5 EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16
|
| Legal base | —
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document numbers | (35996), 9467/14, JOIN(14) 17
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
5.1 The Joint Communication outlines the key elements
for a future EU strategy. It covers the political context as well
as the key objectives and initiatives upon which the EU would
seek to focus on in support of the Government of Afghanistan.
It focuses on four key areas, with critical sub-objectives: promoting
peace and security; reinforcing democracy; encouraging economic
and human development; and fostering the rule of law and respect
for human rights.
5.2 Details of the context — particularly the
2012 Tokyo Conference, at which International Community pledged
to improve aid effectiveness and provide US$16 billion to Afghanistan
in return for the Government of Afghanistan meeting its commitments
under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework — are summarised
below, and detailed in our previous Report.[17]
So, too, the Strategy itself.
5.3 The authors noted that the strategic goal and
objectives were developed in advance of clarity on the size and
scale of any international military presence post-2014; expectations
as to the degree of progress and the delivery of international
assistance in support of the Government of Afghanistan's priorities
in the event of a very limited international presence would necessarily
have to be tempered.
5.4 When we considered the Joint Communication in
June, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) noted that
the work of the EU would be constrained by the tough security
environment; the UK would continue to press for sensible and realistic
outcomes. The strategy would need to be sufficiently flexible
to adapt to developments on the ground and, importantly, the policies
and priorities set by a new Afghan Government later this year.
There would also be two key events — the NATO Summit and
"the Development Conference" — that would look
closely at the international community's future commitments. In
helping to shape the proposed strategy, the Government would continue
to urge prioritisation and better coordination with its international
partners and other multilateral organisations (NATO and United
Nations) engaged in Afghanistan, to avoid duplicity and guarantee
a genuinely unified approach: any strategy must give weight to
the importance of these relationships.
5.5 Though there was nothing controversial about
the proposed elements for an EU Strategy, we felt that it would
be appropriate to debate it in due course because of the role
that, one way or another, the EU would be undertaking (with EU
taxpayers' money) in post-2014 Afghanistan and the host of uncertainties
surrounding the essentials for its successful implementation.
But the Strategy had yet to be agreed; the outcome of Presidential
elections was yet to be settled; and both USA and NATO post-2014
security agreements with the Government of Afghanistan were consequently
still in limbo. Two key conferences were also on the horizon:
first, the NATO Summit in Wales, and then the London Conference
on Afghanistan. The Committee therefore asked the Minister to
write to us in due course, with: a copy of the Strategy; his thoughts
on the outcome of the Presidential election; more details concerning
the dates, location and nature of the two key events to which
he referred; and an update on the BSA with Afghanistan, NATO's
equivalent SOFA, and the National Security Council's consideration
of the UK's specific post-2014 military commitment.
5.6 The Minister now reports that Dr Ashraf Ghani
was sworn in as President on 29 September and immediately appointed
his electoral rival, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, as "Chief Executive
and partner in what will be a National Unity Government",
in which they will take decisions on key appointments and a programme
for Government. The Prime Minister met President Ghani on 3 October
and underlined the UK Government's strong commitment to the new
Government; alongside its own bilateral efforts, the Government
"will continue to influence the EU and other Member States
to engage constructively with the new Government at all levels,
to ensure that we can take the necessary steps to align and deliver
on our shared priorities". Both the US/Afghan Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
have now been signed. The UK 4-5 September NATO Summit in Wales
set out the long term commitment of NATO partners to Afghanistan,
focusing on three key strands of activity:
a) Resolute Support Mission;
b) financial support for the Afghan National
Security Forces; and
c) NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership.
5.7 Later this month, on 24-25 November, the UK will
co-chair the London Conference on Afghanistan alongside the Afghan
Government, which will be:
"a further platform for the international
community to demonstrate solidarity with Afghanistan and for the
new Government to set out its vision for reform and delivery of
our shared priorities."
5.8 The 20 October Foreign Affairs Council welcomed
the formation of a Government of National Unity, reiterated the
EU's long-term commitment to Afghanistan and reaffirms the comprehensive
strategy agreed in June. It looked forward to working in close
cooperation with the new government and international partners
to safeguard the advances Afghanistan has made over the last 13
years and to support and incentivise urgently needed reforms.
The EU recognises the important future role to be played by UNAMA
in Afghanistan.[18] It
pledges up to €1.4 billion in assistance up to 2020, complementing
the development assistance to be provided bilaterally by Member
States. The EU restates its willingness to finalise the Cooperation
Agreement for Partnership and Development, as the basis for a
wide-ranging long-term partnership between the EU and Afghanistan.
The EU also restates its commitment to the extension of the EU
police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) until the end of 2016.[19]
5.9 The Council also calls for a clear and unequivocal
commitment to respect human rights, in particular the rights of
women and girls, and says that it is now imperative that the Government
of Afghanistan enact the reforms necessary to restore economic
confidence, promote job creation, increase revenue generation,
reform the judicial system, tackle the twin threats from corruption
and narcotics and improve the accountability of the state to ordinary
Afghans. The London conference on 24-25 November will, the Council
says, provide the opportunity both for the government to set out
its reform commitment in these areas and for the international
community to restate its long-term commitment to support Afghanistan.[20]
5.10 We continue to regard the Joint Communication
as an appropriate basis for future debate, especially as the Minister
has nothing to say about the 23 page Strategy itself, and thus
of the extent to which it reflects the approach that he advocated
or how realistic he now thinks it is in the light of subsequent
political and security developments (c.f. paragraph 5.5 above
and 5.25 below).
5.11 But before then we would like to hear from
the Minister about the outcome of the London Conference, with
his assessment in the light thereof of the prospects for the EU
achieving its objectives over the next three years, including
the extent to which it will depend on the commitments of the Afghan
government and of other members of the International Community,
and the likely impact of the post-2014 security environment (c.f.
the "caveat" at paragraph 5.4 above). We would also
still like to know the outcome of the National Security Council's
consideration of the UK's specific post-2014 military commitment
(c.f. paragraph 5.6 above).
5.12 In the meantime, we shall retain the Joint
Communication under scrutiny.
Full details of the document:
Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council
— Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16: (35996),
9467/14, JOIN(14) 17.
Background
5.13 The Afghan Government and the International
Community met on 8 July 2012 in Tokyo "to reaffirm and further
consolidate their partnership from Transition to the Transformation
Decade". The Tokyo Conference, together with the Chicago
Summit of Afghanistan and ISAF contributing countries of May 2012,
established what the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described
as:
"a renewed stronger foundation for partnership
to support sustainable growth and development of Afghanistan throughout
the Transformation Decade (2015-2024). These undertakings are
built on the outcome of the Bonn Conference in December 2011,
where the Afghan Government and the International Community mutually
renewed their long-term commitments in the areas of governance,
security, peace process, economic and social development, and
regional cooperation, as well as on the outcomes of the previous
international conferences such as the London Conference in January
2010 and the Kabul Conference in July 2010. Chaired by the Japanese
and Afghan Governments with the participation of ministers and
representatives from 55 countries and 25 international and other
organizations from around the world, today's conference also recognized
the increasing roles of new partners and neighboring and regional
countries for the sustainable development of Afghanistan."
5.14 Acknowledging the promulgation of its new Constitution,
the Declaration pointed out that much nonetheless remained to
be done to achieve a peaceful, stable and self-sustaining Afghanistan,
including on such issues as security, with a focus on terrorism
and counter-narcotics, poverty reduction, humanitarian needs,
provision of basic social services, food security, protection
of human rights in particular the rights of women and children,
respect for individual dignity, promotion of education and culture,
improvement of governance, reducing corruption, lessening reliance
on international assistance, and promotion of private investment,
thereby contributing to human security. The Bonn Conference had
demonstrated a shared vision for long-term partnership between
Afghanistan and the International Community to help Afghanistan
attain sustainable economic growth and development and fiscal
self-reliance from Transition through the Transformation Decade.
Afghanistan and the International Community had accordingly established
the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (a.k.a. the 'Tokyo Framework'),
which underpinned their partnership for the Transformation Decade.
[21]
5.15 At the Conference, the International Community
pledged to improve aid effectiveness and provide US$16 billion
to Afghanistan in development assistance through 2015-17, to respond
to Afghanistan's predicted budget shortfall following military
transition. For Afghanistan to benefit fully from these funds,
the Government of Afghanistan must meet its commitments under
the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF).[22]
5.16 The January 2014 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions
defined 2014 as a critical year. The Council called on the Government
of Afghanistan to reciprocate the EU's commitment to Afghanistan
by finalising negotiations on the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership
and Development (CAPD). Sustained development would require the
maintenance of security. With that in mind, finalisation of the
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States of America
was vital and would provide the basis for ongoing international
support to increase the capability of the Afghan National Security
Forces. The continued provision of significant international development
assistance to the Afghan people across the country was dependent
on a conducive security environment.
5.17 The High Representative and the Commission was
tasked with preparing, by the second quarter of 2014, a strategy
to the end of 2016. [23]
Commission/High Representative Joint Communication
5.18 This outlines the key elements for a future
EU strategy. It covers the political context as well as the key
objectives and initiatives upon which the EU would seek to focus
on in support of the Government of Afghanistan. It focuses on
four key areas, with critical sub-objectives:
— Promoting peace and security;
— Reinforcing democracy;
— Encouraging economic and human development;
and
— Fostering the rule of law and respect
for human rights.
5.19 The Commission/High Representative acknowledge
that, even in the most optimistic scenario, Afghanistan will continue
to be a fragile state, dependent on international financial assistance
and prone to outbreaks of violent conflict. The central government
will need to mitigate the threats posed by the insurgency, corruption
and the criminalisation of the state — in particular from
drug money — and maintain security and service delivery
in sparsely populated rural areas, if it is to retain credibility
and popular support. Strengthening democratic and accountable
governance in Afghanistan at all levels will determine the credibility
and success of the transition, as much as will strengthening the
capability of the security forces. Though a long-term, generational
task, progress in the next three years can both prevent backsliding
and provide an important foundation for further advances in years
to come. Afghanistan will face severe economic contraction if
the government is unable to generate the necessary confidence
to attract investment and stem capital flight as the international
presence and assistance contracts reduce. In particular, there
is the need to create jobs for some 400,000 Afghans entering the
workforce each year. If this demand is not met, there is a risk
of a new generation of underemployed and alienated youth, which
may lead to an increased pool for insurgent recruitment and uncontrolled
and illegal immigration to neighbouring countries and Europe.
5.20 The Commission/High Representative also note:
"The strategic goal and objectives have
been developed in advance of clarity on the size and scale of
any international military presence post-2014. Expectations as
to the degree of progress and the delivery of international assistance
in support of the Government of Afghanistan's priorities in the
event of a very limited international presence will necessarily
have to be tempered."[24]
5.21 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 11 June 2014,
Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) said that the Joint Communication
reflected well the current views of the UK and wider international
community "on how best to engage in Afghanistan, now and
beyond 2014". It was vital that over the next three years
that the EU, working alongside key international partners, had
a strategy to direct its activity in Afghanistan, which meant
"bringing together the collective weight of the EU's diplomatic
community to engage the Government of Afghanistan", adopting
a comprehensive and cohesive approach and providing both financial
and technical support across many areas, to ensure that the gains
made over the last decade in Afghanistan were not lost. The four
key areas identified in the strategy were the areas where the
EU could have the most impact.
5.22 However, the work of the EU would be constrained
by the tough security environment; the UK would continue to press
for sensible and realistic outcomes. The strategy would need to
be sufficiently flexible to adapt to developments on the ground
and, importantly, the policies and priorities set by a new Afghan
Government later this year. There would also be two key events
— the NATO Summit and the Development Conference —
that would look closely at the international community's future
commitments in Afghanistan. In helping to shape the proposed strategy,
the Government would continue to urge prioritisation and better
coordination with its international partners and other multilateral
organisations (NATO and United Nations) engaged in Afghanistan,
to avoid duplicity and guarantee a genuinely unified approach:
"Any strategy must give weight to the importance of these
relationships".[25]
Our assessment
5.23 We noted that this latter point is highlighted
in the January 2014 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. Recalling
the key role of the US/Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)
in post-2014 Afghanistan, we noted that in May President Obama
had announced that 9,800 US troops would remain in Afghanistan
in 2015, reducing to roughly half by the end of that year; and
that by the end of 2016, troop numbers would draw down to a normal
embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component:
but that this US proposal remained contingent on signature of
the BSA between the US and Afghanistan, and that negotiations
remained ongoing.
5.24 We understood that the current text of the BSA
had provided the first draft of NATO's equivalent Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) with Afghanistan, which would provide a similar
legal framework for a post-2014 NATO mission; that the Government
was still working with allies (some of them EU Member States)
on its plans following the US announcement; and that the National
Security Council would decide the UK's specific post-2014 military
commitment in due course (in addition to the £70 million
the UK had already committed to funding the Afghan National Security
Forces).
5.25 In January 2014, the Afghan Government and the
international community had reviewed progress against the different
objectives set out in the TMAF, and agreed that sustained action
over the long term was needed to transform the status and rights
of women and immediate action needed to ensure that the Afghan
Human Rights Commission retained its category A status. There
was also a call for the Afghans to move forward and agree key
economic enablers, specifically passing through Parliament, VAT
and Anti-Money Laundering laws. These were yet to be signed.
5.26 In the meantime, both the people of Afghanistan
and the International Community awaited the official results of
the run-off in the Afghan presidential election, which was held
on the weekend of 14-15 June. According to The Guardian:
"Facing off are former mujahideen doctor
Abdullah Abdullah and World Bank technocrat Ashraf Ghani. Both
are modernising nationalists who have teamed up with civil war-era
strongmen, a bid to broaden their support base that may also have
alienated young voters seeking change."[26]
5.27 Thus, though there was nothing controversial
about the proposed elements for an EU Strategy, we felt that it
would be appropriate to debate it in due course because of the
role that, one way or another, the EU would be undertaking (with
EU taxpayers' money) in post-2014 Afghanistan and the host of
uncertainties surrounding the essentials for its successful implementation.
In the short-term, however, the Strategy itself had to be agreed
(at the 23 June Foreign Affairs Council), and we all needed to
know who was to be the new President of Afghanistan. We therefore
asked the Minister to write to us in due course, with:
— a copy of the Strategy;
— his thoughts on the outcome of the Presidential
election;
— more details concerning the dates, location
and nature of the two key events to which he referred; and
— an update on the BSA with Afghanistan,
NATO's equivalent SOFA, and the National Security Council's consideration
of the UK's specific post-2014 military commitment.
5.28 In the meantime, we retained the Joint Communication
under scrutiny.[27]
The Minister's letter of 16 October 2014
5.29 The Minister responds to our request as follows:
"PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
"The first round of the Presidential elections
took place in April 2014. More than 7 million people turned out
to vote, a truly historic moment for Afghanistan. This was followed
by a second round contest in June between the two leading candidates
from the first round, Dr Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah.
After some initial dispute over the preliminary results, the candidates
agreed to support a full audit of the ballots cast, to be overseen
by the Afghan Independent Election Commission, with support from
the United Nations. After a protracted and challenging process
the audit was completed and Dr Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner".
"Dr Ghani was sworn in as President of Afghanistan
on 29 September, the first democratic transfer of power in Afghan
history. He immediately appointed his electoral rival Dr Abdullah
Abdullah as Chief Executive and partner in what will be a National
Unity Government. Together over the coming weeks and months, they
will take decisions on key appointments and a programme for Government.
"The Prime Minister visited Afghanistan
on 3 October and was able to meet with President Ghani. It was
an opportunity to underline our strong commitment to the new Government;
making clear that we see our role in Afghanistan as changing -
not ending. President Ghani in his inaugural address set out an
ambitious agenda on reform and international partnership. Alongside
our own bilateral efforts, we will continue to influence the EU
and other Member States to engage constructively with the new
Government at all levels, to ensure that we can take the necessary
steps to align and deliver on our shared priorities.
"SECURITY
"In his Quarterly Statement to the House
of Commons on 9 September, the Foreign Secretary spoke of the
security challenges that remain in Afghanistan and the evolution
of our support beyond 2014.
"The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
are now leading 99% of combat operations across Afghanistan and
proving increasingly effective. We know that to maintain this
progress and protect the gains made so far, the ANSF will require
sustained support. The UK has committed £70 million per annum
to 2017 in support of this crucial activity. The focus of our
assistance will be the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, which
aims to provide the professional and effective leaders the army
needs to maintain security.
"The first significant act of the National
Unity Government was to sign both the US/Afghan Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
This was a decisive and welcome move by the new President. These
documents provide the legal framework for the presence of international
military support post 2014. Their signature ends a long period
of uncertainty.
"NATO SUMMIT AND THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN
"The UK hosted the NATO Summit in Wales
on the 4-5 September 2014. The Summit was an important opportunity
to mark the achievements and sacrifices of the ISAF mission. A
declaration was agreed setting out the long term commitment of
NATO partners to Afghanistan, focused on three key strands of
activity: a) Resolute Support Mission; b) financial support for
the Afghan National Security Forces and c) NATO-Afghanistan Enduring
Partnership.
"The London Conference on Afghanistan will
take place on 24-25 November. The United Kingdom will co-chair
the Conference alongside the Afghan Government. The Conference
will be a further platform for the international community to
demonstrate solidarity with Afghanistan and for the new Government
to set out its vision for reform and delivery of our shared priorities.
"EU STRATEGY 2014-16 & THE EU/AFGHAN COOPERATION
AGREEMENT ON PARTNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT (CAPD)
"The EU strategy for Afghanistan was endorsed
by the Foreign Affairs Council in June 2014. A copy of the
agreed strategy and Council Conclusions is attached.[28]
"As set out in my Explanatory Memorandum,
the EU strategy is designed principally to ensure that the EU
and Member States can adopt a comprehensive and coordinated approach
to activities on the ground in support of the Afghan Government.
The four key priority areas set out in the strategy will act as
an important guide for the EU's focus and engagement. However,
we do recognise that the EU's approach will need to be responsive
to the outcomes of the London Conference, the vision set by the
new Government and the challenges of a post conflict environment.
"As acknowledged by your Committee, it will
be important for the EU and Member States to remain flexible.
Over the coming weeks and months, we will encourage partners to
work closely with the new Government, adapting our approaches
as necessary to ensure that we are working to a strategy that
allows us to meet our desired outcomes. This is likely to be an
ongoing discussion.
"As part of the EU's long term commitment
to Afghanistan it continues to seek agreement on the EU/Afghan
Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development. If signed,
the agreement will provide a legal underpinning for a wide-ranging
long-term partnership between the EU and Afghanistan. Now that
a new Afghan Government is in place, we will continue to work
with the EU and Member States to reach an agreement. Once this
work is concluded, as previously agreed with the Committee, I
will deposit the relevant documents for your consideration".
Previous Committee Reports
Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter 5 (18
June 2014); also see (36033) —: Second Report HC 219-ii
(2014-15), chapter 11 (11 June 2014).
17 See Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter 5
(18 June 2014). Back
18
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is
a political mission established by the Security Council in 2002
at the request of the Government to assist it and the people of
Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and
development in the country. On 17 March 2014, the UN Security
Council unanimously adopted resolution 2145(2014), which renewed
the UNAMA mandate and set out the scope and range of activities
it must undertake over the coming 12 months, as Afghanistan continues
its political and security transition. Overall, the resolution
calls for UNAMA, led by the Secretary-General's Special Representative,
Ján Kubiš, to continue leading and coordinating international
civilian efforts in assisting the South Asian nation with its
transition - within the mandate and guided by the principle of
reinforcing Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership. See
http://unama.unmissions.org/ for full details. Back
19
We deal with this elsewhere: see Commission Staff Working Document:
Comprehensive EU Action to support Afghan efforts in strengthening
civilian policing and Rule of Law post-2014: (35190), 11109/13,
SWD(13) 220, at chapter 8 of this Report. Back
20
See the Annex to this chapter of our Report for the full Council
Conclusions. Back
21
See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_declaration_en1.html
for further information. Back
22
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) agreed in May
2012, establishes the mutual commitments of the Government of
Afghanistan and the international community to help Afghanistan
achieve its development and governance goals. Back
23
Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140656.pdf. Back
24
For full details, see our Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter 5
(18 June 2014). Back
25
Ditto. Back
26
See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/14/afghanistan-votes-election-taliban-threat. Back
27
See Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter 5 (18 June 2014). Back
28
The Minister's emphasis: available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/143322.pdf. Back
| 
