11 EU restrictive measures against the
Syrian regime
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny
|
| Document details | Further amendments to EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime
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| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
Article 215 TFEU; QMV
|
| Department
Document numbers
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(a) (36433), —; (b) (36434), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
11.1 At the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 October
2014, EU Foreign Ministers agreed the designation of an additional
16 entities and two individuals under the EU's restrictive measures
against Syria.
11.2 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
explains that these new designations include 12 new members of
the Syrian Government, individuals and entities involved in the
supply of oil to the Syrian Regime, and individuals responsible
for grave human rights abuses in Syria, and are as follows:
· "Houmam Jaza'iri — Minister
of Economy and Foreign Trade
· "Mohamad Amer Mardini — Minister
of High Education
· "Mohamad Ghazi Jalali — Minister
of Communications and Technology
· "Kamal Cheikha — Minister of
Water Resources.
· "Hassan Nouri — Minister of
Administrative Development
· "Mohammad Walid Ghazal — Minister
of Housing and Urban Development
· "Khalaf Souleymane Abdallah —
Minister of Labour
· "Nizar Wahbeh Yazaji — Minister
of Health
· "Hassan Safiyeh — Minister
of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection
· "Issam Khalil — Minister of
Culture
· "Mohammad Mouti' Mouayyad —
Minister of State
· "Ghazwan Kheir Bek — Minister
of Transport
· "Major General Ghassan Ahmed Ghannan
— Commander of the 155 Missile Brigade, responsible for
the firing of scud missiles at civilian sites.
· "Colonel Mohammed Bilal — Senior
Officer in the Air Force Intelligence Service.
· "Mohamed Farahat — Vice President
of Finance and Administration at the sanctioned Tri-Ocean Energy,
responsible for supplying oil to the Syrian Regime.
· "Abdelhamid Khamis Abdullah —
Chairman of the listed company Overseas Petroleum Trading, responsible
for coordinating shipments of oil to the Syrian Regime.
· "Pangates International — Acts
as an intermediary in the supply of oil to the Syrian Regime.
· "Abdulkarim Group — Parent
Company of Pangates International."
11.3 In addition, the Minister says, the statements
of reason for Muhamad Dib Zaytun, Ayman Jabir, Tarif Akhras and
Sorouh were updated, and Mohamed Nidal Al-Chaar was removed from
the sanctions list following the EU General Court judgment of
3 July 2014.[55]
11.4 The Minister notes that, since early 2011,
over nine million Syrians have been driven from their homes by
a civil war unleashed by the regime's brutal crackdown on peaceful
protests calling for democratic reform. He further notes that,
headed by Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian regime:
"has been responsible for numerous heinous
crimes, including chemical weapons attacks on civilian populations,
indiscriminate bombardment of civilian neighbourhoods, torture,
extrajudicial executions, sexual violence as acts of war and arbitrary
denial of access to international aid organisations attempting
to reach besieged communities."
11.5 The Minister then explains that:
"These new sanctions measures amplify the
pressure on Assad by freezing the assets of 18 individuals and
entities who prop up his regime and who supply oil that allows
him to wage war on the Syrian people. The cause of instability
and conflict in Syria is Assad, and sanctions are a key part of
our strategy for weakening the regime, limiting its ability to
perpetrate barbaric acts against the Syrian people and putting
pressure on Assad to negotiate an end to the conflict. The UK
remains firm in its belief that a negotiated political settlement
is the only solution to conflict and Syria's worsening humanitarian
crisis."
11.6 When we scrutinised the last changes to these
restrictive measures, in early September in relation to Council
action of 20 July, we noted that the Syrian crisis had been somewhat
overshadowed in the previous weeks by developments in neighbouring
Iraq, brought about by the spread from a disintegrating Syria
of the barbaric activities of ISIS.[56]
That is all the more so now — an impression underscored
by the Minister's by now somewhat "pro forma" comments.
With ISIS now dominating the international community's agenda
in Syria as well as in Iraq, it is difficult to see how these
by now extensive measures have indeed undermined the Assad regime
and made it any more compelled than hitherto towards the negotiating
table and peace talks with the Syrian opposition, such as it is
at present. The counter-argument is, of course, that not to respond
to the actions of the Assad regime would no doubt be seen as defeatist
and an evasion of the EU's international responsibilities. In
the final analysis, time alone will tell what effect they have
in resolving the crisis in line with UK and EU interests.
11.7 In the meantime, we now clear these documents.
11.8 In the circumstances explained by the Minister
(the need to adopt these measures as soon as agreed, to mitigate
the significant risk of asset flight), on this occasion we do
not object to his having overridden scrutiny.
Full details of the documents:
(a) Council Implementing Decision implementing Council Decision
2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria: (36433),
—; (b) Council Implementing Regulation implementing Council
Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in
view of the situation in Syria: (36344), —.
Background
11.9 As of 21 October 2014, the range of EU restrictive
measures against the Assad regime and its supporters, as set out
in Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP and as amended, is as follows:
— Prohibition on the import of arms and
related material from Syria. Export restrictions on certain equipment,
goods and technology that might be used for internal repression
or for the manufacture or maintenance of such products. The measure
includes a prohibition on related financial assistance as well
as insurance and reinsurance;
— Obligation for member states to inspect
vessels and aircraft if there are reasonable grounds to believe
they carry arms, related material or equipment which might be
used for internal repression. This applies in member states' seaports,
airports and in their territorial sea, in accordance with international
law. Items that may not be exported from the EU to Syria must
be seized;
— Import ban on crude oil and petroleum
products from Syria. The prohibition concerns import, purchase
and transport of such products as well as related finance and
insurance. The ban also includes a prohibition on related technical
and financial assistance. Under certain conditions and after consultation
with the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary
Forces, member states may authorise derogations from this prohibition;
— Ban on investment in the Syrian oil industry.
This covers loans and credits, acquisition or extension of participations
and the creation of joint ventures. Under certain conditions and
after consultation with the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition
and Revolutionary Forces, member states may authorise derogations
from this prohibition;
— Ban on investment in companies engaged
in the construction of new power plants for electricity production
in Syria;
— Prohibition to participate in the construction
of new power plants, including related technical or financial
assistance;
— Ban on exports to Syria of key equipment
and technology for the oil and gas industry. The ban also includes
a prohibition on related technical and financial assistance. Under
certain conditions and after consultation with the Syrian National
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces, member states
may authorise derogations from this prohibition;
— Ban on trade in goods belonging to Syria's
cultural heritage which have been illegally removed from Syria
with the objective of facilitating the safe return of those goods;
— The assets of the Syrian central bank
within the EU are frozen and it is prohibited to make funds or
economic resources available, but the provision allows for legitimate
trade to continue under strict conditions;
— Ban on trade in gold, precious metals
and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and the central bank;
— Ban on supplying banknotes and coinage
to the Syrian central bank;
— Member states must not give new grants
and concessional loans to the Syrian government;
— Asset freeze on 63 entities and 211 persons
responsible for or associated with the violent repression against
the civilian population in Syria or supporting or benefiting from
the regime. The release of certain frozen funds or economic resources
may be authorised exceptionally under certain conditions if they
are intended, inter alia, for humanitarian purposes; for
evacuations from Syria; or in order to make payments on behalf
of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for activities related to the OPCW
verification mission and the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons;
— Travel ban on 211 persons responsible
for or associated with the violent repression against the civilian
population in Syria or supporting or benefiting from the regime;
— Export ban on equipment, technology or
software primarily intended for monitoring or interception of
the internet or telephone communications;
— No disbursements and payments in connection
with existing loan agreements between Syria and the European Investment
Bank, as well as the suspension of technical assistance contracts
relating to projects in Syria;
— Prohibition to trade Syrian public or
public-guaranteed bonds to or from the government of Syria or
its public bodies and Syrian financial institutions. No brokering
or issuing services for such bonds are allowed;
— Prohibition for Syrian financial institutions
to open new branches or subsidiaries in the EU or to establish
new joint ventures or new correspondent banking relationships
with EU banks;
— EU banks are prohibited from opening
offices or accounts in Syria. Under certain conditions and after
consultation with the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition
and Revolutionary Forces, member states may authorise derogations
from this prohibition;
— Member states are to restrain short and
medium term financial support for trade with Syria, including
export credits, guarantees and insurance; no more long-term support;
— No insurance or re-insurance to the Syrian
government, public bodies, corporations or agencies (except health
and travel insurance or compulsory third party insurance for Syrian
persons or entities in the EU);
— Cargo flights operated by Syrian carriers
and all flights operated by Syrian Arab Airlines may not have
access to EU airports; and
— Prohibition to export luxury goods to
Syria.[57]
11.10 Scrutiny by the Committee of the adoption of
and subsequent amendments to this Council Decision and Council
Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 is set out in our previous Reports.[58]
11.11 In the absence of any positive developments
since last summer, Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP was renewed
in May 2014, meaning that these measures were "rolled over"
for a further 12 months, until 1 June 2015; and some minor amendments
were made (the delisting of two persons and one entity: Asif Shawkat,
now deceased; and Soulieman Marouf and the Syrian International
Islamic Bank, who no longer met the designation criteria; the
statement of reasons of 14 individuals was updated to reflect
their present circumstances). A subsequent Council Implementing
Decision and Council Implementing Regulation put the "roll
over" into effect.
11.12 As part of the process of keeping the listings
under constant review, the 23 June Foreign Affairs Council agreed
to list an additional 12 Syrian Government Ministers, as well
as amend the statement of reasons to reflect that one of those
listed was by then a former Government Minister; all the new ones
were listed with the statement of reasons being: "as Government
Minister, shares responsibility for the regime's violent repression
against the civilian population".
11.13 Since the House was already well aware of the
lack of progress in the Syrian crisis and the nature of the existing
sanctions regime, the Committee concluded that this straightforward
"roll-over" did not warrant a substantive Report, and
cleared them from scrutiny accordingly.
11.14 The measures adopted by the 22 July 2014 Foreign
Affairs Council — the designation of an additional nine
entities and three individuals — were reported to the House
on 3 September.[59]
11.15 The essence of the Explanatory Memorandum of
24 October 2014 from the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
is set out above.
The Minister's letter of 24 October 2014
11.16 The Minister says that, as detailed in his
Explanatory Memorandum:
"the situation in Syria continues to be
of serious concern. I am clear that the cause of instability in
Syria is Assad. The only long-term solution to the Syrian conflict,
and ISIL, is a negotiated solution. It is therefore important
that the EU continues to send a strong message to the Syrian regime
that its continued intransigence is unacceptable, and that the
Syrian regime must negotiate an end to its brutal war. These new
listings signal the EU's determination to step up the pressure
on Assad and those propping up his regime."
11.17 The Minister also expresses regret that:
"to ensure details of these designations
were not made public until after the measures were in place, to
mitigate the significant risk of asset flight, I found myself
in the position of having to agree to the adoption of the Council
Decision and Regulation before your Committee had an opportunity
to scrutinise the documents… [which] … on this occasion
was regrettably unavoidable."
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36246), —; and (36247), —:
Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014-15) chapter 42 (3 September
2014); (35713), —: Thirty-first Report HC 83-xxviii (2013-14),
chapter 16 (22 January 2014) and the earlier Reports referred
to therein.
55 Case T-203/12. Back
56
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham. Back
57
For full information, see the annex to the 20 October 2014 EU
Fact Sheet on the EU and Syria, at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131018_01_en.pdf
Back
58
See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2012R0036:20130423:EN:HTML
for the text of Council Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 and links
to subsequent amendments. Back
59
See (36246), - and (36247), -: Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014-15)
chapter 42 (3 September 2014). Back
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