13 Integrated Border Management Assistance
Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny (decision reported on 14 May 2014); further information requested
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| Document details | Council Decision setting budget for second year of two-year mandate
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document number | (35995), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
13.1 EUBAM Libya (the European Union Integrated Border Management
Assistance Mission in Libya) was established in May 2013, with
a two-year mandate and a budget that (after this May's further
Council Decision) amounts to €56.5 million. The aim is to
support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing
the security of their borders in the short term and a broader
Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy in the longer term.
13.2 As recalled below, the Committee had pressed
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) for news of the first
EEAS Review, to which he referred when submitting this Council
Decision for scrutiny in mid-May, but about which he was then
able to say nothing. At that time, the Committee observed that,
in view of the security situation and the collapse of effective
national governance, and thus the limited prospect of any sustainability
for the mission, the question must arise as to whether the EU
should cut its losses unless there was a dramatic change over
the next 12 months. The Minister subsequently reported that the
EEAS review recommendation was that the mission be extended beyond
next May for a further two years.
13.3 The Minister then reported that, given the deterioration
in the security situation and the collapse of effective national
governance, it was decided in August to withdraw staff from Libya:
a core team of 17-20 staff would work from Tunis, pending a second
Strategic Review. This second review should, he said, assess all
possible options, including closure. In the meantime, the core
team would carry out very limited operational activities. These
steps would reduce the immediate cost of the Mission, initiate
the formal Strategic Review process without any further delay
and ensure that, should the security situation in Libya improve
in the short to medium term, EUBAM was sufficiently staffed and
operationally ready to return quickly. Border Security remained
"a critical issue for Libyan and regional security engagement
— and we should aim to continue to work on it where possible".
13.4 The Minister also noted that, up until
their evacuation, EUBAM had made progress in a several areas including
work on a cross-agency Border Management Working Group, a strategy
for Libyan customs, training Libyan border and search/rescue officials,
the design for an integrated borders control network and on the
regional aspect of its mandate. Such work, the Minister said,
was "all the more urgent given the wider concerns about IS
and extremism in the surrounding region and Sahel". However,
little progress had been able to be made on the southern borders,
including the proposal to provide alternative income opportunities
for communities that had relied on smuggling, given the deterioration
in the security situation.
13.5 With regard to the handling of the EEAS Review
, the Minister said that his officials would ensure that there
was a thorough consideration of all the options, including cooperation
with regional partners (including, unusually, a meeting in London
with the team preparing the Review) and that he had instructed
them to obtain an early sight of the strategic review; this would
"consider the longer term future of the mission along with
a robust FCO analysis; he would "of course write again in
due course with the findings of this review".
13.6 When we reported this to the House, we noted
that the situation in Libya remained dire — the governments
of France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
having strongly condemned the ongoing violence, calling for an
immediate cessation of hostilities, condemning the crimes of Ansar
al-Sharia[26] entities,
and the ongoing violence in communities across Libya, including
Tripoli and its environs; noting that Libya's security challenges
and the fight against terrorist organizations could only be sustainably
addressed by regular armed forces under the control of a central
authority accountable to a democratic and inclusive parliament;
and strongly encouraging all partners to refrain from actions
that might exacerbate current divisions in order to let Libyans
address the current crisis within the framework of UN-facilitated
talks.[27]
13.7 Though of course hoping that the situation would
improve, we found it hard to see it doing so dramatically before
the year's end; it was thus more than ever appropriate that all
options for the mission, including closure, were on the table,
especially given the EU's experience with EUBAM Rafah (a similar
EU mission on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, which
was likewise down-sized and has been on "standby" since
2007 because of the security situation). We asked the Minister
to update the Committee no later than Thursday 11 December.[28]
13.8 The Minister now reports he expects a review
document "to be released" in December and "to be
formally considered in January", with "a final decision
on the future of the mission being taken in February". He
says that the Review will:
"set out conditions for the potential return
of the mission as well as presenting the pros and cons of options
for the future of the mission, including: maintaining the mission
as it currently is; putting the mission into "sleeper mode"
with the capacity to re-start operations quickly when the situation
in Libya becomes more permissive; closing the mission; and re-location
of the mission to either Tunisia or Egypt, with more of a containment
focus working with their national authorities. I will write with
more details on the future of this mission once this document
has been discussed."
13.9 Given the systemic reluctance to contemplate
closing a mission completely because of subsequent unfavourable
developments on the one hand, and the experience with EUBAM Rafah
referred to above on the other (presumably what the Minister means
by "sleeper mode"), the outcome of this Review will
have considerable importance, not only with respect to this mission
but also more widely. Given the Minister's oft-professed commitment
to enhanced scrutiny of CFSP, it is important that we have an
opportunity to consider the likely findings. So, given the Minister's
projected timetable, we expect to hear further from him in January,
and well before any final decision is taken. At that time, we
should like to know when he expects the review document to be
placed in the public domain.
13.10 In the meantime, we are drawing this further
information to the attention of the House because of the level
of interest in the situation in Libya and the efforts of the EU
and the wider international community to help to restore order
and good governance.
Full
details of the document:
Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP
on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance
Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya): (35995), —.
Background
13.11 Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of May 2013
established this civilian CSDP Mission, the European Union Integrated
Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). The
mission's mandate is for 24 months. It would consist of up to
165 people (at full operational capability). The aim is to support
the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security
of their borders in the short term and a broader Integrated Border
Management (IBM) strategy in the longer term. The mission would:
support Libyan authorities, through training and mentoring, in
strengthening the border services in accordance with international
standards and best practices; advise the Libyan authorities on
the development of a Libyan national IBM strategy; and support
the Libyan authorities in strengthening their institutional operational
capabilities.
13.12 The budget for the first year of the mission
was €30,300,000. This Council Decision set out a budget of
€26,200,000 covering the period 22 May 2014 to 21 May 2015,
i.e., the second year of EUBAM Libya's two-year mandate.
13.13 When we considered the draft Council Decision
on 14 May 2014, we noted that the latest Commons Library Standard
Note on Libya of 11 April 2014 said that, since the end of the
2011 civil war, Libya had been awash with militia and state sponsored
armed groups who, having originally helped overthrow Muammar Gaddafi,
were now reluctant to disarm and were intent on grabbing a share
of power and the country's immense oil wealth; and who, in the
face of a weak and disparate government, had taken the place of
an effective army and police force, and also dispensed aid and
humanitarian assistance to a beleaguered population.[29]
13.14 This wider background underlined the importance
of an EEAS Strategic Review of the Mission, about which the Minister
said he was unable to provide any information because, despite
pressing it to do so, the EEAS had yet to release it.
13.15 We concluded that, given that the mission was
already to cost over €50 million, with little prospect of
any sustainability, the question must arise as to whether the
EU should cut its losses unless there was a dramatic change over
the next 12 months.[30]
13.16 On 28 August, the Minister reported that EUBAM
Libya had decided on 4 August to withdraw staff from Libya due
to the security situation: the core staff had temporarily relocated
to Tunis and a small number were temporarily co-located with the
European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels. This, he
said, was against a background in which fighting had escalated
over the past few months, particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi,
which had closed the main international airport in Tripoli and
led to the majority of the diplomatic community, including the
UK, closing their Embassies and withdrawing staff. The political
situation remained equally uncertain: after "relatively peaceful
elections" on 25 June, a new House of Representatives had
been sitting in Tobruk, due to the security situation in Tripoli:
but not all members had taken up their seats, and some members
of the expired General National Congress had convened sessions
in Tripoli, declaring it as the sole legislative authority.
13.17 In our response, we reminded the Minister of
the outstanding request in our previous Report.
13.18 The Minister then wrote on 3 October 2014 that
the Strategic Review came out at the end of May, and had recommended
that the mission be extended for two years, to continue the successful
work the mission had been doing on maritime borders and airport
security, while strengthening activities on the land borders:
however, discussions on this proposal were, he said "then
overtaken by events in Libya".
13.19 The Minister recalled the deterioration of
the political and security situation in Libya having forced EUBAM
to evacuate temporarily from Tripoli and said that, despite the
holding of UN sponsored peace talks on 29th September, EUBAM was
likely to be unable to return to Libya in the immediate future;
he had therefore agreed to support an EEAS proposal to downsize
EUBAM Libya as soon as possible from a full Mission to a core
team of 17-20 staff, working from Tunis, pending a second Strategic
Review; this "should assess all possible options, including
closure, for the future of the mission and is due to take place
before the end of the year".
The Minister's letter of 4 December 2014
13.20 The Minister writes thus:
"I am writing in response to your request
for an update by 11 December on plans for EUBAM Libya.
"As you know, the recently downsized EUBAM
Libya mission continues to operate from Tunisia with a core team
of 17 people but is limited in what it can achieve given the lack
of Libyan interlocutors, the security situation and the fact that
it is currently located out of country. The team have been preparing
workshops and training courses but have not been able to carry
out any training since the evacuation in August.
"As a result, the EEAS are in the process
of preparing a Strategic Review to recommend options for the future
of the mission. My officials have held meetings with the Strategic
Review Team to discuss this review. We expect a review document
to be released in December and to be formally considered in January,
with a final decision on the future of the mission being taken
in February.
"The Review will set out conditions for
the potential return of the mission as well as presenting the
pros and cons of options for the future of the mission, including:
maintaining the mission as it currently is; putting the mission
into "sleeper mode" with the capacity to re-start operations
quickly when the situation in Libya becomes more permissive; closing
the mission; and re-location of the mission to either Tunisia
or Egypt, with more of a containment focus working with their
national authorities. I will write with more details on the future
of this mission once this document has been discussed".
Previous Committee Reports
Fifteenth Report HC 219-xv (2014-15), chapter
10 (22 October 2014) and Fiftieth Report HC 83-xlv (2013-14),
chapter 14 (14 May 2014); also see (34875), —: Third
Report HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 25 (21May 2013) and
First Report HC 83-i (2013-14), chapter 10 (8 May 2013).
26 An Islamist militia group that advocates the implementation
of strict Sharia law across Libya: it came into being during the
Libyan Civil War; is led by its "Emir", Mohamed al-Zahawi;
has deliberately targeted both Libyan and American civilians;
and has been designated by the US Department of State as a terrorist organisation. Back
27
Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/10/233137.htm. Back
28
See Fifteenth Report HC 219-xv (2014-15), chapter 10 (22 October
2014). Back
29
See the Commons Library Standard Note on Libya of 11 April 2014. Back
30
See Fiftieth Report HC 83-xlv (2013-14), chapter 14 (14 May 2014).
For the full background to, and the Committee's consideration
of, the establishment of this mission, see (34875),-: Third Report
HC 83-iii (2013-14), chapter 25 (21May 2013) and First Report
HC 83-i (2013-14), chapter 10 (8 May 2013). Back
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