15 EU training of Malian security forces
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision launching the CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document number | (36579), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
15.1 Mali has been in crisis since March 2012, when the military
overthrew the government and, then, a coalition of separatist
Tuareg rebels and militant Islamist armed groups with links to
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb pushed the national army out of
the north of the country. In late 2012, it was agreed to create
a military intervention force (now known as AMISA), under the
auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
which would attempt to retake the north. However, in January 2013,
the prospect that the entire country might fall to the rebels
before AMISA could become operational provoked an urgent French
military intervention.
15.2 The restoration of security and lasting peace
in Mali is a major issue for the stability of the Sahel region
and, in the wider sense, for Africa and Europe.[47]
On 18 February 2013, at the request of the Malian authorities,
and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution
2085 (2012), the EU launched a training mission for Malian armed
forces, EUTM Mali. That mission (to which 28 States, including
23 Member States, are contributing military personnel) aims to
support the training and reorganisation of the Malian Armed Forces
and to help improve its military capacity, in order to allow,
under civilian authority, the restoration of the country's territorial
integrity. The mission would not be involved in combat operations
(and has not been). This Mission is now into its second mandate
of training and advising the Malian armed forces.
15.3 On 15 April 2014 the Council established a further
CSDP civilian mission to support the internal security forces
in Mali — EUCAP Sahel Mali, as an additional contribution
to the EU's overall support to stability, institutional reform
and the full restoration of state authority throughout the country.
The mission will support the Malian state to ensure constitutional
and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace as well
as to maintain its authority throughout the entire territory.
The mission will deliver strategic advice and training for the
three internal security forces in Mali, i.e. the police, Gendarmerie
and Garde Nationale, and coordinate with international partners,
with a view to:
— improving
their operational efficacy;
— re-establishing the chain of command;
— reinforcing the role of the judicial
and administrative authorities in the management and supervision
of their missions, and
— facilitating their redeployment to the
north of Mali.[48]
15.4 This further Council Decision would authorise
the launch of EUCAP Sahel Mali as of 15 January 2015, with a 24
month mandate and a Year 1 budget of €11.4 million, from
the overall CFSP Budget. The UK would also separately fund a political
adviser.
15.5 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
explains that EUCAP Sahel Mali is designed to mirror the CSDP
Mission in neighbouring Niger — EUCAP Sahel Niger —
which has been building the capacity of the civilian security
sector there since 2012 and which, after a slow start, has "turned
itself around and is now delivering effectively". He further
explains that the lack of a comprehensive peace agreement in Mali
has meant that the Malian state has been unable to re-establish
its authority across much of the northern part of the country;
basic services including law-enforcement, justice and education
are still lacking; the UN Mission (MINUSMA), mandated to lead
on security and justice sector reform in Mali, will be EUCAP Sahel
Mali's principal international partner in delivering the extra
security capacity.
15.6 The Minister describes the overall objective
by the end of the mandate as:
"for the security forces to be more capable
to provide public security, particularly in the north; to have
greater control over the territory; and for the chain of command
to be strengthened. In addition, the penal chain will be more
robust and effective."
15.7 He notes that the mission's exit strategy will
be "defined in more detail as part of a Strategic Review
after the first year", but at this stage:
"there is consensus among EU Member States that
the Malian government, the EDF, other EU instruments, the UN and
bilateral partners will all have a role in providing advice at
Ministerial level, human resources advice, advice in managing
training schools as well as training teacher trainers."
15.8 As the "Background" section of
our Report recalls, the Committee has been engaged already on
two fronts in connection with the first of these two missions,
EUTM Mali — avoiding an unending commitment and "upstream"
scrutiny of the process. In the case of the new mission, the Minister
clearly set out his pre-conditions a year ago, including that
any new CSDP mission should have "a focused, measureable
mandate", be "up-front about the potential challenges",
and have "achievable aims" and "a clear, achievable
exit strategy" (see paragraphs 15.15-15.16 below for full
details).
15.9 It is plain that we are not there yet: there
is no mention of the potential challenges, nor is a focused and
measurable mandate discernible. Moreover, an exit strategy is
at least a year away — which raises the other longstanding
point of discussion, regarding how the Committee can be engaged
in the Strategic Review process of such missions, so as to avoid
being where we are now, presented with a fait accompli
in the form of a Council Decision requiring urgent attention.
That issue remains unresolved. In any event, we would like the
Minister to write to us in the autumn, when the House has returned
from the conference recess, to bring us up to date on how the
new mission is performing — as he notes, its counterpart
in Niger got off to a slow start — and what the position
then is with regard to concretising a proper exit strategy and
whether the Committee is to be given sight of the Strategic Review
before any decision is presented regarding the Year 2 budget.
15.10 In the meantime, we clear this Council Decision.
Full
details of the documents:
Council Decision launching the CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel
Mali) and amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP: (36599) —.
Background
15.11 In the words of the current House of Commons
Library research paper:
"Mali has been in crisis since March 2012,
when the military overthrew the government of Amadou Toumani Touré.
Within weeks of the coup, a coalition of separatist Tuareg rebels
and militant Islamist armed groups with links to Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb pushed the national army out of the north of the
country. The coalition split up quickly, leaving the militant
Islamists largely in control. A weak and ineffective transitional
government has been in existence in the south of the country since
April but the north remained beyond its control. In late 2012,
it was agreed to create a military intervention force, under the
auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
which would attempt to retake the north, but it was not expected
to be battle-ready until September 2013. At the same time, political
negotiations began to try and draw parts of the rebel coalition
into a political process. However, on 9 January 2013, a sudden
military push southwards by rebels appeared to open up the possibility
that the entire country might fall to them in the near future.
This provoked an urgent French military intervention from 11 January
onwards to stop the rebel advance and, indeed, roll it back. This
is being achieved. However, the rebels are re-grouping and will
turn to insurgency.
"Concerns are being raised about the need
for French and Malian forces to uphold humanitarian and human
rights law during the current military operation in Mali. Malian
forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses. As the
ECOWAS force, known as AFISMA, assembles and deploys, these concerns
will extend to it as well. The agreed EU training mission that
has been agreed, along with the UK training initiative for Anglophone
troops involved, will need to respond to such concerns. The UK
is not currently in a combat role in Mali, although some worry
about gradual 'mission creep'."[49]
15.12 The Council Decision establishing that training
mission — EUTM Mali — was debated in European Committee
B on 16 January 2013.[50]
The EU's overall political objective is to enable the Malian authorities
to: restore constitutional order, supporting a roadmap to free
and open elections in 2013; extend the State's authority throughout
the country; and tackle the terrorist threat and organised crime.
EUTM Mali aims at strengthening conditions for a proper political
control by legitimate civilian authorities of the Malian Armed
Forces. The Mission's parameters were to be: non-involvement
in combat operations; the provision to the Malian Armed Forces
of training and advice in command and control, logistical chain
and human resources, and international humanitarian law, protection
of civilians and human rights; strengthening conditions for a
proper political control by legitimate civilian authorities of
the Malian Armed Forces; to be conducted in close coordination
with other factors involved in the support to the Malian Armed
Forces, in particular the UN and ECOWAS (the Economic Community
of West African States). The budget was €12.3 million, to
cover its 15 month duration. An extraordinary FAC meeting on 17
January 2013 adopted the Council Decision and thus authorised
its establishment.[51]
15.13 By July 2013, EUTM Mali was approximately 550
strong, comprising:
— approximately
200 instructors, of which approximately 100 are infantry trainers;
— 150 troops providing force protection,
from France (1 company), Czech Republic and Spain (one platoon
each);
— 150 staff officers and NCOs at the Main
Headquarters in Bamako and the Forward Headquarters in Koulikoro,
responsible for command and control, liaison with the Malian authorities,
medical support and logistics;
— a small cell in Brussels responsible
for co-ordination between the Mission and the EU apparatus.
15.14 Twenty-two Member States had provided personnel.
France was by far the largest contributor. The UK was providing
33 military trainers, four HQ staff and one Human Rights trainer.
15.15 As our previous Reports on EUTM Mali relate,
the Committee has long underlined the danger of "mission
creep" in all CSDP missions. Here, the element of "mission
creep" at this early stage was budgetary: double the original
estimate, and clearly the likelihood of more to come. The Committee
said that it expected to hear more when the Minister wrote about
the mid-term review and asked, when he did so, to provide his
assessment of EUTM Mali's achievements-against-benchmarks thus
far, of progress towards achieving the EU's overall objectives
and of the likelihood of attaining the planned exit at the end
of the 15- month mandate.[52]
15.16 In January 2014, as part of an update on CSDP
in the Sahel, the Minister for Europe flagged up the likelihood
of this new mission. He had given it "a cautious welcome"
but, "mindful of the need for any new CSDP activity to be
effective and represent good value for money", had clearly
set out his pre-conditions, viz., any new CSDP mission should:
complement the work of other actors, principally MINUSMA; have
a focused, measureable mandate; be up-front about the potential
challenges; have achievable aims and a clear, achievable exit
strategy; prioritise training of officers who will eventually
deploy to northern Mali, where the need is greatest; work closely
with the other CSDP Missions to deliver the EU Strategy for the
Sahel, sharing good practice, learning lessons and avoiding duplication;
and consider early and realistically how it will be staffed.
Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP
15.17 On 15 April 2014, the Council adopted this
Decision, authorising the conduct of a civilian mission in Mali
(EUCAP Sahel Mali) in support of the Malian internal security
forces (ISF): police, gendarmerie, National Guard. Its objectives
are to allow the Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional
and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in Mali,
and to restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout
the territory of Mali by means of an effective redeployment of
its administration. With "the support of the Malian dynamic
in restoring State authority", and in close coordination
with other international actors, in particular MINUSMA, EUCAP
Sahel Mali shall assist and advise the ISF in the implementation
of the security reform set out by the new Government, with a view
to:
— improving
their operational efficacy;
— re-establishing their respective hierarchical
chains;
— reinforcing the role of judicial and
administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision
of their missions; and
— facilitating their redeployment to the
north of the country.[53]
15.18 In clearing this Council Decision from scrutiny,
the Committee noted that, although the EEAS seemed to have stepped
back from the very ambitious objectives outlined in the Minister's
letter of 3 January 2014, they were nonetheless very challenging,
given the starting point with the security forces — poor
relations with the authorities and the general population; insufficient
training and equipment; a lack of infrastructure; a chain of command
not fit for purpose; disorganised human resources management;
endemic clientelism and corruption; and a general a lack of credibility.
15.19 The aim accordingly appeared to be more realistic:
the security forces to be better at ensuring public security,
with greater control over their territory, a more effective penal
chain, a strengthened chain of command and operating more effectively.
Given the starting point, they could hardly fail to be achieved.
15.20 Nonetheless, it was already envisaged that
this mission would run for at least four years, with an exit strategy
that would not be defined until the time of the first Strategic
Review; and that the EU would be involved for years thereafter
through the EDF and other EU instruments, in providing advice
at Ministerial level, human resources advice, advice in managing
training schools as well as training teacher trainers. This was,
we noted, very reminiscent of the EU's approach in the Democratic
Republic of Congo: however, what might be called "Stage 1"
had lasted a great deal longer than originally envisaged, while
"Stage 2" had yet to be initiated.
15.21 The first Strategic Review would thus be of
particular importance. However, the Minister did not say when
it would take place. Moreover, as he was aware, we had been in
extensive and as yet unresolved discussion over our wish to be
involved in the scrutiny of such Strategic Reviews, given that
they determine the way ahead and that, by the time that the ensuing
Council Decisions are submitted for scrutiny, the die is effectively
cast.
15.22 For now, as the Minister noted, there would
be a second Council Decision in the autumn, prior to the mission's
launch. At that stage, as well as demonstrating how the fully
fleshed-out Mission would meet his pre-conditions, we hoped that
the Minister would have more to say about the exit strategy and
the sort of timeline and scope that Member States envisaged for
longer-term EU involvement (and that our discussions on the general
question of the Committee's involvement in the Strategic Review
process as a whole would have been resolved to our satisfaction).
The draft Council Decision
15.23 The draft Council Decision authorises the launch
of EUCAP Sahel Mali. The objectives of the mission are summarised
thus by the Minister in his Explanatory Memorandum of 18 December
2014:
"to assist the Malian authorities to restore
constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting
peace in Mali, and to restore and maintain state authority and
legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali through an effective
redeployment of its administration."
15.24 The mission's first mandate will be for 24
months.
The Government's view
15.25 The Minister notes that Mali remains a fragile
democracy. He says that EUCAP Sahel Mali has been established
to mirror the EUCAP Sahel Niger CSDP Mission in neighbouring Niger
which has been building the capacity of the civilian security
sector there since 2012, and which he says, after "a slow
start", has "turned itself around and is now delivering
effectively".
15.26 He continues as follows:
"The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement
in Mali has mean that the Malian state has been unable to re-establish
its authority cross much of the northern part of the country.
Basic services including law-enforcement, justice and education
are still lacking, and the UN Mission (MINUSMA), mandated to lead
on security and justice sector reform in Mali, will be EUCAP's
principal international partner in delivering the extra security
capacity.
"The Mission will focus its initial efforts
on enabling officers to deploy to northern Mali where the need
for security apparatus is most acute. In order to achieve its
objectives, the mission will:
i. "Provide strategic advice on the security
forces human resources: The mission will embed experts in
the management structures of the national police, National Guard
and Gendarmerie to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each
service and to produce a needs analysis in terms of training and
management oversight and control. The experts will also encourage
the forces to create mechanisms to coordinate better with each
other and with ministers. Experts will also identify pieces of
legislation that need to be put in place and will assist in creating
an annual human resources plan. Finally they will support the
services in defining their training needs and draft a training
plan both for basic initial training and ongoing training needs,
with modules on this, human rights and gender equality. This work
will all be recorded in a human resources database for each force.
ii. "Training: The mission will embed
experts in the security forces to identify the strengths and weaknesses
in terms of training and will define the content of training programmes.
Planning has identified that a third of the Gendarmerie and Police
will need training and a quarter of the National Guard and they
will focus on community police and middle management. The mission
anticipates training in general surveillance and community policing,
forensics, criminal law and procedures, treatment of evidence,
public order, human rights and the fight against organised crime
and terrorism. Trainers will be identified and trained. Finally,
the impact of training will be monitored and evaluated.
iii. "Coordination: Given the large
international community present in Mali, donor coordination has
been identified as particularly important to the mission's success.
Structures for coordination with MINUSMA, in particular, will
be created. Communication channels will be opened and some staff
collocated to facilitate this and to identify synergies and to
reduce the risks of duplication. The mission will also coordinate
closely with the EUSR's office and with other CSDP missions present
in the region as well as bilateral programmes.
"The overall objective by the end of the mandate
is for the security forces to be more capable to provide public
security, particularly in the north; to have greater control over
the territory; and for the chain of command to be strengthened.
In addition, the penal chain will be more robust and effective.
The mission's exit strategy will be defined in more detail as
part of a Strategic Review after the first year, but at this stage
there is consensus among EU Member States that the Malian government,
the EDF, other EU instruments, the UN and bilateral partners will
all have a role in providing advice at Ministerial level, human
resources advice, advice in managing training schools as well
as training teacher trainers."
15.27 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says:
"EUCAP Sahel Mali's preliminary budget will
total €11.4 million and will be funded from the Common Foreign
and Security Policy budget. The UK contributes a proportion to
the pre-agreed CFSP budget, not the individual programmes within
it. Funds for EUCAP's budget will be found within existing resources
in the CFSP budget.
"The budget will be broken down as follows:
"Personnel Costs: €5,669,223
"Staff will include a Head of Mission, 25 contracted
staff to include positions such as mission support, finance, logistics,
security etc., 50 seconded experts and 30 assistants who will
be local staff. The costs will include salaries where appropriate,
per Diems and insurance.
"Mission Expenditure: €258,628
"Staff will be expected to travel to Brussels
to coordinate with the Institutions involved in management and
direction of the mission, as well as travel throughout the Sahel
to coordinate with other CSDP missions, particularly EUCAP Sahel
Niger and EUTM in Mali.
"Running Expenditure: €3,711,870
"This heading includes the costs of transporting
and running vehicles donated from surplus from other CSDP missions
and the CSDP Warehouse, office and accommodation costs, communication
costs, and security services, as well as training and small project
costs.
"Capital Expenditure: €1,518,912
"This includes costs for IT equipment, communications
equipment, office furniture and equipment such as air conditioners
and generators for the office and the accommodation, building
works and security upgrades and equipment and medical equipment
and supplies
"Representation: €15,900
"This budget line funds the mission's public
facing activities.
"Contingencies: €225,467
"This can only be used with prior written approval
of the Commission.
"In addition to the core costs funded from the
CFSP budget, the UK is funding a Political Adviser for the mission.
The cost for this position will come from the Conflict Pool and
will cost approximately £80,000."
Previous
Committee Reports
None, but see (35889), —: Forty-fourth Report
HC 83-xxxix (2013-14), chapter 16 (26 March 2014) and the earlier
Reports referred to therein.
47 See EU and Sahel fact sheet for full information. Back
48
See EUCAP Sahel Mali for full information. Back
49
See "The crisis in Mali: current military action and upholding
humanitarian law": SN06531 of 11 March 2013. Back
50
The record of the debate is available at Gen Co Deb, European
Standing Committee B, 16 January 2013, cols. 3-24. Back
51
For the full background and the Committee's earlier consideration,
see (34646): Thirteenth Report HC 86-xxxi (2012-13), chapter 13
(6 February 2013) and (34550)-: Twenty-fifth Report HC 86-xxv
(2012-13), chapter 2 (19 December 2012). Back
52
See (34664), -: Thirty-second Report HC 86-xxxii (2012-13), chapter 14
and Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 17 (3 July 2013). Back
53
See Council Decision of 15 April 2014 on CSDP Mission in Mali. Back
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