House of Commons - Documents considered by the Committee on 4 February 2015

Documents considered by the Committee on 4 February 2015 - European Scrutiny Contents

9 EU Special Representative for the Sahel

Committee's assessment	Politically important
Committee's decision	Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
Document details	Council Decision extending the mandate of the EU's Special Representative for the Sahel
Legal base	Articles 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
Department	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Document number	(36629), —

Summary and Committee's conclusions

9.1 The Sahel region is defined in this context as Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The mandate was initiated in 2013. It is based on the EU's policy objectives, i.e., to contribute actively to regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and development in the region. The EUSR's job involves enhancing the quality, intensity and impact of the EU's multi-faceted engagement in the Sahel region, including the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, and to participate in coordinating all relevant instruments for EU actions. Initial priority was given to Mali and to the regional dimensions of the conflict there. The EUSR's specific tasks are detailed in the "Background" section below.

9.2 A year on, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) supported renewal. Mr Reveyrand had performed satisfactorily, and there was broad consensus that his mandate be extended for a further 12 months. It had been "tweaked" to reflect the (broadly positive) political developments in the Sahel since February 2013 (the signing of the Ouagadougou Accords in June, the deployment of the UN Mission (MINUSMA) to Mali in July, and the successful presidential and legislative elections in Mali) and now included language on the need for the EUSR to push for further progress on the Malian peace process, and to "keep a weather eye on Niger and Burkina Faso, which will hold important elections in 2015-16." Following what the Minister called a "light-touch "refresh" of the EU's Sahel Strategy (which in future would also cover Chad and Burkina Faso), a further (fifth) Policy Advisor would be funded by savings made elsewhere in the budget. The Minister also noted that the 12-month extension until February 2015 would bring it into line with the majority of other EUSR mandates, which were to be renewed "for only 8 months from June 2014 to February 2015".

9.3 The Minister now reports that Mr Reveyrand has generally performed effectively; after a period of illness, he resumed an energetic programme in autumn 2014, continuing to travel widely across the Sahel region and engaging with a wide range of interlocutors. His annual report was, the Minister says, welcomed by the PSC,[45] and Member States are supportive of his continuing in the role. Mr Reveyrand has continued to chair periodic meetings of a core group of Member States which have an interest in the Sahel, including the UK.

9.4 With regard to what he describes as a "near-final draft", the Minister says:

— the proposed mandate for EUSR Sahel is unchanged from 2014-15, and he believes this gives sufficient latitude for Mr Reveyrand to adapt his role to evolving events in the Sahel region;

— the UK has proposed in Brussels Committee discussions that Mr Reveyrand should monitor the Mali negotiations even more closely in future, and report back regularly to Member States in order that they can formulate their positions accordingly;

— Mr Reveyrand's new mandate will be for a period of eight months rather than a year, in tune with other EUSRs, and will therefore expire on 31 October 2015;

— he understands that the shorter mandates for all EUSRs have been proposed by the new High Representative/Vice President (Federica Mogherini) "to allow her to become acquainted with the individuals and evaluate their roles and performance".

9.5 As noted in the "Background" section of our Report, the tying-in of most other EUSR mandate renewals to end-February 2015 reflected a wider tussle between the then High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and Member States, about the future of the EUSR "concept", resolution of which was postponed until the arrival of the new HR last November. That seems to have been resolved, though it is debatable whether an eight-month renewal period, which is bound to include a summer break, is sufficient to evaluate all EUSR roles and performance. Moreover, though the Minister provides this interpretation here, in the case of other EUSRs whose mandate renewal we consider elsewhere in this Report, he talks of the eight-month renewal period being "under review".

9.6 In this instance, the draft is not yet final; and, again, no budgetary information is yet available. In this instance too, he refers to the late circulation of documents by the EEAS, which will result in a short gap between the 2013-14 and 2014-15 mandates, though a mechanism exists to allow the EUSR to continue operating during this period. The questions thus arise: is this late circulation the result of the EEAS having had to await the new HR's determination of the wider policy issue, and then being faced with a lot of work at the last minute? In that case, the new HR is guilty of not taking sufficient cognisance of the need for timely parliamentary scrutiny. Or is it, once again, the EEAS's failure alone?

9.7 In terms of the need for the job and the performance of the incumbent, no questions arise. We shall, however, continue to retain the Council Decision under scrutiny, pending clarification of the final terms of the mandate, the timing issues and the proposed budget.

Full details of the documents: (36629), —: Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union's Special Representative for the Sahel

Background

9.8 Council Decision 2013/133/CFSP of 18 March 2013 appointed Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon as the new European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel.[46] The Sahel region is defined as in the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, i.e. Mali, Mauritania and Niger.[47] Further background is set out in our previous Reports.

9.9 As with the already established EUCAP SAHEL Niger mission,[48] we shared the Minister's concern not so much about the case for this additional EUSR (which was well-made) but about ensuring Value for Money (VFM). Looking ahead, we said that we expected the salary and other VFM aspects of the EUSR role to be given full consideration in the forthcoming EUSR review, which we looked forward to scrutinising in due course.[49]

9.10 Given that the EUSR Sahel was to have few staff, a small budget and no executive responsibilities, we found it difficult to see the justification for an annual remuneration of a quarter of a million Euros, or for it to be the same as that of counterparts with palpably bigger responsibilities.

9.11 We trusted that the Minister's officials' engagement in addressing the salary and other VFM aspects of the EUSR role would include ways in which the EUSRs' individual performances could be better measured, given that (as in this instance) their tasks were defined in such terms that a high "box marking" was almost guaranteed, and looked forward to hearing more from the Minister about his approach.[50]

The 2014 Council Decision

9.12 This Council Decision renewed Mr Reveyrand's mandate for one year, until 28 February 2015. The Minister reported that Mr Reveyrand had performed satisfactorily, having: played an important role in the process that facilitated presidential and legislative elections in Mali; travelled widely in the Sahel-Sahara region over the last year; and been energetic in building dialogue with regional and international contacts on the issues facing the Sahel. EU Member States appreciated his collaborative approach; agreed that the EUSR could play an important role in helping Sahelian states to address the wide-ranging challenges affecting the region; and saw his co-ordinating function as helpful in mobilising the range of EU instruments available to assist in the region and coordinating the EU's work with that of other international actors such as the UN, World Bank, African Union and ECOWAS. Consequently there was broad consensus that Reveyrand's mandate be extended for a further 12 months.

9.13 The Minister drew attention to some amendments to the mandate, in order to reflect the (broadly positive) political developments in the Sahel since February 2013 (the signing of the Ouagadougou Accords in June, the deployment of the UN Mission (MINUSMA) to Mali in July, and the successful presidential and legislative elections in Mali); the need the EUSR to push for further progress on the Malian peace process; and the need to keep a weather eye on Niger and Burkina Faso, which were to hold important elections in 2015-16. Also, following the "light-touch 'refresh'" of the EU's Sahel Strategy (which in future would also cover Chad and Burkina Faso), the EUSR had proposed to expand his team to include a further (fifth) POLAD (Policy Advisor) who would be based in Brussels, and which (after resistance from the UK and others) would not involve any financial increase. All in all, the Minister was content with the outcome.

9.14 The Minister also noted that the extension of Mr Reveyrand's mandate until February 2015 would bring it into line with the majority of other EUSR mandates, which were also to be renewed, but only for only eight months from June 2014. This touched on the general issues — the review of current guidelines on EUSRs and the apparent tussle between the HR and Member States over their future — that the Committee raised in a separate chapter of the same Report, on the (former) EUSR to the Middle East Peace Process and the then recent resignations of the EUSRs to the South Caucasus and Georgia and to Central Asia.[51]

9.15 So far as this mandate extension was concerned, however, no questions arose. We therefore cleared this Council Decision from scrutiny.[52]

The draft Council Decision

9.16 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 2 February 2015, the Minister says that this "near-final draft" proposes that Mr Reveyrand's mandate be renewed once again, on this occasion for a further eight months; that a draft Budget Impact Statement for the new mandate has not yet been circulated, "but we expect this soon"; and that he supports the renewal of Mr Reveyrand's mandate.

The Government's view

9.17 The Minister continues his comments as follows:

"Despite a period of illness which restricted his activity in 2014, Mr Reveyrand has generally performed effectively in the EUSR role in 2014-15. Once recovered from his illness, Mr Reveyrand resumed an energetic programme in autumn 2014. This was timely given the commencement of the Mali peace negotiations in Algiers, and that Mr Reveyrand is the EU's eyes and ears, and instrument of influence on that process.

"Mr Reveyrand has continued to travel widely across the Sahel region, engaging with a wide range of interlocutors. His annual report was welcomed by the PSC, and Member States are supportive of his continuing in the role. Mr Reveyrand has continued to chair periodic meetings of a core group of Member States which have an interest in the Sahel, including the UK. The UK has offered to host the next of these gatherings in London in March 2015. The UK's Special Representative to the EU [sic], the Rt Hon Stephen O'Brien MP,[53] will act as principal host."

9.18 With regard to the "near-final draft", the Minister says:

"The proposed mandate for EUSR Sahel is unchanged from 2014-15, and we believe this gives sufficient latitude for Mr Reveyrand to adapt his role to evolving events in the Sahel region. The UK has proposed in Brussels Committee discussions that Mr Reveyrand should monitor the Mali negotiations even more closely in future, and report back regularly to Member States in order that they can formulate their positions accordingly.

"Mr Reveyrand's new mandate will be for a period of eight months rather than a year, in tune with other EUSRs. It will therefore expire on 31 October 2015. We understand that the shorter mandates for all EUSRs have been proposed by the new High Representative/Vice President (Federica Mogherini) to allow her to become acquainted with the individuals and evaluate their roles and performance."

9.19 Finally, on the Financial Implications, the Minister says:

"We have not yet seen a budget for the new mandate. It is expected to be circulated to Member States soon, and we will provide an update to the Committees once it arrives. The late circulation of documents by the EEAS will result in a short gap between the 2013-14 and 2014-15 mandates, though a mechanism exists to allow the EUSR to continue operating during this period.

"The PSC is expected to instruct COAFR to discuss and agree the mandate and budget during the week beginning 2 February. RELEX will consider the budget during the week of 9 February 2015. It is hoped that the Council will clear the new mandate and budget during the week of 2 March 2015.

"Given that there will be a gap between mandates, a retroactivity clause will allow the EUSR to continue his work during this period, using funds that remain unspent under the 2014-15 mandate."

Previous Committee Reports

None, but see (35800), —: Thirty-seventh Report HC 83-xxxiv (2013-14), chapter 21 (26 February 2014).

45 Political and Security Committee: the committee of ambassador-level officials from national delegations who, by virtue of article 38 TEU, under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the Council, monitor the international situation in areas covered by the CFSP and exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations, as set out in article 43 TEU. The chair is nominated by the HR. Back

46 EUSRs promote the EU's policies and interests in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. They support the work of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), in the regions concerned, and provide the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a "voice" and "face" for the EU and its policies. See http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm for full details. Back

47 The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel has four key themes:

· that security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and that helping these countries achieve security is integral to enabling their economies to grow and poverty to be reduced;

· that achieving security and development in the Sahel is only possible through closer regional cooperation. This is currently weaker than it needs to be, and the EU has a potential role to play in supporting it;

· all the states of the region will benefit from considerable capacity-building, both in areas of core government activity, including the provision of security and development cooperation; and

· that the EU therefore has an important role to play both in encouraging economic development for the people of the Sahel and helping them achieve a more secure environment in which it can take place, and in which the interests of EU citizens are also protected.

See http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf for full information. Back

48 EUCAP SAHEL Niger is designed to build the capacity of Nigerien security forces to fight terrorism and organised crime. With a first year budget of €8,700,000, a 24-month mandate and, at full operational capability, up to 78 people, the aim of the mission is to enable the Nigerien authorities to implement the security dimension of their Strategy for Security and Development, as well as improving regional coordination in tackling common security threats and contributing to the development of an integrated, sustainable, and human rights-based approach to the fight against terrorism and organised crime. Back

49 See Thirty-third Report HC 86-xxxiii (2012-13), chapter 13 (27 February 2013) for the full background. Back