Annex 1: Oral evidence: Scrutiny of EU Business,
HC 507, Wednesday 16 July 2014: Albania
Q17 Geraint Davies: In
the question of whether or not Albania should be upgraded to candidate
status at this juncture, major UK domestic interests are engaged—in
this instance, concerns over immigration and criminality. The
accession of Bulgaria and Romania has already shown the danger
of allowing EU political considerations to over-ride the much
trumpeted conditionality. Even in the case of Croatia, where new
arrangements were put in place because of experience, the process
has been found wanting. All these considerations underline the
need for proper, prior parliamentary discussion. When the Committee
reported the previous Commission report to the House on 29 January,
it could not have made its position clearer. We said: "Looking
ahead to later this year, when the Minister deposits the further
Commission report for scrutiny, we shall expect him to provide
an unqualified statement of the Government's position." Instead,
all that you had to say in your 16 June explanatory memorandum
was: "The Government has not taken a final view on whether
to support the granting of candidate status." Why did you
not warn the Committee that you would not be complying with its
request?
Mr Lidington: What
happened, as Mr Davies knows, is that the Commission's report
was published on 4 June this year. I certainly hoped, and expected
at that time, that we would be able to provide the Committee with
an explanatory memorandum and a statement of the Government's
position within the time that would allow the Committee to consider
those ahead of the General Affairs Council where this decision
was due to be taken. In the event, that did not prove possible.
The Commission report came out late in the day. It then took longer
than I had hoped to get cross-Government agreement. That is not
to say that there were necessarily big arguments within the Government.
Sometimes this is about trying to get a decision in front of senior
Ministers in a number of different Departments when they are coping
with competing priorities from the areas for which they had direct
responsibility — perhaps with parliamentary commitments
too, and so on. We actually established a definitive Government
position the day before the General Affairs Council, so it was
late in the day. I took the decision that in the circumstances
that faced me, it was better to let the Committee have the explanatory
memorandum on the 16th to meet the convention of 10 days' notice,
even without a Government statement, than to delay the explanatory
memorandum until the Government's position had definitively been
achieved. I regret very much that we were not able to do what
we ought to have been able to do here, but it was a matter that
the sequence of Government decision making this time on Albania
did not meet the Committee's requirements in terms of procedure.
Q18 Michael Connarty: Minister,
you say in your 27 June letter that the Commission's recommendation,
and carrying out the FCO's own analysis of Albania's progress
required, and I quote, "a considered and thorough judgment",
and then you continue, "The full range of British interests
needed to be factored in", and that consequently "the
Government did not reach a formal view until very close to the
GAC which did not leave time to update the Committee in advance".
Knowing the process, and having watched the process over the last
15 years in the Committee, is the Committee seriously expected
to believe that the Government had nothing that it could have
said sooner, that you had no inkling of what the Commission was
likely to say before 4 June, and that the Government had not been
receiving assessments from Tirana and from Brussels on the Albanian
situation and had not essentially formulated a position well before
publication of the Commission report on 4 June? Given all of the
evidence from sitting on this Committee and watching the European
process of enlargement over 15 years, do you really believe Committee
members will accept that no decision was formulated, rather than
expressed, before 4 June?
Mr Lidington: The
truth is, as I have just said in answer to Mr Davies, that the
Government's agreed position was reached the day before the General
Affairs Council took place. We only had final clarity about the
Commission's language during the General Affairs Council proceedings
themselves. The situation here was that we were faced with a very
finely balanced decision. On the one hand, Albania is a European
country that wants to join the EU, and therefore there is no reason
why, in principle, it cannot be accepted—one day, provided
all the criteria are met—as acceding to full EU membership.
However, the reality is that Albania today is a very long way
from being in a situation where it is able to cope with the obligations
of EU membership and meet all the conditions involved. In particular,
Albania is plagued by corruption, is used by organised crime,
and is a significant source of illegal migration into the European
Union. One reason for us supporting the eventual membership of
Albania is that the process of accession and complying with all
those conditions over the years of negotiations that will be needed
is the best route, we judge, for seeing Albania entrench reforms,
so that those problems of corruption, illegal migration, and organised
crime are diminished and finally eliminated We have seen how in
other parts of central and eastern Europe, that accession process
has indeed entrenched democratic values, human rights, and judicial
and democratic institutions in parts of Europe where those things
were crushed for most of the 20th century. The judgment
we had to make in June was this: on the one hand, Albania has
made some pretty good progress in tackling the problems I have
described. The question for us, though, was whether that was still
sufficient, given that the remaining problems are still severe
and endemic, to grant candidate status. In the end, we came to
the view that to refuse candidate status would be likely to set
back the course of reform. We have ahead of us a long process.
Albania is not going to be ready for European Union membership
on any estimate until, at what is I suppose the most optimistic
calculation, the late 2020s or perhaps the early 2030s. They have
a lot of work to do, and that will need to be sustained over a
number of Governments and Parliaments in Albania. However, they
have made significant strides, particularly since the Rama Government
came in, in terms of anti-corruption measures, action against
organised crime, and on working particularly with the United Kingdom
on reform of the judiciary, action against illegal migration,
and the return of foreign national offenders to serve sentences
in their home countries. We wanted to have that recognised as
an incentive for Albania to do more. I said in my minute statement
and in open session at the GAC that there was a need for reform
of transitional controls for migration for all future EU accessions.
We also used this decision to give us leverage to insert some
language into the conclusions of the GAC about the need for Albania
to do more on illegal migration if it was to make further progress.
The other point I wanted to make here was that we talked at length
to the Commission about this. The Commission has come to the view,
particularly after looking at Croatian accession, that economic
convergence is going to be one of the key means of trying to avoid
large-scale migration of people when a new member state enters
the European Union. Commissioner Füle, the Enlargement Commissioner,
said in London in February this year that by driving economic
convergence between aspiring and current member states, migratory
pressures should reduce, thus helping new member states to keep
their brightest and best while reassuring wider publics that enlargement
can proceed without creating substantial migration. I think the
Commission has recognised too that there is a challenge here that
needs to be addressed in the way they handle the accession process
in future.
So it was a balanced judgment, and we came to the
view that the right thing to do was to give Albania a recognition
that it had done a lot, and the incentive to do more. Candidate
status does not set a date for the start of negotiations. It does
not open one chapter of negotiations. It does not allow one additional
Albanian the right to travel to the United Kingdom or anywhere
else. It is a symbolic statement, but it was a symbol that was
very important to the Government of Albania in being able to say
to their people, "The pain that our economic and political
reforms are requiring is worthwhile; we have started on the long
road towards eventual membership."
Q19 Geraint Davies: Can
I ask a supplementary? If you are saying that economic convergence
really is a prior condition before we run the risk of mass migration,
are you saying that there is a case for a different relationship
where economic trading opportunities are provided to candidate
countries before freedom of movement of people? Do you think that
is a good idea?
Mr Lidington: What
the Commission is saying is that economic convergence has to be
a key element in the accession process, and that a consequence
of economic convergence will be a decreased incentive for migration
elsewhere.
Q20 Geraint Davies: I
understand that. That is what you said before. I am saying that,
following on from that, you could argue we should change the rules
so that people are encouraged to have economic convergence first
of all without migration by providing trading opportunities, as
you would as a member state?
Mr Lidington: The
Prime Minister has said publically that he wants the European
Union to revisit this whole issue of transitional controls. At
the moment, every other part of an accession negotiation rests
upon qualitative criteria: upon on a series of benchmarks to show
that particular reforms have been enacted and then bedded down,
and a track record established. For freedom of movement only,
the EU has worked on a somewhat arbitrary five or seven-year period
of time after which the controls come off automatically. What
the Prime Minister is saying is that we need to have more of a
qualitative test—more of a benchmark-based system—for
transitional controls on migration too. He has suggested that
you could relate freedom of movement to the relationship of the
GDP of the applicant country to EU average GDP, or perhaps that
you could relate it to average wage levels. There are a number
of different indicators that could be used. We have not come to
a fixed view on recommending a particular option or basket of
options, but we think that that would be a more sensible approach
than the current one.
Q21 Michael Connarty: Can
I move back to my question? I would love to have that debate at
great length with yourself. I had a few skirmishes with Olli Rehn
about his fiscal policies, which are destroying people. We went
to Lithuania and were told that 600,000 people, mostly educated
young people, had left Lithuania, and that 200,000 of them now
lived in the UK. That is a very welcome addition to our talent
pool, and a destructive one for theirs. I think we do have to
have something about the economic criteria before we agree that
country should come in. The point we have is that what you outlined
for us is clearly an indication that there was quite a lot of
discussion going on within the UK delegation and with those people
in Mr Jenkins' Enlargement Department. Therefore there was clearly
much information that could have been brought to this Committee
long before 4 June. This idea that the UK Government naively wandered
into a meeting and was naively bounced into having to take a position
does not do you any credit. Those who know you as an intelligent
Minister know you do not go into meetings unprepared for the possible
questions that might be asked. It just might have been useful
for you to bring these things to the Committee before 4 June,
so that people felt that you were engaging with Parliament as
well as engaging with your officials on that matter. I think that
what you have said in the past contribution will be read as an
indication that you have had quite a lot of discussion and thought,
and that you knew this was coming down the track and was going
to pop up at the General Affairs Council — if not at that
meeting then at some other meeting very quickly. Why were the
Government so secretive about what they were doing? Why do they
think that they just have to discuss with their officials? Do
you not realise that it does undermine the public's confidence
in the Government and in the EU process if you remain so secretive
and do not discuss it in open forums with us?
Mr Lidington: We
are very prepared to be held accountable for our decisions, and
to discuss those decisions and the reasons for them publically.
I also think that there has to be a space for Government—for
different Government Departments and different Ministers—to
discuss these matters in order to come to a collective Government
decision. I think what Mr Connarty is asking me to do is to involve
the Committee in an internal Government discussion, in a way that,
in fairness, I do not think any previous Government have agreed
should be the case. I can understand that there is an argument
for changing the way that we do government in this country, but
I actually think that the right relationship between Government
and Parliament is for Government to take its policy decisions
and to have these discussions internally, and then to come to
Parliament, to say what we have done, to set out our reasons and
to defend them.
Q22 Michael Connarty: I
have to challenge that. On 4 June, when the Commission produced
its report, the Enlargement Commissioner said, and I quote, that
he believed "without any reservations, beyond any doubt,"
that Albania should be granted candidate status. Is it the truth—it
is certainly the perceived truth—that the matter was therefore
never in doubt, and that the Government gave priority to the EU
process, that you have fallen into the trap you should avoid,
and that you seem to be giving priority to the EU process and
not to the parliamentary process? Because clearly it is as if
you have conceded and colluded in that decision by the Commission
without reservation, and played the EU game, which is what is
discrediting your Government. You are seen to play the EU game
and not the parliamentary game.
Mr Lidington: No,
this is not the case at all. The Commission had made the same
recommendation for Albania to be given candidate status in December
2013. We were one of a number of member states that said at that
point that it was premature to take that decision, that the Rama
Government were very new in office, and that it was too early
to be confident that they were serious about the programme of
reform that they were taking forward. I went to Albania earlier
this year. I talked to Prime Minister Rama, to the Justice Minister,
to the Interior Minister, and to a number of other members of
the Albanian Government about what they were doing. I did come
back quite impressed by the level of their commitment—for
example, by the Interior Minister's clear personal commitment
to take action against organised crime. The Commission report
fleshed out the impression I gained on that visit with some hard
evidence showing an increase in the number of prosecutions and
convictions for certain key categories of offence. There were
good arguments behind the Commission's recommendation. Against
that, though, there was the fact that although there had been
a significant increase, in percentage terms, in these prosecutions
and convictions, it was from a very low base. The overall numbers
were still low. There was still evidence of endemic corruption
in Albania. There are questions about the impartiality of the
judiciary. I think the Albanians have only just begun to embark
on the task of judicial reform. So, there was a lot of work to
do. The judgment for us was whether we agree to candidate status,
recognise their achievement so far, and encourage them to do more,
or do we say to them, "This really is not enough by any objective
test, and you cannot be treated seriously as a candidate until
you do quite a lot more"? Would saying that simply demoralise
them and risk the country slipping backwards rather than maintaining
a forward path to reform? Having discussed it internally, we came
to the view that the first was the right judgment to make.
Q23 Michael Connarty: I
have to press you on that. This Committee watched the Bulgaria
and Romania recommendation we made being ignored, and Bulgaria
and Romania coming in long before they should have, according
to this Committee. Slipping backwards is exactly what they did.
In fact, if you saw the programme just this week on television
about the involvement of the Roma community in transporting large
numbers of young women for prostitution, you will realise that
there is a long way to go before it really does, even at this
moment, reach the standards, or "conditionality" as
we called it here, that they were supposed to reach before they
got in. Now we were told by the Croatians that their big worry
was not that they had a mafia, but that there was a mafia from
Albania that infected all of the Balkans, and that they were worried
and trying to keep that out. Now we are talking about having that
very same country admitted without reservation as a candidate
country. This gives a signal to people, I think wrongly, that
countries that get candidate status do not necessarily increase
their efforts but feel that they have got their foot in the door
and that the door will not be closed on them after that. The point
is that it would appear, Minister, that you have actually ignored
the priority for the scrutiny process and have chosen the EU process.
You said you were against the candidacy in 2013. As things progress,
why was there not an attempt to inform this Committee of how they
were progressing, and to talk to this Committee and to Parliament
about how you saw things changing? Why did you only tell us after
you had, in fact, agreed to the candidacy? What comfort can you
give us that this will not continue to happen, and that you will
not use what you call the Government process as an excuse for
ignoring the Parliamentary process?
Mr Lidington: We
wrote to the Committee with a very detailed explanatory memorandum
after the publication of the Commission's annual enlargement report
last year, ahead of the General Affairs Council in December that
considered those matters. We sent the explanatory memorandum that
I described on to this Committee in June. The Committee cleared
the annual enlargement report from scrutiny on 29 January this
year. What the Committee then asked for was, as Mr Davies read
out, an unqualified statement of the Government's position on
Albania accession candidate status before the event, so it can
be scrutinised — a perfectly reasonable response. We, in
good faith, thought we would be able to provide that. For the
reasons I have described, that did not prove to be possible. I
am always willing to respond to questions from parliamentary colleagues
in this Committee or outside about our approach to particular
countries. I would just say to Mr Connarty that there is a profound
difference here between the decision in June about Albania and
the decisions on the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. The criticisms
made about Romania and Bulgaria are that they were admitted to
membership of the EU before they had undertaken and entrenched
all the necessary reforms. That is why we still have the co-operation
verification mechanism in force today. The decision here about
Albania was not about accession; it was about a symbolic designation
of Albania as a candidate country. First of all, there have to
be further individual decisions even to set a date for the opening
of negotiations. There then have to be individual decisions—all
subject to unanimity—about opening and closing individual
chapters of those negotiations. As I have indicated already, I
think nobody expects Albania to be ready for membership before
the late 2020s at the earliest. That assumes steady progress and
determination from now on in. It may well be the 2030s. I
will just say in conclusion, Chairman, that the lessons were learned
from Romania and Bulgaria. Chapters 23 and 24 were invented as
a response to the problems that arose from the Romanian and Bulgarian
accession. Then the Croatian experience was used to require all
future accessions, starting with Montenegro, to start with Chapters
23 and 24 being opened, precisely so that there was time not just
for legislation to be brought in and for new appointments of judges
and prosecutors to be made, but for a track record to be built
up so that we and every other existing member state could see
that these were reforms that were entrenched, were working, and
were not just reforms that were there for show. [30]
30 See Oral evidence: Scrutiny of EU Business HC 507,
16 July 2014; available at http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/european-scrutiny-committee/scrutiny-of-eu-business/oral/11603.pdf. Back
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