10 The EU and the Horn of Africa: Regional
Maritime Capacity Building
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
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| Document details | EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR)
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | (36372), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
10.1 EUCAP NESTOR is a civilian-led Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, launched in July 2012, as part
of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to tackling insecurity in the
Horn of Africa. It had a two-year mandate. Its aim is to enhance
maritime and related rule of law capacity in the Horn of Africa
and Western Indian Ocean States, and thus the capacity for action
against piracy, with an initial geographical focus in Djibouti
(HQ, country office, first permanent advisors, initial training),
Kenya (country office), Tanzania (country office), the Seychelles
(country office) and Somalia. The mission would be predominantly
civilian with some military expertise, particularly on coast guarding.
The mission was to address four key issues:
· strengthening legal frameworks in each
jurisdiction, to develop the rule of law and human rights standards
in support of legal maritime capacity building;
· creating a cadre of military and civilian
personnel to provide training to regional authorities to achieve
an efficient organisation of their maritime security agencies
carrying out a coastguard function;
· assisting the procurement of adequate
hardware and equipment — patrol boats, communication equipment
etc.; and
· generating operational intelligence, enabling
States affected by piracy to develop an operational picture of
criminal activity and to share information.
10.2 As our previous Reports reveal, EUCAP NESTOR
has thus far failed to make any discernible impact, and has suffered
particularly from a lack of partner "buy-in". A year
ago, when the Committee cleared the Council Decision regarding
the previous budget, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
prayed in aid a forthcoming EEAS strategic review. In April, the
Committee questioned whether a mission under ineffective leadership
and lacking partner "buy in", and which had made no
discernible impact, should be extended simply because there were
"few credible alternatives": no matter how compelling
the context, and no matter how frustrating the reality, if those
at the receiving end simply could not play their part, would not
the most effective course of action be for the EU to cut its losses,
rather than spend a further two years throwing good money after
bad?
10.3 This Council Decision provides for budget of
€17.9 million to cover EUCAP NESTOR's operations from 15
October 2014 to 14 October 2015 (see the Annex to our previous
Report for details).
10.4 In submitting it for scrutiny, the Minister
also revealed that a Council Decision extending the mission mandate
has already been adopted, on 22 July, as a result of an error
in the FCO's handling of that Council Decision. He acknowledged
that his officials wrote to the Committee's clerks on 27 June
to request a waiver of scrutiny for a proposal to extend the budget
for three months at no additional cost: negotiations on the renewal
of the mandate had turned out to be more protracted than expected
and there was significant under spend; the Committee's clerks
agreed to this request. The Minister noted that the RELEX Secretariat
(i.e., the European External Action Service (EEAS)), in a covering
email sent to UKREP on 26 July, described the draft Council Decision
as "concerning the no-cost extension of EUCAP Nestor",
and said that it was "also the case that whenever we have
negotiated short term extensions previously, we have had a special
Decision adopting just the negotiated changes and not an additional
long term mandate extension"; only very recently had anyone
in UKREP or the FCO noticed that at the very end of the text was
a sentence extending the mandate (though not the budget) until
December 2016. The Minister said that "We shall be taking
up with the EEAS their handling of this case".
10.5 The failure properly to inform Member States
of the content of the draft Council Decision combined with the
relevant FCO officials' failure to spot this had thus deprived
the Committee of the opportunity to raise any questions about
the further mandate, and thus totally undermined the scrutiny
process. All that the Minister could now do was report after the
event on the ways in which the mission had been re-shaped and
provide answers to the Committee's earlier observations on his
earlier letters about the mandate-reviewing process.
10.6 We found this oversight astonishing. Was the
UK the only Member State which failed to notice the last sentence
in the text? Were any other Member States as concerned?
10.7 We therefore asked, in the first instance: was
this a deliberate manoeuvre on the part of the EEAS, which was
well aware of the Committee's concerns about this mission's performance
and continuation? Would the Minister be taking this up with the
head of the EEAS, i.e., the High Representative? In our view,
nothing else would suffice.
10.8 This was far from the first instance of the
scrutiny of Common Foreign and Security Policy being undermined
by the EEAS. Numerous earlier representations to the High Representative
had produced mollifying assurances from her but been ineffectual.
What was the Minister proposing to do about this when her successor
took office?
10.9 So far as the FCO was concerned, the Minister
said that he had "followed up in detail with officials and
… ensured steps have been taken to prevent recurrence".
We asked who had led this follow-up process, and what the steps
taken consisted of.
10.10 With regard to this latest Council Decision,
the Minister's officials had no doubt laboured long and hard to
make the best of a bad hand. Policy-wise, however, all the questions
that were open remained so, and the answers thus far were largely
aspirational. The process appeared still to be driven essentially
by a lack of any alternative and the hope that, over the next
two years, the mission could be made more effective than the first
two. Phase 2 in particular was posited on a number of key institutions
that presently did not exist being in place by then, e.g. law
enforcement bodies in the coastal areas of Somalia and judicial
authorities willing and able to prosecute pirates. Above all,
much hope was being placed in the untried "Key Leadership
Engagements" process to (as the Minister puts it) "cement
buy in". It was therefore vital that any decision to move
to Phase 2 be taken at PSC level (and not by the CIVCOM), and
that the Minister informed the Committee ahead of time what his
position is, and the basis of it.
10.11 We noted that the only success thus far has
been based on NATO and EU naval engagement — over whose
continuation there nonetheless hung a cloud of uncertainty. And
the Minister had nothing to say about measures to tackle the root
causes, i.e., poverty and the lack of alternative employment opportunities.
These being issues beyond our remit, we drew this chapter of our
Report to the attention of the International Development and Foreign
Affairs Committees. For our part, we asked what the state of play
was on the outcome of a separate EEAS Review of Operation ATALANTA.
10.12 In the meantime, we cleared this Council Decision,
if reluctantly and — as detailed above — with serious
reservations. We also asked the Minister to respond to our concerns
within ten working days.[49]
10.13 In his response, the Minister:
— again apologises
for the oversight;
— says that while many did notice the mandate
extension, the UK was not alone in missing the provision, and
those that noticed were in favour;
— acknowledges that there have been other
instances where the EEAS has failed to take account of our scrutiny
processes, but regards this as more an issue of the EU's internal
organisation and time management, rather than a deliberate intention
to undermine the UK's scrutiny process;
— says that UKRep Brussels has again spoken
to the EEAS about this issue and the importance of respecting
UK national scrutiny processes;
— agrees that he has raised previously
the importance of national scrutiny processes with the High Representative
and he and his officials intend to do so again with the new High
Representative once she has taken office;
— says that he has
personally discussed FCO handling of this Decision and the steps
they will take to prevent reoccurrence with the relevant officials
in London, who have now "better defined their respective
roles and responsibilities in relation to ensuring effective scrutiny
of future decisions";
— regarding the decision to move from Phase
1 to Phase 2 of the EUCAP NESTOR mandate being taken in the PSC
rather than CivCom, says that, though having lobbied for this
previously, he has accepted CivCom oversight on the basis that
it would allow the mission to move between phases quickly, should
the conditions be met and should a rapid decision be required:
but, given the Committee's concerns, will seek to secure PSC oversight
to move between phases — PSC Ambassadors will review progress
towards the move to Phase 2 at PSC in November; the Minister will
update the Committee in the event that the EEAS or Member States
block this effort; and will of course ensure that the Committee
is informed of any proposed moves to different phases ahead of
time and his position on such proposals, to ensure that proper
scrutiny can take place;
— reports that negotiations on a two-year
mandate renewal of the EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA to December
2016 have begun in Brussels, following the completion of the EEAS
Strategic Review of that mission; and that the resulting Council
Decision will be deposited for scrutiny in due course; and
— has encouraged the EEAS to hold one strategic
review in 2015 looking at the three CSDP missions operating in
Somalia — EUCAP NESTOR, EUTM[50]
and Operation ATALANTA — to ensure the missions are working
in a coordinated manner.
10.14 On the process aspects of this Council Decision,
we should be grateful if the Minister would provide us with a
comprehensive list of his personal representations on scrutiny
to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (Baroness Ashton)
over the past four years and of her responses.[51]
10.15 On the policy aspects, we note the Minister's
undertaking to provide the Committee with his views on any proposal
to move to Phase 2 of EUCAP NESTOR prior to any decision being
taken so to do.
10.16 Regarding Operation ATALANTA, we look forward
to receiving the Council Decision in good time for any questions
that may arise to be answered, prior to adoption by the Council.
10.17 We would also like him to let us know, as
and when it is so decided, if the EEAS is to carry out a "three-mission-review"
in 2015, and whether or not it will be a public document.
Full details of the document:
Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP
on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building
in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR): (36372), —.
Background
10.18 At the outset, in April 2012, we endorsed the
importance that the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) attached
to the mission remaining focused on delivering its specified objectives
effectively, and his underlining of the time-limited, two-year
mandate and defined exit strategy. But we cautioned against the
wording that the Minister used to define that exit strategy —
it would "no longer be required once its host countries have
adopted more effective legal and policing counter-piracy techniques"
— leading to pressure towards making it somewhat more open-ended.
The unanimity required for any extension would, we hoped, be an
adequate safeguard.
10.19 In November 2013 — when the Committee
agreed to a budget for the second year of the mission only because
it would otherwise have run out of money — the Minister
said that his officials would be "engaging closely with NESTOR's
strategic review", and would "ensure that the mission
is tightly focused and that the resources it requires are constrained,
well-managed and used effectively".
10.20 In April, the Committee questioned whether
a mission under ineffective leadership and lacking partner "buy
in", and which had made no discernible impact, should be
extended simply because there were "few credible alternatives".
In the Committee's estimation there was at least one: to recognise
that, no matter how compelling the context, and no matter how
frustrating the reality, those at the receiving end simply could
not play their part; and that the most effective course of action
was therefore to cut one's losses, rather than spend a further
two years throwing good money after bad.
10.21 The Committee also asked the Minister to provide
forthwith an unclassified summary of the EEAS Strategic Review,
outlining precisely what "a reinvigorated focus on Somalia
in three clear phases" consisted of; how much it was likely
to cost and if the budget would be annual and performance-reviewed
before a second tranche was authorised; and, on the back of his
assessment of the various partners' capabilities and approach,
why he believed that, under its present leadership, EUCAP NESTOR
was likely to be any more effective than it had been hitherto
— including how effectiveness would now be measured and
what sort of mid-term review would be carried out.[52]
10.22 In response to whether continuing the mission
was of value to the UK, the Minister said that:
— although no Somali pirate attack had
been successful since May 2012, pirates retained an ability to
operate from the shore as they did at the height of the problem
in 2011;
— international naval forces remained
key to mitigating this risk in the immediate term but the EU and
NATO mandates beyond the end of 2016 were unknown; and
— capacity building efforts, including
EUCAP NESTOR, would therefore remain important to address the
root causes of piracy on land.
10.23 The Minister nonetheless believed a greater
focus on UK priorities and measures to improve the mission's performance
had been achieved; he therefore continued to support the mission
going forward. Regarding the Committee's concerns, and progress
achieved in recent months:
— the mission was now more tightly focussed
on delivering in Somalia through a three phased approach: in the
first phase, developing further security and risk mitigation options
to allow deployment throughout key areas in Somalia; developing
jointly with Somali authorities conceptual plans on law enforcement
in coastal areas, including possible future police structures
at federal level and developing options on how to reduce the operation
of piracy networks in conjunction with other missions; in the
second, support to entities in charge of law enforcement in coastal
areas such as police services stationed along the coast, maritime
or coastal police forces, coast guards or port police; in the
third phase, evaluating, mentoring and monitoring the people who
have been trained;
— following the Committee's 9 April 2014
Report,[53]
officials had ensured that adequate security measures for deployment
inside Somalia were reflected in the Operational Plan (OPLAN);
— there would be a drive for continued
progress and accountability: any decision to move from phase one
to phase two in Somalia would be made on the basis of a comprehensive
assessment of the mission's progress against five criteria, including
the completion of phase one activities; mechanisms for oversight;
the implementation of proper security and medical arrangements;
and commitment from the Somali authorities;
— the assessment of the conditions to be
fulfilled before the mission could move forward to phase two in
the different regions in Somalia would be submitted to the Committee
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom)[54]
through regular reporting (Mission Monthly and Six-Monthly reports)
and/or ad hoc reports; the UK would have the opportunity to challenge
the assessment at CivCom; if these were not achieved in the short
term (six months) then the Government would review its bilateral
support of the mission, comprising a number of UK secondments;
— with regard to how the local state authorities
would be able to provide EUCAP NESTOR with the necessary "buy-in"
that had been lacking thus far: the OPLAN underscored Key Leadership
Engagements (KLE); building on a recent successful KLE with the
Puntland authorities from an EUNAVFOR ATALANTA ship, the OPLAN
will aim to cement buy-in within Somalia;
— following successful UK interventions,
the OPLAN also stated how the mission would work more closely
with UN agencies who had been operating inside Somalia for many
years, such as the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and thus further improve the mission's
access, security and standing within Somalia; and
— moreover, the mission was increasingly
engaged with broader international efforts in Somalia, which improved
the mission's visibility and reputation with local authorities
(e.g., its involvement with the UK-led Working Group on Capacity
Building of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
will enable the mission to be held to account for any failure
to focus its efforts on key priorities or any lack of coordination
with other regional implementers).
The Minister's letter of 28 October 2014
10.24 The Minister begins by again apologising for
the oversight that led to the Committee being deprived of the
opportunity to scrutinise the mandate's renewal, reiterating that
it was not his or his officials' intention.
10.25 He then continues as follows:
THE EEAS'S BEHAVIOUR AND HIS RESPONSE:
"You asked if other Member States had noticed
that the mandate was being renewed in the July Council Decision.
My officials have spoken with key Member States and have found
that while many did notice the mandate extension, the UK was not
alone in missing the provision. Those that noticed were unconcerned:
they were in favour of the mandate extension, and as they have
different Parliamentary scrutiny processes to follow, they agreed
to the Council Decision without querying the inclusion of the
provision.
"I do not believe that this was a deliberate
manoeuvre on the part of the EEAS. As you state in your report,
there have been other instances where the EEAS has failed to take
account of our scrutiny processes. This is more an issue of the
EU's internal organisation and time management, rather than a
deliberate intention to undermine the UK's scrutiny process. As
you note, I have raised previously the importance of national
scrutiny processes with the High Representative and my officials
and I intend to do so again with the new High Representative once
she has taken office.
THE FCO RESPONSE
"In terms of FCO handling of this Decision,
I have personally met with the relevant officials to discuss the
steps they will take to prevent reoccurrence. My officials in
UKRep Brussels have since spoken to the EEAS about this issue
and the importance of respecting our national scrutiny processes,
and my officials in London have since better defined their respective
roles and responsibilities in relation to ensuring effective scrutiny
of future decisions. The FCO will also continue to share the documents
concerned with your Clerks when requesting an exemption, which
I hope will give the Committees additional reassurance on this
matter.
THE PHASING OF THE EUCAP NESTOR MANDATE
"I have noted your request that the decision
to move from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in Somalia should take place in
PSC rather than CivCom. My officials have lobbied for this previously,
but accepted CivCom oversight on the basis that it would allow
the mission to move between phases quickly, should the conditions
be met and should a rapid decision be required. However, given
your Committee's concerns, my officials will seek to secure PSC
oversight to move between phases. PSC Ambassadors will review
progress towards the move to Phase 2 at PSC in November. I will
update the Committee in the event that the EEAS or Member States
block this effort and will of course ensure that the Committees
are informed of any proposed moves to different phases ahead of
time and our position on such proposals, to ensure that proper
scrutiny can take place.
"Nestor is engaging with the appropriate authorities
in Somalia and international organisations, such as the United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, to progress the mission. The
Mission Commander is establishing his office in Mogadishu, which
will help with Key Leader Engagement. Nestor is also acting as
the lead of a sub-working group of the UK/Indian Ocean Commission
co-chaired Working Group on Capacity Building, part of the Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). As part of their
role leading this workstream, Nestor officials are due to table
their proposed priorities for capacity-building in the next two
years to the 17th CGPCS plenary in Dubai this week.
EU NAVAL FORCE OPERATION ATALANTA
"Finally, negotiations on a two-year mandate
renewal of the EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA to December 2016
have begun in Brussels, following the completion of the EEAS Strategic
Review of that mission. The resulting Council Decision will be
deposited for scrutiny in due course. The Government has encouraged
the EEAS to hold one strategic review in 2015 looking at the three
CSDP missions operating in Somalia — EUCAP NESTOR, EUTM
and Operation ATALANTA — to ensure the missions are working
in a coordinated manner."
Previous Committee Reports
Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter
39 (15 October 2014); also see (35429), —: First Report
HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 26 (4 June 2014); Forty-sixth Report
HC 83-xli (2013-14), chapter 14 (9 April 2014) and Twenty-second
Report HC 83-xx (2012-13), chapter 23 (6 November 2013); also
see (33835), —: Sixty-fourth Report HC 428 lviii (2010-12),
chapter 11 (25 April 2012) and (35109), —: Eighth Report
HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 22 (3 July 2013); and (33741), —:
Fifty-ninth Report HC 428-liv (2010-12), chapter 13 (14 March
2012) and (33759), —: Sixtieth Report HC 428-lv (2010-12),
chapter 8 (21 March 2012).
49 Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 37
(15 October 2014). Back
50
On 10 April 2010, the European Union launched a military training
mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in order to contribute to strengthening
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions
of Somalia. See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
51
Our exchanges on this matter with the Minister seem to have concluded
thus far with the Chairman's letter to him of 25 June 2014 about
the late publication of documents relating to restrictive measures
against the Assad regime in Syria (documents 36014-15). Back
52
The Minister's response is summarised in our previous Report.
For full details, see (35429), -: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15),
chapter 26 (4 June 2014). Also see Forty-sixth Report HC 83-xli
(2013-14), chapter 14 (9 April 2014) and Twenty-second Report
HC 83-xx (2012-13), chapter 23 (6 November 2013); (33835), -:
Sixty-fourth Report HC 428 lviii (2010-12), chapter 11 (25 April
2012) and (35109), -: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 22
(3 July 2013); and (33741), -: Fifty-ninth Report HC 428-liv
(2010-12), chapter 13 (14 March 2012) and (33759), -: Sixtieth
Report HC 428-lv (2010-12), chapter 8 (21 March 2012) for the
full story thus far. Back
53
See HC 83-xli (2013-14), chapter 14 (9 April 2014) and HC 83-xx
(2012-13), chapter 23 (6 November 2013). Back
54
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial
level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main
functions are keeping track of the international situation, and
helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response
to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic
direction. The PSC is chaired by a representative of the High
Representative. In parallel with the European Union Military Committee
(EUMC: the highest military body set up within the Council, which
provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military
matters within the EU), the PSC is advised by a Committee for
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee
provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion
to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. Back
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