10 Integrated Border Management Assistance
Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny (decision reported on 14 May 2014); further information provided and requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision setting budget for second year of two-year mandate
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | (35995), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
10.1 The European Union Integrated Border Management
Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) was established in May
2013, with a two-year mandate and a budget that (after this May's
further Council Decision) amounts to €56.5 million. The aim
is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing
the security of their borders in the short term and a broader
Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy in the longer term.
Given the deterioration in the security situation and the collapse
of effective national governance, it was decided in August to
withdraw staff from Libya: the mission's core staff to Tunis and
a small number co-located with the European External Action Service
(EEAS) in Brussels.
10.2 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
now reports that, earlier this month, he agreed to support an
EEAS proposal to downsize EUBAM Libya as soon as possible from
a full Mission to a core team of 17-20 staff, working from Tunis,
pending a second Strategic Review of EUBAM Libya:
"This Review should assess all possible
options, including closure, for the future of the mission and
is due to take place before the end of the year. The core team
will carry out very limited operational activities, including
preparatory work for training courses and maintaining the contacts
they had built with Libyan counterparts. According to the EEAS,
running EUBAM Libya at this reduced state will save approximately
€1m per month.
"This initial decision to downsize reduces
the immediate cost of the Mission, and initiates the formal Strategic
Review process without any further delay. It also ensures that
if the security situation in Libya improves in the short to medium
term, EUBAM is sufficiently staffed and operationally ready to
return quickly. Border Security remains a critical issue for Libyan
and regional security engagement — and we should aim to
continue to work on it where possible."
10.3 The Minister also notes that, up until
their evacuation, EUBAM had made progress in several areas including
work on a cross-agency Border Management Working Group, a strategy
for Libyan customs, training Libyan border and search/rescue officials,
the design for an integrated borders control network and on the
regional aspect of its mandate.
10.4 Such work, the Minister says:
"is all the more urgent given the wider
concerns about IS and extremism in the surrounding region and
Sahel."
10.5 However, little progress has been able to be
made on the southern borders, including the proposal to provide
alternative income opportunities for communities that had relied
on smuggling, given the deterioration in the security situation.
10.6 With regard to the handling of the EEAS Review
, the Minister says:
"My officials will be involved in the Review
from the early stages to ensure there is a thorough consideration
of all the options, including cooperation with regional partners
and, unusually, a meeting in London with the team preparing the
Review. I have instructed officials to obtain an early sight of
the strategic review which will consider the longer term future
of the mission along with a robust FCO analysis and will of course
write again in due course with the findings of this review."
10.7 As the Minister is aware, the Committee has
been pressing for news of the first EEAS Review, to which he referred
when submitting this Council Decision for scrutiny in mid-May,
but about which he was then able to say nothing. At that time,
the Committee observed that, in view of the security situation
and the collapse of effective national governance, and thus the
limited prospect of any sustainability for the mission, the question
must arise as to whether the EU should cut its losses unless there
was a dramatic change over the next 12 months. The latest EEAS
proposal has overtaken what the Minister now reports was its original
recommendation — that the mission be extended beyond next
May for a further two years.
10.8 As of last weekend, the situation in Libya
remains dire — the governments of France, Italy, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States strongly condemning the
ongoing violence, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
condemning the crimes of Ansar al-Sharia[37]
entities, and the ongoing violence in communities across Libya,
including Tripoli and its environs; noting that Libya's security
challenges and the fight against terrorist organizations can only
be sustainably addressed by regular armed forces under the control
of a central authority which is accountable to a democratic and
inclusive parliament; and strongly encouraging all partners to
refrain from actions which might exacerbate current divisions
in order to let Libyans address the current crisis within the
framework of UN-facilitated talks.[38]
10.9 Though we must of course hope that the situation
improves, it is hard to see it doing so dramatically between now
and the year's end. It is thus more than ever appropriate that
all options for the mission, including closure, are on the table,
especially given the EU's experience with EUBAM Rafah (a similar
EU mission on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, which
was likewise down-sized and has been on "standby" since
2007 because of the security situation).
10.10 We ask the Minister to update the Committee
no later than Thursday 11 December.
10.11 In the meantime, we are drawing this further
information to the attention of the House because of the level
of interest in the situation in Libya and the efforts of the EU
and the wider international community to help to restore order
and good governance.
Full details of the documents:
Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP
on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance
Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya): 35995, —.
Background
10.12 Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of May 2013
established this civilian CSDP Mission, the European Union Integrated
Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). The
mission's mandate is for 24 months. It would consist of up to
165 people (at full operational capability). The aim is to support
the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security
of their borders in the short term and a broader Integrated Border
Management (IBM) strategy in the longer term. The mission would:
support Libyan authorities, through training and mentoring, in
strengthening the border services in accordance with international
standards and best practices; advise the Libyan authorities on
the development of a Libyan national IBM strategy; and support
the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational
capabilities.
10.13 The budget for the first year of the mission
was €30,300,000. This Council Decision set out a budget of
€26,200,000 covering the period 22 May 2014 to 21 May 2015,
i.e., the second year of EUBAM Libya's two-year mandate.
10.14 When the Committee considered the draft Council
Decision on 14 May 2014, it noted that the latest Commons Library
Standard Note on Libya of 11 April 2014 said that, since the end
of the 2011 civil war, Libya had been awash with militia and state
sponsored armed groups who: had originally helped overthrow Muammar
Gaddafi; were now reluctant to disarm; and were intent on grabbing
a share of power and the country's immense oil wealth. In the
face of a weak and disparate government, these groups had taken
the place of an effective army and police force, and also dispensed
aid and humanitarian assistance to a beleaguered population. Six
months earlier, the Cyrenaica region, in eastern Libya, had announced
a new federalist government, citing central government's inability
to control the huge levels of violence and claims of corruption;
and in March 2014 the General National Congress (GNC: the Libyan
parliament), critical of the worsening crisis in the country —
caused by rebel militias and other armed gangs who had established
control over much of the east of Libya, including the oil and
gas facilities and exporting ports — voted to remove the
Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan, from office and to hold new elections
in July 2014.[39]
10.15 The wider background underlined the importance
of an EEAS Strategic Review of the Mission, about which the Minister
said he was unable to provide any information because, despite
pressing it to do so, the EEAS had yet to release it.
10.16 We concluded that, given that the mission was
already to cost over €50 million, with little prospect of
any sustainability, the question must arise as to whether the
EU should cut its losses unless there was a dramatic change over
the next 12 months. We found it especially galling that, not for
the first time, the EEAS appeared to believe that this process
belonged to itself, and not the Member States who pay for it.
The Minister said that he would write about the Strategic Review
as soon as possible. At that time, the Committee asked to hear
about progress, if any, on the related "development"
issues cited by the Minister a year ago (c.f. our previous Report),
i.e., projects that offered economic development to the communities
on Libya's borders; and discussions then underway with international
partners (including the UN and US) on plans, and funding, for
development work to provide alternative income sources for those
individuals and communities that had traditionally relied upon
the revenue from smuggling routes.[40]
The Minister's letter of 28 August 2014
10.17 The Minister reported that EUBAM Libya had
decided on 4 August to withdraw staff from Libya due to the security
situation: the core staff had temporarily relocated to Tunis and
a small number were temporarily co-located with the European External
Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels. This, he said, was against
a background in which fighting had escalated over the past few
months, particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi, which had closed
the main international airport in Tripoli and led to the majority
of the diplomatic community, including the UK, closing their Embassies
and withdrawing staff. The political situation remained equally
uncertain: after "relatively peaceful elections" on
25 June, a new House of Representatives had been sitting in Tobruk,
due to the security situation in Tripoli: but not all members
had taken up their seats, and some members of the expired General
National Congress had convened sessions in Tripoli, declaring
it as the sole legislative authority.
10.18 In its response, the Committee reminded the
Minister of the outstanding request in its previous Report.
The Minister's letter of 3 October 2014
10.19 The Minister says that the Strategic Review
came out at the end of May, and had recommended that the mission
be extended for two years, to continue the successful work the
mission had been doing on maritime borders and airport security,
while strengthening activities on the land borders:
"The new mandate was to have a good mix
of strategic and operational activity, providing advice to Ministries
on reforms and operational training activities. Agreement of the
Strategic review was held up in Brussels by a Member State proposal
to increase work on the Tunisian border with Libya from the Tunisian
side where security conditions are easier. However, discussions
on this proposal were then overtaken by events in Libya."
10.20 The Minister then recalls his earlier letter
about the deterioration of the political and security situation
in Libya forced EUBAM to evacuate temporarily from Tripoli, and
continues as follows:
"Although there has been some improvement
in the general situation, in particular the holding of UN sponsored
peace talks on 29th September, it seems possible that
EUBAM may be unable to return to Libya in the immediate future.
I therefore agreed earlier this month that we should support an
EEAS proposal in Brussels to downsize EUBAM Libya as soon as possible
from a full Mission to a core team of 17-20 staff, working from
Tunis, pending a second Strategic Review of EUBAM Libya. This
Review should assess all possible options, including closure,
for the future of the mission and is due to take place before
the end of the year. The core team will carry out very limited
operational activities, including preparatory work for training
courses and maintaining the contacts they had built with Libyan
counterparts. According to the EEAS, running EUBAM Libya at this
reduced state will save approximately €1m per month.
"This initial decision to downsize reduces
the immediate cost of the Mission, and initiates the formal Strategic
Review process without any further delay. It also ensures that
if the security situation in Libya improves in the short to medium
term, EUBAM is sufficiently staffed and operationally ready to
return quickly. Border Security remains a critical issue for Libyan
and regional security engagement — and we should aim to
continue to work on it where possible."
10.21 With regard to the mission's work prior to
their evacuation from Libya, and proposed projects on the southern
border to provide alternatives to smuggling, the Minister says:
"Up until their evacuation from Libya, EUBAM
had made progress in a several areas including work on a cross-agency
Border Management Working Group, a strategy for Libyan customs,
training Libyan border and search/rescue officials, and the design
for an integrated borders control network (BISON). The mission
also made progress on the regional aspect of its mandate, shaping
Libyan policy on regional issues at the Rabat Conference on regional
border security in November 2013 and was developing ideas, within
its mandate, on involving neighbouring countries by offering participation
in workshops and seminars. Such work is all the more urgent given
the wider concerns about IS and extremism in the surrounding region
and Sahel. However, little progress was able to be made on the
southern borders, including the proposal to provide alternative
income opportunities for communities that had relied on smuggling,
given the deterioration in the security situation."
10.22 Finally, looking ahead to the handling of this
further review, the Minister says:
"My officials will be involved in the Review
from the early stages to ensure there is a thorough consideration
of all the options, including cooperation with regional partners
and, unusually, a meeting in London with the team preparing the
Review. I have instructed officials to obtain an early sight of
the strategic review which will consider the longer term future
of the mission along with a robust FCO analysis and will of course
write again in due course with the findings of this review."
Previous Committee Reports:
Fiftieth Report HC 83-xlv (2013-14), chapter 14 (14
May 2014); also see (34875), —: Third Report HC 83-iii (2013-14),
chapter 25 (21 May 2013) and First Report HC 83-i (2013-14), chapter
10 (8 May 2013).
37 An Islamist militia group that advocates the implementation
of strict Sharia law across Libya: it came into being during the
Libyan Civil War; is led by its "Emir", Mohamed al-Zahawi;
has deliberately targeted both Libyan and American civilians;
and has been designated by the US Department of State as a terrorist organisation. Back
38
See the Annex to this chapter of our Report for the full text
of the Joint Statement of 18 October 2014 on Libya by the Governments
of France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Back
39
The Commons Library Standard Note on Libya of 11 April 2014 is
available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06864/libya. Back
40
See Fiftieth Report HC 83-xlv (2013-14), chapter 14 (14 May 2014).
For the full background to, and the Committee's consideration
of, the establishment of this mission, see (34875), -: Third Report
HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 25 (21 May 2013) and First Report
HC 83-i (2013-14), chapter 10 (8 May 2013). Back
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