6 The EU's Special Representative (EUSR)
to Bosnia and Herzegovina and wider EUSR issues
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny (decision reported on 7 January 2015)
|
| Document details | Council Decision appointing a new European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
| Legal base | Articles 31 (2) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
| Department
Document number
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(36572), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
6.1 Mr Peter Sørensen had been the EU's Special
Representative (EUSR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with a mandate
until 30 June 2015. He was highly rated. But a vacancy arose
on 31 October 2014 due to (as the Minister for Europe, Mr David
Lidington, put it) his "early departure … to another
position".
6.2 It was not until earlier this month, however,
that the Council proposed to appoint as his successor Mr Lars-Gunnar
Wigemark — described by the Minister as "a senior Swedish
diplomat with close to 30 years of experience, most recently as
EU Head of Delegation to Pakistan". Though endorsed by him,
the Minister expected "swift Commission action to fill the
position on a longer term basis next spring, assuming the mandate
of the EUSR is renewed".
6.3 Not only had the EU seemingly lost a key interlocutor
and was now having to rely on a short-term appointment; this was
all taking place at a crucial moment. Nineteen years after the
Dayton Accords, and notwithstanding sustained support from the
International Community, a country of four million inhabitants
remained divided by mistrust between the various ethnic groups,
the upshot of which has been political stagnation, a lack of badly
needed reform and the consequential stagnation of the Bosnian
EU accession process. Against this background, in November 2014
the Foreign Secretary and his German counterpart put forward a
new, high-profile initiative towards BiH's EU accession, which
was swiftly followed up by the EU High Representative/Vice-President,
Federica Mogherini, and the Enlargement Commissioner in a visit
to Sarajevo. The EUSR is seen as crucial in supporting HR Mogherini's
mandate under the new EU initiative, which was endorsed by the
December 2014 Foreign Affairs Council.
6.4 The fact that the previous HR had decided to
leave the appointment until her successor had taken office seemed
to us to reflect a much wider uncertainty over the future of EUSRs
as a whole. As noted in other earlier Reports,[41]
Baroness Ashton had wished to incorporate all the EUSRs into the
European External Action Service (EEAS), thereby turning them
from special representatives agreed by the Council into ones who
would be appointed by, and report only to, the High Representative
— a proposal that the Committee had indicated that it would
find disturbing because it would undermine Member State control
of an important element in Common Foreign and Security Policy.
6.5 The Committee therefore asked the Minister to
provide a swift update on where this proposal now stood, in the
aftermath of HR Mogherini's appointment; and to provide the background
to Mr S¾rensen's premature departure — why he had left,
whether it had anything to do with this political tussle over
the future of EUSRs and what his new appointment was.
6.6 In the meantime, this Council Decision was cleared
from scrutiny.
6.7 The Minister:
— agrees entirely that it is unfortunate
that the EU has lost a key interlocutor at this juncture, but
nonetheless maintains that Mr Wigemark will bring significant
experience to the role, and will be well supported by an experienced
team in Sarajevo, including a Deputy Head Delegation with substantial
regional expertise, in Kosovo as well as in BiH;
— understands that Mr S¾rensen's departure
was entirely for personal reasons and not as a result of any other
issues; his new role is as Head of the EU Delegation to the United
Nations and other International Organisations in Geneva;
— says that, during discussions of both
the 2014 and 2015 EU budgets, the UK and likeminded Member States
ensured that EEAS proposals for transferring the EUSRs and their
associated resources, currently under the (Member State-controlled)
CFSP budget, into the EEAS, have been rejected;
— that, now Federica Mogherini has taken
office, he will "continue to underline the primacy of the
Member States in this important tool";
— has written to Federica Mogherini towards
the end of last year to stress the importance of allowing sufficient
time for national scrutiny processes in advance of the forthcoming
round of mandate renewals;
— understands that the new mandates will
issue shortly;
— recalls that Baroness Ashton did not
replace the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process
when they resigned last year, stating that she did not wish to
pre-empt the decision of her successor;
— understands that Federica Mogherini is
considering filling both slots in the near future; and
— describes all this as "a promising
start", which he will "continue to monitor".
6.8 So, too, shall we — beginning with the
raft of mandate renewals that are falling due for renewal shortly.
We accordingly look to the Minister to lean hard on the EEAS
in order to ensure that they are submitted for scrutiny in good
time for any questions that may arise to be dealt with before
those mandates expire.
6.9 In the meantime, we note with approval that
the previous High Representative's proposal has been rejected,
and that the role and mandate of all EUSRs will therefore continue
to lie in with the Council, along with approval of any change
of incumbent — all of which remains subject to prior parliamentary
scrutiny.
Full details of the documents:
Council Decision appointing a new European Union Special Representative
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (36572), —.
Background
6.10 EU Special Representatives (EUSR) tackle specific
issues (including Human Rights), countries or regions of conflict.
They provide the EU with an active political presence, acting
as a "voice" and "face" for the EU and its
policies.[42] They answer
directly to the EU High Representative/Vice-President, who is
responsible for proposing their appointment. But they are appointed
by the EU Council, who determine each mandate, budget and job
holder.
6.11 Council Decision 2011/426/CFSP appointed Peter
S¾rensen as the EU's Special Representative (EUSR) to Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH) with a mandate until 30 June 2015. As recently
as June 2014, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) had
described him as having strengthened the EU's visibility and political
impact in BiH, taken the lead in supporting BiH in EU-related
matters and being a respected and trusted interlocutor who carried
real weight with key Bosnian politicians from all three constituent
parties (Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat); the EUSR mandate,
he said, remained critical to galvanising BiH's leaders into making
the reforms needed to allow them to submit a credible application
for candidate status.
6.12 Earlier this month, the Minister said that,
following Mr S¾rensen's departure last autumn "to another
function", the Council now proposed to appoint Mr Lars-Gunnar
Wigemark as the new EUSR in BiH from 1 March 2015. He would continue
with the same mandate as in Council Decision 2011/426/CFSP (see
our previous Report for details).
6.13 The objective of the EUSR is to assist in the
creation of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic BiH, co-operating
peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track towards
EU membership. To this end, the EUSR offers advice and facilitation
in the local political progress, co-ordinates the activities of
EU actors in BiH and provides EU actors and EU Heads of Mission
with regular reporting on the local political situation. The EUSR
also undertakes significant outreach work, aimed at communicating
to the BiH population the benefits of EU integration and why certain
reforms are necessary to realise them.
6.14 The current political framework emerged from
the 1995 Dayton Agreement, which ended a bitter three-and-a half-year
war. The longstanding goal has always been for BiH to work its
way towards European accession. The BiH authorities need to deliver
five objectives (well established, approved by the PIC SB[43]
and all previously recognized by BiH authorities as obligations)
revolving around creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic, democratic,
law-based State, and fulfil two conditions — signing of
a BiH Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and a positive
assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB based on full
compliance with the Dayton Agreement.
6.15 But things have not gone according to plan.
Delivery or fulfilment of these "Five Objectives and Two
Conditions" has, however, proved elusive. Nineteen years
later, a country of four million inhabitants remains divided by
mistrust between the various ethnic groups, the upshot of which
has been political stagnation, a lack of badly needed reform and
the consequential stagnation of the Bosnian EU accession process.
6.16 On 6 November 2014, the British and German foreign
ministers met their eight western Balkan counterparts and then
proposed a new joint initiative, the key points of which the two
Foreign Ministers set out in a joint article in the German daily
newspaper "Frankfurter Rundschau" and in an "open
letter" in Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighbouring countries
(see the second Annex to this chapter of our previous Report).
Their proposals are focused on improvements in economic and social
policy and good governance, so as to create jobs, strengthen the
rule of law and reduce corruption and criminality. The two foreign
ministers called on the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to commit in writing to "making the country's institutions
fit" at all levels as a precondition for working effectively
with the European Union; urged them to draw up a broad reform
agenda with the European Union to help the country make progress
on the road towards EU membership; and extended an offer to the
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the politicians they have
elected: if they implement the necessary reforms, they would "work
to achieve progress on the country's path towards Europe".
6.17 They also promised actively to seek broad-based
political support for their initiative from neighbouring Croatia
and Serbia, EU partners and the USA. However, the most important
factor, they argued, was leadership on the part of Bosnian politicians,
who must have the interests of their whole country at heart, regardless
of ethnic affiliations.[44]
6.18 This initiative was followed up in a 5 December
2014 visit to Sarajevo by the EU High Representative/Vice-President,
Federica Mogherini, and the Enlargement Commissioner, Johannes
Hahn; in an end-of-visit statement, the HR said:
"From our side this would mean not lowering
the bar and changing the EU conditionality — that is not
something that is on the agenda — but it might mean that
we can look at how the sequence can be changed or can be better
addressed to make sure that there are some concrete deliverables
in terms of reforms, starting from the economic and social reforms
and getting also to the functionality of the state"[45].
6.19 The initiative was subsequently endorsed by
the 15 December 2014 Foreign Affairs Council, who invited HR Mogherini
and Commissioner Hahn:
"to continue engaging with the BiH leadership
to secure at the earliest its irrevocable commitment to undertake
reforms in the framework of the EU accession process… [in
order to]… establish functionality and efficiency at all
levels of government and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare
itself for future EU membership" (see second annex to our
previous Report for the full Council Conclusions[46]).
Our assessment
6.20 The appointment of Mr Wigemark — described
by the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) as "a senior
Swedish diplomat with close to 30 years of experience, most recently
as EU Head of Delegation to Pakistan", and endorsed by him
— thus came at a crucial moment, after nearly two decades
of not-very-fruitful endeavours by the International Community.
We accordingly felt it unfortunate that the EU had lost a key
interlocutor at this juncture and now had to rely on a short-term
appointment with no apparent regional experience — the Minister
having said that he expected "swift Commission action to
fill the position on a longer term basis next spring, assuming
the mandate of the EUSR is renewed".
6.21 That assumption, and the fact that the previous
High Representative decided to leave the appointment until her
successor took office, reflected a much wider uncertainty over
the future of EUSRs as a whole. As the Minister knew, the previous
HR, Baroness Ashton, had wished to incorporate all the EUSRs into
the European External Action Service (EEAS), thereby turning them
from special representatives agreed by the Council into ones who
would be appointed by, and report only to, the High Representative
— a proposal that the Committee has said it would find disturbing
because it would undermine Member State control of an important
element in Common Foreign and Security Policy.[47]
We therefore asked the Minister to provide, within ten working
days, an update on where this proposal now stood, in the aftermath
of HR Mogherini's appointment.
6.22 At the same time, we asked about the background
to Mr S¾rensen's premature departure — why he had left,
whether it had anything to do with this political tussle over
the future of EUSRs and what his new appointment was.
6.23 In the meantime, we cleared the Council Decision
from scrutiny.[48]
The Minister's letter of 19 January 2015
6.24 The Minister responds as follows:
"I agree entirely with the Committee's assessment
that it is unfortunate that the EU has lost a key interlocutor
at this juncture. However, Mr Wigemark is a seasoned diplomat
who will bring significant experience to the role. He will be
well supported by an experienced team in Sarajevo, including Renzo
Daviddi, the current Deputy Head of the EU Delegation in Sarajevo,
who has substantial regional expertise, including in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and in Kosovo. My understanding is that Mr S¾rensen's
departure was entirely for personal reasons and not as a result
of any other issues. His new role is as Head of the EU Delegation
to the United Nations and other International Organisations in
Geneva.
"As the Committee highlights, it was no secret
that, as High Representative, Baroness Ashton advocated a full
transfer of EUSRs and their associated resources, currently under
the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget, into the EEAS.
During discussions of both the 2014 and 2015 EU budgets, the UK
and likeminded Member States ensured that EEAS proposals for such
a transfer have been rejected.
"Now that Federica Mogherini has taken office,
we will continue to underline the primacy of the Member States
in this important tool. Indeed, I wrote to Federica Mogherini
towards the end of last year to stress the importance of allowing
sufficient time for national scrutiny processes in advance of
the forthcoming round of mandate renewals. I understand that the
new mandates will issue shortly.
"The Committee will recall that Baroness Ashton
did not replace the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East
Peace Process when they resigned last year, stating that she did
not wish to pre-empt the decision of her successor. However, I
understand that Federica Mogherini is considering filling both
slots in the near future. This is a promising start and we will
continue to monitor developments."
Previous Committee Reports
Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15), chapter
14 (7 January 2015) and (35701), —: First Report HC 219-i
(2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014).; also see (36036), —:
Second Report HC 219-ii (2014-15), chapter 12 (11 June 2014);
(35032), —: Seventh Report HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter
12 (26 June 2013); also see (33960), —: Fourth Report HC
86-iv (2012-13), chapter 23 (14 June 2012) and (34725), —:
Thirty-fourth Report HC 86-xxxiv (2012-13), chapter 12 (6 March
2013): also (32951), —: Thirty-sixth Report HC 428-xxxii
(2010-12), chapter 17 (6 July 2011); (32579), —: Twenty-second
Report HC 428-xx (2010-12), chapter 8 (16 March 2011); and (31844),—
(31856-66),— and (31884), —: First Report HC 428-i
(2010-12), chapter 66 (8 September 2010).
41 Principal among these being our Report at: (35701)
-: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014). Back
42
See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
43
The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) - 55 countries and international
organisations that sponsor and direct the peace implementation
process - oversees all this. The PIC Steering Board (PIC SB) nominates
the HR, representing the International Community; the UN Security
Council (which approved the Dayton Agreement and the deployment
of international troops in BiH) then endorses the nomination.
The Steering Board also provides the HR with political guidance.
The Steering Board members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of
the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is represented by Turkey.
In Sarajevo, the HR chairs weekly meetings of the Ambassadors
to BiH of the Steering Board members. In addition, the Steering
Board meets at the level of political directors three times a
year. At the outset the HR was "double-hatted" as EUSR
and HR. Currently, the HR is "free-standing", ever since
the EUSR also became Head of the EU delegation. Back
44
See http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/BosnienUndHerzegowina/141006_Steinmeier_Hammond_Neustart_Bosnien.html,
which is reproduced at the first annex to our previous Report:
Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15), chapter 14 (7 January
2015). Back
45
See http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/remarks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-end-visit-bosnia-and-herzegovina_en.
Back
46
Also available at http://italia2014.eu/media/4325/council-conclusions-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina.pdf.
Back
47
For the full background to this issue, see our Report at: (35701),
-: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014). Back
48
See Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15), chapter 14 (7
January 2015). Back
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