House of Commons - Documents considered by the Committee on 26 November 2014

Documents considered by the Committee on 26 November 2014 - European Scrutiny Committee Contents

17 European security and defence: following up the December 2013 European Defence Council

Committee's assessment	Politically important
Committee's decision	Cleared from scrutiny (by Resolution of the House of 12 March 2014); further information now provided; drawn to the attention of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees
Document details	Joint Communication: The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises
Legal base	—
Department	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Council numbers	(35696), 17859/13, JOIN(13) 30

Summary and Committee's conclusions

17.1 The Joint Communication sets out how the EU could take a more "Comprehensive Approach" in its external relations policies and actions. It, the High Representative's review of the European External Action Service and a Commission Communication, Towards A More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector, were all prepared ahead of the December 2013 European Council, which was the first since 2007 to review that EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and defence activities.[51]

17.2 As the "Background" section below relates, we have been corresponding with the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) about scrutinising a number of documents related to the December Council Conclusions — the EU MSS (EU Maritime Security Strategy); the Defence Implementation Road Map; a proposed new EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework; and new EDA projects and work on developing what was originally described as a new "Policy Framework for systematic and long term cooperation on capabilities", which was presumably the "Policy Framework for Defence Cooperation" to which he referred most recently. The Minister had undertaken to "submit these in line with the usual procedures or provide as much information as possible once those documents have been finalised", and promised a more substantial update and clearer timetable going forward, following this progress report from HR/VP Ashton at the July Foreign Affairs Council.

17.3 Thus far, both the EU MSS and the Defence Implementation Road Map had been submitted for scrutiny and, at the time of our most recent Report:[52]

— we awaited a report from the Minister on the EU MSS Action Plan;[53]

— the Defence Implementation Road Map remained under scrutiny pending receipt of the Opinion that we had requested of our colleagues on the Defence Committee;[54] and

— in terms of substance, we were as yet little the wiser about either the Cyber Defence Policy Framework or the Policy Framework for Defence Cooperation.

17.4 We therefore asked the Minister to let us know when he expected to be able to deposit these for scrutiny too, and at that time, also to provide us with:

· a summary and his assessment of the informal discussions by EU Defence Ministers on 9 September to which he referred (which we presumed were analogous to the well-established "Gymnich" arrangements for such discussions among EU Foreign Ministers); and

· information on how he proposed to handle scrutiny of the review of CSDP financing and the separate Athena mechanism review.

17.5 Looking further ahead, the process that the Minister said would inform the June 2015 European Council appeared to be identical to that which had led up to the December 2013 Defence European Council. In that process, those "inputs" were all deposited for scrutiny and (despite a number of hurdles that had to be overcome en route) debated. We asked the Minister to confirm that these further "inputs" would also be deposited for scrutiny, and in good time for them to be debated prior to the June 2015 European Council.

17.6 In the meantime, we drew this further information not only to the attention of the House at large, but also to the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees.[55]

17.7 Since then, we have dealt with the review of CSDP financing;[56] have received the Opinion of the Defence Committee and recommended a European Committee debate on the Defence Implementation Road Map;[57] and have now received a (very limited) update on the equivalent "output" from the EU MSS, namely the EU MSS Action Plan.[58] But we have heard nothing else from the Minister concerning the other matters.

17.8 However, we now see that, at its meeting on 18 November 2014, the Foreign Affairs (Defence) Council adopted substantive conclusions, running to 13 paragraphs and four pages (see the Annex to this chapter of our Report).[59] Those Council Conclusions note that, among other things, the Council adopted:

— the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, which focuses on "supporting the development of Member States cyber defence capabilities related to CSDP; enhancing the protection of CSDP communication networks used by EU entities; promoting civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber policies, relevant EU institutions and agencies as well as with the private sector; improving training, education and exercises opportunities; and enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners";

— adopted a Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation, which "[i]n view of deepening cooperation in Europe, this Policy Framework will guide the cooperative approaches of Member States, through their national decision making processes, when developing defence capabilities. In line with the European Council Conclusions, it has been put forward in full coherence with existing NATO planning processes";

— agreed the Progress Catalogue 2014, which "provides an assessment of the critical military shortfalls resulting from the Headline Goal process and their impact on CSDP; these shortfalls are integrated into the revised Capability Development Plan agreed by the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, which should support and orientate national capability planning, identify the capabilities required and seize collaborative opportunities."

17.9 These wide-ranging Council Conclusions presumably reflect the informal discussions by EU Defence Ministers on 9 September, of which we have also heard nothing. We would like the Minister to explain why; and why, too, we were given no information prior to the event that such wide-ranging Council Conclusions were in prospect.

17.10 We would also like to know why the Minister has not either submitted the documents referred to above "in line with the usual procedures" or provided "as much information as possible once those documents have been finalised", and ask him now to do one or the other. In either event, we would like him to explain how they are on the right side of any UK "red lines" and how they protect and promote UK interests.

17.11 With regard to this specific Joint Communication, The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, we note that an Action Plan is to be developed before the end of the first quarter of 2015. We shall expect the Minister to provide information between now and then on what is being considered, and to deposit the final version for scrutiny.

17.12 We should also like the Minister to illustrate what the Council has in mind by "a more structured approach to cooperation between the CSDP missions and operations and Freedom/Security/Justice actors, notably the EU Agencies (EUROPOL, FRONTEX and CEPOL) and with INTERPOL".

17.13 More generally, we would like to feel more confident than we currently do that the Minister will live up to his professed commitment to "upstream" scrutiny of major CSDP developments, and work with us to make this an effective reality. At the beginning of this year, he and his MOD counterpart, writing about the December 2013 "Defence" European Council Conclusions, said:

"This was a good outcome for the UK, and demonstrates how we have shifted the parameters of the debate on EU defence cooperation onto the UK's agenda for an operational CSDP focused on cost-effective delivery as part of the Comprehensive Approach to conflict and its causes, that complements NATO. Implementation of the Conclusions will present positive opportunities for the UK to continue to shape CSDP in the right direction. However, we will of course need to pay close attention in certain areas going forward."

17.14 We noted at the time that, notwithstanding the Government's claims to the contrary, there were still many within the institutions that did not share the Government's vision — otherwise, we asked, why was the NATO secretary general only invited to the European Council discussion after UK lobbying, rather than as a matter of course?[60] Doubt over the general direction of travel was underlined soon afterwards, by the remarks of the President of the European Council at the Munich Security Conference (which neatly skate over the question we posed):

"We clearly prefer diplomatic solutions, but our countries are ready to use military force when necessary. When it comes to defence, we know we will need to do more with less. European countries have security responsibilities to fulfil — as President Gauck said yesterday for Germany — and they need the means. I got the 28 Heads of EU countries together last December, to affirm their will to do more together. The NATO Secretary-General joined us and expressed his firm support. Starting this year, Europeans will be launching new joint defence programmes, for cutting-edge drones, satellite communication, cyber defence and air-to-air refuelling. It is the start of a process. All these tools: at the service of Europe's interests and security."

17.15 Even now, we find the Minister fighting what appears to be a difficult battle over the EU Operations Centre,[62] against other Member States who continue to want it to evolve into a full-blown EU command and control facility (Operational Headquarters).[63] At the same time, the Council "reiterates the urgent need of enabling the EU and its Member States to assume increased responsibilities to act as a security provider, at the international level and in particular in the neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing their own security and their global strategic role by responding to these challenges together", leaving open to interpretation of what is meant by its "increased responsibilities" and a "security provider, at the international level and in particular in the neighbourhood". The Council Conclusions talk of an assessment of the critical military shortfalls resulting from the Headline Goal process and their impact on CSDP, but we have no idea what they are. Ditto the Delphic reference to "ongoing deliberations looking into the full potential of the use of Article 44 TEU".[64]

17.16 In the short term, we look forward to hearing more from the Minister, as outlined above. Beyond that, we hope that we have illustrated why, going forward, this process needs proper Parliamentary scrutiny and, as noted above, look to the Minister to facilitate it.

17.17 We are again drawing these developments to the attention of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees.

Full details of the document: Joint Communication: The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises: (35696), 17859/13, JOIN(13) 30.

Background

17.18 The Joint Communication sets out how the EU could take a more "Comprehensive Approach" in its external relations policies and actions. It, the High Representative's review of the European External Action Service and a Commission Communication: Towards A More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector were all prepared ahead of the December 2013 European Council, which was the first since 2007 to review that EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and defence activities.[65]

17.19 The EEAS Report was subsequently debated in European Committee on 13 January;[66] and the two Commission Communications were finally debated in European Committee on 12 March 2014 — the Government having rejected the Committee's recommendation that such an infrequent and important process warranted debate on the floor of the House.[67]

17.20 Last December, the Minister for Europe had broadly welcomed the "Comprehensive Approach" Communication, but said there was insufficient detail on how the proposed actions would be taken forward or their implementation monitored. The Committee asked him to write following the 12 May Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions outlining how his concerns had been satisfied. He then said that Council Conclusions:

— set out an agreed definition of the concept and provide clear direction to the Commission and EEAS to take more concerted action in priority areas for implementation, "heavily based on UK language";

— fully addressed the Government's previous concerns with the December 2013 Joint Communication and did not formally endorse the document;

— in particular, tasked the EEAS and European Commission to draw up an implementation plan setting out concrete and priority actions through clearly defined focal points, by the end of the first quarter of 2015;

— called on the EU institutions to address their working practices to improve coordination; and

— contained no references to consular protection and security expertise in EU Delegations.[68]

17.21 These, and some other detailed points, were described as "an important and successful outcome for the UK which should improve the way EU contributes to conflict prevention, crisis and stabilisation", with regard to which the Government would "continue to press the EU institutions to fulfil their commitments".[69]

17.22 The Minister also provided "a brief update on wider progress on implementing" the December 2013 European Council on Defence.[70]

17.23 The Minister's letter of 28 August embodied a further update, based on a limité progress report from HR/VP Ashton on implementation of the December 2013 European Council Conclusions on defence, which he says was noted at the 22 July FAC. He described it as "a useful and broadly factual update of the progress on the numerous taskings (sic) from the December Council".

17.24 The Minister noted in particular that the Government:

— was encouraged by the Commission and European Defence Agency (EDA's) efforts to date to work with Member States on December Council implementation, particularly consultation on capabilities and the defence industry;

— was working to ensure that December Council taskings with direct relevance to NATO have been developed in such a way as to reduce unnecessary duplication and enhance complementarity;

— was continuing to work towards operationalising the Comprehensive Approach, including concluding the review of CSDP financing and the separate Athena mechanism review;

— would be involved "only where we see added value work" on continuing work on defence capabilities, including on member state led collaborative projects such as Air-to-Air Refuelling, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and Governmental SatCom;

— would work to ensure that the development of the Cyber Defence Policy Framework to ensure that is focused on protecting information/networks which support CSDP, or raising awareness of cyber amongst member states and encouraging cooperation with international partners, particularly NATO;

— would ensure that Member States retain control over development of the Policy Framework for Defence Cooperation and ensure that its development is in full coherence with NATO planning processes;

— would remain fully engaged to develop the actions within the Commission's Roadmap for Implementation on the defence industry; aiming "to support areas we like (for example, support to SMEs, increasing access to Commission funding for R&D) and to resist the areas we consider represent the greatest risk";[71] and

— during these negotiations would "work to negate risks and challenge areas which might limit our ability to procure the best capability for our armed forces, undermine the transatlantic relationship or interfere with matters of national sovereignty".

17.25 Looking ahead, the Minister noted that:

— EU Defence Ministers would meet informally on 9 September to discuss CSDP and December Council progress and at the FAC (Defence) and EDA Steering Board on 18 November; and

— the Government and EU partners were beginning to consider planning for the June 2015 European Council which would "assess concrete progress on all issues…and provide further guidance, on the basis of a report from the Council drawing on inputs from the Commission, the High Representative and the European Defence Agency".

17.26 The Minister concluded by undertaking to "keep the Committee informed".[72]

17.27 We noted that the Minister had provided this progress report "in confidence",[73] which meant that, from a scrutiny perspective, we were dependent entirely on what he chose to include in his letter — an approach that might be understandable were this report to contain something controversial, or still to be in the process of negotiation.

17.28 However, the report was precisely as the Minister described it: "a useful and broadly factual update" that was "not open for negotiation". That being so, we could see no good reason why it should not be in the public domain — especially as it was no doubt circulating freely among those in "the Brussels beltway" and in academia who were interested in these matters.[74] We accordingly asked the Minister to explain why this report needed to remain limité, and why it should not be put officially into the public domain forthwith.

17.29 We also noted that the Minister was aware (from earlier exchanges with the Committee on this particular Joint Communication) of the Committee's interest in scrutinising a number of documents related to the December Council Conclusions — the EU MSS (EU Maritime Security Strategy); the Defence Implementation Road Map; the proposed new EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework; and new EDA projects and work on developing what was originally described as a new "Policy Framework for systematic and long term cooperation on capabilities", which was presumably the "Policy Framework for Defence Cooperation" to which he now referred. The Minister had undertaken to "submit these in line with the usual procedures or provide as much information as possible once those documents have been finalised", and promised a more substantial update and clearer timetable going forward, following this progress report from HR/VP Ashton at the July Foreign Affairs Council.[75]

Previous Committee Reports

Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 33 (15 October 2014), Fifth Report HC 219-v (2014-15), chapter 13 (2 July 2014) and Twenty-ninth Report HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 9 (8 January 2014); also see (36180) 11358/14: Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014-15), chapter 19 (3 September 2014) and (35857) 7537/14: Second Report HC 219-ii (2014-15), chapter 4 (11 June 2014).

51 For the European "Defence" Council Conclusions, see pp.1-11 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf. Back

52 See Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 33 (15 October 2014). Back

53 See (35857), 7537/14: Second Report HC 219-ii (2014-15), chapter 4 (11 June 2014). Back

54 See (36180), 11358/14: Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014-15), chapter 19 (3 September 2014). Back

55 See Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 33 (15 October 2014). Back

56 See (36464), -: Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 12 (5 November 2014). Back

57 See (36180), 11358/14: Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 1 (5 November 2014). Back

58 See (35857), 7537/14 at chapter 18 of this Report. Back

59 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145824.pdf. Back

60 See Twenty-ninth Report HC 83-xxvi (2013-14), chapter 9 (8 January 2014). Back

61 See more at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140883.pdf. Back

62 Agreed at the December 2004 European Council: located within the EUMS structure in Brussels, designed to establish a further option for the planning and conduct of small-scale EU military, "civ/mil" or civilian operations; not a standing, fully manned headquarters, but basically a room full of computers and the other paraphernalia used in such operations and capable of being augmented by staff for a particular operation. The staff of 16 is provided voluntarily by Member States at their own cost. Back