16 EU restrictive measures against the
Syrian regime
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny
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| Document details | Council decision on further amendments to EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime
|
| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity
Article 215 TFEU; QMV
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| Department
Document numbers
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(a) (36539), —; (b) (36538), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
16.1 At the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 October 2014, EU Foreign
Ministers agreed the designation of an additional 16 entities
and two individuals under the EU's restrictive measures against
Syria — 12 new members of the Syrian Government, individuals
and entities involved in the supply of oil to the Syrian Regime,
and individuals responsible for grave human rights abuses in Syria.
We cleared the consequential Council Decision and Council Regulation
on 5 November.[46]
16.2 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
now explains that:
— on
20 October 2014, EU Foreign Ministers also agreed to impose a
ban on the export of jet fuel and relevant additives to Syria
in view of the indiscriminate air attacks on the Syrian civilian
population by the Assad regime;
— on 24 November, the
RELEX working group[47]
discussed the legal acts that will implement this political commitment,
which seek to:
· prohibit
the sale, supply, transfer or export of jet fuel and additives
to any person, entity or body in Syria, or for use in Syria;
· prohibit
the provision of financing, insurance and reinsurance, and related
brokering services for the sale, supply transfer or export of
jet fuel and relevant additives;
· include
an exemption to allow the export of jet fuel to Syria when it
is for use by the UN, or bodies acting on its behalf, for humanitarian
purposes;
— in
addition, the "no claims" clause provided for in Regulation
(EU) No. 36/2012 was amended in accordance with the wording of
EU Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive
measures.
16.3 The Minister then notes that the Council Decision
and Council Regulation are scheduled for adoption on 11 December
and says:
"I apologise that due to the fast pace of
events and the impact of this on the ground in Syria, I am not
able to give the committees more time. Difficult negotiations
in Brussels (involving other Member States rather than the UK)
meant that the previous target dates for adoption were put back".
16.4 The Minister says that the Government is appalled
by the situation in Syria, adding that:
— "the
conflict has cost nearly 200,000 lives and left millions displaced
and in need. Assad's regime is carrying out war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The Assad regime conducts mass torture and execution,
systematic repression of the Syrian people, alliances with foreign
extremist militias, wilful withholding of humanitarian aid, and
uses starve and surrender tactics against besieged communities.
The Assad regime's barbaric tactics also include the indiscriminate
killing and maiming of civilians by dropping barrel bombs and
chemical weapons from military aircraft onto civilian areas;
— "Meanwhile, the extremist threat
grows greater for all of us. Assad does not have the will or capability
to combat the extremist threat effectively. He has failed to address
the legitimate grievances of the Syrian people, and purposefully
allowed the ISIL threat to develop and used it to counter the
moderate opposition. This has caused extremism to grow into a
problem endangering the entire region. In the search for a political
settlement and an end to extremism, Assad's policies are the root
cause of Syria's problems, not the solution. He has lost legitimacy
and is a driver of extremism, sectarianism, and disunity; the
very opposite of what Syria now needs;
— "We need to increase practical and
political pressure on the Syrian regime to reduce its ability
to kill its own people, and to make the regime more likely to
negotiate a peace settlement. A political solution will also reduce
ISIL's ability to operate with impunity in Syria. Sanctions
are one of the few tools we have to put pressure on the Syrian
regime;
— "The Syrian regime needs jet fuel
to continue its indiscriminate aerial bombardments of its own
people. The Syrian regime routinely drops bombs on civilians —
including women, children and schools — from the air, including
chlorine gas, thermobaric munitions and barrel bombs. The Syrian
regime imports jet fuel. Some of this jet fuel is imported from
the EU. Fuel going into Syria is imported almost exclusively by
the Syrian regime and its military. The regime controls all of
Syria's ports — certainly those capable of receiving petroleum
product deliveries;
— "Jet fuel is only necessary for
limited humanitarian purposes in Syria, for which an exemption
will be introduced. If civilian companies wish to fly into Syria
for passenger trips, they can ensure their aircraft carry enough
fuel to make a return trip. Crop-spraying aircraft will not be
affected as they use a different fuel type — AvGas. Jet
fuel is used only in jet aeroplane engines — it is not used
for cooking, heating, electricity generation or land transportation."
16.5 It is courteous of the Minister to apologise
as he does, but we are pleased to have the opportunity to scrutinise
these measures prior to adoption; which, for reasons that we accept
— the need to adopt them as soon as agreed, to mitigate
the significant risk of asset flight — is normally not the
case. In the final analysis, time alone will tell what effect
they have in resolving this crisis in line with UK and EU interests.
16.6 In the meantime, we now clear these documents.
Full
details of the documents:
(a) Council Implementing Decision implementing Council Decision
2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria: (36433),
—; (b) Council Implementing Regulation implementing Council
Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in
view of the situation in Syria: (36344), —.
Background
16.7 The range of EU restrictive measures against
the Assad regime and its supporters, as set out in Council Decision
2013/255/CFSP and as amended, is as follows:
— Prohibition
on the import of arms and related material from Syria. Export
restrictions on certain equipment, goods and technology that might
be used for internal repression or for the manufacture or maintenance
of such products. The measure includes a prohibition on related
financial assistance as well as insurance and reinsurance;
— Obligation for member states to inspect
vessels and aircraft if there are reasonable grounds to believe
they carry arms, related material or equipment which might be
used for internal repression. This applies in member states' seaports,
airports and in their territorial sea, in accordance with international
law. Items that may not be exported from the EU to Syria must
be seized;
— Import ban on crude oil and petroleum
products from Syria. The prohibition concerns import, purchase
and transport of such products as well as related finance and
insurance. The ban also includes a prohibition on related technical
and financial assistance. Under certain conditions and after consultation
with the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary
Forces, member states may authorise derogations from this prohibition;
— Ban on investment in the Syrian oil industry.
This covers loans and credits, acquisition or extension of participations
and the creation of joint ventures. Under certain conditions and
after consultation with the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition
and Revolutionary Forces, member states may authorise derogations
from this prohibition;
— Ban on investment in companies engaged
in the construction of new power plants for electricity production
in Syria;
— Prohibition to participate in the construction
of new power plants, including related technical or financial
assistance;
— Ban on exports to Syria of key equipment
and technology for the oil and gas industry. The ban also includes
a prohibition on related technical and financial assistance. Under
certain conditions and after consultation with the Syrian National
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces, member states
may authorise derogations from this prohibition;
— Ban on trade in goods belonging to Syria's
cultural heritage which have been illegally removed from Syria
with the objective of facilitating the safe return of those goods;
— The assets of the Syrian central bank
within the EU are frozen and it is prohibited to make funds or
economic resources available, but the provision allows for legitimate
trade to continue under strict conditions;
— Ban on trade in gold, precious metals
and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and the central bank;
— Ban on supplying banknotes and coinage
to the Syrian central bank;
— Member states must not give new grants
and concessional loans to the Syrian government;
— Asset freeze on 63 entities and 211 persons
responsible for or associated with the violent repression against
the civilian population in Syria or supporting or benefiting from
the regime. The release of certain frozen funds or economic resources
may be authorised exceptionally under certain conditions if they
are intended, inter alia, for humanitarian purposes; for evacuations
from Syria; or in order to make payments on behalf of the Syrian
Arab Republic to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) for activities related to the OPCW verification
mission and the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons;
— Travel ban on 211 persons responsible
for or associated with the violent repression against the civilian
population in Syria or supporting or benefiting from the regime;
— Export ban on equipment, technology or
software primarily intended for monitoring or interception of
the internet or telephone communications;
— No disbursements and payments in connection
with existing loan agreements between Syria and the European Investment
Bank, as well as the suspension of technical assistance contracts
relating to projects in Syria;
— Prohibition to trade Syrian public or
public-guaranteed bonds to or from the government of Syria or
its public bodies and Syrian financial institutions. No brokering
or issuing services for such bonds are allowed;
— Prohibition for Syrian financial institutions
to open new branches or subsidiaries in the EU or to establish
new joint ventures or new correspondent banking relationships
with EU banks;
— EU banks are prohibited from opening
offices or accounts in Syria. Under certain conditions and after
consultation with the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition
and Revolutionary Forces, member states may authorise derogations
from this prohibition;
— Member states are to restrain short and
medium term financial support for trade with Syria, including
export credits, guarantees and insurance; no more long-term support;
— No insurance or re-insurance to the Syrian
government, public bodies, corporations or agencies (except health
and travel insurance or compulsory third party insurance for Syrian
persons or entities in the EU);
— Cargo flights operated by Syrian carriers
and all flights operated by Syrian Arab Airlines may not have
access to EU airports; and
— Prohibition to export luxury goods to
Syria.[48]
16.8 Scrutiny by the Committee of the adoption of
and subsequent amendments to this Council Decision and Council
Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 is set out in our previous Reports.[49]
16.9 In the absence of any positive developments
since last summer, Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP was renewed
in May 2014, meaning that these measures were "rolled over"
for a further 12 months, until 1 June 2015; and some minor amendments
were made (the delisting of two persons and one entity: Asif Shawkat,
now deceased; and Soulieman Marouf and the Syrian International
Islamic Bank, who no longer met the designation criteria; the
statement of reasons of 14 individuals was updated to reflect
their present circumstances). A subsequent Council Implementing
Decision and Council Implementing Regulation put the "roll
over" into effect.
16.10 As part of the process of keeping the listings
under constant review, the 23 June Foreign Affairs Council agreed
to list an additional 12 Syrian Government Ministers, as well
as amend the statement of reasons to reflect that one of those
listed was by then a former Government Minister; all the new ones
were listed with the statement of reasons being: "as Government
Minister, shares responsibility for the regime's violent repression
against the civilian population".
16.11 Since the House was already well aware of the
lack of progress in the Syrian crisis and the nature of the existing
sanctions regime, the Committee concluded that this straightforward
"roll-over" did not warrant a substantive Report, and
cleared them from scrutiny accordingly.
16.12 The measures adopted by the 22 July 2014 Foreign
Affairs Council — the designation of an additional nine
entities and three individuals — were reported to the House
on 3 September.[50]
16.13 The essence of the Explanatory Memorandum of
3 December 2014 from the Minister for Europe is set out above.
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36433), — and (36434), —:
Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 11 (5
November 2014); (36246), —; and (36247), —: Ninth
Report HC 219-ix (2014-15) chapter 42 (3 September 2014);
(35713), —: Thirty-first Report HC 83-xxviii (2013-14),
chapter 16 (22 January 2014) and the earlier Reports referred
to therein.
46 See (36433), - and (36434), -: Eighteenth
Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 11 (5 November 2014). Back
47
The Foreign Relations (RELEX) Counsellors Working Party is responsible
for examining the overall horizontal aspects of the preparation
and implementation of Council Decisions, in particular regarding
the institutional, legal, logistical and financial dimension of
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Back
48
For full information, see the annex to the 20 October 2014 EU Fact Sheet
on the EU and Syria. Back
49
See text of Council Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 and links to subsequent
amendments. Back
50
See (36246), - and (36247), -: Ninth Report HC 219-ix (2014-15)
chapter 42 (3 September 2014). Back
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