest, transfer, detain and prosecute
piracy suspects; address economic impact and financial flows related
to piracy; and improve national and regional capacities in maritime
security functions, including surveillance and coastguard functions.
See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/piracy/regional_maritime_capacities_en.htm
for full information. Back
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