11 Ukraine and Russia: EU restrictive
measures
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; relevant to the debate on the Floor of the House on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
|
| Document details | Council Decision and Regulation on further restrictive measures targeting separatists destabilising the situation in Ukraine
|
| Legal base | Article 29 TEU; unanimity and Article 215 TFEU; QMV
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document numbers | (a) (36546), —; (b) (36545) —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
11.1 On 28 November 2014 the EU Council agreed to
list a further 13 individuals and five entities under Ukraine
restrictive measures.
11.2 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
explains that the crisis in Ukraine is of continued concern to
the UK Government: the ceasefire agreed in Minsk (in September)
has been breached multiple times; it is vital that all parties
implement the ceasefire fully without delay and without further
loss of life; decisive measures need to be taken to de-escalate
tensions and engage constructively with the Government of Ukraine;
the illegal elections held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
on 2 November served only to destabilise further the situation
on the ground.
11.3 He notes that the 17 November Foreign Affairs
Council requested the European External Action Service (EEAS)
and European Commission to present a proposal for additional listings
targeting individuals and entities involved in the illegal elections
in Donetsk and Luhansk.
11.4 A full list of the individuals and entities
designated, including the reason for each designation, is set
out below (see paragraph 11.27 for full details).
11.5 As noted below, as long ago as 15 October
we recommended a debate on the floor of the House on the proposed
implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement —
an agreement that began the crisis and which Russia still rejects.[37]
Since then, we have urged the Government on no less than two further
occasions to arrange this debate, and "tagged" to that
debate the previous round of restrictive measures and the decision
to launch an ESDP civilian mission to Ukraine. The Government's
initial response was not forthcoming until 10 December.
11.6 For our part, we recalled that the process
of implementing the Association Agreement was (in the Minister's
own words, when he submitted it for scrutiny in mid-October, after
adoption) "clearly a politically important decision on which
I would have liked to have given you the opportunity to scrutinise".[38]
The place of this Agreement in arguably the most serious crisis
in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall was why, on 15 October,
we said that it was "of very considerable importance that
this Council Decision is debated on the floor of the House at
the earliest opportunity". We therefore found it highly regrettable
that the Government's response, six weeks after our original recommendation,
was to ask the Committee to rescind its recommendation because,
"[with] time on the Floor of the House being quite limited",
a Backbench Business debate on Ukraine timetabled for 11 December
would be adequate. We disagreed.
11.7 Time on the Floor of the House was far from
being so limited that a debate could not have been arranged by
then, or before the Christmas recess. We accordingly maintained
our recommendation.[39]
11.8 The Minister's letter dated 15 December refers
to the Backbench Business debate,[40]
which "covered issues that will no doubt be of interest to
your Committee", and continues thus:
"As I have said on previous occasions, it
is my view that the structure and additional time given to debates
held in Committee, makes a debate in Committee the most appropriate
option for scrutinising these measures. I have asked my officials
to schedule a debate in Committee for the earliest possible opportunity".
11.9 That may be the Minister's view, but —
as we have also said on previous such occasions — it is
not the Committee's. As we have said before, we do not recommend
a debate on the floor of the House without serious consideration
and without good reason. The good reasons in this instance are
set out above. It is not for the Minister to contradict the Committee's
view and unilaterally determine the appropriate forum.
11.10 In the Minister's own words, the way in
which the Association Agreement is to be implemented is "clearly
a politically important decision." Whether or not the Backbench
Business debate covered "issues… of interest" to
the Committee, the politics underlying the implementation of the
Association Agreement, or of the EU's other crisis-related responses
— some of which have had serious economic consequences on
both sides of the dispute — have still not been properly
debated. The House is still not short of time for such a debate.
One should be held, on the floor of the House, as soon as the
House returns from the Christmas recess, on a Government motion
and in Government time.
11.11 This chapter of our Report should be "tagged"
to that debate.
11.12 In the meantime, we clear this Council Decision
and Council Implementing Regulation.
11.13 On this occasion and in the circumstances
described ("a necessary step in order to mitigate the significant
risk of asset flight"), we do not take issue with the Minister
having over-ridden scrutiny.
Full details of the documents:
Council Decision 2014/855/CFSP of 28 November 2014 amending Decision
2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions
undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of Ukraine: (36546)—; Council Implementing
Regulation (EU) No. 1270/2014 of 28 November 2014 implementing
Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in
respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine: (36545),
—.
Background
11.14 In view of the gravity of the situation in
the Ukraine, the Council adopted Council Decision 2014/658/CFSP,
Council Regulation 959/2014 and Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) 961/2014 on 8 September 2014, expanding the listing criteria
of the EU Ukraine sanctions regime to included "natural persons
conducting transactions with separatist groups in the Donbass
region of Ukraine", subjecting an additional 24 individuals
to "Tier Two" asset freeze and travel ban measures,
and extending the effect of these measures for a further six months
until 15 March 2015; these measures were published and took effect
on 12 September 2014, following a period of consideration by EU
Member States regarding the progress of a ceasefire agreement
in Eastern Ukraine.[41]
11.15 The Minister recalled that, with effect from
1 August 2014, the EU had already agreed a measure to prevent
five state owned Russian Banks and their subsidiaries from accessing
EU primary and secondary capital markets; had extended these measure
to three major entities in the oil sector, and three in the defence
sector; had extended the previous "Tier Three" measures
preventing the export, or financing of supply, of dual-use goods
for military use or to military end users in Russia, to a list
of non-military entities, with an exception for aeronautical products;
had tightened previous restrictions on the export of sensitive
technologies in the deep water, shale and Arctic oil sectors,
so as to ensure further that the EU played no inadvertent role
in facilitating the supply of goods which could contribute to
Russia's efforts to support separatists in the Ukraine and that
the long-term development of Russia's oil sector was further slowed
by the denial of vital technology from the EU and other countries
imposing similar measures. The expansion of financial measures
was designed to raise the cost of borrowing in Russia, for state
corporations, including those involved in the provision of arms
to actors in the conflict in Ukraine; and although the full practical
impact of these measures and listings could not yet be assessed,
as a whole they sent the message that the UK and the EU would
not accept the efforts of Russia to destabilise and undermine
the sovereignty of the Ukraine.[42]
11.16 Elsewhere in our 15 October Report, we recommended
a debate on the floor of the House on a related Council Decision
to suspend provisional application of the "Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area" elements of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
— which is where this crisis began, and which continues
to be centre stage in the EU's endeavours to help to solve it.[43]
11.17 In that context, we noted a 1 October 2014
letter from the then President of the European Council, José
Manuel Barroso, to President Putin, focussing on the Minsk Protocol
of 5 September and the ensuing Ukraine/Russia/EU memorandum of
19 September, and emphasizing:
— that the proposal to delay the provisional
application of the DCFTA was linked to continuation of the CIS-FTA
preferential regime;
— strong concerns about the recent adoption
of a decree by the Russian government proposing new trade barriers
between Russia and Ukraine, which he said called into question
the decision to delay the provisional application of the trade
related part of the Association Agreement;
— that the Association Agreement remained
a bilateral agreement and that, in line with international law,
any adaptations to it could only be made at the request of one
of the parties and with the agreement of the other;
— that these steps were part and parcel
of a comprehensive peace process in Ukraine, respecting the territorial
integrity of Ukraine as well as its right to decide on its destiny;
— that the European Commission remained
fully committed to contribute to a peaceful solution, and hoped
that the recent positive steps embodied in the 19 September document
would be fully implemented, including the monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian
state border and its verification by the OSCE, and the withdrawal
of all foreign armed formations and military equipment from the
Ukrainian territory; and
— the Commission's expectation that rapid
and decisive progress could be achieved in the trilateral gas
talks towards a mutually acceptable interim solution for the upcoming
winter period, on the basis of the compromise elements set out
by the European Commission.[44]
11.18 As those latest restrictive measures were due
to be reviewed at the end of October (presumably with upcoming
parliamentary elections being one factor to be taken into consideration),
we concluded that the House would benefit from a further examination
of these issues: hence we "tagged" this chapter of our
Report to the debate that we had already recommended, on the floor
of the House, on the Association Agreement.[45]
11.19 By that time, the Council had already decided
to establish an EU Advisory Mission for civilian security sector
reform (EUAM Ukraine), to:
"mentor and advise relevant Ukrainian bodies
in the design and implementation of comprehensive and coherent
civilian security sector reform strategies, in a manner which
enhances legitimacy; increases public confidence; in full respect
for human rights and consistency with the constitutional reform
process."[46]
11.20 On 29 October, the Committee cleared two further
Council Decisions authorising the signing and conclusion of a
Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and the launch of EUAM Ukraine.
When it did so, the Committee urged the Government, for a second
time, to organise the floor of the House debate on the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement as soon as possible because of the very
considerable importance of the crisis.
11.21 It also "tagged" that chapter of
its Report to that debate and asked the Minister for Europe to
provide an update no later than 27 November on the political situation
then pertaining, i.e., post the parliamentary elections; and to
confirm that it was the view of the Operational Commander at that
time that Initial Operational Capacity had been reached and that
the Mission could and should be effectively deployed on 1 December.[47]
11.22 By the time the Minister responded, the overall
situation continued to show no sign of improvement, as detailed
in the extensive 14 November Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions.[48]
In those Council Conclusions, EUAM Ukraine has but a walk-on part;
not because it lacks importance, but because it is overshadowed
by the many other aspects of this crisis that continue to preoccupy
the Council — not the least being its "calls in particular
for a halt to the continuous violations of the ceasefire, a withdrawal
of all illegal and foreign forces, mercenaries and military equipment,
as well as for securing the Ukrainian-Russian border with permanent
monitoring by the OSCE". The Council called on the EEAS and
the Commission to present a proposal for decision by the end of
November on additional listings targeting separatists.
11.23 The Council also welcomed "the launch
of the provisional application of important parts of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement as of 1 November 2014" and recalled
that "a reinvigorated reform process, including the adequate
preparation for the future implementation of Title IV of the Agreement,
will be crucial in view of Ukraine's political association and
economic integration with the EU". The Council went on to
call on the Government of Ukraine "to accelerate the implementation
of reforms" and "reiterates that the EU stands ready,
in coordination with other donors and international financial
institutions, to support implementation of the comprehensive reform
package as well as rebuilding of Ukraine's economy".
11.24 The process of implementing the Association
Agreement was (in the words of the Minister) "clearly a politically
important decision on which I would have liked to have given you
the opportunity to scrutinise".[49]
The place of this Agreement in arguably the most serious crisis
in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall was why, on 15 October,
we had deemed it "of very considerable importance that this
Council Decision is debated on the floor of the House at the earliest
opportunity". We found it highly regrettable that, six weeks
since our original recommendation, only now had the Government
responded — by writing, on the day our most recent relevant
Report was agreed, asking the Committee to rescind its recommendation
because, "[with] time on the Floor of the House being quite
limited", a Backbench Business debate on Ukraine timetabled
for 11 December would be adequate. We disagreed.
11.25 Time on the Floor of the House was far from
being so limited that a debate could not have been arranged by
then, or before the Christmas recess. We accordingly maintained
our recommendation.
11.26 We also "tagged" that chapter of
our Report to the debate we had recommended on 15 October on the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.[50]
The Council Decision and Council Implementing
Regulation
11.27 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 December
2014, the Minister recalls the tasking of the EEAS and the Commission
by the 17 November Foreign Affairs Council and provides details
of the individuals and entities designated, including the reason
for each designation, as follows:
"Serhiy KOZYAKOV — In
his capacity as 'Head of the Luhansk Central Election Commission'
he is responsible for organising the so called 'elections' of
2 November 2014 in the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'.
These 'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore
illegal. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in organising
the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions
and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Oleg AKIMOV —
Deputy of the 'Luhansk Economic Union' in the 'National Council'
of the 'Luhansk People's Republic'. Stood as a candidate in the
so called 'elections', of 2 November 2014 to the post of the 'Head'
of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. These 'elections'
are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking
on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally
as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively
supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further
destabilise Ukraine.
"Larisa AIRAPETYAN
— 'Health Minister' of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'.
Stood as a candidate in the so called 'elections' of 2 November
2014 to the post of the 'Head' of the so called 'Luhansk People's
Republic'. These 'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian law and
therefore illegal. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and
in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections',
she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which
undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Yuriy SIVOKONENKO
— Member of the 'Parliament' of the so called 'Donetsk People's
Republic' and works in the Union of veterans of the Donbass Berkut.
Stood as a candidate in the so called 'elections' of 2 November
2014 to the post of the Head of the so called 'Donetsk People's
Republic'. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and
therefore illegal. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and
in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections',
he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which
undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Aleksandr KOFMAN
— 'First deputy speaker' of the 'Parliament' of the so called
'Donetsk People's Republic'. Stood as a candidate in the so called
illegal 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of the Head
of the so called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. These elections
are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking
on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally
as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively
supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further
destabilise Ukraine.
"Ravil KHALIKOV —
'First Deputy Prime Minister' and previous 'Prosecutor- General'
of the so called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and
acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions
and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Dmitry SEMYONOV — 'Deputy
Prime Minster for Finances' of the so called 'Luhansk People's
Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore
actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further
destabilise Ukraine.
"Oleg BUGROV —
'Defense Minister' of the so called Luhansk People's Republic.
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively
supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further
destabilise Ukraine.
"Lesya LAPTEVA —
'Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Religion' of the
so-called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting
in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions
and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Yevgeniy Eduardovich MIKHAYLOV
— 'Head of the administration for governmental affairs'
of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and
acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions
and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Ihor Vladymyrovych KOSTENOK
— 'Minister of Education' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's
Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore
actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further
destabilise Ukraine.
"Yevgeniy Vyacheslavovich ORLOV
— Member of the 'National Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk's
People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity,
he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which
undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Vladyslav Nykolayevych DEYNEGO
'Deputy Head' of the 'People's Council' of the so-called 'Luhansk
People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity,
he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which
undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Entities
"Donetsk Republic
"Public 'organisation' that presented candidates in
the so called 'elections' of the so called 'Donetsk People's Republic'
on 2 November 2014. These 'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian
law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal
'elections' it has therefore actively supported actions and policies
which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Alexander
ZAKHARCHENKO and founded by Andriy PURGIN
"Peace to Luhansk —
Region 'organisation' that presented candidates in the so called
'elections' of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic' 2 November
2014. These 'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore
illegal. In participating formally in the illegal 'elections'
it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which
undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Igor
PLOTNITSKY.
"Free Donbass — Public
'organisation' that presented candidates in the so called 'elections'
of the so called 'Donetsk People's Republic' 2 November 2014.
These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.
In participating formally in the illegal 'elections' it has therefore
actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further
destabilise Ukraine.
"People's Union —
Public 'organisation' that presented candidates in the so called
'elections' of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic' 2 November
2014. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore
illegal. In participating formally in the illegal 'elections'
it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which
undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.
"Luhansk Economic Union
— 'Social organisation' that presented candidates in the
illegal so called 'elections' of the so called 'Luhansk People's
Republic' 2 November 2014. Nominated a candidate, Oleg AKIMOV,
to be 'Head' of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. These
'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.
In participating formally in the illegal 'elections' it has therefore
actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine."
The Minister's letter of 12 December 2014
11.28 In his accompanying letter, the Minister says
that these measures focus on individuals and entities involved
in the holding of "presidential and parliamentary elections"
in Donetsk and Luhansk, "which are illegal and illegitimate,
and the aim of which was to further destabilise Ukraine".
11.29 He continues as follows:
"The ceasefire agreed in Minsk has been
breached multiple times. It is vital that all parties implement
the ceasefire fully without delay and without further loss of
life, and that decisive measures are taken to de-escalate tensions
and engage constructively with the Government of Ukraine. The
illegal elections held in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine
on 2 November served only to destabilise further the situation
on the ground. The individuals and entities listed in the EU
Regulation and Council Decision were all designated because of
their close involvement in the conduct of the 2 November elections.
"In order to ensure that details of these
designations were not made public before they entered into force,
which creates a risk of asset flight, I agreed to the adoption
of the Council Decision and Regulation before your Committee had
an opportunity to scrutinise the documents. This was regrettable,
but a necessary step in order to mitigate the significant risk
of asset flight."
The Minister's letter of 15 December 2014
11.30 The Minister notes that the Committee's report
of 3 December confirmed that the Committee did not wish to rescind
its referral of the Council Decision on the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement for debate on the Floor of the House, and continues
as follows:
"However, I hope that you had the opportunity
to follow the Backbench Business debate on Ukraine and UK Relations
with Russia on 11 December 2014, which covered issues that will
no doubt be of interest to your Committee.
"As I have said on previous occasions, it is
my view that the structure and additional time given to debates
held in Committee, makes a debate in Committee the most appropriate
option for scrutinising these measures. I have asked my officials
to schedule a debate in Committee for the earliest possible opportunity."
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36430), —; (36435), —:
Twenty-fourth Report HC 219-xxiv (2014-15), chapter 9 (12 December
2014); Sixteenth Report HC 219-xvi (2014-15), chapter 10 (29 October
2014); (36348), — (36349), — (36350), — (36351),
— (36352), —: Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15),
chapter 35 (15 October 2014), (36262), — (36263), —
(36264), — (36265), —: Eleventh Report HC 219-xi
(2014-15), chapter 1 (3 September 2014); (36235), — (36236),
— (36240), — (36241), —: Ninth Report HC 219-ix
(2014-15), chapter 40 (3 September 2014); also see (36028), —
(36029), — (36030), —: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15),
chapter 28 (4 June 2014); (35905), — (35906), —:
Forty-seventh Report HC 83-xlii (2013-14), chapter 23 (30 April
2014), Forty-fifth Report HC 83-xl (2013-14), chapter 5 (2 April
2014); also see (35880), — (35881), —: Forty-fourth
Report HC 83-xxxix (2013-14), chapter 3 (26 March 2014), (35848),
— (35849), —: Fortieth Report HC 83-xxxvii (2013-14),
chapter 1 (12 March 2014).
37 See (36361), 13519/14: Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii
(2014-15), chapter 35 (15 October 2014). Back
38
As above. Back
39
See (36430), -; (36435), -: Twenty-fourth Report: HC 219-xxiv
(2014-15), chapter 9 (12 December 2014). Back
40
Hansard, cols. 1055-1087, 11 December 2014. Back
41
See (36348), -, (36349), -, (36350), -, (36351), -, (36352), -:
Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 35 (15 October
2014). Back
42
See the "Background" section of our 15 October Report
under reference for full details. For full information on EU-Ukraine
relations, also see the EEAS 12 September 2014 Fact Sheet. Back
43
See (36361), 13519/14: Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15),
chapter 4 (15 October 2014). Back
44
The full text of the letter. Back
45
See Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 35 (15 October
2014). Back
46
See Eighth Report HC 219-viii (2014-15), chapter 14 (16 July 2014). Back
47
See Sixteenth Report HC 219-xvi (2014-15), chapter 10 (29 October
2014). Back
48
Council conclusions on Ukraine. Back
49
See (36361), 13519/14: Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15),
chapter 4 (15 October 2014). Back
50
See (36430), -; (36435), -: Twenty-fourth Report HC 219-xxiv
(2014-15), chapter 9 (12 December 2014). Back
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