10 Common Security and Defence Policy:
Policing in Afghanistan
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested; drawn to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee
|
| Document details | Council decision on the mandate extension of the CSDP Policing Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document numbers | (36514), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
10.1 EUPOL Afghanistan was established on 30 May
2007 with a three-year mandate; this was extended in 2010 for
another three years, until 31 May 2013. It was set up to:
— assist the Government of Afghanistan
in implementing coherently its strategy towards sustainable and
effective civilian policing arrangements, especially with regard
to the Afghan Uniform (Civilian) Police and the Afghan Anti-Crime
Police, as stipulated in the National Police Strategy;
— improve cohesion and coordination among
international actors;
— work on strategy development, while placing
an emphasis on work towards a joint overall strategy of the international
community in police reform and enhanced cooperation with key partners
in police reform and training, including with the NATO-led mission
ISAF and the NATO Training Mission and other contributors; and
— support linkages between the police and
the wider rule of law.
10.2 The draft Council Decision extends the mandate
of the CSDP Policing Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and sets out
plans for a new budget of €57,750,000 covering the period
from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.
10.3 As the "Background" section relates,
this mission has been consistently supported by the Government,
as being in line with its own priorities in Afghanistan and as
part of the international community's wider efforts in supporting
the Afghan Government. But over seven years of operation it has
had a chequered performance. In the first period, it suffered
from poor leadership: but it was always backed by Member States
as being an essential complement to the recruit-level training
of police officers being led by the US. Last year, with the wider
withdrawal of ISAF forces in 2014 in mind, Member States commissioned
an EEAS review.
10.4 Its mandate was last renewed on 1 June 2013,
with a further €108 million budget covering the period from
then until 31 December 2014. By the end of 2014, the mission
will have cost over €220 million. In November 2012, the
Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) told the Committee that
he had secured the key UK objectives of a continued focus on Afghan
National Police (ANP) senior leadership, a tighter and more focused
EUPOL presence in the provinces and a further review in the autumn
of 2013 to determine the shape of CSDP engagement after transition.
Effective benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation would become
ever more important, since only then would Member States be able
properly to determine whether EUPOL had achieved its objectives,
assess the impact of what was now five years of costly training
and answer his key question — could the Afghans continue
this training beyond 2014 with a much reduced international presence?
EUPOL needed to get better at measuring this. With 14 CSDP missions
globally, and the potential need for more, Missions needed to
provide Member States with more comprehensive evidence of their
effectiveness and to show that stretched EU resources were being
used to deliver maximum impact. The Committee agreed with all
this, reported it to the House and looked forward to hearing more
in due course.[50]
10.5 That story concludes in a separate chapter
of this Report, dealing with a subsequent EEAS Strategic Review
of EU support for policing post-2014 (SR), which provides the
backdrop to this Council Decision, and which should be read together
with this one.
10.6 With this Council Decision in prospect, the
Committee had asked the Minister a number of questions concerning
the outcome of the SR: what sustainable outcomes the SR and the
CIVCOM[51] concluded
the mission had achieved thus far; what sort of budget was in
mind for the next two years; what clear, measurable and deliverable
objectives and timelines would be set down; and whether and how
the next mandate would be benchmarked and assessed along the way.
And, with the overall EU Strategy on Afghanistan 2014-16 in mind,
how the next EUPOL mandate would relate to other relevant work,
bilateral or multi-lateral, in the area of "good governance"
and human rights.
10.7 The Minister's full response, which comprehensively
answers our queries, is set out in our separate Report.[52]
In brief, the Minister said that:
— the SR assessed that:
· progress had been made in all areas
of EUPOL Afghanistan's mandate, but recognised that the Mission's
six strategic objectives would not be fully achieved by the end
of 2014;
· Afghan capacity would not be sufficient
to continue self-sustaining progress towards a capable and functioning
police service by December 2014; and
· non-EU actors, such as NATO and the
UN, would not take on EUPOL Afghanistan activity; Member States
agreed that EUPOL Afghanistan should therefore extend its mandate
to support Afghan authorities in the further development of an
effective civilian police force;
— his own assessment was that EUPOL
provided an effective means of delivering engagement on policing
post-2014, augmenting the UK's own efforts to build sustainable
rule of law institutions that the Afghans can lead in the long
term;
— Member States agreed that a two year
mandate extension was a sufficient period to support Afghan authorities
in areas where progress was lacking, allowing the mission to transition
activity to the Afghans in a timely and practicable manner; and
— based on the evidence presented in
the SR, Member States agreed that the mandate extension should
continue EUPOL Afghanistan's current structure of three broad
lines of activity (advancing institutional reform in the Ministry
of Interior (MOI), professionalisation of Afghan National Police
(ANP) and connecting the police to the justice sector), within
which support could be prioritised as necessary. Member States
agreed on the continuation of all three strands of activity for
the first year, with the third pillar (connecting the police to
the justice sector) discontinued at the end of 2015. In its final
year the mission would continue to support MOI reform and police
professionalisation, with all activity transitioned to the Afghans
or other multilateral actors by the mission end date of 31 December
2016.
10.8 The Council Decision (which is described
in detail, along with Minister's view, below) is in line with
the outcome of the SR, as described by the Minister. There, he
noted that EUPOL Afghanistan will apply "a structured process
to report and inform on the mission's performance and progress
in implementing the mandate", which will be "benchmarked
against the objectives, timeframes and measurable indicators identified
within the OPLAN", and that this contains "a clear outline
of the phases and timescales for activities in the run-up to the
end of 2016, assessing progress of the three lines of operation
and the transition of the mission's activity". The "benchmarking"
process will help measure progress and outcomes by comparing the
situation (an initial baseline) for a range of activities, against
their evolution at given points using pre-defined indicators and
means of verification; information on progress will then be used
to facilitate tactical, operational and strategic policy adjustments,
as required; and six-monthly reports issued by the Head of Mission
which evaluate the mission against its specific objectives will
be discussed in CIVCOM and the PSC, and "provide all Member
States with the opportunity to critique the mission at regular
intervals and inform budget and mandate discussions, ensuring
that the mission is delivering value for money".
10.9 This is as it should be. But only time will
tell if it works. We would therefore like the Minister, after
the second of these six monthly reports, to write to us with:
details of its contents and the PSC/CIVCOM conclusions thereon;
of the prescription for the remainder of the mandate; and his
views on the outcomes thus far.
10.10 In the meantime, we now clear this Council
Decision.
10.11 We are also drawing these developments to
the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Full
details of the documents:
Council Decision extending Decision 2010/279/CFSP on the European
Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN): (36514),
—.
Background
10.12 The full history of the Committee's consideration
of developments since the mission was established in 2007 are
set out in our previous Reports.[53]
10.13 The Government has consistently expressed full
support for EUPOL Afghanistan: without it there would be no international
operation focused exclusively on providing civilian policing expertise;
it also brought in other Member States in support of a UK foreign
policy priority, and had an important role to play in the international
community's effort in supporting the Afghan Government to develop
its police force. However, while its performance had improved,
it was still not fulfilling its full potential. The then Minister
(Alistair Burt) was committed to supporting recent momentum so
that the mission could achieve its objectives before the end of
its current mandate in May 2013; but effective evaluation would
be a top priority, to ensure that the new budget represented good
value for money. The Committee commended the then Minister and
looked forward to hearing about this when the next budget was
presented.
10.14 The Council Decision that we considered on
11 July 2012 set EUPOL Afghanistan's budget for 1 August 2012-31
May 2013 at €56.91 million. As it covered only ten months,
it was effectively 11% higher than the 12 months budget up to
31 July 2012. The principal reason was the need for a greater
level of security and more close protection teams, in response
to recent attacks on international advisers, as well as a heightened
threat environment, and was consistent with the increased security
arrangements of others in the international community. The number
of EUPOL international staff was also now at its highest: 353,
up from 182 at the start of 2009. The Minister for Europe (Mr
David Lidington) stressed that, without it, there would be no
international mission focused on providing civilian policing expertise
or the professionalization of the senior police leadership; he
also noted that the UK was a major contributor.
10.15 That other Member States were now putting more
of their shoulder to wheel was, we felt, welcome. However, the
principal reason for the budget increase — a greater level
of security and more close protection teams, in response to recent
attacks on international advisers, as well as a heightened threat
environment — was sobering, to say the least. What the
Minister had to say was essentially a brief statement of mission
activity, and in no way an evaluation of EUPOL's impact and value
for money over the previous 12 months. Given the cause of the
budget increase, effective evaluation of EUPOL's activity was
all the more important — as, therefore, was the strategic
review to which the Minister drew attention. We therefore asked
the Minister to deposit it once he had received and studied it,
with his views on its findings and on its implications for the
right way forward, and explaining where matters stood on evaluating
its impact and value for money.[54]
10.16 The Minister's response is set out in detail
in our 21 November 2012 Report. In brief, he said that he had
achieved the key UK objectives of a continued focus on Afghan
National Police senior leadership, a tighter and more focused
EUPOL presence in the provinces and a further review in 2014 to
determine the shape of CSDP engagement after transition. EUPOL's
role was vital in developing a more capable, legitimate, accountable
and sustainable Afghan National Police (ANP), and complementary
to the work of the US and other international police reform programmes,
which focussed on recruitment, equipping and providing basic training
for new police recruits. By 2014, EUPOL would be in Kabul and
three to four other locations, down from ten at present.
10.17 Looking ahead, the Minister said that a planning
document would now be drawn up, looking at the role of the Mission
until the end of 2014. Prompted by the UK, the new EUPOL Head
of Mission was preparing to establish a "pure benchmarking
system" for the mission: the Minister looked forward to updating
the Committee on this in due course. Other Member States, like
France, were also keen for evidence of EUPOL's impact. Effective
benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation would become ever more
important, since only then would Member States be able properly
to determine whether EUPOL had achieved its objectives, assess
the impact of what was now five years of costly training and answer
his key question — could the Afghans continue this training
beyond 2014 with a much reduced international presence? EUPOL
needed to get better at measuring this. With 14 CSDP missions
globally, and the potential need for more, Missions needed to
provide Member States with more comprehensive evidence of their
effectiveness and to show that stretched EU resources were being
used to deliver maximum impact.
10.18 We presumed that that the planning document
would pave the way to the next major review, determining the best
post-2014 option, and looked forward to hearing more from the
Minister when he submitted the next Council Decision for scrutiny.
10.19 In the meantime, we reported these developments
to the House because of the widespread interest in the situation
in Afghanistan; and for the same reason, also drew this chapter
of our Report to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee.[55]
The most recent Council Decision
10.20 This extended the EUPOL mandate and sets out
a new €108 million budget from 1 June 2013 until 31 December
2014. In submitting it for scrutiny on 8 May 2013, the Minister
described EUPOL as the only organisation "doing for the police
what the Officer Academy will do for the army: help the generational
shift in Afghanistan by training a cadre of professional and able
senior leaders". By 2014, the Minister said, the majority
of basic police training would have been completed: then, "the
principal gap will be on senior leadership, which is both EUPOL's
area of focus and the area the UK considers key to a sustainable
Afghanistan National Security Force". In the meantime, EUPOL
was "performing well in the delivery of key areas of police
training in which it added the most value — intelligence-led
policing, CID, and community policing — through projects
such as the Police Staff College, the City Police and Justice
Programme and the Crime Stoppers hotline". The Minister again
underlined EUPOL's unique role in developing a more capable, legitimate,
accountable and sustainable ANP and in complementing the US and
other international police reform programmes (such as NATO's Training
Mission Afghanistan, NTM-A). The operating environment over this
new mandate would see "a flux in security forces", and
it was therefore important that UK officials continued to scrutinise
the mission, and allow for Mission flexibility to adapt to any
change. A further review in the autumn of 2013 would determine
the shape of CSDP engagement after transition.
10.21 With regard to costs, the Minister said that
he was "mindful" of the Committee's interest (and that
of its House of Lords counterpart), as with other CSDP missions,
and therefore provided a detailed analysis (which is set out in
our 21 May 2013 Report).
Our assessment
10.22 We were happy to clear this Council Decision
on the basis of the information provided at this juncture, and
thanked the Minister for his detailed analysis of the budget.
However, we were also even more interested in effectiveness and
value for money.
10.23 There were to be two important milestones between
then and the end of 2014 — the first being the autumn 2013
review. We presumed that it would focus on the Minister's key
question of the previous November — would the Afghans be
able to continue this training beyond 2014 with a much reduced
international presence? We hoped that he would be able to deposit
this for scrutiny in the normal way; if, however, its sensitivity
prevented him from so doing, then we asked him to supply the sort
of full summary that he had provided last November.
10.24 The second was the detailed report that was
to be issued at the 12 month mark. We hoped that, finally, it
would provide some evidence of effectiveness, rather than activity
analysis; by the end of 2014, the mission would have cost over
€220 million.
10.25 We recalled the discussion that we had had
with the Minister about the audit by the Court of Auditors of
another similar, lengthy and costly mission, EULEX Kosovo, which
found that it had been effective only in a limited part of its
mandate. Our discussion revolved essentially around the wider
implications of this unprecedented audit, which we suggested should
be applied to all CSDP missions — notwithstanding the political
considerations that tended towards the quickest possible establishment
of each new mission, they needed to be: given clear, measurable
objectives and a time limit; be benchmarked; be rigorously assessed
along the way; and be wound up if those objectives were, for whatever
reason, not being met effectively and not providing value for
money. Thanks in no small measure to the stamina and persistence
of UK Ministers and officials, EUPOL Afghanistan had finally been
brought to the point where, at least in theory, it was to be subjected
to at least some of these key elements. If not now, then certainly
by mid-2014, we needed to see detailed evidence of its effectiveness,
so that the lessons could be identified and then applied to other
such CSDP missions in similarly challenging circumstances.[56]
The draft Council Decision
10.26 The draft Council Decision extends the mandate
of the CSDP Policing Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and sets out
plans for a new budget of €57,750,000 covering the period
from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.
The Government's view
10.27 The Minister comments as follows:
"EUPOL AFGHANISTAN: Development of
the Afghan National Police (ANP) is essential to long term Afghan-owned
stability and security post 2014. EUPOL Afghanistan provides
an effective means of delivering engagement on policing, augmenting
our own efforts to build sustainable rule of law institutions
that the Afghans can lead in the long term.
"It is the only organisation focused
on providing civilian policing expertise, focused on the development
of a sustainable and effective civilian police force, closely
coordinated with the Afghan justice system.
"The Strategic Review of EUPOL Afghanistan
assessed that progress had been made across all three lines of
operation in the current mandate, including reform of the Ministry
of Interior (MoI), professionalisation of the ANP and the development
of links between the police and justice sector. However, it was
assessed that Afghan capacity would not be sufficient to continue
self-sustaining progress towards a capable and functioning police
service by December 2014, and that further support would be required
from EUPOL Afghanistan to prevent regression.
"PROPOSED NEW MANDATE: It is proposed
that EUPOL Afghanistan's current mandate be extended by two years
until December 2016 to continue providing support to Afghan authorities
in priority areas where progress was lacking. It would also allow
full transition of authority to Afghan ownership to occur as smoothly
as possible, whilst ensuring that the gains made to date are fully
embedded and sustainable.
"Following the Strategic Review,
the extended EUPOL Afghanistan will be a smaller and more focused
mission: mentoring will take place only at the highest strategic
level, activity will be prioritised, and the geographical layout
of the mission reduced, resulting in reductions in staffing and
a reduced mission budget.
"EUPOL Afghanistan will continue
EUPOL Afghanistan's three current lines of operation (institutional
reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), professionalisation
of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and developing justice-police
linkages) for the first year. At the end of 2015, EUPOL Afghanistan's
justice work will be discontinued, with the following 12 months
focused on the delivery of objectives under the two remaining
lines of operation. All activity will be transitioned to the Afghans
or other multilateral actors by the mission end date of 31 December
2016."
10.28 With regard to the Budget, the Minister
notes that the budget is a reduction of 39% on the previous budget,
which had covered the period 1 June 2013 to 31 December 2014.
He also provides a detailed overview (see the Annex to this chapter
of our Report), which he says is currently being negotiated in
Brussels; should the final budget differ from the figures in his
overview, he undertakes to update the Committee accordingly.
10.29 Finally, on evaluation, the Minister
says:
"UK officials will continue to evaluate
closely the impact of EUPOL throughout the course of the mandate,
which should remain flexible and appropriate for its operating
environment, whilst maintaining value for money.
50 See (34908), -: Third Report HC 83-iii (2013-14),
chapter 26 (21 May 2013). Back
51
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial
level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main
functions are keeping track of the international situation, and
helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response
to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic
direction. The PSC is chaired by a representative of the High
Representative. In parallel with the European Union Military Committee
(EUMC: the highest military body set up within the Council, which
provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military
matters within the EU), the PSC is advised by a Committee for
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee
provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion
to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. Back
52
See (35190), 11109/13 at chapter ?? of this Report. Back
53
See (34908) -: Third Report HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 26 (21
May 2013) and the earlier Reports referred to therein. Back
54
See (34057) -: HC 86-viii (2012-13), chapter 16 (11 July 2012). Back
55
See (34057) -: Twentieth Report HC 86-xx (2012-13), chapter 19
(21 November 2012). Back
56
See (34908) -: Third Report HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 26
(21 May 2013). Back
|
