14 EU Military Advisory Mission in the
Central African Republic (EUMAM CAR)
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny
|
| Document details | Council Decision on establishment of an EU Military Advisory Mission to the Central African Republic (EUMAM CAR)
|
| Legal base | Articles 42 (4) and 43 (2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document number | (36595), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
14.1 The Council agreed to establish operation an EU military
operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) on 10 February
2014. It was launched on 1 April 2014 and operates under a UN
Security Council mandate (UNSCR 2134 (2014)). It ends on 15 March
2015.
14.2 Earlier, some 1,600 French troops had been deployed
in the CAR since early December 2013 on a mission to stem fighting
between predominantly Muslim militants, known as the ex-Seléka,[60]
and bands of Christian vigilantes, the Anti-balaka.[61]
14.3 UN SCR 2149 (2014) authorised the UN Peacekeeping
Operation, MINUSCA, which replaced the African Union Mission (MISCA)
on 15 September 2014. MINUSCA should reach Full Operational Capability
in April 2015.
14.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
believes that EUFOR CAR has had a positive effect, successfully
improving and maintaining security around the airport and in the
3rd and 5th districts of the capital, Bangui; the establishment
of this EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM CAR) would support
the UN's deployment and "help lock in the security gains
and trust that EUFOR CAR has built up with the local population
and government". In particular it would, he says:
— begin
the process of security sector reform of the FACA in CAR;
— cement the current positive civil-military
co-operation;
— provide a positive signal of EU support
to the Interim President of CAR and her interim government following
their request for priority to be given to reforming and training
of the FACA; and
— deepen EU and UN common cooperation in
CAR.
14.5 Despite the progress thus far, the Minister
says that the situation in the CAR remains dire and fragile. The
population continues to suffer from extrajudicial killings, arbitrary
arrests and detention, torture, recruitment and use of child soldiers
and sexual violence against women and children. Security
sector reform is vital. CAR's interim Prime Minister has warned
that if no direction is given to the under-utilised CAR national
army, known as the FACA, there is a real risk they could turn
against the population; and CAR's interim President has requested
that priority be given to reforming and training the FACA. The
UN (which has the lead on security sector reform) has welcomed
the prospect of the EU beginning the process. Building
state institutions can only be considered when there is sufficient
and effective political dialogue, leadership and security. The
UK's immediate priorities are to ensure: that a safe and secure
environment is established and maintained, particularly in Bangui,
to enable the right conditions for a sustainable political process;
and for the UN to coordinate the humanitarian response effectively.
An EU Military Advisory Mission meets the UK's objective of
working with and through international organisations to ensure
peace and security are delivered to CAR.
14.6 A mission of 50-60 military advisers is envisaged;
there are no plans at present for the UK to contribute troops.
Its estimated cost is €7.9 million; the UK share would be
€1.24 million. EUMAM CAR will need to deploy on 1 March 2015
to ensure it can reach Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 15
March 2015, and thus have a smooth handover with EUFOR CAR. EUMAM
RCA shall end no later than 12 months after having reached FOC.
14.7 Looking further ahead, the Minister says that,
at UK request, the Crisis Management Concept (the first stage
of the planning process of a possible mission) is based on a "phased
approach", i.e.:
"EUMAM CAR will begin as an advisory mission
which, subject to meeting agreed conditions and receiving further
political consent from Member States, could transition to conduct
targeted non-operational training. We have also emphasized, and
gained agreement in Brussels, that EUMAM CAR must work in close
co-ordination with the UN. Non-operational training will involve
improving the capabilities of existing units, increasing military
leadership skills and competences, courses on basic citizenship
and military knowledge modules (Human Rights, Gender Equality,
international humanitarian law etc.)."
14.8 So far, so good. The case for this second
EU mission is compelling. The danger, however, is that —
as in the DRC[62]
— what begins as a one-year mission morphs into one that
goes on for years. In that case, what began in 2005 with the aim
of making sure ex-guerrillas who were now supposedly soldiers
actually got paid, has expanded its activities over the past decade
into modernising both administration and human resources management,
and providing assistance to its Congolese partners in troop training.
14.9 The Minister and his officials have plainly
done what they can at this juncture to guard against EUMAM CAR
becoming self-generating, but troop training is already in prospect.
It will be necessary for there to be a very sound justification
for a further mandate in a year's time.
14.10 The Minister also underlines the lead that
the UN is to have in SSR and the need for EUMAM CAR to work in
close co-ordination with the UN. However, we would like greater
clarity about how EUMAM CAR and MINUSCA are to work together,
i.e. who is going to do what and with whom, and how the UN is
to take the lead on SSR.
14.11 We ask the Minister to provide the answer
before the Council Decision to launch the mission is submitted
for scrutiny. In the meantime, we now clear this Council Decision
from scrutiny.
Full
details of the document:
Council Decision on a European Union Military Advisory Mission
in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA): (36595), —.
Background
14.12 On 10 February 2014 the Council adopted Decision
2014/73/CFSP on a European Union military operation in the Central
African Republic (EUFOR CAR). It was launched on 1 April 2014,
and is due to run until 15 March 2015.[63]
14.13 EUFOR CAR stems from UN Security Council resolution
2134 of 28 January 2014. It was originally established to provide
temporary support, for a period of up to six-months, to help achieve
a secure environment in the Bangui area, and contribute to international
and regional efforts, i.e., the African Union (AU) peace-keeping
force MISCA, so as to protect the populations most at risk, enable
the free movement of civilians, and create the conditions required
in order to provide humanitarian aid for those who needed it.
14.14 Earlier, via Operation Sangaris, some 1,600
French troops had been deployed in the CAR since early December
2013 on a mission to stem fighting between predominantly Muslim
militants, known as the ex-Seléka,[64]
and bands of Christian vigilantes, the Anti-balaka.[65]
14.15 The most recent Council Decision proposed the
extension of EUFOR CAR's mandate until 15 March 2014, at which
point "EUFOR RCA shall end". The extension was proposed
by interim President Samba-Panza on 10 September 2014; and was
welcomed by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations in order
to provide support to and ensure a smooth handover with the UN
Peacekeeping Operation MINUSCA (which was launched on 15 September
2014, into which the AU's 5,200 troops were absorbed, which was
to be augmented by an additional 1,800 UN uniformed personnel,
and which was due to reach Full Operational Capacity by April
2015).
14.16 When the Committee cleared this Council Decision
on 15 October 2014, it found it heartening that EUFOR CAR had
been able to make a positive impact in extremely challenging circumstances,
and that security and governance as a whole was moving in the
right direction: but that it was also right that the UN and, within
it, the AU should be taking the lead. The Minister's case for
this further extension, to enable this to happen in good order,
was compelling: but so, too, was the determination that there
shall be no further extension of EUFOR CAR beyond April 2015.[66]
The Minister's letter of 2 January 2015
14.17 The Minister for Europe recalls noting, when
submitting the EUFOR RCA Council Decision for scrutiny, that Member
States were considering options for future EU engagement in CAR
and says that he would like to provide another update at this
point for information and to ensure adequate time for parliamentary
scrutiny.
14.18 He continues as follows:
CURRENT POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAR
"EUFOR CAR has secured the airport and the 3rd
and 5th districts within the capital, Bangui.
EUFOR's mandate will expire on 15 March 2015. We judge the
handover between the African Union troops (MISCA) to the UN Peacekeeping
force (MINUSCA) on 15 September as a successful transfer of authority.
However, several months of relative calm in Bangui was shattered
in October with an increase in violence including an attack on
a MINUSCA convoy. The situation has calmed since then but
still remains fragile. Banditry, in particular against the
humanitarian community, is now the main problem in Bangui. Elections
are scheduled for July 2015. There is a requirement for building
state institutions in CAR but this can only be considered when
there is sufficient and effective political dialogue, leadership
and security.
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN CAR
"It is clear that, to ensure sustainable security
in CAR, it is vital to have security sector reform. The under-utilised
CAR national army is known as the FACA and is now considered to
be the biggest risk of stability to CAR. The CAR interim
Prime Minister has said that if no direction is given to the FACA
there is a real risk they will turn against the population of
CAR and further destabilise the country. The UN are currently
going through and cleansing the database of FACA personnel —
removing people that have been involved in threatening the peace
and stability of the country. The CAR interim President has requested
that priority be given to reforming and training the FACA. The
UN (which has the lead on security sector reform in CAR) has requested
that the EU starts the process of security sector reform of the
FACA in CAR. The UN would then look at putting together a wider
plan on security sector reform following elections ensuring it
has the buy-in of the newly elected CAR government. In November,
the EU started to consider the possibility of developing an advisory
mission to the FACA, which might also provide non-operational
training if conditions allow.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
"Political endorsement was given for a new EU
Military Advisory Mission to CAR (EUMAM CAR) and a Crisis Management
Concept (CMC) was approved at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)
on 15 December. A CMC is the first stage of the planning process
of a possible mission. The UK supported the development of a CMC
and will work with partners to ensure that the mission will: have
a clear mandate, be co-ordinated with the UN, have a realistic
scale, be underpinned by proper planning, represent good value
for money, and have a clear exit strategy and budget. The severity
and scale of the violence and subsequent humanitarian crisis,
as well as the potential for the situation to destabilise the
region, has justified a UK response. A follow-on mission meets
our objective of working with and through international organisations
to ensure peace and security is delivered to CAR.
"The CMC incorporates a 'phased approach' for
EUMAM CAR — starting off as an advisory mission, which,
subject to agreed conditions and further political consent, could
transition to conduct targeted non-operational training, in co-ordination
with the UN. Non-operational training will involve improving the
capabilities of existing units' chain of command, increasing military
leadership skills and competences, courses on basic citizenship
and military knowledge modules (Human Rights, Gender Equality,
international humanitarian law etc.).
"The mission would consist of 50-60 military
advisors. The further Security Sector Reform process depends on
the elections in CAR as a prerequisite to set up a democratically
elected and recognised government. Since elections are scheduled
for July 2015, the mission will have a duration of 12 months from
the time of reaching full operational capacity.
TIMETABLE AND PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY
"The timetable for EUMAM CAR is tight, with
the aim to have the mission on the ground before EUFOR CAR ends
to enable continuity and a good handover of contacts and expertise.
We will work to ensure we get the necessary documents to the Committees
as early as possible to ensure adequate time for clearance. We
have very much appreciated the speed at which previous EUFOR CAR
documents have been cleared by the Committees and hope the same
will be possible for this mission.
"With the CMC approved at the Foreign Affairs
Council (FAC) on 15 December, we anticipate that a draft Council
Decision to 'establish a mission' will be issued at the beginning
of January, which we will aim to submit to scrutiny Committees
by 8 January with a view to the Council Decision being
approved at the FAC on 19 January. A draft Council Decision to
'launch the mission' will then be issued late January/early February
which we will submit to scrutiny Committees with a view to the
Council Decision being approved at the FAC on 9 February.
"The EU Military Advisory Mission to CAR (EUMAM
CAR) is envisaged to deploy on 1 March and reach full operational
capacity on 15 March, the same date that the mandate for EUFOR
expires."
The draft Council Decision
14.19 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 8 January
2015, the Minister says that, to ensure sustainable security in
the CAR:
"it is vital to have security sector reform.
The under-utilised CAR national army, known as the FACA, is considered
to be a significant risk to the stability of the country. CAR's
interim Prime Minister has warned that if no direction is given
to the FACA, there is a real risk they could turn against the
population. This would further destabilise the country and put
at risk the security gains helped by international forces (EU,
AU and UN). Catherine Samba-Panza, CAR's interim President, has
requested that priority be given to reforming and training the
FACA. The UN (which has the lead on security sector reform in
CAR) has welcomed the prospect of the EU beginning the process
of FACA security sector reform.
"The Foreign Affairs Council on 15 December
2014 gave political endorsement for an EU Military Advisory Mission
to CAR and approved a Crisis Management Concept (subject to Parliamentary
scrutiny). The External Action Service and Member States hope
to secure a Council Decision to establish EUMAM CAR at the 19
January 2015 Foreign Affairs Council. Early agreement is needed
to allow sufficient time for operational planning to meet an envisaged
deployment date of 1 March. This would allow the mission to reach
Full Operational Capability (FOC) on 15 March, the same date that
the mandate for the separate EU security mission (EUFOR CAR) expires.
The mission will last for 12 months from the point it reaches
FOC.
"At UK request, the Crisis Management Concept
is based on a 'phased approach'. EUMAM CAR will begin as an advisory
mission which, subject to meeting agreed conditions and receiving
further political consent from Member States, could transition
to conduct targeted non-operational training. We have also emphasized,
and gained agreement in Brussels, that EUMAM CAR must work in
close co-ordination with the UN. Non-operational training will
involve improving the capabilities of existing units, increasing
military leadership skills and competences, courses on basic citizenship
and military knowledge modules (Human Rights, Gender Equality,
international humanitarian law etc.). The mission will consist
of 50-60 military advisors."
The Government's view
14.20 The Minister comments as follows:
"The situation in the Central African Republic
remains dire. Despite the signing of a cessation of hostilities
agreement in Brazzaville on 23 July, renewed fighting continues
in several parts of the country, leading to further internal displacements
and restrictions to humanitarian access. Several months of relative
calm in Bangui was shattered in October with a spike in violence
including an attack on a UN convoy. The situation has calmed since
then but still remains fragile. The population continues to suffer
from extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detention,
torture, recruitment and use of child soldiers and sexual violence
against women and children.
"A sustainable recovery from crisis will
depend on improved security. There is a requirement for building
state institutions in CAR but this can only be considered when
there is sufficient and effective political dialogue, leadership
and security."
14.21 The Minister goes on to say that the UK's immediate
priorities for CAR at this critical time are to ensure:
"that a safe and secure environment are
established and maintained, particularly in the capital Bangui
which will enable the right conditions for a sustainable political
process; and for the UN to coordinate the humanitarian response
effectively."
14.22 An EU Military Advisory Mission "meets
the UK's objective of working with and through international organisations
to ensure peace and security are delivered to CAR".
14.23 With regard to EUFOR CAR and the UN Peacekeeping
Operation, MINUSCA (which should reach Full Operational Capability
in April 2015), the Minister says that establishing EUMAM CAR
would support the UN's deployment and help lock in the security
gains and trust that EUFOR CAR has built up with the local population
and government; and in particular would:
— begin
the process of security sector reform of the FACA in CAR;
— cement the current positive civil-military
co-operation;
— provide a positive signal of EU support
to the Interim President of CAR and her interim government following
their request for priority to be given to reforming and training
of the FACA; and
— deepen EU and UN common cooperation in
CAR.
14.24 Looking ahead, the Minister then says:
"Before giving our support to the development
of a Crisis Management Concept, we worked to ensure that it incorporated
a 'phased approach' for EUMAM CAR — starting off as an advisory
mission which, subject to agreed conditions and further political
consent, could transition to conduct targeted non-operational
training in co-ordination with the UN. We have also emphasised
the importance of a realistic exit strategy as planning continues.
The mission aims to complement UN efforts on SSR. Any further
steps, following its 12 month mandate, will need to consider progress
and CAR internal political reforms."
14.25 With regard to the Financial Aspects, the Minister
says:
"Through the ATHENA mechanism,[67]
the UK would expect to pay a 15.66% share of common costs. The
Reference Amount for EUMAM CAR, the initial estimate of the total
common costs, will be agreed as part of this Council Decision.
The Athena Administrator has made a preliminary analysis of the
possible costs EUMAM CAR based on a certain number of assumptions.
The Administrator has evaluated the reference amount for the activities
foreseen in the draft Council Decision at €7.9m for the 14
month period. The UK's contribution would therefore be around
€1,237,140. HMG would provide this funding from the Peacekeeping
budget which on current planning has sufficient capacity and flexibility
to absorb this spend in the short term. We continue to argue strongly
for the importance of driving down costs and pushing for value
for money. At present, there are no plans for the UK to contribute
troops."
14.26 With regard to the immediate Timetable,
the Minister says:
"The aim is for the adoption of the Council
Decision to launch the mission at the Foreign Affairs Council
on 19 January 2015 with a further Council Decision to establish
the mission being adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council on 9
February 2015 (a further Explanatory Memorandum will be submitted
ahead of that decision). EUMAM CAR will need to deploy on 1 March
2015 to ensure it can reach Full Operational Capability by 15
March 2015. This will allow for a smooth handover from EUFOR CAR,
the mandate for which expires on 15 March 2015."
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36377), —: Thirteenth Report
HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 38 (15 October 2014); (35747),
—: Thirty-fourth Report HC 83-xxxi (2013-14), chapter 14
(5 February 2014) and Thirty-eighth Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14),
chapter 16 (5 March 2014); and (35827), — and (35828), —:
Thirty-eighth Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14) chapter 18 (5 March
2014).
60 Séléka was an alliance of rebel militia
factions that overthrew the Central African Republic government
on 24 March 2013. Nearly all the members of Séléka
are Muslim. Back
61
The term used to refer to the Christian militias formed after
the rise to power of the Seléka; Anti-balaka means "anti-machete"
or "anti-sword" in the local Sango and Mandja languages. Back
62
The EUSEC RD Congo mission has been deployed in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) since June 2005, reforming their army,
working with the other contributing members of the international
community, giving advice and assistance directly to the competent
Congolese authorities on securitysector reform. Since the
original mandate, which aimed to support integration into the
Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and to run the "Chain of
payments" project for ensuring the security of payments to
the military, the mission has expanded its activities in this
area with a view to modernising both administration and human
resources management, and diversified its activities, providing
assistance to its Congolese partners in the field of troop training. Back
63
See (35747), -: Thirty-fourth Report HC 83-xxxi (2013-14), chapter 14
(5 February 2014) and Thirty-eighth Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14),
chapter 16 (5 March 2014); and (35827), - and (35828), -: Thirty-eighth
Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14) chapter 18 (5 March 2014) for full
background and details. Back
64
Séléka was an alliance of rebel militia factions
that overthrew the Central African Republic government on March
24, 2013. Nearly all the members of Séléka are Muslim. Back
65
The term used to refer to the Christian militias formed after
the rise to power of the Seléka; Anti-balaka means "anti-machete"
or "anti-sword" in the local Sango and Mandja languages. Back
66
See (36377), -: Thirteenth Report HC 219-xiii (2014-15), chapter 38
(15 October 2014). Back
67
Athena is the mechanism that handles the financing of common costs
relating to EU military operations under the EU's common security
and defence policy (CSDP). It operates on behalf of the 27 EU
member states who contribute to the financing of EU military operations
(Denmark has opted out of CSDP on military matters). Athena was
set up by the Council of the European Union on 1 March 2004. Five
active EU military operations currently benefit from Athena financing:
EUFOR ALTHEA (Kosovo); EUNAVFOR ATALANTA (anti-piracy); EUTM SOMALIA;
EUTM MALI; and EUFOR RCA. Athena manages the financing of common
costs for these operations, such as transport, infrastructure
and medical services, as well as the nation borne costs, which
include lodging, fuel, and similar costs linked to national contingents.
Athena is managed by an administrator and under the authority
of a Special Committee made up of representatives from the member
states contributing to the financing of each operation. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/fac/financing-security-and-defence-military-operations-(athena)
for full information. Back
| 
