1 EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; for debate in European Committee B
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| Document details | Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16
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| Legal base | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | (35996), 9467/14, JOIN(14) 17
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
1.1 The Joint Communication outlines the key elements for a future
EU strategy. It covers the political context as well as the key
objectives and initiatives upon which the EU would seek to focus
on in support of the Government of Afghanistan. It focuses on
four key areas, with critical sub-objectives: promoting peace
and security; reinforcing democracy; encouraging economic and
human development; and fostering the rule of law and respect for
human rights.
1.2 Details of the context — particularly the
2012 Tokyo Conference, at which the International Community pledged
to improve aid effectiveness and provide US$16 billion to Afghanistan
in return for the Government of Afghanistan meeting its commitments
under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework — are summarised
below, and detailed in our previous Report.[1]
So, too, the Strategy itself.
1.3 The authors noted that the strategic goal and
objectives were developed in advance of clarity on the size and
scale of any international military presence post-2014; expectations
as to the degree of progress and the delivery of international
assistance in support of the Government of Afghanistan's priorities
in the event of a very limited international presence would necessarily
have to be tempered.
1.4 In this latest update, the Minister for Europe
(Mr David Lidington) has finally provided the Committee with the
further information that it requested in its 5 November 2014 Report,
concerning primarily the outcome of the 24-25 November 2014 London
Conference on Afghanistan, which the UK co-chaired the alongside
the Afghan Government (see paragraph 1.14 below for details).
1.5 When the Committee first considered this Joint
Communication, it indicated that, though there was nothing controversial
about it per se, it was minded to recommend it for debate
in due course because of the role that, one way or another, the
EU would be undertaking (with EU taxpayers' money) in post-2014
Afghanistan and the host of uncertainties surrounding the essentials
for its successful implementation. That point has now been reached.
We therefore recommend that the Joint Communication be debated
in European Committee B.
1.6 We are conscious that, with a large backlog
of debate recommendations, it is unlikely that this can be arranged
prior to the dissolution of Parliament. However, we are confident
that, in due course, our successors would support this recommendation;
and believe that a new House would value the opportunity to debate
the subject, and the next Government the opportunity to report
on and discuss what has actually happened under the EU Strategy.
Full details of
the documents: Joint
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements
for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16: (35996), 9467/14,
JOIN(14) 17.
Background
1.7 The Afghan Government and the International Community
met on 8 July 2012 in Tokyo "to reaffirm and further consolidate
their partnership from Transition to the Transformation Decade".
The Tokyo Conference, together with the Chicago Summit of Afghanistan
and ISAF contributing countries of May 2012, established what
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described as:
"a renewed stronger foundation for partnership
to support sustainable growth and development of Afghanistan throughout
the Transformation Decade (2015-2024). These undertakings are
built on the outcome of the Bonn Conference in December 2011,
where the Afghan Government and the International Community mutually
renewed their long-term commitments in the areas of governance,
security, peace process, economic and social development, and
regional cooperation, as well as on the outcomes of the previous
international conferences such as the London Conference in January
2010 and the Kabul Conference in July 2010. Chaired by the Japanese
and Afghan Governments with the participation of ministers and
representatives from 55 countries and 25 international and other
organizations from around the world, today's conference also recognized
the increasing roles of new partners and neighboring and regional
countries for the sustainable development of Afghanistan."
1.8 Acknowledging the promulgation of its new Constitution,
the Declaration pointed out that much nonetheless remained to
be done to achieve a peaceful, stable and self-sustaining Afghanistan,
including on such issues as security, with a focus on terrorism
and counter-narcotics, poverty reduction, humanitarian needs,
provision of basic social services, food security, protection
of human rights in particular the rights of women and children,
respect for individual dignity, promotion of education and culture,
improvement of governance, reducing corruption, lessening reliance
on international assistance, and promotion of private investment,
thereby contributing to human security. The Bonn Conference had
demonstrated a shared vision for long-term partnership between
Afghanistan and the International Community to help Afghanistan
attain sustainable economic growth and development and fiscal
self-reliance from Transition through the Transformation Decade.
Afghanistan and the International Community had accordingly established
the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (a.k.a. the 'Tokyo Framework'),
which underpinned their partnership for the Transformation Decade.[2]
1.9 At the Conference, the International Community
pledged to improve aid effectiveness and provide US$16 billion
to Afghanistan in development assistance through 2015-17, to respond
to Afghanistan's predicted budget shortfall following military
transition. For Afghanistan to benefit fully from these funds,
the Government of Afghanistan must meet its commitments under
the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF).[3]
1.10 The January 2014 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions
defined 2014 as a critical year. The Council called on the Government
of Afghanistan to reciprocate the EU's commitment to Afghanistan
by finalising negotiations on the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership
and Development (CAPD). Sustained development would require the
maintenance of security. With that in mind, finalisation of the
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States of America
was vital and would provide the basis for ongoing international
support to increase the capability of the Afghan National Security
Forces. The continued provision of significant international development
assistance to the Afghan people across the country was dependent
on a conducive security environment.
1.11 The High Representative and the Commission was
tasked with preparing, by the second quarter of 2014, a strategy
to the end of 2016.[4]
Commission/High Representative Joint Communication
1.12 The Joint Communication outlines the key elements
for a future EU strategy. It covers the political context as well
as the key objectives and initiatives upon which the EU would
seek to focus on in support of the Government of Afghanistan.
It focuses on four key areas, with critical sub-objectives: promoting
peace and security; reinforcing democracy; encouraging economic
and human development; and fostering the rule of law and respect
for human rights. The context is detailed in our previous Report
of 18 June 2014.[5] So,
too, the Joint Communication itself.
1.13 The authors noted that the strategic goal and
objectives were developed in advance of clarity on the size and
scale of any international military presence post-2014; expectations
as to the degree of progress and the delivery of international
assistance in support of the Government of Afghanistan's priorities
in the event of a very limited international presence would necessarily
have to be tempered.
1.14 When we considered the Joint Communication in
June 2014, the Minister for Europe noted that the work of the
EU would be constrained by the tough security environment; the
UK would continue to press for sensible and realistic outcomes.
The strategy would need to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to
developments on the ground and, importantly, the policies and
priorities set by a new Afghan Government later this year. There
would also be two key events — the NATO Summit and "the
Development Conference" — that would look closely at
the international community's future commitments. In helping to
shape the proposed strategy, the Government would continue to
urge prioritisation and better coordination with its international
partners and other multilateral organisations (NATO and United
Nations) engaged in Afghanistan, to avoid duplicity and guarantee
a genuinely unified approach: any strategy must give weight to
the importance of these relationships.
1.15 Though there was nothing controversial about
the proposed elements for an EU Strategy, we felt that it would
be appropriate to debate it in due course because of the role
that, one way or another, the EU would be undertaking (with EU
taxpayers' money) in post-2014 Afghanistan and the host of uncertainties
surrounding the essentials for its successful implementation.
But the Strategy had yet to be agreed; the outcome of Presidential
elections was yet to be settled; and both USA and NATO post-2014
security agreements with the Government of Afghanistan were consequently
still in limbo. Two key conferences were also on the horizon:
first, the NATO Summit in Wales, and then the London Conference
on Afghanistan. The Committee therefore asked the Minister to
write to us in due course, with: a copy of the Strategy; his
thoughts on the outcome of the Presidential election; more details
concerning the dates, location and nature of the two key events
to which he referred; and an update on the BSA with Afghanistan,
NATO's equivalent SOFA, and the National Security Council's consideration
of the UK's specific post-2014 military commitment.
1.16 The Minister subsequently reported that Dr Ashraf
Ghani was sworn in as President on 29 September and had immediately
appointed his electoral rival, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, as "Chief
Executive and partner in what will be a National Unity Government",
in which they would take decisions on key appointments and a programme
for Government. The Prime Minister had met President Ghani on
3 October and underlined the UK Government's strong commitment
to the new Government; alongside its own bilateral efforts, the
Government would "continue to influence the EU and other
Member States to engage constructively with the new Government
at all levels, to ensure that we can take the necessary steps
to align and deliver on our shared priorities". Both the
US/Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) had now been signed. The UK 4-5 September
NATO Summit in Wales had set out the long term commitment of NATO
partners to Afghanistan, focusing on three key strands of activity:
a) Resolute Support Mission;
b) financial support for the Afghan National
Security Forces; and
c) NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership.
1.17 The 20 October 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
welcomed the formation of a Government of National Unity, reiterated
the EU's long-term commitment to Afghanistan and reaffirms the
comprehensive strategy agreed in June. It looked forward to working
in close cooperation with the new government and international
partners to safeguard the advances Afghanistan has made over the
last 13 years and to support and incentivise urgently needed reforms.
The EU recognised the important future role to be played by UNAMA
in Afghanistan.[6] It pledged
up to €1.4 billion in assistance up to 2020, complementing
the development assistance to be provided bilaterally by Member
States. The EU restated its willingness to finalise the Cooperation
Agreement for Partnership and Development, as the basis for a
wide-ranging long-term partnership between the EU and Afghanistan.
The EU also restated its commitment to the extension of the EU
police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) until the end of 2016.
1.18 The Council also called for a clear and unequivocal
commitment to respect human rights, in particular the rights of
women and girls, and says that it is now imperative that the Government
of Afghanistan enact the reforms necessary to restore economic
confidence, promote job creation, increase revenue generation,
reform the judicial system, tackle the twin threats from corruption
and narcotics and improve the accountability of the state to ordinary
Afghans.
1.19 The London conference would, the Council said,
provide the opportunity both for the government to set out its
reform commitment in these areas and for the international community
to restate its long-term commitment to support Afghanistan.[7]
Our assessment
1.20 We continued to regard the Joint Communication
as an appropriate basis for future debate, especially as the Minister
had nothing to say about the 23 page Strategy itself, and thus
of the extent to which it reflected the approach that he advocated
or how realistic he now thought it was in the light of subsequent
political and security developments.
1.21 But, before then, we asked the Minister to report
on the outcome of the London Conference, with his assessment in
the light thereof of the prospects for the EU achieving its objectives
over the next three years, including the extent to which it would
depend on the commitments of the Afghan government and of other
members of the International Community, and the likely impact
of the post-2014 security environment. We also asked him to outline
the outcome of the National Security Council's consideration of
the UK's specific post-2014 military commitment.
1.22 In the meantime, we retained the Joint Communication
under scrutiny.[8]
1.23 More recently, we had to remind the Minister
that two months had passed, during which we had heard nothing
from him; and asked him to provide this information forthwith.[9]
The Minister's letter of 10 February 2015
1.24 The Minister, "with apologies for the delay",
provides "an overview of the London Conference, the focus
and formation of the new National Unity Government, an update
on the security situation, Human Rights and the EU's work in Afghanistan".
1.25 He does so as follows:
"LONDON CONFERENCE
ON AFGHANISTAN
"On the 4 December the UK Government and the
Afghan government co-hosted the London Conference on Afghanistan.
The conference was an important opportunity for the new Afghan
government to set out its vision for reform and for the international
community, led by the Prime Minister, to signal its strong support
for the new Afghan government. The Prime Minister congratulated
President Ghani on the start his government had made and underlined
the UK's commitment; making clear that we see our role in Afghanistan
as changing — not ending.
"President Ghani and CEO Abdullah used the opportunity
to set out an ambitious reform programme, tackling corruption
and reconnecting Afghan citizens to their government. President
Ghani thanked the international community for its sacrifices and
set out his vision for a new partnership.
"The conference communiqué reaffirmed
the commitment of the international community to Afghanistan and
its support for the new Afghan government's focus on reform. The
National Unity Government and International Community have also
committed to holding a follow-up meeting of senior officials later
this year.
"THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
"The formation of the new Afghan national unity
government, led by President Ghani with Dr Abdullah Abdullah as
Chief Executive, represents the first democratic transfer of power
in Afghan history. We are now encouraging the swift confirmation
of Ministerial appointments to ensure momentum continues. Eight
cabinet positions along with the current intelligence chief have
been confirmed by the Afghan parliament. New Ministers are now
in place at the Ministry of Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs,
Health, Rural Development, Mines, Refugees and Religious Affairs.
These new Ministers have started work. We note that the new government's
nominee for the position of Minister for Defence was rejected
by the Afghan parliament. We are also mindful that no women ministers
were approved.
"Nevertheless, it is not unusual in the Afghan
political system for Parliament to reject a number of nominees
requiring the government to return to Parliament with revised
nominations. Alongside our own bilateral efforts, we will continue
to influence the EU and other Member States to engage constructively
with the new Afghan government at all levels, to ensure that we
can take the necessary steps to align and deliver on our shared
priorities.
"SECURITY
"In his last update report to Parliament on
developments in Afghanistan on 29th January, the Foreign Secretary
referenced the security challenges that remain in Afghanistan
and the evolution of our support beyond 2014.
"The attacks against Afghan security personnel,
innocent Afghan civilians, and international workers, including
a British Embassy vehicle at the end of last year which resulted
in the death of a UK national security contractor and an Afghan
member of British Embassy staff, bring home to us the continuing
challenge. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are proving
increasingly effective in combating the insurgency and have now
assumed complete security responsibilities from ISAF, including
the lead for combat operations across Afghanistan. We know that
to maintain this progress and protect the gains made so far, the
ANSF will require continued support from the international community.
The UK has committed £70 million per annum to 2017 in support
of this crucial activity.
"The first significant act of the National Unity
Government was to sign both the US/Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement
(BSA) and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
"This was a decisive and welcome move by the
new President and provides the legal framework for the continuing
presence of international military support. The BSA and NATO SOFA
were subsequently ratified by the Afghan Parliament between 23-27
November. This was followed by formal agreement from NATO Foreign
ministers on 2 December to the launch the new NATO Resolute Support
Mission to train, advise and assist the ANSF from the start of
2015.
"HUMAN RIGHTS
"Women's and girls' rights featured prominently
at the London Conference. CEO Abdullah Abdullah confirmed in his
opening speech that protecting human rights, particularly women's
and children's rights, would be a focus of the new government.
The conference also highlighted the importance of civil society,
justice reform and the need for increased economic opportunities
for women. Together with our EU partners, we continue to raise
the rights of women and girls with the Afghan government. We have
allocated over £300,000 to address the psychological needs
of victims of sexual harassment and violence in Afghanistan and
provided £500,000 this year to the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC). UK support for girls' access to quality
education has included allocating £48.4m to the Girls Education
Challenge Fund (2013-17). We also continue to work with our international
partners such as the EU to improve the situation in Afghanistan
for human rights defenders, including through the EU plus member
states strategy on human rights defenders in Afghanistan.
"EU STRATEGY 2014-16
& THE EU/AFGHAN COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON PARTNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT
(CAPD)
"The successful transition to a new Afghan government
augurs well for the EU to achieve its objectives over the next
three years. The reform agenda, as outlined by the new Afghan
government's paper 'Realising Self-Reliance' and set out by President
Ghani at the London Conference, provides a credible framework
for delivering economic security by tackling corruption; maintaining
progress on national security; delivering political reform; and
consolidating progress on human rights. These are the right priorities
and closely align with the EU's 2014-16 strategy. The EU Strategy
is designed principally to ensure that the EU and Member States
can adopt a comprehensive and coordinated approach to activities
on the ground in support of the Afghan Government.
"As part of the EU's long term commitment to
Afghanistan it will seek early agreement with the new Afghan government
on the EU/Afghan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development.
If signed, the agreement will provide a legal underpinning for
a long-term partnership between the EU and Afghanistan. This will
be a priority for the EUSR as he works to deliver his mandate
objectives in 2015.[10]
Now that a new Afghan Government is in place, we will continue
to work with the EU and Member States to reach an agreement. Once
this work is concluded, as previously agreed with the Committee,
I will deposit the relevant documents for your consideration."
THE LIKELY IMPACT OF THE POST 2014 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
"We acknowledge that the work of the EU will
be constrained by the tough security environment. But the ratification
of the BSA and SOFA and the successful standing up of the NATO
Resolute Support Mission is a welcome backdrop for EU work and
brings to an end a long period of uncertainty. As acknowledged
by your Committee, it will be important for the EU and Member
States to remain flexible. Over the coming months, we are encouraging
partners to work closely with the new Afghan government, adapting
our approaches as necessary. This will be an ongoing discussion."
Previous Committee Reports
Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter
5 (5 November 2014) and Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter
5 (18 June 2014); also see (36033), —: Second Report HC
219-ii (2014-15), chapter 11 (11 June 2014).
1 See Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter 5
(18 June 2014). Back
2
See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_declaration_en1.html
for further information. Back
3
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) agreed in May
2012, establishes the mutual commitments of the Government of
Afghanistan and the international community to help Afghanistan
achieve its development and governance goals. Back
4
Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140656.pdf. Back
5
See Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter 5 (18 June 2014). Back
6
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is
a political mission established by the Security Council in 2002
at the request of the Government to assist it and the people of
Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and
development in the country. On 17 March 2014, the UN Security
Council unanimously adopted resolution 2145(2014), which renewed
the UNAMA mandate and set out the scope and range of activities
it must undertake over the coming 12 months, as Afghanistan continues
its political and security transition. Overall, the resolution
calls for UNAMA, led by the Secretary-General's Special Representative,
Ján Kubiš, to continue leading and coordinating international
civilian efforts in assisting the South Asian nation with its
transition - within the mandate and guided by the principle of
reinforcing Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership. See
http://unama.unmissions.org/ for full details. Back
7
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145218.pdf
, pp.2-24, for the Council Conclusions. Back
8
See Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 5 (5 November
2014). Back
9
See (36623), -: Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 6
(4 February 2015); also at chapter 18 of this Report. Back
10
See (36623), -: Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 6
(4 February 2015); also at chapter ?? of this Report. Back
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