Documents considered by the Committee on 5 November 2014 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents


10 The EU and the Horn of Africa: Regional Maritime Capacity Building

Committee's assessment Politically important
Committee's decisionCleared from scrutiny; further information requested

Document detailsEU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR)
Legal baseArticles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Document numbers(36372), —

Summary and Committee's conclusions

10.1 EUCAP NESTOR is a civilian-led Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, launched in July 2012, as part of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to tackling insecurity in the Horn of Africa. It had a two-year mandate. Its aim is to enhance maritime and related rule of law capacity in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean States, and thus the capacity for action against piracy, with an initial geographical focus in Djibouti (HQ, country office, first permanent advisors, initial training), Kenya (country office), Tanzania (country office), the Seychelles (country office) and Somalia. The mission would be predominantly civilian with some military expertise, particularly on coast guarding. The mission was to address four key issues:

·  strengthening legal frameworks in each jurisdiction, to develop the rule of law and human rights standards in support of legal maritime capacity building;

·  creating a cadre of military and civilian personnel to provide training to regional authorities to achieve an efficient organisation of their maritime security agencies carrying out a coastguard function;

·  assisting the procurement of adequate hardware and equipment — patrol boats, communication equipment etc.; and

·  generating operational intelligence, enabling States affected by piracy to develop an operational picture of criminal activity and to share information.

10.2 As our previous Reports reveal, EUCAP NESTOR has thus far failed to make any discernible impact, and has suffered particularly from a lack of partner "buy-in". A year ago, when the Committee cleared the Council Decision regarding the previous budget, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) prayed in aid a forthcoming EEAS strategic review. In April, the Committee questioned whether a mission under ineffective leadership and lacking partner "buy in", and which had made no discernible impact, should be extended simply because there were "few credible alternatives": no matter how compelling the context, and no matter how frustrating the reality, if those at the receiving end simply could not play their part, would not the most effective course of action be for the EU to cut its losses, rather than spend a further two years throwing good money after bad?

10.3 This Council Decision provides for budget of €17.9 million to cover EUCAP NESTOR's operations from 15 October 2014 to 14 October 2015 (see the Annex to our previous Report for details).

10.4 In submitting it for scrutiny, the Minister also revealed that a Council Decision extending the mission mandate has already been adopted, on 22 July, as a result of an error in the FCO's handling of that Council Decision. He acknowledged that his officials wrote to the Committee's clerks on 27 June to request a waiver of scrutiny for a proposal to extend the budget for three months at no additional cost: negotiations on the renewal of the mandate had turned out to be more protracted than expected and there was significant under spend; the Committee's clerks agreed to this request. The Minister noted that the RELEX Secretariat (i.e., the European External Action Service (EEAS)), in a covering email sent to UKREP on 26 July, described the draft Council Decision as "concerning the no-cost extension of EUCAP Nestor", and said that it was "also the case that whenever we have negotiated short term extensions previously, we have had a special Decision adopting just the negotiated changes and not an additional long term mandate extension"; only very recently had anyone in UKREP or the FCO noticed that at the very end of the text was a sentence extending the mandate (though not the budget) until December 2016. The Minister said that "We shall be taking up with the EEAS their handling of this case".

10.5 The failure properly to inform Member States of the content of the draft Council Decision combined with the relevant FCO officials' failure to spot this had thus deprived the Committee of the opportunity to raise any questions about the further mandate, and thus totally undermined the scrutiny process. All that the Minister could now do was report after the event on the ways in which the mission had been re-shaped and provide answers to the Committee's earlier observations on his earlier letters about the mandate-reviewing process.

10.6 We found this oversight astonishing. Was the UK the only Member State which failed to notice the last sentence in the text? Were any other Member States as concerned?

10.7 We therefore asked, in the first instance: was this a deliberate manoeuvre on the part of the EEAS, which was well aware of the Committee's concerns about this mission's performance and continuation? Would the Minister be taking this up with the head of the EEAS, i.e., the High Representative? In our view, nothing else would suffice.

10.8 This was far from the first instance of the scrutiny of Common Foreign and Security Policy being undermined by the EEAS. Numerous earlier representations to the High Representative had produced mollifying assurances from her but been ineffectual. What was the Minister proposing to do about this when her successor took office?

10.9 So far as the FCO was concerned, the Minister said that he had "followed up in detail with officials and … ensured steps have been taken to prevent recurrence". We asked who had led this follow-up process, and what the steps taken consisted of.

10.10 With regard to this latest Council Decision, the Minister's officials had no doubt laboured long and hard to make the best of a bad hand. Policy-wise, however, all the questions that were open remained so, and the answers thus far were largely aspirational. The process appeared still to be driven essentially by a lack of any alternative and the hope that, over the next two years, the mission could be made more effective than the first two. Phase 2 in particular was posited on a number of key institutions that presently did not exist being in place by then, e.g. law enforcement bodies in the coastal areas of Somalia and judicial authorities willing and able to prosecute pirates. Above all, much hope was being placed in the untried "Key Leadership Engagements" process to (as the Minister puts it) "cement buy in". It was therefore vital that any decision to move to Phase 2 be taken at PSC level (and not by the CIVCOM), and that the Minister informed the Committee ahead of time what his position is, and the basis of it.

10.11 We noted that the only success thus far has been based on NATO and EU naval engagement — over whose continuation there nonetheless hung a cloud of uncertainty. And the Minister had nothing to say about measures to tackle the root causes, i.e., poverty and the lack of alternative employment opportunities. These being issues beyond our remit, we drew this chapter of our Report to the attention of the International Development and Foreign Affairs Committees. For our part, we asked what the state of play was on the outcome of a separate EEAS Review of Operation ATALANTA.

10.12 In the meantime, we cleared this Council Decision, if reluctantly and — as detailed above — with serious reservations. We also asked the Minister to respond to our concerns within ten working days.[49]

10.13 In his response, the Minister:

—  again apologises for the oversight;

—  says that while many did notice the mandate extension, the UK was not alone in missing the provision, and those that noticed were in favour;

—  acknowledges that there have been other instances where the EEAS has failed to take account of our scrutiny processes, but regards this as more an issue of the EU's internal organisation and time management, rather than a deliberate intention to undermine the UK's scrutiny process;

—  says that UKRep Brussels has again spoken to the EEAS about this issue and the importance of respecting UK national scrutiny processes;

—  agrees that he has raised previously the importance of national scrutiny processes with the High Representative and he and his officials intend to do so again with the new High Representative once she has taken office;

—  says that he has personally discussed FCO handling of this Decision and the steps they will take to prevent reoccurrence with the relevant officials in London, who have now "better defined their respective roles and responsibilities in relation to ensuring effective scrutiny of future decisions";

—  regarding the decision to move from Phase 1 to Phase 2 of the EUCAP NESTOR mandate being taken in the PSC rather than CivCom, says that, though having lobbied for this previously, he has accepted CivCom oversight on the basis that it would allow the mission to move between phases quickly, should the conditions be met and should a rapid decision be required: but, given the Committee's concerns, will seek to secure PSC oversight to move between phases — PSC Ambassadors will review progress towards the move to Phase 2 at PSC in November; the Minister will update the Committee in the event that the EEAS or Member States block this effort; and will of course ensure that the Committee is informed of any proposed moves to different phases ahead of time and his position on such proposals, to ensure that proper scrutiny can take place;

—  reports that negotiations on a two-year mandate renewal of the EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA to December 2016 have begun in Brussels, following the completion of the EEAS Strategic Review of that mission; and that the resulting Council Decision will be deposited for scrutiny in due course; and

—  has encouraged the EEAS to hold one strategic review in 2015 looking at the three CSDP missions operating in Somalia — EUCAP NESTOR, EUTM[50] and Operation ATALANTA — to ensure the missions are working in a coordinated manner.

10.14 On the process aspects of this Council Decision, we should be grateful if the Minister would provide us with a comprehensive list of his personal representations on scrutiny to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (Baroness Ashton) over the past four years and of her responses.[51]

10.15 On the policy aspects, we note the Minister's undertaking to provide the Committee with his views on any proposal to move to Phase 2 of EUCAP NESTOR prior to any decision being taken so to do.

10.16 Regarding Operation ATALANTA, we look forward to receiving the Council Decision in good time for any questions that may arise to be answered, prior to adoption by the Council.

10.17 We would also like him to let us know, as and when it is so decided, if the EEAS is to carry out a "three-mission-review" in 2015, and whether or not it will be a public document.

Full details of the document: Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR): (36372), —.

Background

10.18 At the outset, in April 2012, we endorsed the importance that the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) attached to the mission remaining focused on delivering its specified objectives effectively, and his underlining of the time-limited, two-year mandate and defined exit strategy. But we cautioned against the wording that the Minister used to define that exit strategy — it would "no longer be required once its host countries have adopted more effective legal and policing counter-piracy techniques" — leading to pressure towards making it somewhat more open-ended. The unanimity required for any extension would, we hoped, be an adequate safeguard.

10.19 In November 2013 — when the Committee agreed to a budget for the second year of the mission only because it would otherwise have run out of money — the Minister said that his officials would be "engaging closely with NESTOR's strategic review", and would "ensure that the mission is tightly focused and that the resources it requires are constrained, well-managed and used effectively".

10.20 In April, the Committee questioned whether a mission under ineffective leadership and lacking partner "buy in", and which had made no discernible impact, should be extended simply because there were "few credible alternatives". In the Committee's estimation there was at least one: to recognise that, no matter how compelling the context, and no matter how frustrating the reality, those at the receiving end simply could not play their part; and that the most effective course of action was therefore to cut one's losses, rather than spend a further two years throwing good money after bad.

10.21 The Committee also asked the Minister to provide forthwith an unclassified summary of the EEAS Strategic Review, outlining precisely what "a reinvigorated focus on Somalia in three clear phases" consisted of; how much it was likely to cost and if the budget would be annual and performance-reviewed before a second tranche was authorised; and, on the back of his assessment of the various partners' capabilities and approach, why he believed that, under its present leadership, EUCAP NESTOR was likely to be any more effective than it had been hitherto — including how effectiveness would now be measured and what sort of mid-term review would be carried out.[52]

10.22 In response to whether continuing the mission was of value to the UK, the Minister said that:

—  although no Somali pirate attack had been successful since May 2012, pirates retained an ability to operate from the shore as they did at the height of the problem in 2011;

—   international naval forces remained key to mitigating this risk in the immediate term but the EU and NATO mandates beyond the end of 2016 were unknown; and

—  capacity building efforts, including EUCAP NESTOR, would therefore remain important to address the root causes of piracy on land.

10.23 The Minister nonetheless believed a greater focus on UK priorities and measures to improve the mission's performance had been achieved; he therefore continued to support the mission going forward. Regarding the Committee's concerns, and progress achieved in recent months:

—  the mission was now more tightly focussed on delivering in Somalia through a three phased approach: in the first phase, developing further security and risk mitigation options to allow deployment throughout key areas in Somalia; developing jointly with Somali authorities conceptual plans on law enforcement in coastal areas, including possible future police structures at federal level and developing options on how to reduce the operation of piracy networks in conjunction with other missions; in the second, support to entities in charge of law enforcement in coastal areas such as police services stationed along the coast, maritime or coastal police forces, coast guards or port police; in the third phase, evaluating, mentoring and monitoring the people who have been trained;

—  following the Committee's 9 April 2014 Report,[53] officials had ensured that adequate security measures for deployment inside Somalia were reflected in the Operational Plan (OPLAN);

—  there would be a drive for continued progress and accountability: any decision to move from phase one to phase two in Somalia would be made on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the mission's progress against five criteria, including the completion of phase one activities; mechanisms for oversight; the implementation of proper security and medical arrangements; and commitment from the Somali authorities;

—  the assessment of the conditions to be fulfilled before the mission could move forward to phase two in the different regions in Somalia would be submitted to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom)[54] through regular reporting (Mission Monthly and Six-Monthly reports) and/or ad hoc reports; the UK would have the opportunity to challenge the assessment at CivCom; if these were not achieved in the short term (six months) then the Government would review its bilateral support of the mission, comprising a number of UK secondments;

—  with regard to how the local state authorities would be able to provide EUCAP NESTOR with the necessary "buy-in" that had been lacking thus far: the OPLAN underscored Key Leadership Engagements (KLE); building on a recent successful KLE with the Puntland authorities from an EUNAVFOR ATALANTA ship, the OPLAN will aim to cement buy-in within Somalia;

—  following successful UK interventions, the OPLAN also stated how the mission would work more closely with UN agencies who had been operating inside Somalia for many years, such as the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and thus further improve the mission's access, security and standing within Somalia; and

—  moreover, the mission was increasingly engaged with broader international efforts in Somalia, which improved the mission's visibility and reputation with local authorities (e.g., its involvement with the UK-led Working Group on Capacity Building of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia will enable the mission to be held to account for any failure to focus its efforts on key priorities or any lack of coordination with other regional implementers).

The Minister's letter of 28 October 2014

10.24 The Minister begins by again apologising for the oversight that led to the Committee being deprived of the opportunity to scrutinise the mandate's renewal, reiterating that it was not his or his officials' intention.

10.25 He then continues as follows:

THE EEAS'S BEHAVIOUR AND HIS RESPONSE:

    "You asked if other Member States had noticed that the mandate was being renewed in the July Council Decision. My officials have spoken with key Member States and have found that while many did notice the mandate extension, the UK was not alone in missing the provision. Those that noticed were unconcerned: they were in favour of the mandate extension, and as they have different Parliamentary scrutiny processes to follow, they agreed to the Council Decision without querying the inclusion of the provision.

    "I do not believe that this was a deliberate manoeuvre on the part of the EEAS. As you state in your report, there have been other instances where the EEAS has failed to take account of our scrutiny processes. This is more an issue of the EU's internal organisation and time management, rather than a deliberate intention to undermine the UK's scrutiny process. As you note, I have raised previously the importance of national scrutiny processes with the High Representative and my officials and I intend to do so again with the new High Representative once she has taken office.

THE FCO RESPONSE

    "In terms of FCO handling of this Decision, I have personally met with the relevant officials to discuss the steps they will take to prevent reoccurrence. My officials in UKRep Brussels have since spoken to the EEAS about this issue and the importance of respecting our national scrutiny processes, and my officials in London have since better defined their respective roles and responsibilities in relation to ensuring effective scrutiny of future decisions. The FCO will also continue to share the documents concerned with your Clerks when requesting an exemption, which I hope will give the Committees additional reassurance on this matter.

THE PHASING OF THE EUCAP NESTOR MANDATE

    "I have noted your request that the decision to move from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in Somalia should take place in PSC rather than CivCom. My officials have lobbied for this previously, but accepted CivCom oversight on the basis that it would allow the mission to move between phases quickly, should the conditions be met and should a rapid decision be required. However, given your Committee's concerns, my officials will seek to secure PSC oversight to move between phases. PSC Ambassadors will review progress towards the move to Phase 2 at PSC in November. I will update the Committee in the event that the EEAS or Member States block this effort and will of course ensure that the Committees are informed of any proposed moves to different phases ahead of time and our position on such proposals, to ensure that proper scrutiny can take place.

"Nestor is engaging with the appropriate authorities in Somalia and international organisations, such as the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, to progress the mission. The Mission Commander is establishing his office in Mogadishu, which will help with Key Leader Engagement. Nestor is also acting as the lead of a sub-working group of the UK/Indian Ocean Commission co-chaired Working Group on Capacity Building, part of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). As part of their role leading this workstream, Nestor officials are due to table their proposed priorities for capacity-building in the next two years to the 17th CGPCS plenary in Dubai this week.

EU NAVAL FORCE OPERATION ATALANTA

    "Finally, negotiations on a two-year mandate renewal of the EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA to December 2016 have begun in Brussels, following the completion of the EEAS Strategic Review of that mission. The resulting Council Decision will be deposited for scrutiny in due course. The Government has encouraged the EEAS to hold one strategic review in 2015 looking at the three CSDP missions operating in Somalia — EUCAP NESTOR, EUTM and Operation ATALANTA — to ensure the missions are working in a coordinated manner."

Previous Committee Reports

Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 39 (15 October 2014); also see (35429), —: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 26 (4 June 2014); Forty-sixth Report HC 83-xli (2013-14), chapter 14 (9 April 2014) and Twenty-second Report HC 83-xx (2012-13), chapter 23 (6 November 2013); also see (33835), —: Sixty-fourth Report HC 428 lviii (2010-12), chapter 11 (25 April 2012) and (35109), —: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 22 (3 July 2013); and (33741), —: Fifty-ninth Report HC 428-liv (2010-12), chapter 13 (14 March 2012) and (33759), —: Sixtieth Report HC 428-lv (2010-12), chapter 8 (21 March 2012).


49   Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 37 (15 October 2014). Back

50   On 10 April 2010, the European Union launched a military training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/index_en.htm for full information. Back

51   Our exchanges on this matter with the Minister seem to have concluded thus far with the Chairman's letter to him of 25 June 2014 about the late publication of documents relating to restrictive measures against the Assad regime in Syria (documents 36014-15). Back

52   The Minister's response is summarised in our previous Report. For full details, see (35429), -: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 26 (4 June 2014). Also see Forty-sixth Report HC 83-xli (2013-14), chapter 14 (9 April 2014) and Twenty-second Report HC 83-xx (2012-13), chapter 23 (6 November 2013); (33835), -: Sixty-fourth Report HC 428 lviii (2010-12), chapter 11 (25 April 2012) and (35109), -: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 22 (3 July 2013); and (33741), -: Fifty-ninth Report HC 428-liv (2010-12), chapter 13 (14 March 2012) and (33759), -: Sixtieth Report HC 428-lv (2010-12), chapter 8 (21 March 2012) for the full story thus far. Back

53   See HC 83-xli (2013-14), chapter 14 (9 April 2014) and HC 83-xx (2012-13), chapter 23 (6 November 2013). Back

54   The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction. The PSC is chaired by a representative of the High Representative. In parallel with the European Union Military Committee (EUMC: the highest military body set up within the Council, which provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU), the PSC is advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. Back


 
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