House of Commons - Documents considered by the Committee on 25 February 2015

Documents considered by the Committee on 25 February 2015 - European Scrutiny Contents

6 The EU and Central Asia

Committee's assessment	Politically important
Committee's decision	Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
Document details	Joint Staff Working Document on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy
Legal base	—
Department	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Document numbers	(36624), 5241/15, SWD(15) 2

Summary and Committee's conclusions

6.1 The 2007 EU Central Asia strategy — embracing Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — prioritised a number of areas for engagement and cooperation:

· good governance, rule of law, human rights and democratisation;

· education and training; economic development, trade and investment;

· transport and energy; environmental sustainability and water management; and

· common security threats and challenges (see paragraphs 6.19-6.21 below for details).

6.2 Although a formal review was envisaged in the Strategy, Member States and the Commission agreed in mid-2012 on a "lighter-touch implementation review" and "a future orientation to guide the EU in its engagement", which was reinforced by Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) produced his own assessment at the same time (see paragraph 6.25 below for details).

6.3 Then, in early 2014, a European Court of Auditors' Special Report examined how the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) had planned and managed €674 million of development assistance to the Central Asian republics in the period 2007-2012.[35] The audit concluded that, under challenging circumstances, planning and allocation of assistance had been generally satisfactory. But assistance covered too many sectors and involved too many small projects; and the Commission/EEAS could not establish how much the EU had spent per sector and per country. Budget support programmes in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could and should have been more rigorously managed, and tied to specific anti-corruption measures. Disbursement decisions were based on partner countries' commitments to reform rather than on progress achieved. Implementation was slow overall. The regional programmes did not achieve a genuine regional dimension. The Commission reports focused on activity rather than results. At that time, the then Minister (Lynne Featherstone) said that these were general issues, which would be addressed via the EU's new "Agenda for Change",[36] an updated Development Cooperation Instrument and the Commission's work on an effective results framework, to measure impact and not just activities undertaken (see paragraphs 6.26-6.27 below for details).

6.4 Now, on 13 January 2015, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini) issued this progress report on implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy. It provides an overview of progress to date, identifies possible areas for change or additional focus and sets the scene for further detailed policy review scheduled to take place over the coming months under the Latvian EU Presidency, with the aim of agreeing a revised EU Strategy at the June European Council.

6.5 Significant developments noted include:

— establishment of a High Level Security Dialogue in 2013, focussing on developments in Afghanistan, Iran and Syria, cooperation against drugs trafficking, border management, counter-terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks;

— the conclusion in late 2014 of negotiations on a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan;

— continuing structured human rights dialogues and seminars and training workshops under the Rule of Law initiative with all five Central Asian states; and

— activity to promote a collaborative and sustainable approach to management of water resources in the region.

6.6 However, the report identifies a number of significant long-standing and underlying challenges: tense relationships, making developing cooperative approaches to shared regional challenges an uphill struggle; an overall slow pace of reform in key areas of rule of law, good governance, human rights and democratisation; and, more broadly, different and competing priorities leading to what the drafters consider a relative lack of EU focus and resources by comparison with other regions.

6.7 The report additionally notes new and potentially destabilising developments — e.g., the 2014 transition in Afghanistan, the current crisis in Ukraine, Russian promotion of the Eurasian Economic Union in the region — but concludes that, rather than a complete overhaul of approach, what is required are proposals that will make achievement of the EU's policy goals more effective (see paragraphs 6.28-6.33 below for details).

6.8 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) has no substantive concerns with the report's overall thrust: though he notes that it has been somewhat over-taken by subsequent developments, he continues to regard the core of the strategy, with its focus on the need to address a series of key shared security, economic and governance challenges, as remaining valid. Though the UK has Embassies in all five Central Asian states, and plays "an active role" in the region both bilaterally and through EU activity, most other EU Member States have no or limited representation, and "co-ordinated action through EU Representations is a useful and practical way to collectively leverage positive EU influence across the region". The Minister fully supports the emphasis on the need for renewed focus on addressing challenges posed in the context of climate change and pressure on shared water resources, and highlights the importance of co-ordinated work with key international partners including the UN Regional Centre for Central Asia, the OSCE and International Financial Institutions. He also agrees that much engagement in the region would naturally be bilateral and differentiated accordingly, given the substantial differences between the various Central Asian states:

"However, it is important not to lose the EU's specific comparative advantage in its ability to act as a disinterested and honest broker in bringing regional players together to share experience and seek shared approaches to addressing vital issues such as common security challenges (in the High Level Security Dialogue for example) or common governance and resource challenges" (see paragraphs 6.34-6.38 below for details).

6.9 This evaluation raises three issues. The first concerns the quality of the Commission and EEAS evaluation systems. Some €750 million has been spent by the EU in assisting this region in the last financial perspective. What has it actually achieved in terms of value for money? The short answer is: no-one knows.

6.10 As noted below, last April the Committee recommended for debate in European Committee a Commission Staff Working Document on "Paving the way for an EU Development and Cooperation Results Framework". For no good reason the Government did not arrange this debate for seven months. When it finally took place, the motion did no more than "welcome the document as an important step towards putting in place a results framework which will help drive improvements in the impact of the European Commission's development programmes by reporting results achieved and providing performance information for the Commission and others to act on".[37]

6.11 The Committee then came to consider a European Court of Auditors' (ECA) Special Report, which found that EuropeAid's[38] evaluation and Results-Orientated Monitoring (ROM) systems considerably limited its capacity to account for actual results achieved and that there was no systematic method of ensuring that evaluations actually led to improvement in programme quality. The Committee had already found (when considering an earlier ECA Special Report on the use of "blending", where loans are mixed with grants[39]) that the relevant DFID minister (Baroness Northover) might need to do a touch more than simply monitor the Commission's progress in adapting its ROM process and methodology to blending, and in devising and implementing a proper results framework, if the clearly defined success criteria were ever to be established that she rightly regarded as vital to understanding the effectiveness with which the Commission used EU taxpayers' resources in its development activities around the globe.

6.12 Given these subsequent, broader ECA findings regarding the ROM and evaluation systems overall, we felt that this was all the more so: instead, however, there was a regrettable air of hand-wringing; of there being little that could be done other than to keep on knocking on the door; of there being little sign of a real drive to back the ECA's basic conclusion — that, to pave the way for the necessary improvements relating to annual development expenditure in the region of €8 billion, "it is imperative that robust evaluation systems are implemented without delay" — notwithstanding the fact that other multi-lateral and bilateral donors have long had such systems in operation.

6.13 The lack of impetus was, in our view, best summed up by the fact that, as the Minister put it: "No date has been set for this to go to Council". In our view, only if the Council pressed the Commission would the necessary improvements be made in the right timeframe. We accordingly recommended that this Special Report be debated in European Committee, so that the House could question the Minister further about why a more determined effort was not being made, and why the Council was not putting its weight more directly to the wheel.[40] That debate has yet to be arranged. We urge the Government to do so forthwith.

6.14 The second is, who represents the EU in roles such as this? In mid-2013, the Committee cleared from scrutiny a straightforward extension of the mandate of the then EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia, Mrs Patricia Flor (previously a senior FRG diplomat, who had been appointed a year earlier). The Minister for Europe reported that she had travelled extensively in the region, performed well, been receptive to UK views, launched the High Level Security Dialogue to which he now refers, and been effective in raising the EU's level of influence in Central Asia. He saw her as continuing to provide a common focus for delivering EU messages not just on key human rights issues, but also on the benefits of regional co-operation and on potential EU assistance in helping the region to address some of its shared socio-economic difficulties; underlining again the strategic importance of the Central Asia region, the Minister said that the extension of the mandate of the EUSR was important to enable continued personal, high-level engagement with the leaders of the five Central Asia states. However, Mrs Flor resigned in early 2014, and on 9 April the then High Representative announced that she had decided to appoint Janos Herman, a senior EEAS official as her Special Envoy to Central Asia, with the task of ensuring continued EU high-level engagement in the region, for a six-month period. This hiatus reflected a wider tussle between the HR/EEAS (aided and abetted by the European Parliament) to reduce Member States' control of CFSP by making all such EUSRs responsible to the HR, and not to the Council.

6.15 Now, the Minister has told us that the new HR (Federica Mogherini) has proposed the reestablishment of the EUSR for Central Asia, and invited Member States to propose candidates, having said that: "a new EUSR for Central Asia would take up stewardship at political level of vital regional issues at stake"; this "would assure Central Asian partners that the region remains important to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of communication at the highest level with the countries of the region"; "would be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities of Central Asia"; and "will also build on the ongoing exercise to review our Strategy for Central Asia".

6.16 The third is, how is the upcoming review of this Strategy to be handled in terms of parliamentary scrutiny? Given the factors outlined above, it is perhaps not surprising that, as the Minister notes, the report identifies a number of significant long-standing and underlying challenges, an overall slow pace of reform in key areas and a relative lack of EU focus and resources by comparison with other regions. Nonetheless, as far as the Minister is concerned, the central tenets of the 2007 Strategy remain valid. In our estimation, all the issues outlined above make it imperative that the House has the opportunity, via the Committee, to scrutinise the final draft of the revised Strategy before it is adopted by the Council, so that it can be assured that it is not "more of the same" and does, instead, properly address the weaknesses identified by this evaluation.

6.17 We should accordingly like to hear from the Minister, within the next ten working days, on this matter. In the meantime, we shall retain this Joint Staff Working Document under scrutiny.

Full details of the documents: Joint Staff Working Document: Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy: (36624), 5241/15, SWD(15) 2.

Background

6.18 The Common Strategy instrument was created by the Amsterdam Treaty, as the means of setting out the objectives, overall policy guidelines, organisation and duration of the EU's external policies towards geographic or thematic areas.

6.19 The 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia set out the EU's approach to promoting democracy, human rights, good governance and sustainable development, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and energy security in Central Asia. It set out how it intended to work within existing instruments, such as the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements and other co-operation frameworks, to enhance co-operation. The then Minister for Europe (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) explained that it: would serve as the general framework for enhancing EU co-operation over the next 5-10 years; sat alongside the Commission's 2007-2013 Assistance Strategy for Central Asia, which provides the resources to support the strengthening of political dialogue with the Central Asian states; and was based on "a clear sense, both within the EU and the Central Asia region, that the EU's profile in the region was low, and fell some way behind that of Russia, China and the United States".

6.20 In its introduction, the paper noted that the Central Asian States lay at a strategically important intersection between the two continents; the time had come for a new partnership in a globalised world. The EU had a strong interest in a peaceful, democratic and economically prosperous Central Asia. The aim of the EU Strategy was therefore to co-operate actively with the Central Asian States in reaching these goals as well as to contribute to safeguarding peace and prosperity in neighbouring countries. The Strategy built on the progress that the Central Asian States had themselves made since attaining independence. It took account of their common aspects as well as specific national contexts and requirements. It also built on the results obtained under the implementation of the various Partnership and Co-operation Agreements, EU assistance programmes and other EU initiatives. It emphasised cooperation with other international and regional entities. Within the new external assistance instruments based on the EU budget for 2007-2013, the Commission had allocated €750 million for Central Asia, which would be disbursed through the European Commission Assistance Strategy for Central Asia for 2007-2013. The average annual allocation for the region would increase from €58 million in 2007 to €139m in 2013. It would be reviewed in mid-2008 and every two years thereafter.

6.21 Having been one of the German Presidency priorities, reflecting Germany's historic connections and economic interests, the Strategy, according to the Minister, was now more realistic, and less likely to raise expectations in Central Asia that the EU did not have the political will or resources to fulfil; contained a better balance between the EU's strategic interests in energy security and the importance of human rights and good governance (which was previously down-played); and included at least some differentiation between the five Central Asian states (which were at different stages of political and economic development), whereas previous drafts tended to treat them as an homogeneous bloc.

Our assessment

6.22 The then Committee judged the Strategy to be timely, comprehensive and ambitious. They noted that, in its introduction, the Strategy said "the development and consolidation of stable, just and open societies, adhering to international norms, is essential to bring the partnership between the European Union and Central Asian States to full fruition"; and how the Uzbek authorities failure to respond to international concern over the killings two years previously,[41] and the travails that the EU-Russia relationship was (even then) undergoing,[42] as illustrating the extent of the challenges that would have to be overcome, and how problematic it was likely to be to achieve the sort of partnership to which the EU naturally aspired.

6.23 Although the then Minister said that there were no financial implications for the UK, the then Committee presumed that the UK would be involved in at least some of the bilateral programmes envisaged under the strategy; and asked that, when he submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the review, he outlined what relevant UK activity there had been and how much it had cost.[43]

The Minister's letter of 22 May 2012

6.24 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) wrote to say that, rather than conduct a full-scale review, the EEAS and Member States to "focus on a lighter-touch implementation review and agree a future orientation to guide the EU in its engagement"; which "future orientation" text was on the point of being "shared with Central Asian partners", and which would be agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council in June or July.[44]

6.25 In the meantime, the Minister provided the following assessment thus far:

"a) What is the Government's assessment of the EU Central Asia Strategy, especially the effectiveness of each work stream?

"We believe that, overall, the EU Central Asia Strategy provides a useful framework for EU engagement in the region. The work streams it has generated are all important in terms of building the regional stability, greater rule of law and economic growth we wish to see (although arguably — see below — there is scope for the EU to prioritise better and to spread itself less thinly). While there is still clear room for improvement, the Strategy together with the active engagement of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia over the last five years, have helped the EU raise its profile and impact in a region of growing strategic importance, from what was a low base in 2007. The EU response to the 2010 Kyrgyz crisis is one example of improved engagement.

"My comments below on the individual work streams need to be caveated by the fact we and our (modestly-resourced) missions in the region have been more actively involved in some EU programmes than others, The EU Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM) project has provided a useful evaluation function since 2008, but we have used the implementation review to argue for more formal (ideally external) review and evaluation to be structured into the EU Strategy going forward.

"The rule of law initiative aims to promote legal and administrative reform underpinning both economic development and human rights. We judge that it has contributed to enhanced EU support to reform in several of the Central Asian countries and broader engagement by the Venice Commission. However we believe it is too early properly to judge results: this engagement will need to be sustained over a longer period to really deliver. EUCAM has called for development of clearer benchmarks to evaluate progress, which we would support. The establishment of EU Human Rights Dialogues with all five Central Asian countries has been a real success although, as noted in my 2 April letter, we see scope for these dialogues to become more results focussed. On Energy, the EU's work to promote energy efficiency and renewable; to develop an energy dialogue with Caspian Sea littoral states (under the Baku Initiative, which covers the whole of the Eastern Europe and Central Asian region), and — in particular — to facilitate negotiations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on a Trans-Caspian pipeline (TCP), has been of real importance. However in our judgement the EU has been slow to progress the TCP dossier: we are keen to improve momentum and engagement. We are less clear what value the EU adds in its energy dialogues with Kazakhstan, where the private sector is well-placed to lead developments. However the EU has supported us when lobbying on issues such as local content rules and shift rosters that penalise foreign investors. Work on Education (including reform of educational structures; policy dialogue; and support for vocational training) has, with its uplift in funding, begun to deliver some valuable work. For example in Uzbekistan the EU's development programme has been quite successful, particularly through its continued higher education cooperation programme, TEMPUS, which offers grants for partnership with EU higher education institutions; and its university scholarship programme linked to ERASMUS: and its inclusive education programme for children with special needs. We would be keen to see it continue (and extended to countries like Tajikistan), ensuring that programmes are fully adapted to Central Asian realities, On Security we judge that the flagship programmes of BOMCA (Border Management in Central Asia); CADAP (Central Asia Drugs Action Programme) and the co-ordination provide by CABSI (Central Asia Border Security Initiative) have all made useful contributions. We would be keen to see the EU build on them further, including through greater cooperation with other players such as the OSCE. It is less clear with some of the other work streams (including economic development and transport) what real impact the EU has had to date. The EU acknowledges that it has yet to deliver under the economic work-stream, but partners who have been more involved than us in the environment and water dossier point to useful engagement. We will be encouraging the EU to build evaluation mechanisms into its work in these areas and to look critically at what the EU can achieve in future interventions.

"b) What does the Government consider as the main weaknesses of the present strategy?

"Our main concern is that EU assistance is spread too thinly and lacks visibility. We have been using the 'implementation review and future orientation' discussions to ensure a clearer focus on priority areas going forward. We are encouraging the EEAS to open (and fully staff) Delegation Offices in all Central Asian states as a key element of improving EU visibility: there is currently no office in Ashgabat. This would be without prejudice to the Multi-Annual Financial Framework for 2014-2020; and we have shown with the FCO's own network shift that it is possible to add a network of Posts despite budget cuts, by rigorous attention to priorities (including opening an Embassy in Bishkek). We will continue to encourage the EU to think carefully about how best to work with partners in the region to maximise impact, while ensuring the EU's own contribution is fully recognised. We have underlined the importance of personal high-level engagement with senior leaders in the five countries and thus the need for regular visits by senior EU officials. We are supporting the renewal of the mandate of the EU Special Representative on Central Asia when it expires at the end of June, and will submit an Explanatory Memorandum on this in the usual way.

"c) How does the Strategy fit in with the EU's conditionality requirements on human rights and democracy?

"The Strategy itself states that, 'human rights issues are not confined to annual human rights dialogues. The EU raises human rights concerns at all levels, including at the highest level and in the context of meetings held under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. Individual cases of concern have benefited from these efforts. Supporting human rights protection and promoting reform and modernisation in the areas of the rule of law, good governance and democratisation are key priorities in EU relations with Central Asia. Long term stability, development and prosperity depend on progressive implementation of policies in these areas'. We are active supporters of the promotion of human rights and governance in the full range of EU work in the region.

"d) How does the Government intend to ensure that the EU Central Asia Strategy will become more focused and result orientated in the future?

"We believe that — particularly in light of transition in Afghanistan — it will be important for the EU to focus on regional security issues in the mid-term. We are also arguing that the EU's focus needs to remain on promoting rule of law/human rights and economic development. Despite the difficulties, it also has an important role to play in promoting regional co-operation.

"The current version of the 'Strategy Review' has taken on board many of our concerns, with explicit recognition of the need for the EU to target its efforts more narrowly; recognition of the growing importance of regional security issues and a prioritisation of a number of useful areas for action; stress on the importance of promoting and protecting human rights; stress on the importance of quick advancement of the Top; a focus on education, rule of law, key economic issues (including Kazakhstan and others' WTO accession); and consolidation of the network of EU Delegations in Central Asia.

"We will continue to promote this more focussed approach as the review process continues. We are additionally looking at two possible ways in which the UK could contribute to more effective EU engagement in the region. Following recent news of the current EUSR's decision to retire, we are keen to see an able and effective successor appointed and — to this end — will be running a UK candidate (Sir Anthony Brenton KCMB, former Ambassador to Moscow) for this position. We are additionally considering whether the UK should take a more formal role in the 'chef de file' system by which the EU is delivering much of its regional engagement,[45] although have yet to reach a firm conclusion on whether this would be the best use of our resources."

The European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report 13/2013

6.26 This Special Report, on "European Union development Assistance to Central Asia", was published on 14 January 2014. The ECA examined how the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) planned and managed €674 million of development assistance to the Central Asian republics in the period 2007-2012. The audit concluded that, under challenging circumstances, planning and allocation of assistance had been generally satisfactory. But assistance covered a larger number of sectors than was consistent with best practice; involved too many small projects, which placed a greater administrative burden on delegations; and the need to use financial instruments and multiple lines of reporting made it difficult to establish how much the EU had spent per sector and per country. The Commission could and should have been more rigorous in managing its budget support programmes in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and tied it to specific anti-corruption measures. Disbursement decisions were based on partner countries' commitments to reform rather than on progress achieved. Implementation was slow overall, though with some significant variations. The regional programmes did not achieve a genuine regional dimension. The Commission reports focused on activity rather than results.[46]

6.27 The then Minister (Lynne Featherstone) noted that these failings were general, and being addressed in the upcoming financial perspective via the overall approach in the 2012 "Agenda for Change" (particularly a focus on three sectors (four in fragile states) in EU country programmes), the updated Development Cooperation Instrument and work on an effective results framework that would (it was hoped, at long last) enable the measurement of the impact of Commission programming (rather than simply the activities undertaken). That being so, given the Minister for Europe's earlier letter, and given that it was reporting elsewhere on the Commission's proposals on that results framework,[47] the Committee concluded that this ECA Report was not, in and of itself, of sufficient political interest to warrant a substantive Report, and cleared it accordingly.[48]

The Joint Staff Working Document

6.28 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 9 February 2015, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) says that the report outlines EU activity under the Central Asia strategy, including implementation of its development assistance programme, in these priority areas: good governance, rule of law, human rights and democratisation; education and training; economic development, trade and investment; transport and energy; environmental sustainability and water management; and common security threats and challenges.

6.29 The Minister notes a number of significant developments, including:

— the conclusion in late 2014 of negotiations on a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan; and

— the establishment of a High Level Security Dialogue in 2013, focussing on developments in Afghanistan, Iran and Syria, cooperation against drugs trafficking, border management, counter-terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks.

6.30 The Minister also notes continuing structured human rights dialogues and seminars and training workshops under the Rule of Law initiative with all five Central Asian states, as well as EU activity to promote a collaborative and sustainable approach to management of water resources in the region.

6.31 He then notes a number of significant long-standing and underlying challenges in implementing the EU strategy identified in the report:

"with tense relationships amongst a number of Central Asian states making developing cooperative approaches to shared regional challenges problematic, an uphill struggle, an overall slow pace of reform in key areas of rule of law, good governance, human rights and democratisation, and more broadly different and competing priorities leading to what the drafters consider a relative lack of EU focus and resource in Central Asia by comparison with other regions."

6.32 The Minister then says that the report:

"additionally notes new and potentially destabilising developments ranging from the 2014 transition in Afghanistan, to the current crisis in Ukraine and Russian active promotion of Eurasian Economic Union in the region. The report notes the importance of regional economic integration being fully based on WTO principles and rules and respect for sovereign and autonomous decisions of States in deciding on their participation or otherwise."

6.33 Finally, the Minister says:

"The report concludes that 7 years after adoption of the original strategy there is no requirement for a complete overhaul of the EU approach to Central Asia, but makes a number of proposals to make achievement of the EU's policy goals more effective:

a. "To bring the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Turkmenistan and the enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan into force as soon as possible;

b. "To make the human rights dialogue more result-oriented and inclusive, with additional discussion bringing together EU, Central Asian authorities and civil society;

c. "To increase the role of Member States in delivering cooperation programmes;

d. "To give additional focus to capacity building in the context of climate change and disaster risk reduction with particular focus on cooperation in relation to shared water resources;

e. "To differentiate between the various Central Asian states in implementation of the strategy and recalibrate resources accordingly where necessary."

The Government's view

6.34 The Minister says that the Government "has no substantive policy concerns with the overall thrust of this report".

6.35 With regard to the Strategy, the Minister says:

"As the original strategy was agreed in 2007, it has in some areas become outdated, as it predates a number of significant regional events, such as the drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and current conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and recent trends, ranging from the rise of remittances as major factors in the economies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and increasing large-scale Chinese investment across the region. However, the core of the strategy with its focus on the need to address a series of key shared security, economic and governance challenges remains valid."

6.36 As well as being "a useful summary of progress to date" in implementing the 2007 Strategy, the Minister sees the report itself as:

"providing pointers for further consideration as the EU and its Member States begin the process of further strategy review in Committee discussions under the current Latvian EU Presidency. A strategy refresh is due to be agreed over the coming months, most likely by the time of the June European Council."

6.37 Regarding diplomatic representation in the area, the Minister says:

"The UK has Embassies in all five Central Asian states covered by the EU Central Asia strategy and plays an active role in the region both bilaterally and through EU activity. Most other EU Member States have no or limited representation in the region, and co-ordinated action through EU Representations is a useful and practical way to collectively leverage positive EU influence across the region."

6.38 As far as the various policy recommendations are concerned, the Minister says:

a. "The House Scrutiny Committees have recently cleared the Council Decision relating to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Turkmenistan. Negotiations on an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU institutions and the Kazakh authorities have recently been concluded, although a final proposal has yet to be passed to Council;

b. "The UK fully supports the goal of making human rights dialogues more result-oriented and inclusive, but notes the difficulty faced in achieving greater engagement between Central Asian authorities and the often limited reach of local civil society organisations across the region. At a time when civil society actors across the region are coming under increasing pressure, there may also be associated risks for local NGOs if they are perceived to be too closely identified with external actors;

c. "A number of EU Member States are already involved in delivering cooperation programmes and have bilateral assistance programmes in some or all of the Central Asian states. The UK has modest bilateral programme budgets across the region used to target niche areas of greatest need or comparative advantage (for example with a particular focus on conflict prevention and border cooperation work). In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, DFID operate bilateral programmes focussed on governance and economic growth. We will study further whether particular capability or funding gaps have been identified. But with substantial EU resources already devoted across the region, we consider that adding additional piecemeal bilateral effort would not necessarily be the most effective way to address the issues identified;

d. "The UK fully supports the emphasis on the need for renewed focus on addressing challenges posed in the context of climate change and pressure on shared water resources across the region, and would highlight the importance of co-ordinated work with key international partners including the UN Regional Centre for Central Asia, the OSCE and International Financial Institutions;

e. "The UK would agree that much engagement in the region would naturally be bilateral and differentiated accordingly, given the substantial differences between the various Central Asian states. However, it is important not to lose the EU's specific comparative advantage in its ability to act as a disinterested and honest broker in bringing regional players together to share experience and seek shared approaches to addressing vital issues such as common security challenges (in the High Level Security Dialogue for example) or common governance and resource challenges."

Previous Committee Reports

None, but see (28674),—: Twenty-fifth Report HC 41-xxv (2006-07), chapter 12 (13 June 2007).

35 The EEAS has delegations in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and a chargé d'affaires for Turkmenistan; while the European Commission has a regional office for humanitarian aid and civil protection in Almaty, Kazakhstan. See http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/index_en.htm for further information on EU relations with Central Asia. Back

36 In 2011 the EU adopted two reforms that (according to its website) are "designed to make its development policy both more strategic and more targeted: the 12-points Agenda for Change and new policy and rules for budget support"; these changes "will make sure EU aid targets the countries in greatest need, where external support can really make a difference in terms of poverty reduction", and "will be concentrated in two overall priority areas": human rights, democracy and other aspects of good governance; and inclusive and sustainable growth: see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/agenda-change_en for further information. Back

37 The record of the European Committee debate, held on 6 November 2014, is available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmgeneral/euro/141106/141106s01.htm. Back

38 I.e., the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, also known as DG DEVCO. Back

39 See (36451), -: Twentieth Report HC 219-xix (2014-15), chapter 14 (19 November 2014). Back

40 See (36569), -: Twenty-ninth Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15), chapter 2 (14 January 2015). Back

41 See (28664), -: Twenty-third Report HC 41-xxiii (2006-07), chapter 18 (6 June 2007). Back

42 See (26607), 8799/05: Twenty-fifth Report HC 41-xxv (2006-07), chapter 9 (13 June 2007). Back

43 See (28674), -: Twenty-fifth Report HC 41-xxv (2006-07), chapter 12 (13 June 2007). Back

44 The 25 June 2012 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131149.pdf. In brief, they said that EU actions in Central Asia over the coming years would focus in particular on: