9 EU civilian CSDP mission in Ukraine:
launch and status of mission
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information provided and requested; relevant to the floor of the House debate already recommended on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement[40]
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| Document details | Council Decisions on the status of and authorising the launch of European Union civilian CSDP mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)
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| Legal base | Articles 37 TEU 218(5) and 218(6) TFEU; unanimity; Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department
Document numbers
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(36430), —; (36435), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
9.1 On 16 July the Committee cleared a draft Council
Decision to establish a civilian CSDP mission in Ukraine, for
an initial duration of two years and with a strategic review conducted
after 12 months. The Council Decision was adopted at the 22 July
Foreign Affairs Council, when the mission was named the "EU
Advisory Mission for civilian security sector reform" (EUAM
Ukraine).
9.2 The mission is expected to:
"mentor and advise relevant Ukrainian bodies
in the design and implementation of comprehensive and coherent
civilian security sector reform strategies, in a manner which
enhances legitimacy; increases public confidence; in full respect
for human rights and consistency with the constitutional reform
process."[41]
9.3 In October:
— two further Council Decisions authorised
the signing and conclusion of a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)
and the launch of EUAM Ukraine, together with a budget from 1
December 2014 to 30 November 2015 of €13,350,000; and
— the Council approved the Operation Plan
and decided that, following the recommendation of the Civilian
Operation Commander and the achievement of Initial Operational
Capability, the Mission should be launched on 1 December 2014
(see "Background" for more details).
9.4 When the Committee cleared these latter Council
Decisions on 29 October, it noted the continuing volatility in
eastern Ukraine and the political uncertainty revolving around
then-upcoming parliamentary elections; and asked the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) to update the Committee on the
political situation then pertaining by no later than 27 November
— particularly regarding the formation of a new government
and his assessment of the nature of the new parliament and the
capacity of the two institutions to work together — and
to confirm that it was the view of the Operational Commander at
that time that Initial Operational Capacity (IOC) had been reached
and that the Mission could and should be effectively deployed
on 1 December.
9.5 In his response, the Minister says that formation
of a coalition government is "well underway" following
the 26 October parliamentary elections and that he expects the
first session of the new parliament — which includes a majority
of pro-European and pro-reform parties — will be held on
27 November; as yet, there has been no public announcement on
ministerial positions, as this responsibility will lie with the
new Prime Minister; the new government must be formed within 30
days of the first parliamentary session, i.e. 27 December: "Given
this timetable, we will have a better sense of the interaction
between the new Ukrainian government and the Verkovna Rada in
the New Year". The Minister also confirms that he has been
advised by the Mission that, by 1 December, the IOC will have
been reached, and up to 55 Mission staff deployed. He also notes
that €129,000 has been shaved off the original estimated
budget (see paragraph 9.23 below for full details[42]).
9.6 On 29 October, we recommended that our previous
Report[43] be
"tagged" to the debate that we had already recommended,
on 15 October, on the floor of the House on the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement — a debate that, because of the very considerable
importance of the crisis, we urged the Government, for a second
time, to organise as soon as possible.[44]
9.7 The overall situation continues to show no
sign of improvement, as detailed in the extensive 14 November
Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions that we append to this chapter
of our Report (Annex 2). In those Council Conclusions, EUAM Ukraine
has but a walk-on part; not because it lacks importance, but because
it is overshadowed by the many other aspects of this crisis that
continue to preoccupy the Council — not the least being
its "calls in particular for a halt to the continuous violations
of the ceasefire, a withdrawal of all illegal and foreign forces,
mercenaries and military equipment, as well as for securing the
Ukrainian-Russian border with permanent monitoring by the OSCE".
The Council calls on the EEAS and the Commission to present a
proposal for decision by the end of November on additional listings
targeting separatists.
9.8 The Council also welcomes "the launch
of the provisional application of important parts of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement as of 1 November 2014" and recalls
that "a reinvigorated reform process, including the adequate
preparation for the future implementation of Title IV of the Agreement,
will be crucial in view of Ukraine's political association and
economic integration with the EU". The Council goes on to
call on the Government of Ukraine "to accelerate the implementation
of reforms" and "reiterates that the EU stands ready,
in coordination with other donors and international financial
institutions, to support implementation of the comprehensive reform
package as well as rebuilding of Ukraine's economy".
9.9 This process is (in the words of the Minister)
"clearly a politically important decision on which I would
have liked to have given you the opportunity to scrutinise".[45]
The place of this Agreement in arguably the most serious crisis
in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall is why we said, on
15 October, that it was "of very considerable importance
that this Council Decision is debated on the floor of the House
at the earliest opportunity". We find it highly regrettable
that, six weeks since our original recommendation, only now has
the Government responded — by writing, on the day this Report
was agreed, asking the Committee to rescind its recommendation
because, "[with] time on the Floor of the House being quite
limited", a Backbench Business debate on Ukraine timetabled
for 11 December would be adequate. We disagree.
9.10 Time on the Floor of the House is far from
being so limited that a debate could not have been arranged by
now, or before the Christmas recess. We accordingly maintain our
recommendation.
9.11 We consider that this chapter of our Report
is relevant to the debate we have recommended.
9.12 We also look forward to a further update
when the comprehensive assessment is undertaken at the time of
the strategic review, or earlier should there be (as he put it
in October) "any significant developments".
Full details of the documents:
(a) Council Decision concerning the signing and conclusion of
the Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine on the status
of the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector
Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine): (36430), —; (b) Council
Decision launching the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian
Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) and amending Decision
2014/486/CFSP: (36435), —.
Background
9.13 On 29 October, we considered two further Council
Decisions that authorised:
— the signing and conclusion of a Status
of Mission Agreement (SOMA) negotiated between the European Union,
under the authority of the High Representative, and the Government
of Ukraine on the status of EUAM Ukraine; and
— the launch of EUAM Ukraine, together
with a budget from 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015 of €13,350,000.
9.14 The SOMA is designed to set out a clear and
binding understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the
EU on the status of the mission and its personnel. The agreement
covers issues such as the security of personnel and the privileges
and immunities of personnel. The Minister considered that this
would ensure that EUAM Ukraine would be able to operate more effectively
by reducing practical obstacles to its activities in country.
9.15 Having authorised the mission in Council Decision
2014/486/CFSP of 22 July 2014, on 20 October 2014 the Council
approved the Operation Plan and decided that, following the recommendation
of the Civilian Operation Commander and the achievement of Initial
Operational Capability, the Mission should be launched on 1 December
2014.
9.16 The Minister said that EUAM Ukraine would:
— focus on two core themes during its two-year
mandate: Advice on Strategic Security Sector Reform (SSR); and
Coordination and Cooperation to further the EU's application of
the Comprehensive Approach;
— apply a structured process to report
and inform on the mission's performance and progress in implementing
the mandate, with a comprehensive assessment at the time of the
strategic review, would take place after the first year of the
mandate.
9.17 The Minister went on to describe the desired
end state of the mission as being when:
— a Ukraine-led strategic level civilian
SSR Vision and Strategy for its implementation had been agreed,
including a clear and agreed delineation of competencies and tasks;
— Ukrainian authorities had designed a
vetting process for its security sector;
— Ukrainian authorities had started implementing
the reforms according to an agreed Road Map and Implementation
plan drawn from the planning; and the mission acted with other
EU instruments in a comprehensive and targeted manner; delineations
of competence between EU and international partners were agreed.
9.18 As the mission neared completion, and following
a comprehensive assessment of progress, it would be in a position
to scale down activities. Timelines for that process would depend
on the ability of EU instruments, Member States and donors to
support the needs of the security sector at that time. The Minister
would ensure that the transition process was timely and managed
effectively.
9.19 On the wider political context, the Minister
said:
— Ukraine's future was important
to UK and EU interests: Ukraine's resource base, pre-eminently
in energy and agriculture, had the potential to contribute powerfully
to the development of a European region resilient to 21st century
threats to its stability, prosperity and competitiveness;
— the Government and the EU were committed
to upholding Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty following
Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and incursions and support
for the separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (regions)
of eastern Ukraine;
— the situation in eastern Ukraine remained
fragile; the ceasefire, agreed on 5 September as part of the Minsk
Protocol, was just about holding despite continued violations;
— a closer relationship with the EU was
the best way to encourage an independent and successful Ukraine;
— ratification by the Government of Ukraine
of the Association Agreement sent a strong signal of continued
commitment despite Russian pressure;
— parliamentary elections would take
place on 26 October 2014: an important milestone for Ukraine's
commitment to democracy;
— against this backdrop, "we must
ensure EUAM Ukraine is able to deliver its mandate effectively,
in support of the Government of Ukraine's implementation of a
comprehensive over-haul of the civilian security sector and rule
of law institutions".
Our assessment
9.20 We thanked the Minister for his and his officials'
endeavours to ensure the timely submission of these important
draft Council Decisions, and hoped that they would be able to
ensure that this was sustained across the board under the new
High Representative.
9.21 We considered these developments relevant to
the debate that we had already recommended on the floor of the
House on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and accordingly
recommended that this chapter of our Report be "tagged"
to that debate — a debate that, because of the very considerable
importance of the crisis, we again urged the Government to organise
as soon as possible.
9.22 As the Minister noted, the situation in eastern
Ukraine remained fragile: with over 1,400 Ukrainian soldiers already
dead or missing, not only was the ceasefire undergoing continued
violations; the Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts were boycotting the 26 October elections and endeavouring
to organise their own on 2 November, and some three million people
in these two eastern regions ravaged by conflict did not vote.
As the BBC's Kiev correspondent, David Stern, had put it on 27
October, as the preliminary election results emerged:
"Ukraine's parliamentary elections potentially
could completely transform the country's political landscape.
The question is, in what way.
"Already this is shaping up to be the most
pro-Western legislature in the country's post-independence history.
Former heavy hitters, like former President Viktor Yanukovych's
Party of Regions and the Communist Party, have been sidelined.
"But even if the majority of the parties
are pro-Western, it does not necessarily mean they're unified.
Ukraine's political culture is notoriously fractious. And the
issues facing the country, such as how to enact reform, battle
corruption or fight the war in the east, will provide fertile
ground for disagreement.
"Within the parties themselves there are
a number of question marks — especially among the numerous
war heroes and battalion commanders who populate the candidate
lists. Though their battlefield bravery is not in doubt, their
political views are not entirely clear. Where they stand on the
problems the country faces remains to be seen."[46]
9.23 We presumed that it was these uncertainties
that the Minister had in mind when he said that, as well as providing
the Committee with an update at that time when the comprehensive
assessment was undertaken at the time of the strategic review,
he might write earlier "should there be any significant developments".
9.24 In any event, we asked the Minister to write
to us no later than 27 November, in order to update the Committee
on the political situation then pertaining — particularly
regarding the formation of a new government and his assessment
of the nature of the new parliament and the capacity of the two
institutions to work together — and to confirm that it was
the view of the Operational Commander at that time that Initial
Operational Capacity had been reached and that the Mission could
and should be effectively deployed on 1 December.
9.25 In the meantime, we cleared the draft Council
Decisions.[47]
The Minister's letter 26 November 2014
9.26 The Minister responds as follows:
"THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN UKRAINE
"The formation of a coalition government
is well underway following the 26 October parliamentary elections.
On 14 November, President Poroshenko released the first draft
of a coalition agreement. This draft agreement covers a wide range
of reform measures, including: the establishment of the Anti-corruption
Bureau and implementation of anti-corruption legislation passed
before the elections; judicial reform, strengthening the
independence and removing political influence; decentralisation;
energy sector reform — decreasing energy dependence, phasing
out state subsidies on gas/heating, privatisation of coal-mines
and limiting state involvement across the board; electoral reform
— changing to a 100% open party list system; cancellation
of Ukraine's 'non-bloc' status regarding NATO. Since then,
the agreement has been expanded to include a key Maidan demand
of lifting immunity for MPs.
"I expect the first session of the new parliament
(Verkovna Rada) — which includes a majority of pro-European
and pro-reform parties — will be held on 27 November. As
yet, there has been no public announcement on ministerial positions,
as this responsibility will lie with the new Prime Minister.
By law, the new government must be formed within 30 days of the
first Verkovna Rada session, i.e. 27 December. Given this timetable,
we will have a better sense of the interaction between the new
Ukrainian government and the Verkovna Rada in the New Year.
"MISSION READINESS TO LAUNCH
"In its Report of 29 October, the Committee
also asked for the view of EUAM's Operational Commander with respect
to EUAM's Initial Operational Capacity (IOC) and readiness to
deploy on 1 December. My officials have contacted the Mission
on this question and have been advised that, by 1 December, the
IOC will have been reached, and up to 55 Mission staff
deployed.
"UPDATE ON MISSION BUDGET
"In my Explanatory Memorandum of 23 October,
I informed the Committee that a proposed budget of €13,350,000
for the period of 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015 was under
negotiation. I can now advise that the final budget will be €13,100,000.
My officials were successful in leading efforts to achieve a
lower budget, principally in the form of a reduction of €129,000
to proposed expenditure on software. A revised overview of the
final budget is contained within the table below.[48]
Figures for the current four-month budget are also included, for
ease of reference".
Previous Committee Reports
Sixteenth Report HC 219-xvi (2014-15), chapter 10
(29 October 2014); also see Twelfth Report HC 219-xii (2014-15),
chapter 13 (10 September 2014); Eighth Report HC 219-viii (2014-15),
chapter 14 (16 July 2014); Nineteenth Report HC 83-xviii (2013-14),
chapter 5 (23 October 2013).
40 See Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 4
(15 October 2014). Back
41
See Eighth Report HC 219-viii (2014-15), chapter 14 (16 July 2014). Back
42
Also see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145774.pdf.
Back
43
Sixteenth Report HC 219-xvi (2014-15), chapter 10 (29 October
2014). Back
44
See Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 4 (15 October
2014). Back
45
Ditto. Back
46
See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29772078. Back
47
See Sixteenth Report HC 219-xvi (2014-15), chapter 10 (29 October
2014). Back
48
See the Annex to this chapter of our Report. Back
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