7 EU Action to support Afghan civilian
policing and Rule of Law post-2014
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny (decision reported on 5 November 2014); further information provided; drawn to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee
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| Document details | Commission Staff Working Document on EU support in strengthening civilian policing and Rule of Law post-2014
|
| Legal base | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | (35190), 11109/13, SWD(13) 220
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
7.1 EUPOL Afghanistan was established on 30 May 2007.
Its job is to:
— assist the Government of Afghanistan
in implementing coherently its own strategy towards sustainable
and effective civilian policing arrangements;
— work towards a joint international community
police reform strategy by enhancing cooperation with key partners
in police reform and training, including the US, the NATO-led
mission ISAF and other contributors; and
— support linkages between the police and
the wider rule of law.
7.2 In the first period, it suffered from poor leadership:
but it was always backed by Member States as being an essential
complement to the recruit-level training being led by the US.
7.3 The most recent Council Decision (which the Committee
cleared on 21 May 2013) extended EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate and
set a new €108 million budget covering the period from 1
June 2013 until 31 December 2014.
7.4 With the wider withdrawal of ISAF forces in 2014
in mind, Member States commissioned a European External Action
Service (EEAS) strategic review (SR). We hoped that, finally,
it would provide some evidence of effectiveness, rather than activity
analysis — especially as, by the end of 2014, the mission
would have cost over €220 million. Analysis of another similar,
lengthy and costly mission, EULEX Kosovo, had found that it had
been effective only in a limited part of its mandate: the message
was clear — notwithstanding the political considerations
that tended towards the quickest possible establishment of each
new mission, they needed to be: given clear, measurable objectives
and a time limit; benchmarked; rigorously assessed along the way;
and wound up if those objectives were, for whatever reason, not
being met effectively and the mission was not providing value
for money.
7.5 Thanks in no small measure to the stamina and
persistence of UK Ministers and officials, EUPOL Afghanistan had
finally been brought to the point where, at least in theory, it
was to be subjected to at least some of these key elements. If
not now, then certainly by mid-2014, we needed to see detailed
evidence of its effectiveness, so that the lessons could be identified
and then applied to other such CSDP missions in similarly challenging
circumstances (see our most recent Report for full details).[32]
7.6 In our most recent Report, with the prospective
extension of EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate until the end of 2016
in mind, we posed a number of questions concerning the outcome
of the SR; what sustainable outcomes the SR and the CIVCOM[33]
concluded the mission had achieved thus far; what sort of budget
was in mind for the next two years; what clear, measurable and
deliverable objectives and timelines would be set down; and whether
and how the next mandate would be benchmarked and assessed along
the way. And, with the overall EU Strategy on Afghanistan 2014-16
in mind, how the next EUPOL mandate would relate to other relevant
work, bilateral or multi-lateral, in the area of "good governance"
and human rights.
7.7 We are grateful to the Minister for his speedy
response, which addresses our queries comprehensively (see paragraph
7.17 below for details). They play into the Council Decision
on the final two years of this mission's mandate, which we consider
elsewhere in this Report.
7.8 We are drawing both these developments and
the chapter of our Report on that Council Decision to the attention
of the Foreign Affairs Committee.[34]
Full
details of the document:
Commission Staff Working Document: Comprehensive EU Action
to support Afghan efforts in strengthening civilian policing and
Rule of Law post-2014: (35190), 11109/13, SWD(13) 220.
Background
7.9 Discussion in January this year with the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) revealed that this Commission
Staff Working Document was likely to be replaced with the findings
and recommendations that emerged from the Strategic Review of
EUPOL Afghanistan. The Council would also be seeking to define
the EU's wider strategic engagement with Afghanistan post-2014.
In the meantime, little progress had been made in reaching agreement
with the Government of Afghanistan on the proposed Co-operation
Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) between the EU
and Afghanistan. The Committee therefore asked for a further
update later in the year, and retained this Commission Staff Working
Document under scrutiny.
7.10 In May, the Minister explained that, at the
20 January 2014 FAC discussion on Afghanistan, the Foreign Secretary
took the opportunity to remind the Council about the importance
of the EU continuing to engage in Afghanistan post 2014 and the
need to have clear priorities and realistic deliverables for any
future strategy. The Council invited the High Representative and
the Commission to present a proposal for a strategy by the end
of 2016, to encompass a comprehensive approach, the commitments
identified in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework,[35]
and the CAPD (as currently drafted). The Council agreed that the
strategy should be ready for endorsement later this year.
7.11 In relation to the CAPD, Afghanistan had recently
held elections and a political transition was now underway; any
final agreement on the CAPD would need to be finalised with a
new Government, hopefully towards the end of year; he would deposit
the draft Council Decisions to sign and conclude the CAPD for
parliamentary scrutiny in the normal way, when drafts became available.
7.12 With regard to the Strategic Review into EUPOL
Afghanistan, the Minister said that the draft was approved by
the PSC in March. It concluded that progress had been made by
Afghan authorities in those areas where EUPOL provides support,
but recognised that the Mission's six strategic objectives will
not have been fully achieved by the end of 2014; that it would
be premature to assess that there would be sufficient local Afghan
capacity to continue self-sustaining progress towards building
and maintaining a civilian police service at the end of 2014;
that the desired end state of the mission will not have been met;
and therefore that EUPOL Afghanistan should continue to support
Afghan authorities in the further development of effective civilian
policing and rule of law arrangements beyond 2014, in order to
ensure further progress and to safeguard progress already made.
Operational planning in all three operational pillars —
advancing institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior, professionalisation
of Afghan National Police and connecting the police to the justice
sector — should continue until the end of 2015. The Mission,
in its final year, should also focus on supporting institutional
reform of the Ministry of Interior and on professionalisation
of the ANP.
7.13 The Minister also said that further work on
transition was now underway, with a view to presenting to EU Member
States which activity was working and should be continued, which
could be transitioned and which should cease later in the year.
UK officials would continue to evaluate the impact of EUPOL to
ensure that the mandate remained flexible and appropriate for
the operating environment, whilst maintaining value for money;
they would also assess the spend of the budget allocated to the
mission when each six-monthly report on mission performance is
issued, as well as undertaking a more detailed examination specifically
on the budget at the 12 month point.
7.14 We held back on considering the Minister's May
letter, pending the outcome of the Afghan presidential elections
and further information on the wider EU strategy on Afghanistan
2014-16 (which we dealt with in a recent Report).[36]
7.15 In welcoming the outcome of those elections
and the formation of a Government of National Unity on 29 September,
the October 2014 Foreign Affairs Council also restated "its
commitment to the extension of the EU police mission in Afghanistan
(EUPOL) until the end of 2016". We were expecting a further
Council Decision and Explanatory Memorandum before the end of
the year.
7.16 But we first asked the Minister to clarify the
situation around the outcome of the SR, what sustainable outcomes
the mission had achieved thus far; what sort of budget was in
mind for the next two years; what clear, measurable and deliverable
objectives and timelines would be set down; whether and how the
next mandate would be benchmarked and assessed along the way;
and, with the overall EU Strategy on Afghanistan 2014-16 in mind,
how the next EUPOL mandate would relate to other relevant work,
bilateral or multi-lateral, in the area of "good governance"
and human rights.
7.17 In the meantime, there no longer being any point
in retaining the Commission Staff Working Document under scrutiny,
since it had been overtaken by events, we cleared it from scrutiny.[37]
The Minister's letter of 21 November 2014
7.18 The Minister responds as follows:
THE OUTCOME OF THE SR INTO EUPOL AFGHANISTAN
"The SR assessed that progress had been
made in all areas of EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate, but recognised
that the Mission's six strategic objectives would not be fully
achieved by the end of 2014. In addition, it was acknowledged
that Afghan capacity would not be sufficient to continue self-sustaining
progress towards a capable and functioning police service by December
2014 and assessed non-EU actors, such as NATO and the UN, would
not take on EUPOL Afghanistan activity. Member States agreed that
EUPOL Afghanistan should therefore extend its mandate to support
Afghan authorities in the further development of an effective
civilian police force. We assess that EUPOL provides an effective
means of delivering engagement on policing post-2014, augmenting
our own efforts to build sustainable rule of law institutions
that the Afghans can lead in the long term.
"Member States agreed that a two year mandate
extension was a sufficient period to support Afghan authorities
in areas where progress was lacking, allowing the mission to transition
activity to the Afghans in a timely and practicable manner.
"Based on the evidence presented in the
SR, Member States agreed that the mandate extension should continue
EUPOL Afghanistan's current structure of three broad lines of
activity (advancing institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior,
professionalisation of Afghan National Police (ANP) and connecting
the police to the justice sector), within which support could
be prioritised as necessary. Member States agreed on the continuation
of all three strands of activity for the first year, with the
third pillar (connecting the police to the justice sector) discontinued
at the end of 2015. In its final year the mission will continue
to support Ministry of Interior (MOI) reform and police professionalisation,
with all activity transitioned to the Afghans or other multilateral
actors by the mission end date of 31 December 2016.
"The focus of the new mandate will be narrowed
in terms of size and scope. Mentoring will take place only at
the highest strategic level, activity will be prioritised, and
the geographical layout of the mission reduced, resulting in reductions
in staffing and a reduced mission budget.
"The SR identified a number of sustainable
outcomes in most areas of mission activity. Under the first operational
pillar, advancing institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior,
the SR highlights the improved institutional capacity of the MoI,
largely due to the delivery of substantial leadership and management
training, including in the Police Staff College. Specific reference
is made to progress in professionalism, leadership and management
skills, as well as embedding of command and control mechanisms.
Improvements in the Ministries' capacity to draft operational
policies and strategies are acknowledged, as evidenced by the
development of a number of Afghan operational policies, such as
the ANP Code of Conduct and the 10 Year Vision for the ANP.
"Under the second operational pillar, professionalisation
of ANP, sustainable outcomes focus on the construction and development
of ANP training infrastructure and the Afghans increased capacity
to deliver training. The Police Staff College (PSC) and the Crime
Management College (CMC) were established by EUPOL Afghanistan,
with Afghan officers trained to take over the running of both
training facilities. The Colleges were successfully transferred
to Afghan ownership in February and March 2014. In addition, the
SR references the establishment of a number of EUPOL Afghanistan
trained and mentored Community Policing Units in Kabul and seven
provinces, demonstrating progress in the MOI's commitment to community
policing.
"Under the third operational pillar, connecting
the police to the justice sector, the SR outlines the increased
capacity of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Attorney General's
Office (AGO). MoJ and AGO are increasingly able to draft policies
and strategies, as demonstrated by the drafting of the five year
strategies for the MoJ and the AGO.
"The budget for the period 1 January 2015
to 31 December 2016 is still being negotiated in Brussels. Proposed
expenditure is €58,000,000. This would represent a reduction
of approximately 39% on the current budget covering the period
1 June 2013 to 31 December 2014. I will include a detailed analysis
of the budget in my forthcoming explanatory memorandum on the
mandate renewal, which I hope to issue within the next two weeks.
BENCHMARKING AND MEASURING PROGRESS
"EUPOL Afghanistan will apply a structured
process to report and inform on the mission's performance and
progress in implementing the mandate. The next mandate will be
benchmarked against the objectives, timeframes and measurable
indicators identified within the OPLAN. This contains a clear
outline of the phases and timescales for activities in the run-up
to the end of 2016, assessing progress of the three lines of operation
and the transition of the mission's activity.
"Benchmarking will help measure progress
and outcomes by comparing the situation (an initial baseline)
for a range of activities, against their evolution at given points
using pre-defined indicators and means of verification. Information
on progress will then be used to facilitate tactical, operational
and strategic policy adjustments, as required.
"The UK will continue to have the opportunity
to evaluate the impact of EUPOL through the six-monthly reports
issued by the Head of Mission which evaluate the mission against
its specific objectives. These six month reports are discussed
in Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management Committee and the Political
& Security Committee and provide all Member States with the
opportunity to critique the mission at regular intervals and inform
budget and mandate discussions, ensuring that the mission is delivering
value for money."
HOW EUPOL'S WORK IN THE AREAS OF "GOOD GOVERNANCE"
AND HUMAN RIGHTS WILL RELATE TO THE OVERALL EU STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN
2014-2016
"The EU is pursuing a comprehensive approach
in its support to Afghanistan, with the respective mandates of
the EU instruments aligned to achieve this overarching EU Strategy.
The extended mandate will deliver human rights and anti-corruption
activity through a combination of both mainstreaming and specific
measures. A dedicated human rights and gender advisory capacity
at the level of the Head of Mission will provide strategic advice
on mainstreaming gender throughout the mission's activities. In
addition, the mission will address anti-corruption, gender and
human rights in each of its three lines of operations, with work
at the operational and tactical level. It is intended that EUPOL
Afghanistan's niche activity in this area will be aligned and
will reinforce the overall EU approach as outlined in the EU Strategy
on Afghanistan 2014-2016; advancement of human rights, linking
the components of the justice sector, tackling human rights abuses
and strengthening freedom of expression."
7.19 The Minister concludes by noting that he will:
— shortly deposit the Council Decision
extending EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate and budget, and provide
further detail in the related Explanatory Memorandum; and
— write in due course to update the Committee
following the London Conference and the National Security Council's
consideration of the UK's specific post-2014 military commitment,
as requested in the Committee's latest report on the EU Strategy
in Afghanistan 2014-16.[38]
Previous Committee Reports
Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter
8 (5 November 2014), Thirtieth Report HC 83-xxvii (2013-14), chapter
4 (15 January 2014) and Seventeenth Report HC 83-xvi (2013-14),
chapter 9 (9 October 2013); also see (34908), —: Third Report
HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 26 (21 May 2013); and (34057), —:
Twentieth Report HC 86-xx (2012-13), chapter 19 (21 November 2012)
and Eighth Report HC 86-viii (2012-13), chapter 16 (11 July 2012).
32 Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 8
(5 November 2014). Back
33
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial
level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main
functions are keeping track of the international situation, and
helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response
to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic
direction. The PSC is chaired by a representative of the High
Representative. In parallel with the European Union Military Committee
(EUMC: the highest military body set up within the Council, which
provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military
matters within the EU), the PSC is advised by a Committee for
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee
provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion
to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. Back
34
See (36514) - at chapter 10 of this Report. Back
35
The 2011 Bonn Conference outlined a long-term partnership between
Afghanistan and the International Community to help Afghanistan
attain sustainable economic growth and development and fiscal
self-reliance from Transition through the Transformation Decade.
Afghanistan and the International Community accordingly established
the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (a.k.a. the 'Tokyo Framework'),
which underpinned their partnership for the Transformation Decade.The
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) agreed in May 2012,
establishes the mutual commitments of the Government of Afghanistan
and the international community to help Afghanistan achieve its
development and governance goals. Back
36
See Joint Communication Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan
2014-16: (35996), 9467/14 at Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii
(2014-15), chapter 8 (5 November 2014). Back
37
Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 8 (5 November
2014). Back
38
See (35996), 9467/14 at Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15),
chapter 5 (5 November 2014). Back
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