6 The EU and Central Asia
Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
Document details | Joint Staff Working Document on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy
|
Legal base |
|
Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
Document numbers | (36624), 5241/15, SWD(15) 2
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
6.1 The 2007 EU Central Asia strategy embracing Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
prioritised a number of areas for engagement and cooperation:
· good
governance, rule of law, human rights and democratisation;
· education
and training; economic development, trade and investment;
· transport
and energy; environmental sustainability and water management;
and
· common
security threats and challenges (see paragraphs 6.19-6.21 below
for details).
6.2 Although a formal review was envisaged in the
Strategy, Member States and the Commission agreed in mid-2012
on a "lighter-touch implementation review" and "a
future orientation to guide the EU in its engagement", which
was reinforced by Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. The Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) produced his own assessment at
the same time (see paragraph 6.25 below for details).
6.3 Then, in early 2014, a European Court of Auditors'
Special Report examined how the Commission and the European External
Action Service (EEAS) had planned and managed 674 million
of development assistance to the Central Asian republics in the
period 2007-2012.[35]
The audit concluded that, under challenging circumstances, planning
and allocation of assistance had been generally satisfactory.
But assistance covered too many sectors and involved too many
small projects; and the Commission/EEAS could not establish how
much the EU had spent per sector and per country. Budget support
programmes in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could and should have
been more rigorously managed, and tied to specific anti-corruption
measures. Disbursement decisions were based on partner countries'
commitments to reform rather than on progress achieved. Implementation
was slow overall. The regional programmes did not achieve a genuine
regional dimension. The Commission reports focused on activity
rather than results. At that time, the then Minister (Lynne Featherstone)
said that these were general issues, which would be addressed
via the EU's new "Agenda for Change",[36]
an updated Development Cooperation Instrument and the Commission's
work on an effective results framework, to measure impact and
not just activities undertaken (see paragraphs 6.26-6.27 below
for details).
6.4 Now, on 13 January 2015, the Commission and the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini) issued this progress report on
implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy. It provides an
overview of progress to date, identifies possible areas for change
or additional focus and sets the scene for further detailed policy
review scheduled to take place over the coming months under the
Latvian EU Presidency, with the aim of agreeing a revised EU Strategy
at the June European Council.
6.5 Significant developments noted include:
establishment
of a High Level Security Dialogue in 2013, focussing on developments
in Afghanistan, Iran and Syria, cooperation against drugs trafficking,
border management, counter-terrorism and chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks;
the conclusion in late 2014 of negotiations
on a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan;
continuing structured human rights dialogues
and seminars and training workshops under the Rule of Law initiative
with all five Central Asian states; and
activity to promote a collaborative and
sustainable approach to management of water resources in the region.
6.6 However, the report identifies a number of significant
long-standing and underlying challenges: tense relationships,
making developing cooperative approaches to shared regional challenges
an uphill struggle; an overall slow pace of reform in key areas
of rule of law, good governance, human rights and democratisation;
and, more broadly, different and competing priorities leading
to what the drafters consider a relative lack of EU focus and
resources by comparison with other regions.
6.7 The report additionally notes new and potentially
destabilising developments e.g., the 2014 transition in
Afghanistan, the current crisis in Ukraine, Russian promotion
of the Eurasian Economic Union in the region but concludes
that, rather than a complete overhaul of approach, what is required
are proposals that will make achievement of the EU's policy goals
more effective (see paragraphs 6.28-6.33 below for details).
6.8 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
has no substantive concerns with the report's overall thrust:
though he notes that it has been somewhat over-taken by subsequent
developments, he continues to regard the core of the strategy,
with its focus on the need to address a series of key shared security,
economic and governance challenges, as remaining valid. Though
the UK has Embassies in all five Central Asian states, and plays
"an active role" in the region both bilaterally and
through EU activity, most other EU Member States have no or limited
representation, and "co-ordinated action through EU Representations
is a useful and practical way to collectively leverage positive
EU influence across the region". The Minister fully supports
the emphasis on the need for renewed focus on addressing challenges
posed in the context of climate change and pressure on shared
water resources, and highlights the importance of co-ordinated
work with key international partners including the UN Regional
Centre for Central Asia, the OSCE and International Financial
Institutions. He also agrees that much engagement in the region
would naturally be bilateral and differentiated accordingly, given
the substantial differences between the various Central Asian
states:
"However, it is important not to lose the EU's
specific comparative advantage in its ability to act as a disinterested
and honest broker in bringing regional players together to share
experience and seek shared approaches to addressing vital issues
such as common security challenges (in the High Level Security
Dialogue for example) or common governance and resource challenges"
(see paragraphs 6.34-6.38 below for details).
6.9 This evaluation raises three issues. The first
concerns the quality of the Commission and EEAS evaluation systems.
Some 750 million has been spent by the EU in assisting
this region in the last financial perspective. What has it actually
achieved in terms of value for money? The short answer is: no-one
knows.
6.10 As noted below, last April the Committee
recommended for debate in European Committee a Commission Staff
Working Document on "Paving the way for an EU Development
and Cooperation Results Framework". For no good reason the
Government did not arrange this debate for seven months. When
it finally took place, the motion did no more than "welcome
the document as an important step towards putting in place a results
framework which will help drive improvements in the impact of
the European Commission's development programmes by reporting
results achieved and providing performance information for the
Commission and others to act on".[37]
6.11 The Committee then came to consider a European
Court of Auditors' (ECA) Special Report, which found that EuropeAid's[38]
evaluation and Results-Orientated Monitoring (ROM) systems considerably
limited its capacity to account for actual results achieved and
that there was no systematic method of ensuring that evaluations
actually led to improvement in programme quality. The Committee
had already found (when considering an earlier ECA Special Report
on the use of "blending", where loans are mixed with
grants[39]) that
the relevant DFID minister (Baroness Northover) might need to
do a touch more than simply monitor the Commission's progress
in adapting its ROM process and methodology to blending, and in
devising and implementing a proper results framework, if the clearly
defined success criteria were ever to be established that she
rightly regarded as vital to understanding the effectiveness with
which the Commission used EU taxpayers' resources in its development
activities around the globe.
6.12 Given these subsequent, broader ECA findings
regarding the ROM and evaluation systems overall, we felt that
this was all the more so: instead, however, there was a regrettable
air of hand-wringing; of there being little that could be done
other than to keep on knocking on the door; of there being little
sign of a real drive to back the ECA's basic conclusion
that, to pave the way for the necessary improvements relating
to annual development expenditure in the region of 8 billion,
"it is imperative that robust evaluation systems are implemented
without delay" notwithstanding the fact that other
multi-lateral and bilateral donors have long had such systems
in operation.
6.13 The lack of impetus was, in our view, best
summed up by the fact that, as the Minister put it: "No
date has been set for this to go to Council". In our view,
only if the Council pressed the Commission would the necessary
improvements be made in the right timeframe. We accordingly recommended
that this Special Report be debated in European Committee, so
that the House could question the Minister further about why a
more determined effort was not being made, and why the Council
was not putting its weight more directly to the wheel.[40]
That debate has yet to be arranged. We urge the Government to
do so forthwith.
6.14 The
second is, who represents the EU in roles such as this? In mid-2013,
the Committee cleared from scrutiny a straightforward extension
of the mandate of the then EU Special Representative (EUSR) for
Central Asia, Mrs Patricia Flor (previously a senior FRG diplomat,
who had been appointed a year earlier). The Minister for Europe
reported that she had travelled extensively in the region, performed
well, been receptive to UK views, launched the High Level Security
Dialogue to which he now refers, and been effective in raising
the EU's level of influence in Central Asia. He saw her as continuing
to provide a common focus for delivering EU messages not just
on key human rights issues, but also on the benefits of regional
co-operation and on potential EU assistance in helping the region
to address some of its shared socio-economic difficulties; underlining
again the strategic importance of the Central Asia region, the
Minister said that the extension of the mandate of the EUSR was
important to enable continued personal, high-level engagement
with the leaders of the five Central Asia states. However, Mrs
Flor resigned in early 2014, and on 9 April the then High Representative
announced that she had decided to appoint Janos Herman, a senior
EEAS official as her Special Envoy to Central Asia, with the task
of ensuring continued EU high-level engagement in the region,
for a six-month period. This hiatus reflected a wider tussle between
the HR/EEAS (aided and abetted by the European Parliament) to
reduce Member States' control of CFSP by making all such EUSRs
responsible to the HR, and not to the Council.
6.15 Now,
the Minister has told us that the new HR (Federica Mogherini)
has proposed the reestablishment of the EUSR for Central Asia,
and invited Member States to propose candidates, having said that:
"a new EUSR for Central Asia would take up stewardship at
political level of vital regional issues at stake"; this
"would assure Central Asian partners that the region remains
important to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of
communication at the highest level with the countries of the region";
"would be essential for pursuing our objectives there given
the specificities of Central Asia"; and "will also build
on the ongoing exercise to review our Strategy for Central Asia".
6.16 The third is, how is the upcoming review
of this Strategy to be handled in terms of parliamentary scrutiny?
Given the factors outlined above, it is perhaps not surprising
that, as the Minister notes, the report identifies a number of
significant long-standing and underlying challenges, an overall
slow pace of reform in key areas and a relative lack of EU focus
and resources by comparison with other regions. Nonetheless, as
far as the Minister is concerned, the central tenets of the 2007
Strategy remain valid. In our estimation, all the issues outlined
above make it imperative that the House has the opportunity, via
the Committee, to scrutinise the final draft of the revised Strategy
before it is adopted by the Council, so that it can be assured
that it is not "more of the same" and does, instead,
properly address the weaknesses identified by this evaluation.
6.17 We should accordingly like to hear from the
Minister, within the next ten working days, on this matter. In
the meantime, we shall retain this Joint Staff Working Document
under scrutiny.
Full
details of the documents:
Joint Staff Working Document: Progress Report on the implementation
of the EU Central Asia Strategy: (36624), 5241/15, SWD(15)
2.
Background
6.18 The Common Strategy instrument was created by
the Amsterdam Treaty, as the means of setting out the objectives,
overall policy guidelines, organisation and duration of the EU's
external policies towards geographic or thematic areas.
6.19 The 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia set out
the EU's approach to promoting democracy, human rights, good governance
and sustainable development, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics
and energy security in Central Asia. It set out how it intended
to work within existing instruments, such as the Partnership and
Co-operation Agreements and other co-operation frameworks, to
enhance co-operation. The then Minister for Europe (Mr Geoffrey
Hoon) explained that it: would serve as the general framework
for enhancing EU co-operation over the next 5-10 years; sat alongside
the Commission's 2007-2013 Assistance Strategy for Central Asia,
which provides the resources to support the strengthening of political
dialogue with the Central Asian states; and was based on "a
clear sense, both within the EU and the Central Asia region, that
the EU's profile in the region was low, and fell some way behind
that of Russia, China and the United States".
6.20 In its introduction, the paper noted that the
Central Asian States lay at a strategically important intersection
between the two continents; the time had come for a new partnership
in a globalised world. The EU had a strong interest in a peaceful,
democratic and economically prosperous Central Asia. The aim of
the EU Strategy was therefore to co-operate actively with the
Central Asian States in reaching these goals as well as to contribute
to safeguarding peace and prosperity in neighbouring countries.
The Strategy built on the progress that the Central Asian States
had themselves made since attaining independence. It took account
of their common aspects as well as specific national contexts
and requirements. It also built on the results obtained under
the implementation of the various Partnership and Co-operation
Agreements, EU assistance programmes and other EU initiatives.
It emphasised cooperation with other international and regional
entities. Within the new external assistance instruments based
on the EU budget for 2007-2013, the Commission had allocated 750
million for Central Asia, which would be disbursed through the
European Commission Assistance Strategy for Central Asia for 2007-2013.
The average annual allocation for the region would increase from
58 million in 2007 to 139m in 2013. It would be reviewed
in mid-2008 and every two years thereafter.
6.21 Having been one of the German Presidency priorities,
reflecting Germany's historic connections and economic interests,
the Strategy, according to the Minister, was now more realistic,
and less likely to raise expectations in Central Asia that the
EU did not have the political will or resources to fulfil; contained
a better balance between the EU's strategic interests in energy
security and the importance of human rights and good governance
(which was previously down-played); and included at least some
differentiation between the five Central Asian states (which were
at different stages of political and economic development), whereas
previous drafts tended to treat them as an homogeneous bloc.
Our assessment
6.22 The then Committee judged the Strategy to be
timely, comprehensive and ambitious. They noted that, in its
introduction, the Strategy said "the development and consolidation
of stable, just and open societies, adhering to international
norms, is essential to bring the partnership between the European
Union and Central Asian States to full fruition"; and how
the Uzbek authorities failure to respond to international concern
over the killings two years previously,[41]
and the travails that the EU-Russia relationship was (even then)
undergoing,[42] as illustrating
the extent of the challenges that would have to be overcome, and
how problematic it was likely to be to achieve the sort of partnership
to which the EU naturally aspired.
6.23 Although the then Minister said that there were
no financial implications for the UK, the then Committee presumed
that the UK would be involved in at least some of the bilateral
programmes envisaged under the strategy; and asked that, when
he submitted an Explanatory Memorandum on the review, he outlined
what relevant UK activity there had been and how much it had cost.[43]
The Minister's letter of 22 May 2012
6.24 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
wrote to say that, rather than conduct a full-scale review, the
EEAS and Member States to "focus on a lighter-touch implementation
review and agree a future orientation to guide the EU in its engagement";
which "future orientation" text was on the point of
being "shared with Central Asian partners", and which
would be agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council in June or July.[44]
6.25 In the meantime, the Minister provided the following
assessment thus far:
"a) What is the Government's assessment of
the EU Central Asia Strategy, especially the effectiveness of
each work stream?
"We believe that, overall, the EU Central Asia
Strategy provides a useful framework for EU engagement in the
region. The work streams it has generated are all important in
terms of building the regional stability, greater rule of law
and economic growth we wish to see (although arguably
see below there is scope for the EU to prioritise better
and to spread itself less thinly). While there is still clear
room for improvement, the Strategy together with the active engagement
of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia over the last
five years, have helped the EU raise its profile and impact in
a region of growing strategic importance, from what was a low
base in 2007. The EU response to the 2010 Kyrgyz crisis is one
example of improved engagement.
"My comments below on the individual work streams
need to be caveated by the fact we and our (modestly-resourced)
missions in the region have been more actively involved in some
EU programmes than others, The EU Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM)
project has provided a useful evaluation function since 2008,
but we have used the implementation review to argue for more formal
(ideally external) review and evaluation to be structured into
the EU Strategy going forward.
"The rule of law initiative aims
to promote legal and administrative reform underpinning both economic
development and human rights. We judge that it has contributed
to enhanced EU support to reform in several of the Central Asian
countries and broader engagement by the Venice Commission. However
we believe it is too early properly to judge results: this engagement
will need to be sustained over a longer period to really deliver.
EUCAM has called for development of clearer benchmarks to evaluate
progress, which we would support. The establishment of EU Human
Rights Dialogues with all five Central Asian countries has been
a real success although, as noted in my 2 April letter, we see
scope for these dialogues to become more results focussed. On
Energy, the EU's work to promote energy efficiency
and renewable; to develop an energy dialogue with Caspian Sea
littoral states (under the Baku Initiative, which covers the whole
of the Eastern Europe and Central Asian region), and in
particular to facilitate negotiations between Turkmenistan
and Azerbaijan on a Trans-Caspian pipeline (TCP), has been of
real importance. However in our judgement the EU has been slow
to progress the TCP dossier: we are keen to improve momentum and
engagement. We are less clear what value the EU adds in its energy
dialogues with Kazakhstan, where the private sector is well-placed
to lead developments. However the EU has supported us when lobbying
on issues such as local content rules and shift rosters that penalise
foreign investors. Work on Education (including
reform of educational structures; policy dialogue; and support
for vocational training) has, with its uplift in funding, begun
to deliver some valuable work. For example in Uzbekistan the EU's
development programme has been quite successful, particularly
through its continued higher education cooperation programme,
TEMPUS, which offers grants for partnership with EU higher education
institutions; and its university scholarship programme linked
to ERASMUS: and its inclusive education programme for children
with special needs. We would be keen to see it continue (and extended
to countries like Tajikistan), ensuring that programmes are fully
adapted to Central Asian realities, On Security
we judge that the flagship programmes of BOMCA (Border Management
in Central Asia); CADAP (Central Asia Drugs Action Programme)
and the co-ordination provide by CABSI (Central Asia Border Security
Initiative) have all made useful contributions. We would be keen
to see the EU build on them further, including through greater
cooperation with other players such as the OSCE. It is less clear
with some of the other work streams (including economic development
and transport) what real impact the EU has had to date. The EU
acknowledges that it has yet to deliver under the economic work-stream,
but partners who have been more involved than us in the environment
and water dossier point to useful engagement. We will be encouraging
the EU to build evaluation mechanisms into its work in these areas
and to look critically at what the EU can achieve in future interventions.
"b) What does the Government consider as
the main weaknesses of the present strategy?
"Our main concern is that EU assistance is spread
too thinly and lacks visibility. We have been using the 'implementation
review and future orientation' discussions to ensure a clearer
focus on priority areas going forward. We are encouraging the
EEAS to open (and fully staff) Delegation Offices in all Central
Asian states as a key element of improving EU visibility: there
is currently no office in Ashgabat. This would be without prejudice
to the Multi-Annual Financial Framework for 2014-2020; and we
have shown with the FCO's own network shift that it is possible
to add a network of Posts despite budget cuts, by rigorous attention
to priorities (including opening an Embassy in Bishkek). We will
continue to encourage the EU to think carefully about how best
to work with partners in the region to maximise impact, while
ensuring the EU's own contribution is fully recognised. We have
underlined the importance of personal high-level engagement with
senior leaders in the five countries and thus the need for regular
visits by senior EU officials. We are supporting the renewal of
the mandate of the EU Special Representative on Central Asia when
it expires at the end of June, and will submit an Explanatory
Memorandum on this in the usual way.
"c) How does the Strategy fit in with the
EU's conditionality requirements on human rights and democracy?
"The Strategy itself states that, 'human rights
issues are not confined to annual human rights dialogues. The
EU raises human rights concerns at all levels, including at the
highest level and in the context of meetings held under the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements. Individual cases of concern have benefited
from these efforts. Supporting human rights protection and promoting
reform and modernisation in the areas of the rule of law, good
governance and democratisation are key priorities in EU relations
with Central Asia. Long term stability, development and prosperity
depend on progressive implementation of policies in these areas'.
We are active supporters of the promotion of human rights and
governance in the full range of EU work in the region.
"d) How does the Government intend to ensure
that the EU Central Asia Strategy will become more focused and
result orientated in the future?
"We believe that particularly in light
of transition in Afghanistan it will be important for
the EU to focus on regional security issues in the mid-term. We
are also arguing that the EU's focus needs to remain on promoting
rule of law/human rights and economic development. Despite the
difficulties, it also has an important role to play in promoting
regional co-operation.
"The current version of the 'Strategy Review'
has taken on board many of our concerns, with explicit recognition
of the need for the EU to target its efforts more narrowly; recognition
of the growing importance of regional security issues and a prioritisation
of a number of useful areas for action; stress on the importance
of promoting and protecting human rights; stress on the importance
of quick advancement of the Top; a focus on education, rule of
law, key economic issues (including Kazakhstan and others' WTO
accession); and consolidation of the network of EU Delegations
in Central Asia.
"We will continue to promote this more focussed
approach as the review process continues. We are additionally
looking at two possible ways in which the UK could contribute
to more effective EU engagement in the region. Following recent
news of the current EUSR's decision to retire, we are keen to
see an able and effective successor appointed and to this
end will be running a UK candidate (Sir Anthony Brenton
KCMB, former Ambassador to Moscow) for this position. We are additionally
considering whether the UK should take a more formal role in the
'chef de file' system by which the EU is delivering much of its
regional engagement,[45]
although have yet to reach a firm conclusion on whether this would
be the best use of our resources."
The European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report
13/2013
6.26 This Special Report, on "European Union
development Assistance to Central Asia", was published on
14 January 2014. The ECA examined how the Commission and the European
External Action Service (EEAS) planned and managed 674 million
of development assistance to the Central Asian republics in the
period 2007-2012. The audit concluded that, under challenging
circumstances, planning and allocation of assistance had been
generally satisfactory. But assistance covered a larger number
of sectors than was consistent with best practice; involved too
many small projects, which placed a greater administrative burden
on delegations; and the need to use financial instruments and
multiple lines of reporting made it difficult to establish how
much the EU had spent per sector and per country. The Commission
could and should have been more rigorous in managing its budget
support programmes in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and tied it to
specific anti-corruption measures. Disbursement decisions were
based on partner countries' commitments to reform rather than
on progress achieved. Implementation was slow overall, though
with some significant variations. The regional programmes did
not achieve a genuine regional dimension. The Commission reports
focused on activity rather than results.[46]
6.27 The then Minister (Lynne Featherstone) noted
that these failings were general, and being addressed in the upcoming
financial perspective via the overall approach in the 2012 "Agenda
for Change" (particularly a focus on three sectors (four
in fragile states) in EU country programmes), the updated Development
Cooperation Instrument and work on an effective results framework
that would (it was hoped, at long last) enable the measurement
of the impact of Commission programming (rather than simply the
activities undertaken). That being so, given the Minister for
Europe's earlier letter, and given that it was reporting elsewhere
on the Commission's proposals on that results framework,[47]
the Committee concluded that this ECA Report was not, in and of
itself, of sufficient political interest to warrant a substantive
Report, and cleared it accordingly.[48]
The Joint Staff Working Document
6.28 In his Explanatory Memorandum
of 9 February 2015, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
says that the report outlines
EU activity under the Central Asia strategy, including implementation
of its development assistance programme, in these priority areas:
good governance, rule of law, human rights and democratisation;
education and training; economic development, trade and investment;
transport and energy; environmental sustainability and water management;
and common security threats and challenges.
6.29 The Minister notes a number of significant developments,
including:
the
conclusion in late 2014 of negotiations on a new Enhanced Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan; and
the establishment of a High Level Security
Dialogue in 2013, focussing on developments in Afghanistan, Iran
and Syria, cooperation against drugs trafficking, border management,
counter-terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) risks.
6.30 The Minister also notes continuing structured
human rights dialogues and seminars and training workshops under
the Rule of Law initiative with all five Central Asian states,
as well as EU activity to promote a collaborative and sustainable
approach to management of water resources in the region.
6.31 He then notes a number of significant long-standing
and underlying challenges in implementing the EU strategy identified
in the report:
"with tense relationships amongst a number of
Central Asian states making developing cooperative approaches
to shared regional challenges problematic, an uphill struggle,
an overall slow pace of reform in key areas of rule of law, good
governance, human rights and democratisation, and more broadly
different and competing priorities leading to what the drafters
consider a relative lack of EU focus and resource in Central Asia
by comparison with other regions."
6.32 The Minister then says that the report:
"additionally notes new and potentially destabilising
developments ranging from the 2014 transition in Afghanistan,
to the current crisis in Ukraine and Russian active promotion
of Eurasian Economic Union in the region. The report notes the
importance of regional economic integration being fully based
on WTO principles and rules and respect for sovereign and autonomous
decisions of States in deciding on their participation or otherwise."
6.33 Finally, the Minister says:
"The report concludes that 7 years after adoption
of the original strategy there is no requirement for a complete
overhaul of the EU approach to Central Asia, but makes a number
of proposals to make achievement of the EU's policy goals more
effective:
a. "To bring the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement with Turkmenistan and the enhanced Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement with Kazakhstan into force as soon as possible;
b. "To make the human rights dialogue more
result-oriented and inclusive, with additional discussion bringing
together EU, Central Asian authorities and civil society;
c. "To increase the role of Member States
in delivering cooperation programmes;
d. "To give additional focus to capacity
building in the context of climate change and disaster risk reduction
with particular focus on cooperation in relation to shared water
resources;
e. "To differentiate between the various
Central Asian states in implementation of the strategy and recalibrate
resources accordingly where necessary."
The Government's view
6.34 The Minister says that
the Government "has
no substantive policy concerns with the overall thrust of this
report".
6.35 With regard to the Strategy, the Minister says:
"As the original strategy was agreed in 2007,
it has in some areas become outdated, as it predates a number
of significant regional events, such as the drawdown of the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and current conflict
in Eastern Ukraine, and recent trends, ranging from the rise of
remittances as major factors in the economies of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan and increasing large-scale Chinese investment across
the region. However, the core of the strategy with its focus on
the need to address a series of key shared security, economic
and governance challenges remains valid."
6.36 As well as being "a useful summary of progress
to date" in implementing the 2007 Strategy, the Minister
sees the report itself as:
"providing pointers for further consideration
as the EU and its Member States begin the process of further strategy
review in Committee discussions under the current Latvian EU Presidency.
A strategy refresh is due to be agreed over the coming months,
most likely by the time of the June European Council."
6.37 Regarding diplomatic representation in the area,
the Minister says:
"The UK has Embassies in all five Central Asian
states covered by the EU Central Asia strategy and plays an active
role in the region both bilaterally and through EU activity. Most
other EU Member States have no or limited representation in the
region, and co-ordinated action through EU Representations is
a useful and practical way to collectively leverage positive EU
influence across the region."
6.38 As far as the various policy recommendations
are concerned, the Minister says:
a. "The House Scrutiny Committees have recently
cleared the Council Decision relating to the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement with Turkmenistan. Negotiations on an Enhanced Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement between the EU institutions and the
Kazakh authorities have recently been concluded, although a final
proposal has yet to be passed to Council;
b. "The UK fully supports the goal of making
human rights dialogues more result-oriented and inclusive, but
notes the difficulty faced in achieving greater engagement between
Central Asian authorities and the often limited reach of local
civil society organisations across the region. At a time when
civil society actors across the region are coming under increasing
pressure, there may also be associated risks for local NGOs if
they are perceived to be too closely identified with external
actors;
c. "A number of EU Member States are already
involved in delivering cooperation programmes and have bilateral
assistance programmes in some or all of the Central Asian states.
The UK has modest bilateral programme budgets across the region
used to target niche areas of greatest need or comparative advantage
(for example with a particular focus on conflict prevention and
border cooperation work). In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, DFID operate
bilateral programmes focussed on governance and economic growth.
We will study further whether particular capability or funding
gaps have been identified. But with substantial EU resources already
devoted across the region, we consider that adding additional
piecemeal bilateral effort would not necessarily be the most effective
way to address the issues identified;
d. "The UK fully supports the emphasis on
the need for renewed focus on addressing challenges posed in the
context of climate change and pressure on shared water resources
across the region, and would highlight the importance of co-ordinated
work with key international partners including the UN Regional
Centre for Central Asia, the OSCE and International Financial
Institutions;
e. "The UK would agree that much engagement
in the region would naturally be bilateral and differentiated
accordingly, given the substantial differences between the various
Central Asian states. However, it is important not to lose the
EU's specific comparative advantage in its ability to act as a
disinterested and honest broker in bringing regional players together
to share experience and seek shared approaches to addressing vital
issues such as common security challenges (in the High Level Security
Dialogue for example) or common governance and resource challenges."
Previous
Committee Reports
None, but see (28674),: Twenty-fifth Report
HC 41-xxv (2006-07), chapter 12 (13 June 2007).
35 The EEAS has delegations in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
and a chargé d'affaires for Turkmenistan; while
the European Commission has a regional office for humanitarian aid and civil protection in
Almaty, Kazakhstan. See http://eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/index_en.htm
for further information on EU relations with Central Asia. Back
36
In 2011 the EU adopted two reforms that (according to its website)
are "designed to make its development policy both more strategic
and more targeted: the 12-points Agenda for Change and new policy
and rules for budget support"; these changes "will make
sure EU aid targets the countries in greatest need, where external
support can really make a difference in terms of poverty reduction",
and "will be concentrated in two overall priority areas":
human rights, democracy and other aspects of good governance;
and inclusive and sustainable growth: see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/agenda-change_en
for further information. Back
37
The record of the European Committee debate, held on 6 November
2014, is available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmgeneral/euro/141106/141106s01.htm. Back
38
I.e., the Commission's Directorate-General for International
Cooperation and Development, also known as DG DEVCO. Back
39
See (36451), -: Twentieth Report HC 219-xix (2014-15), chapter 14
(19 November 2014). Back
40
See (36569), -: Twenty-ninth Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15),
chapter 2 (14 January 2015). Back
41
See (28664), -: Twenty-third Report HC 41-xxiii (2006-07), chapter 18
(6 June 2007). Back
42
See (26607), 8799/05: Twenty-fifth Report HC 41-xxv (2006-07),
chapter 9 (13 June 2007). Back
43
See (28674), -: Twenty-fifth Report HC 41-xxv (2006-07), chapter 12
(13 June 2007). Back
44
The 25 June 2012 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions are available
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131149.pdf.
In brief, they said that EU actions in Central Asia over the
coming years would focus in particular on:
· reinforcing EU actions in the
region in the key initiative areas of education, the rule of law,
and environment and water;
· enhancing support for the monitoring,
promotion and protection of human rights, judicial independence,
good governance, inter-community relations and civil society development;
· making the bilateral human rights
dialogues more results-orientated;
· encouraging democratic reforms
and the development of national democratic reform agendas and
support implementation by sharing EU experiences;
· continuing to promote regional
co-operation and to improve neighbourly relations;
· consolidating energy cooperation,
promoting diversification of energy supply and export routes and
integration of energy markets, including concluding a legal framework
agreement between the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for the
Transcaspian Pipeline project;
· mobilising private sector engagement
for infrastructure realisation;
· promoting broader regional co-operation
for Caspian basin development and further strengthening participation
in the enhanced INOGATE programme, the Energy Charter Treaty and
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative;
· strengthening and consolidating
EU support actions for regional cooperation in Afghanistan and
its neighbourhood, in close coordination with Central Asian states
and international actors;
· strengthening dialogue and cooperation
on security matters of common concern, in particular through the
establishment of a regular EU-Central Asia High Level Security
Dialogue in a regional format;
· strengthening co-operation on
counter-terrorism, including through support for the implementation
of the Joint Plan of Action to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy in Central Asia. strengthening cooperation on border
management, migration and asylum, combating organised crime, including
drug and human trafficking;
· encouraging Kazakhstan to make
the necessary final steps for swift WTO accession; supporting
Tajikistan in their efforts to achieve accession and work with
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to advance their accession negotiations
and applications;
· promoting economic diversification,
inclusive growth and sustainable regional development policies
addressing poverty reduction, business services and SME development;
· consolidating the network of
EU Delegations in Central Asia by opening a Delegation in Turkmenistan
as soon as possible; and strengthening co-operation between EU
Delegations and the embassies of EU Member States;
· strengthening political dialogue
and co-operation with Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan bilaterally and regionally, to work
on common security challenges over the coming years; and
· giving "new impetus to political,
trade and economic relations and reforms".
The Council also thanked Ambassador
Pierre Morel for "his outstanding work" during his six
years as EU Special Representative for Central Asia and welcomed
the appointment of Patricia Flor. Back
45
Where individual delegations take the lead on specific topics
within a wider regional context. Back
46
See http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/ECA1403/a14_03.EN.pdf.
Back
47
For the Committee's consideration of the relevant Commission Staff
Working Document: Paving the way for an EU Development
and Cooperation Results Framework, see (35735), 17709/13:
Thirty-seventh Report HC 83-xxxiv (2013-14), chapter 6 (26
February 2014), and Forty-seventh Report HC 83-xlii (2013-14),
chapter 1 (30 April 2014). The record of the subsequent European
Committee debate, held on 6 November 2014, is available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmgeneral/euro/141106/141106s01.htm. Back
48
See (35711), -: Thirty-seventh Report HC 83-xxxiv (2013-14),
chapter 25 (26 February 2014). Back
|