14 The EU's Special Representative (EUSR)
to Bosnia and Herzegovina
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision appointing a new European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
| Legal base | Articles 31 (2) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
| Department
Document number
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(36572), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
14.1 Council Decision 2011/426/CFSP appointed Peter Sørensen
as the EU's Special Representative (EUSR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) with a mandate until 30 June 2015.
14.2 Following the appointment of Mr S¾rensen
to another function, the Council proposes to appoint Mr Lars-Gunnar
Wigemark as the new EUSR in BiH from 1 March 2015. He would continue
with the same mandate, as set out in Council Decision 2011/426/CFSP
(see "Background" below for details).
14.3 The objective of the EUSR is to assist in the
creation of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic BiH, co-operating
peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track towards
EU membership. To this end, the EUSR offers advice and facilitation
in the local political progress, co-ordinates the activities of
EU actors in BiH and provides EU actors and EU Heads of Mission
with regular reporting on the local political situation. The EUSR
also undertakes significant outreach work, aimed at communicating
to the BiH population the benefits of EU integration and why certain
reforms are necessary to realise them.
14.4 The current political framework emerged from
the 1995 Dayton Agreement, which ended a bitter three-and-a half-year
war. Nineteen years later, a country of four million inhabitants
remains divided by mistrust between the various ethnic groups,
the upshot of which has been political stagnation, a lack of badly
needed reform and the consequential stagnation of the Bosnian
EU accession process. On 6 November 2014, the British and German
foreign ministers met their eight western Balkan counterparts
(at the sixth Aspen Institute conference on the Western Balkans
at the British Embassy in Berlin) and then proposed a new joint
initiative.
14.5 The two Foreign Ministers set out the key points
of their reform initiative in a joint article that was published
in the German daily newspaper "Frankfurter Rundschau"
and as an "open letter" in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
neighbouring countries (see the second Annex to this chapter of
our Report). Their proposals are focused on improvements in economic
and social policy and good governance, so as to create jobs, strengthen
the rule of law and reduce corruption and criminality. The two
foreign ministers called on the political leaders of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to commit in writing to "making the country's
institutions fit" at all levels as a precondition for working
effectively with the European Union; and urged them to draw up
a broad reform agenda with the European Union to help the country
make progress on the road towards EU membership. They said:
"We are extending an offer to the people
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the politicians they have elected:
if they implement the necessary reforms, we will work to achieve
progress on the country's path towards Europe."
14.6 They also promised actively to seek broad-based
political support for their initiative from neighbouring Croatia
and Serbia, EU partners and the USA. However, the most important
factor, they argue, is leadership on the part of Bosnian politicians,
who must have the interests of their whole country at heart, regardless
of ethnic affiliations.[39]
14.7 This initiative was followed up on 5 December
2014 by the EU High Representative/Vice-President, Federica Mogherini,
and the Enlargement Commissioner, Johannes Hahn. In a statement
at the end of their visit to Sarajevo, the HR said:
"From our side this would mean not lowering
the bar and changing the EU conditionality — that is not
something that is on the agenda — but it might mean that
we can look at how the sequence can be changed or can be better
addressed to make sure that there are some concrete deliverables
in terms of reforms, starting from the economic and social reforms
and getting also to the functionality of the state" (see
"Background" below for details).
14.8 The initiative was subsequently endorsed by
the 15 December 2014 Foreign Affairs Council, who invited HR Mogherini
and Commissioner Hahn:
"to continue engaging with the BiH leadership
to secure at the earliest its irrevocable commitment to undertake
reforms in the framework of the EU accession process… [in
order to]… establish functionality and efficiency at all
levels of government and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare
itself for future EU membership" (see second annex to this
chapter of our Report).
14.9 The appointment of Mr Wigemark — described
by the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) as "a senior
Swedish diplomat with close to 30 years of experience, most recently
as EU Head of Delegation to Pakistan", and endorsed by him
— thus comes at a crucial moment after nearly two decades
of endeavours by the International Community. It is accordingly
unfortunate that the EU lost a key interlocutor at this juncture
and now has to rely on a short-term appointment with no apparent
regional experience. The Minister says that he expects "swift
Commission action to fill the position on a longer term basis
next spring, assuming the mandate of the EUSR is renewed".
14.10 That assumption, and the fact that the previous
High Representative decided to leave the appointment until her
successor took office, reflects a much wider uncertainty over
the future of EUSRs as a whole. As the Minister will recall, Baroness
Ashton wished to incorporate all the EUSRs into the European External
Action Service (EEAS), thereby turning them from special representatives
agreed by the Council into ones who would be appointed by, and
report only to, the High Representative — a proposal that
the Committee has said it would find disturbing because it would
undermine Member State control of an important element in Common
Foreign and Security Policy.[40]
We would therefore like the Minister to provide, within ten working
days, an update on where this proposal now stands, in the aftermath
of HR Mogherini's appointment.
14.11 At the same time, we would like to know
the background to Mr S¾rensen's premature departure —
why he left, whether it had anything to do with this political
tussle over the future of EUSRs and what his new appointment is.
14.12 In the meantime, we clear this Council Decision
from scrutiny.
Full details of
the documents: Council
Decision appointing a new European Union Special Representative
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (36572), —.
Background
14.13 The internationally brokered Dayton Agreement
ended the 1992-1995 war in BiH. It established BiH as a state
comprising two Entities, each with a high degree of autonomy:
the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation (FBiH). It also designated
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to oversee the implementation
of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement on behalf of the
international community and coordinate the activities of the civilian
organisations operating in BiH.
14.14 The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) —
55 countries and international organisations that sponsor and
direct the peace implementation process — oversees all this.
The PIC Steering Board nominates the HR; the UN Security Council
(which approved the Dayton Agreement and the deployment of international
troops in BiH) then endorses the nomination. The Steering Board
also provides the HR with political guidance. The Steering Board
members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European
Union, the European Commission, and the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), which is represented by Turkey. In Sarajevo,
the HR chairs weekly meetings of the Ambassadors to BiH of the
Steering Board members. In addition, the Steering Board meets
at the level of political directors three times a year. From the
outset the HR was "double-hatted" as EUSR.
14.15 The longstanding goal has always been for BiH
to work its way towards European accession. But things have not
gone according to plan. The BiH authorities need to deliver five
objectives (well established, approved by the PIC SB and all previously
recognized by BiH authorities as obligations) revolving around
creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic, democratic, law-based State,
and fulfil two conditions — signing of a BiH Stabilisation
and Association Agreement, and a positive assessment of the situation
in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton
Agreement. Delivery or fulfilment of these "Five Objectives
and Two Conditions" has, however, proved elusive.
14.16 On 1 September 2011 Peter S¾rensen was
appointed EUSR to BiH. He was appointed also Head of the EU Delegation
in BiH, in a double-hatted role. Previously the EUSR position
had been double-hatted with the High Representative role in BiH.
This was decoupled on 1 September 2011 when the mandate of the
EUSR was transferred from Valentin Inzko (who remains High Representative)
to Peter S?rensen. S?rensen will continue in the roles of EUSR
and EU Head of Delegation.
14.17 The mandate of the EUSR is to:
· offer
the Union's advice and facilitate the political process;
· ensure consistency
and coherence of Union action;
· facilitate
progress on political, economic and European priorities;
· monitor and
advise the executive and legislative authorities at all levels
of government in BiH and liaise with BiH authorities and political
parties;
· ensure the
implementation of the Union's efforts in the whole range of activities
in the field of the rule of law and the security sector reform
promote overall Union coordination of, and give local political
direction to Union efforts in tackling organised crime and corruption,
and in this context, provide the HR and the Commission with assessments
and advice as necessary;
· without prejudice
to the military chain of command, offer the EU Force Commander
political guidance on military issues with a local political dimension,
in particular concerning sensitive operations, relations with
local authorities and with the local media. Consult with the EU
Force Commander before taking political action that may have an
impact on the security situation;
· coordinate
and implement the Union's communication efforts on EU issues towards
the public in BiH;
· promote the
process of EU integration through targeted public diplomacy and
EU outreach activities designed to ensure a broader understanding
and support from the BiH public on EU related matters, including
by means of engagement of local civil society actors;
· contribute
to the development and consolidation of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms in BiH, in accordance with the EU human
rights policy and EU Guidelines on Human Rights;
· engage with
relevant BiH authorities on their full cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
· in line with
the EU integration process, advise, assist, facilitate and monitor
political dialogue on the necessary constitutional changes;
· maintain close
contacts and consultations with the High Representative in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and other relevant international organisations
working in the country;
· provide advice
to the High Representative as necessary concerning natural
or legal persons on whom restrictive measures could be imposed
in view of the situation in BiH; and
· without prejudice
to the applicable chains of command, help to ensure that all Union
instruments in the field are applied coherently to attain the
Union's policy objectives.
14.18 The most recent Council Decision, which we
considered at our meeting on 11 June 2014, authorised a slightly
reduced Year 2 budget to fund the existing mandate. At that time,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) recalled that in
March 2011 the EU agreed a strategy for BiH: in broad terms, an
enhanced EU presence in BiH, led by the EUSR, with a focus on
moving BiH towards its EU future; the three conditions for BiH's
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) to come into force;
and retaining what he described as the important safeguards of
the executive civilian mandate of the OHR and the military executive
mandate of the EU's peacekeeping troops in Operation EUFOR Althea.
He noted that Peter S¾rensen had strengthened the EU's visibility
and political impact in BiH, taking the lead in supporting BiH
in EU-related matters; S¾rensen was a respected and trusted
interlocutor who carried real weight with key Bosnian politicians
from all three constituent parties (Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian Croat); the EUSR mandate remained critical to galvanising
BiH's leaders into making the reforms needed to allow them to
submit a credible application for candidate status. The Minister
also highlighted the need to maintain "a balance of incentives
and deterrents to encourage EU-related reforms, whilst retaining
international safeguards such as the OHR and EUFOR Operation Althea's
executive mandate". The April Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)
Conclusions[41] had acknowledged
a need for a reinvigorated EU push in BiH, aimed at addressing
the population's legitimate concerns through a broadened EU agenda,
and increased outreach activities to the BiH population, in particular
in the months preceding October's general elections, in which
the EUSR's Office took the leading role.
14.19 With regard to the relationship between the
EUSR and the OHR, the Minister said:
"In line with the EU strategy adopted in
March 2011, the EU presence has, to date, coexisted successfully
with the High Representative. The UK will continue to insist that
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) remain in place (or
is potentially 'off-shored' — located outside BiH with the
High Representative's executive powers retained if the security
situation becomes sufficiently stable) until the set of five conditions
and two objectives (known as the '5+2') agreed by the international
community for the closure of the OHR are met. The Peace Implementation
Council (PIC) will continue to review progress against these '5+2'
at its regular meetings. Approval of the EUSR budget does not
prejudice a future PIC decision regarding closure of the OHR.
Both the OHR and EUSR continue to work together effectively on
the ground and focus on complementary tasks."
14.20 The April 2014 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions
to which the Minister referred:
— noted
that the EU integration process had stalled due to the lack of
political will on the part of the BiH politicians and the continued
use of unacceptable, secessionist and divisive, rhetoric and ideas;
— said that Council had heard the public
protests and calls by BiH citizens to improve the social and economic
situation in the country, and that all BiH citizens, including
the younger generation, needed to be given new opportunities;
— strongly urged the BiH institutions and
elected leaders to reach out to the people, engage with civil
society and provide responsible and immediate answers to their
legitimate concerns; and
— emphasized that it was the collective
responsibility of all BiH political leaders and that, ahead of
the general elections in October 2014, "more needs to be
done, not less".[42]
14.21 We noted that these Council Conclusions illustrated
all too clearly the challenges facing the EUSR (and the OHR) over
the next 12 months, and looked forward to hearing from the Minister
about the extent to which they have been overcome when he next
submitted the EUSR mandate for scrutiny. [43]
The draft Council Decision
14.22 The draft Council Decision appoints Mr Lars-Gunnar
Wigemark as the new EUSR in BiH from 1 March 2015 until 30 June
2015.
14.23 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 18 December
2014, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) describes Mr
Wigemark as "a senior Swedish diplomat with close to 30 years
of experience, most recently as EU Head of Delegation to Pakistan".
He goes on to explain that:
— the
need has arisen "due to the early departure of Peter S?rensen
to another position" on 31 October 2014;
— the previous High Representative, Baroness
Ashton, decided to leave appointment decisions to the incoming
High Representative;
— the changeover of the Commission resulted
in an unavoidable delay;
— the position is being covered by the
current interim Head of Delegation;
— although such appointments are normally
for one year, Mr Wigemark's appointment is for a four month period
only, from 1 March 2015 until the end of the present mandate;
and
— he is expected to be concurrently appointed
as both EUSR and Head of the EU Delegation.
The Government's view
14.24 Beyond that, the Minister says:
"We expect swift Commission action to fill
the position on a longer term basis next spring, assuming the
mandate of the EUSR is renewed."
14.25 In the meantime, the Minister comments as follows:
"The objective of the EUSR is to assist
in the creation of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic
BiH, co-operating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly
on track towards EU membership. To this end, the EUSR offers advice
and facilitation in the local political progress, co-ordinates
the activities of EU actors in BiH and provides EU actors and
EU Heads of Mission with regular reporting on the local political
situation. The EUSR also undertakes significant outreach work,
aimed at communicating to the BiH population the benefits of EU
integration and why certain reforms are necessary to realise them.
"BiH is still beset by the terrible consequences
of a war which ended two decades ago. Deeply entrenched ethnic
divisions have led to political and economic stagnation and stymied
much needed reform. February's protests were a direct response
to the country's economic stagnation.
"The result has been economic and social
malaise, which was only exacerbated by catastrophic flooding in
the spring of this year (costing some 15% of GDP). State,
Entity and Cantonal level elections were held on 12 October 2014. The
performance of the new parliament over the next four years will
be crucial in determining their future. The Foreign Secretary
believes that, if the new government is able to demonstrate a
willingness and an ability to make progress on this broader reform
agenda, then we should recognise this through matched progress
on the path to the EU. This is why the Foreign Secretary
and his German counterpart launched a new initiative in Berlin
on 5 November to inject momentum into BiH's EU accession process.
"The reinforcement of the EU's presence
through a single EUSR/Head of EU Delegation figurehead, with the
ability to make effective use of the incentives offered by the
EU, as well as to advise on possible recourse to restrictive measures,
is an important and welcome part of this process. The UK therefore
supports the appointment of Mr Lars-Gunnar Wigemark as EUSR/Head
of EU Delegation in BiH.
"The EUSR role is crucial in supporting
High Representative Mogherini's mandate under the new EU initiative
towards BiH's EU accession, which was endorsed by the December
2014 Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels."
14.26 On 5 December 2014, after visiting BiH with
the Enlargement Commissioner, Johannes Hahn, the EU High Representative/Vice-President,
Federica Mogherini, said that the November FAC had discussed the
way in which "we could profit from the post-electoral period
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and new start in Brussels that we have
with a new Commission" and "see if there is a will,
not only in the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in
the political leadership and institutions to start a new phase,
a new process to move things". She went on to say that, after
meetings with civil society, the Presidency, the leaders of political
parties, their overall impression was that civil society was "more
than ready" to have the country moving forward towards the
European Union and that there was "a relevant and significant
political will … in the institutions and the political leadership
to meet these expectations and start working on a new basis".
14.27 She then went on to say:
"From our side this would mean not lowering
the bar and changing the EU conditionality — that is not
something that is on the agenda — but it might mean that
we can look at how the sequence can be changed or can be better
addressed to make sure that there are some concrete deliverables
in terms of reforms, starting from the economic and social reforms
and getting also to the functionality of the state.
"This is something that we will report to
the Foreign Ministers of the European Union in a little bit more
than a week, on December 15. We will report about the meetings
we have had today and the assessment of the existing political
will that we have found today to move forward on this way. And
we will have the discussion with the Ministers about the engagement
of the EU in this process given the political will that we find
in the country, as I said, not only, but firstly in a population,
but also in the institutions and in the political leadership.
"We know that this is not going to be just
about signing something. It is about starting a process of delivering
to the people, and I think, we think, it is a good opportunity
for the country, for the institutions, for the political leadership
of this country to move forward. We have an opportunity to close
with the divisions or the problems of the past and have a fresh
look at the way in which Bosnia and Herzegovina can fulfil its
being part of the EU family.
"We always say that all countries of the
Western Balkans have a future in the EU and we have to make it
real now, together, with the sense of ownership, here in Sarajevo
and all parts of the country and with a sense of responsibility
and being ready to cooperate from the European Union side."[44]
14.28 Subsequently, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted
the Conclusions set out in the second Annex to this chapter of
our Report.
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36036), —: Second Report HC
219-ii (2014-15), chapter 12 (11 June 2014); (35032), —:
Seventh Report HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 12 (26 June 2013);
also see (33960), —: Fourth Report HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter
23 (14 June 2012) and (34725), —: Thirty-fourth Report HC
86-xxxiv (2012-13), chapter 12 (13 March 2013): (32951), —:
Thirty-sixth Report HC 428-xxxii (2010-12), chapter 17 (6 July
2011); (32579), —: Twenty-second Report HC 428-xx (2010-12),
chapter 8 (16 March 2011); and (31844), (31856-66) and (31884),
—: First Report HC 428-i (2010-12), chapter 66 (8 September
2010).
Annex 1: Joint article by the
Foreign Secretary and the German Foreign Minister published on
6 November 2014.
"There is one country at the heart of Europe
still beset by the terrible consequences of a war which ended
two decades ago. Deeply entrenched ethnic divisions in Bosnia
and Herzogovina have led to political stagnation and stymied much
needed reform. The result has been economic and social malaise,
which was only exacerbated by catastrophic flooding in the spring
of this year. Last month the country's citizens elected a new
parliament. Its performance over the next four years will be crucial
in determining their future.
"The UK and Germany have already invested a
great deal in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the last 20 years: our
soldiers and police officers have taken part in NATO and EU missions
to stabilise the country, and we have promoted the country's economic
development alongside our involvement at the political level.
The fact that our efforts have not yet borne fruit is not a reason
to give up and turn away.
"On the contrary, we must redouble our efforts
to help Bosnia and Herzogovina transform its fortunes.
"What the country desperately needs is stability
and economic prosperity coupled with functioning democratic and
judicial institutions. Accomplishing this requires far-reaching
reforms which have been delayed far too long. While history shows
us that the prospect of EU accession can encourage countries to
enact essential reforms, for Bosnia and Herzegovina, riven with
ethnic political divisions, it has not been able to work its magic.
A new approach is essential.
"This evening we will be presenting our ideas
for recasting Bosnia and Herzegovina's EU accession process, when
foreign ministers from the region gather at the British Embassy
in Berlin for the Aspen Institute's conference on South-Eastern
Europe. These proposals primarily focus on those economic and
social policies, as well as good governance and the rule of law,
which will have the biggest impact on the lives of ordinary Bosnians
and Herzegovinians: policies to deliver jobs and the rule of law,
and to reduce corruption and criminality.
"The first step we are seeking is for Bosnia
and Herzegovina's political leaders to make a written commitment
to do two things: first, to deliver institutional reforms at all
levels of the State, designed to make it more functional and able
to work effectively with the EU; and secondly, to agree with the
EU a roadmap for a broad reform agenda to advance the country
on its path to EU accession.
"This approach is not about lowering the bar
to EU membership. Difficult constitutional amendments, such as
safeguarding the voting rights for all citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (the Sejdic-Finci problem), will still need to be
addressed. But what we are proposing is a step by step process
of reform starting with a focus on genuine economic improvements
and gradually increasing the functionality of state institutions
— an approach that is closely bound up with progress on
Bosnia and Herzegovina's path toward the EU.
"Nor is this a return to the days of the international
community imposing legislation on Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are
making a proposal and an offer to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the politicians they have elected: if they enact the reforms
then we will advocate for progress on the European path.
"Germany and the United Kingdom are setting
the ball rolling today; we are actively seeking the broad-based
political support needed for success. We need our partners in
the neighbouring states of Croatia and Serbia, as well as our
partners in the EU and the USA to work alongside us. But above
all, we are calling on Bosnia and Herzegovina's politicians to
adopt an approach that demonstrates leadership for all of the
country, irrespective of ethnic interests.
"Bosnia and Herzegovina needs a vision for the
future that matches its status as a country at the heart of Europe.
Its people deserve the rule of law, low crime rates, good public
services, jobs and prosperity just as much as the citizens of
neighbouring European states. Today we are offering the people
of Bosnia and Herzegovina a way forward. We sincerely hope they
will grasp it."
Annex 2: 15 December 2014 Foreign
Affairs Council Conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina:
"1. The Council reiterates its unequivocal commitment
to Bosnia and Herzegovina's EU perspective. The Council also reaffirms
its unequivocal commitment to the territorial integrity of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a sovereign and united country.
"2. The Council welcomes the Compact for Growth
and Jobs to shift the focus towards reforms and issues of direct
concern to citizens, in the wake of the widespread, citizen-led
protests in early 2014 which underlined the fragility of the socio-economic
situation.
"3. The Council welcomes the recent visit of
HR Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn to Sarajevo and their engagement
in the revitalisation of the reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Council agreed on a renewed EU approach towards Bosnia and
Herzegovina on its EU accession path throughout which all conditions,
including the implementation of the Sejdic-Finci ruling,[45]
will have to be met. The Council calls on BiH political leadership
to anchor the reforms necessary for EU integration in the work
of all relevant institutions.
"4. The Council invites HR Mogherini and Commissioner
Hahn to continue engaging with the BiH leadership to secure at
the earliest its irrevocable written commitment to undertake reforms
in the framework of the EU accession process. The overall objective
is to establish functionality and efficiency at all levels of
government and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare itself
for future EU membership. The text will also contain a commitment
to work out in consultation with the EU an initial agenda for
reforms, in line with the EU acquis. The reform agenda should
be developed and implemented in consultation with civil society.
This agenda should include first and foremost reforms under the
Copenhagen criteria (socio-economic reforms including the 'Compact
for Growth and Jobs', rule of law, good governance) and also agreed
functionality issues (including the EU coordination mechanism).
The BiH leadership will also commit to make progress, at a later
stage, on further reforms in order to enhance functionality and
effectiveness of the different levels of government.
"5. The Council invites HR Mogherini and Commissioner
Hahn to regularly report on progress in bringing about this written
commitment and on how this is reflected in the work of all relevant
institutions.
"6. Once the written commitment has been agreed
by the BiH Presidency, signed by the BiH political leaders and
endorsed by the BiH Parliament, the Council will decide on the
entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
"7. Meaningful progress on the implementation
of the agenda for reforms, including the 'Compact for Growth and
Jobs', will be necessary for a membership application to be considered
by the EU. When requesting the Commission's Opinion on the membership
application, the Council will ask the Commission to pay particular
attention to the implementation of the Sejdic-Finci ruling.
"8. The Council underlines the crucial importance
of swift government formation and calls on the country's leaders
to ensure that this takes place."[46]
39 See http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/BosnienUndHerzegowina/141006_Steinmeier_Hammond_Neustart_Bosnien.html.
Back
40
For the full background to this issue, see our Report of 4 June
2014: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27. Back
41
Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142228.pdf,
pp.11 and 12. Back
42
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142228.pdf,
p.11. Back
43
See (36036), -: Second Report HC 219-ii (2014-15), chapter 12
(11 June 2014). Back
44
See http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/remarks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-end-visit-bosnia-and-herzegovina_en.
Back
45
Sejdiæ and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (27996/06
and 34836/06) was a case (merged from two) decided by the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in December 2009.
The 1995 BiH, created as part of the Dayton Agreement, included
power-sharing provisions whereby posts in the tripartite Presidency
and the House of Peoples (upper house of the national parliament)
were reserved for ethnic Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats
only. The applicants, being a Roma and a Jew, contested these
provisions. The Court found that applicants' ineligibility to
stand for election to the House of Peoples violated Article 14
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ban of discrimination
in the field of Convention rights) taken in conjunction with Article
3 of Protocol No. 1 (free elections), and that their ineligibility
to stand for election to the Presidency violated Article 1 of
Protocol No. 12 (general ban of discrimination). In October 2011,
the BiH set in motion a process of constitutional reform, including
changing the election provisions. In November 2014, the Foreign
Secretary and his German counterpart sent an "open letter"
to the people of BiH, which pledged substantive progress towards
Bosnia's EU membership if Bosnia's politicians gave a written
commitment to implement a package of reforms, including compliance
with the Sejdic and Finci ruling. Back
46
Available at http://italia2014.eu/media/4325/council-conclusions-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina.pdf.
Back
| 
