8 EU military mission to contribute to
the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision on the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)
|
| Legal base | Articles 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document number | 36656, —
|
Summary and Committee conclusions
8.1 EUTM Somalia was launched in April 2010. The mission is part
of a wider, comprehensive EU approach to Somalia, working with
the wider international community. The EU is also involved in
EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, the operation to tackle piracy
off the coast of Somalia (of which the UK provides the Operational
Headquarters and the Operation Commander), and EU CAP NESTOR aimed
at increasing the capacity of the region to tackle piracy themselves.
8.2 EUTM Somalia's objective was to strengthen the
Somali security forces through the provision of specific military
training, and support to the training provided by Uganda, of 2,000
Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including appropriate
modular and specialised training for officers and non-commissioned
officers.
8.3 After a progress evaluation in July 2011, the
Council decided to extend it until December 2012 and refocus on
command and control and specialised capabilities, and on the self-training
capabilities of the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), with
the intention of transferring EU training expertise to local actors.
This was to be achieved by providing military training to commanders
and specialists up to company level, and through training trainers,
with a view to transferring basic and specialist training expertise
up to platoon level, under African ownership, back to Somalia.
8.4 Then, in December 2012, a further Council Decision
was put forward, which extended the mandate for a further 27 months;
took the total cost over the €20 million mark; shifted training
from Uganda to Mogadishu (reflecting welcome improvements in security);
and broadened the scope. The Committee noted that this was more
than academic: a mission that had begun with a short life in mind
had now morphed into one that would not only be, at least, nearly
five years long, but which — as it branched into security
sector reform, and political and strategic level mentoring that
(as the Minister for Europe, Mr David Lidington, put it at the
time) "ultimately" might "support moves towards
an exit strategy" — already had at least some of the
hallmarks of other such missions that had expanded their original,
limited role and proved costly, lengthy and of doubtful effectiveness.
The Committee was also concerned over the lack of information
from the Minister during the preceding 18 months. Though there
might well be a compelling case for this expansion, the Committee
felt that the House was not being given the opportunity to examine
it properly, and recommended that it be debated in the European
Committee (which took place on 16 January 2013).
8.5 Later in 2013, the Minister provided detailed
updates on progress thus far and on the budget. In considering
this further information, the Committee noted that they were also
at that time considering three other CSDP missions — in
Mali, in Niger and in the Horn of Africa — that, to varying
degrees, demonstrated challenges to the budgeting process. It
was notable, therefore, that the Minister had pledged to "continue
to monitor and to bear down on costs, where appropriate, and evaluate
results, including during the next annual review", and "to
push for improvements in the process for EU budgeting and forecasting
of future requirements for EU military operations". In reporting
this further information to the House, the Committee noted that
it would like to hear more about his success in these areas —
the budgeting, evaluation and forecasting process — at the
time of the next annual review.[60]
8.6 This further Council Decision proposes to extend
EUTM Somalia's mandate until 31 December 2016. The budget for
years 2013 and 2014 was €17.1 million. The proposed budget
for the next 21 months is €17.5 million, with an estimated
UK contribution through Athena of €2.7 million (=15.66%).
8.7 The Minister says that Somalia is a top foreign
policy priority for the Government, which has taken a lead in
coordinating efforts in the international community to support
Somalia. Somalia has made progress against some of its peace
and state-building goals in
2014, and a new Council of Ministers was approved by the Somali
Parliament on 9 February 2015, following the recent appointment
of a new Prime Minister. Developing Somali National Army (SNA)
capacity is crucial if the Federal Government of Somalia is to
be able to take responsibility for security in Somalia, enabling
an eventual exit strategy for AMISOM[61]
— "though this is a long term goal and strategic patience
is required". Security gains in Somalia have to date been
largely due to AMISOM, to which the EU contributes significantly
in terms of troop stipends. But the SNA is playing an increasingly
important part in AMISOM offensives. For it to become an effective
force able to operate independently, continued investment and
support from the international community is required.
8.8 The Minister also notes various ways in which
the EU is playing a positive role in addressing the threat to
regional and international peace, security and development posed
by instability in Somalia, and how EUTM complements these other
EU operations. The EUTM and other EU CSDP missions are important
elements of the overall framework for international engagement.
By demonstrating strong political commitment to the EUTM, the
Minister says, the UK can continue to leverage EU impact in support
of UK objectives. But the Mission must be "well-conceived"
and "capable of delivering its objectives (hence our proactive
input into the Strategic Review)". The Mission's operational
performance is hampered due to the fact that it can only effectively
operate in one location at one time due to force protection and
transport capacity constraints. Additional force protection measures
are being deployed in March 2015 to address this (and cost increases
are therefore justified).
8.9 Other significant challenges (the Minister says)
include "the lack of capacity and collective political will
of the Federal Government of Somalia". However, the President
and new Prime Minister have assured the Government and EU that
progress on security sector reform will be their top priority.
8.10 Despite "these very serious challenges",
EUTM Somalia has had "genuine, if to date relatively modest",
impact. The Minister judges, however, that the Mission "has
the potential to make a significant difference in developing the
Somali Defence Sector, particularly if it continues to take positive
steps towards solving some of the challenges it faces, such as
strengthening its force protection capabilities".
8.11 Also, EUTM Somalia "provides EU Member
States with the opportunity to share costs and to work together
to create a mission which provides better results than if each
country were working towards the same goal individually";
provides the Government with "the ability to leverage international
resources for an area we are interested in [which] has benefits
for our foreign and security policy"; and is "fully
in line with the intentions behind the European External Action
Service to have a foreign policy structure which is more coherent
and able to develop policy on a more consistent basis —
getting the collective voice of the EU Member states heard throughout
the world".
8.12 The mission has now been running for five
years. Achievements thus far have been "relatively modest".
This further extension will take it to nearly seven. The cost
will by then have neared the €40 million mark. There is still
a "lack of capacity and collective political will" on
the part of the Federal Government of Somalia; assurances from
the President and another new prime minister are necessary, but
far from sufficient. Al Shabaab may, as the Minister says, be
increasingly embattled but (ditto) it is clearly still capable
— witness the attack carried out on 20 February on the Central
Hotel in Mogadishu, which (according to the UN) resulted in the
death and injury of dozens of people, including senior members
of the Somali Federal Government.[62]
8.13 None of this is to say that the International
Community should abandon Somalia to its fate; on the contrary.
However, if national parliaments are genuinely to have any control
over CFSP, then exercises such as this need more effective, and
consistent, parliamentary scrutiny — and that requires cooperation
on the part of the Government.
8.14 The "Background" section below
relates some of the history, including the Minister's earlier
view (which we endorse) that scrutiny is "an important part
of open and transparent government and .... the way of connecting
British voters to EU decision-making". It is all the more
regrettable, therefore, that, once again, the Minister has, failed
to provide the Committee with any prior indication of the direction
of travel — notwithstanding his trumpeting of the UK having
been "very active in steering Mandate renewal discussions",
and in steering the EU's Strategic Review of the Mission in October
2014. This is not a question of the Committee wishing to have
caveated documents deposited (assuming that the review was either
limité or restreint), but of having a reasonable
expectation — which the Minister acknowledges, of being
forewarned, once the review has been completed and before the
Committee is, once again, effectively presented with a fait
accompli. It may well have been the case that the Committee
would not have raised any questions: but the Committee is entitled
to be given the opportunity to do so, which in this instance it
has been denied.
8.15 We therefore ask the Minister to explain
why no prior information was provided; and (given the time constraints)
ask him to do so as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we shall
retain the draft Council Decision under scrutiny.
Full
details of the documents:
Council Decision amending and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP
on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training
of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia): 36656, —.
Background
8.16 As explained in detail in our more recent relevant
Report,[63] developments
after the adoption of Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP [64]
effectively moved ahead "under the radar", as the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) maintained that the information
in the 2011 progress report embodied confidential information
from the Crisis Management Concept (one of the planning documents)
A letter from the Minister in December 2011 belatedly provided
some information about the Council Decision: but it was never
submitted for scrutiny.
8.17 On 3 December 2012, the Minister then wrote
to advise the Committee that a fresh Council Decision was likely
to be adopted in the period 18-20 December 2012. The Minister
went on to say that: based on a review in late September, a fresh
Crisis Management Concept was now being drafted: all he could
say at that point was that he expected the proposal to be for
a two-year mandate extension; for the mission to relocate to Mogadishu;
and to build on previous junior officer training by shifting the
focus to more senior levels of the Somali National Security Forces.
The Minister undertook to write again once the Council Decision
became available for scrutiny.
8.18 In its response of 5 December 2012, the Committee
said that it found it difficult to understand why this had arisen.
It pointed out that, for several years now, both it and its predecessor
had made it clear that it relied upon the FCO both to alert it
at the earliest possible moment of this sort of development and
to avoid wherever possible situations such as this where, in reality,
proper prior scrutiny would now be impossible — even if
he were able to provide an Explanatory Memorandum in time for
the Committee's 19 December 2012 meeting, there would be no opportunity
to pursue any questions that might arise prior to adoption by
the Council.
8.19 The Committee went on to say that, so far it
could see, it had not heard from the Minister on EUTM Somalia
since December 2011; it could not see why it was not possible
for the Committee to have been provided with an update on the
review process and its outcome; nor why — his representations
to the High Representative and the European External Action Service
(EEAS) about the need for proper scrutiny to be built into EEAS
timelines notwithstanding — the draft could not have been
provided sooner than a couple of weeks before the mandate was
due to expire. It seemed to us that once again, professed commitments
to scrutiny rang hollow.
8.20 The draft Council Decision anticipated by the
Minister further amended and extended Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP
from 1 January 2013 to 31 March 2015.[65]
In submitting it for scrutiny, the Minister said that the budget
for this Mission from its launch until August 2011 was €4.8
million; for the period from 9 August 2011 until 31 December 2012
was also €4.8 million; and for the next 27-month period,
the reference amount was a further €11.6 million. The increase
in cost resulted predominantly from the proposed move to Mogadishu
in order to cover the more complex nature of the activities and
set up costs, including force protection costs, investment costs
and running costs (including medical costs).[66]
8.21 In his further letter of 13 December 2012, in
response to the Committee's representations, the Minister said
that scrutiny was "an important part of open and transparent
government and .... the way of connecting British voters to EU
decision-making". He again insisted on his commitment to
an effective scrutiny process. The FCO had made a genuine and
concerted effort to bring this matter to the Committee's attention
at the earliest opportunity. There were, however, a number of
factors that had unfortunately resulted in the short timeline
available for scrutiny: the EEAS had said that the fluid situation
in Somalia had made their planning difficult. Only in the last
week or so had he received sufficient detail from the EU and reached
provisional agreement on the way ahead for the mission; the Council
Decision could not have been drafted until this point. The September
review of EUTM and the subsequent Crisis Management Concept were
once again classified documents, so they could not be submitted
to Parliament; he had therefore been unable to share a document
with the Committee until he received the draft Council Decision
itself. He had nevertheless endeavoured now to provide the Committee
with as much detail as possible, and found it regrettable that
the Committee felt that they might not be able to scrutinise this
document satisfactorily. The FCO had done everything within its
power to ensure that these documents were provided with sufficient
time to allow the Committee to represent its views. He would again
make strong representations on this point to the EEAS. Given
the importance the Government attached to ensuring the continued
success of this mission, which played a critical role in supporting
the fragile security situation in Somalia, the Minister hoped
that the Committee would give this matter its full and urgent
consideration. Whilst the outcome was far from ideal, he had ensured
that, at a minimum, the Committee had sight of the Decision in
advance of agreement.
Our assessment
8.22 We found the Minister's response disappointing.
We felt that we did not need to be reminded of our responsibilities.
The matter was urgent only because the process hitherto had made
it so; and that process also limited the effectiveness of any
consideration that could be given to it. This was more than academic:
a mission that had begun with a short life in mind had now morphed
into one that would be, at least, nearly five years long, and
which — as it branched into security sector reform, and
political and strategic level mentoring that "ultimately"
might "support moves towards an exit strategy" —
already had at least some of the hallmarks of other such missions
that had expanded their original, limited role and proved costly
(this one would now cost at least €20 million), lengthy and
(c.f. those in the Democratic Republic of Congo) of doubtful effectiveness
(here, the Minister asserted that EUTM Somalia had been effective,
but provided no evidence). There might well be a compelling case
for this expansion, but the House was, we felt, not being given
the opportunity to examine it properly.
8.23 The Minister still did not explain why we had
not heard from him for over a year. We had never asked for confidential
documents to be deposited: on the contrary. What we had requested,
for several years now, was to be kept in the picture: to be alerted
when such a mandate extension was in prospect, and to be given
a broad outline of what its future shape was likely to be. We
could not see why the Minister could not had provided this in
September, nor how any confidential aspects of the review would
have been thus compromised. We did not regard "sight of this
Decision in advance of agreement" as sufficient.
8.24 Though too late ask the Minister further questions
before the Council Decision was to be adopted, we considered that
the House should nevertheless be given the opportunity to hear
more from him, as to: why he was able to provide no information
prior to his letter of 3 December; what he expected the mission
to have achieved in 27 months' time (there should be benchmarks
and review points); if he believed that it would then be wound
up; and, if not, what he then expected to happen. We accordingly
recommended that the draft Council Decision be debated in European
Committee B.
8.25 That debate took place on 16 January 2013, and
was combined with a similar "short notice" draft Council
Decision on a new military mission to Mali, EUTM Mali.[67]
8.26 Our most recent relevant Report was based on
a letter of 28 May 2013, in which the Minister provided an update
on EUTM Somalia and on a recent budget increase. He said that,
given the Government's strategic interests in making progress
in developing the security sector and in supporting effective
CSDP interventions (and being one of the main supporters of CSDP
missions generally), he believed that it was important to ensure
that the mission had sufficient resources to achieve its mandate.
Recalling the budget of €11.6 million in the 'Financial
Implications' section of his Explanatory Memorandum of 13 December
2012, the Minister said that in April 2013 the Operation Commander
submitted a more detailed proposed budget of €13.394 million,
representing an increase of 15.4% on the initial estimate. Although
the EU said previously that €11.6 million would be a maximum
amount, he had closely scrutinised the new costs and believed
that they were justified (see our Report for details). The Minister
nonetheless committed himself to "continue to monitor and
to bear down on costs, where appropriate, and evaluate results,
including during the next annual review". Based on this experience,
he had asked his officials "to push for improvements in the
process for EU budgeting and forecasting of future requirements
for EU military operations".
Our further assessment
8.27 We considered three other CSDP missions at that
same meeting — in Mali, in Niger and in the Horn of Africa
— all of which, to varying degrees, demonstrated challenges
to the budgeting, evaluation and forecasting process. It was notable,
therefore, that the Minister had pledged to seek the improvements
described immediately above, since the need was apparent.
8.28 We looked forward to hearing more from the Minister
about his success in these areas at the time of the next annual
review (when he could explain why, unlike the other CSDP missions,
this one was not set up with an annual budget that required endorsement
via a Council Decision).[68]
The draft Council Decision
8.29 This draft Council Decision is to extend EUTM
Somalia's mandate until 31 December 2016.
8.30 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 13 February
2015, the Minister recalls that Decision 2013/44/CFSP, which extended
the mandate of EUTM Somalia to March 2015 implied a significant
change of focus for the Mission with the addition of strategic
advisory and mentoring activities in addition to training: until
this point, EUTM Somalia had operated mainly in Uganda where the
Mission Headquarters and the training camp were located; this
structure changed in the first months of 2014 when the centre
of gravity shifted with the relocation of the HQ to Mogadishu,
resulting in all advisory, mentoring and training activities now
being based in Mogadishu.
8.31 The Minister then says that:
— in
terms of training delivered, in its consecutive mandates, EUTM
Somalia has to date trained over 4,000 Somali National Army (SNA)
troops, focussing on the training of Non-Commissioned Officers
(NCOs), Officers, specialists and trainers;
— EUTM advisors also provide strategic
advice and mentoring to the Somali authorities within the Security
Institutions (Ministry of Defence and General Staff) and further
support activities within the mandate are foreseen for 2015/16;
and
— these efforts have contributed positively
to the security situation in Somalia, which has improved dramatically
over the last three years:
"African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and
Somali forces now control Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baraawe and most
key towns in southern Somalia. They continue to push against an
increasingly embattled but still capable Al Shabaab. Increasing
the capability and capacity of the SNA to provide security is
essential and will enable AMISOM's exit strategy."
8.32 The Minister then says that the UK has been
"very active in steering Mandate renewal discussions",
and continues thus:
"The UK inspired non-paper, agreed with the
Netherlands, Sweden and Italy, helped steer the EU's Strategic
Review of the Mission in October 2014. We judge this input was
key in ensuring the Review focused on the Mission's core objectives
and how to achieve them more effectively including via the provision
of more Force Protection resources. The Review concluded that
EUTM Somalia should be extended until 31 December 2016, and maintain
its focus on development of Somali capabilities in the defence
sector, but that its priority should move from core training to
'Train, Advise and Mentor'. It noted that extension of the Mission
beyond 2016 would depend on political and security progress in
Somalia and be considered in the light of UN, IGAD and AMISOM
plans.
"Based on the Review's findings and subsequent
discussions, the EU Political and Security Committee[69]
agreed to amend and extend the Mandate of EUTM Somalia, revising
it to focus the Mission on the provision of: strategic mentoring
and advice to Somali authorities within the Security Institutions;
support and advice on security sector development; mentoring and
training support for the development of Somali training capacity;
specialist and leadership training in accordance with Somali priorities.
EUTM Somalia will also provide support to other EU actors."
The Government's view
8.33 The Minister says that Somalia is a top foreign
policy priority for the Government:
"We have concerns about terrorism, piracy and
migration and there is a large Somali diaspora living in the UK.
Her Majesty's Government has taken a lead in coordinating efforts
in the international community to support Somalia, including by
holding two London Conferences on Somalia on 23 February 2012
and 7 May 2013 respectively. The Government UK also organised
the London Security Event on 18 September 2014, which helped to
identify the Somali National Army's immediate requirements and
outlined the Ministry of Defence's path to development of the
Somali National Army up to 2019. The UK is also the lead country
on drafting UN Security Council resolutions on Somalia."
8.34 The Minister then says that Somalia made progress
against some of its peace and state-building goals
in 2014:
"Two more interim Administrations, the Jubba
(IJA) and South West (ISWA) were formed and a provisional agreement
on a Central region saw Somalia take a step closer to completing
its federal map. A new Council of Ministers was approved by the
Somali Parliament on 9 February 2015.
"This follows the recent appointment of a new
Prime Minister, Sharmarke President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The
Government continues to engage closely with the Somali authorities
to ensure UK and international support reinforces Somali priorities.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud continues to hold security as
his top priority, to establish greater stability and further development
in Somalia. This is in line with the Government's policy; a stable
and prosperous Somalia which is not a threat to the international
community or UK interests."
8.35 Turning to EUTM Somalia itself, the Minister
says:
"Developing Somali National Army (SNA) capacity
is crucial if the Federal Government of Somalia is to be able
to take responsibility for security in Somalia, enabling an eventual
exit strategy for AMISOM; though this is a long term goal and
strategic patience is required. Security gains in Somalia have
to date been largely due to AMISOM, to which the EU contributes
significantly in terms of troop stipends. But the SNA is playing
an increasingly important part in AMISOM offensives. For it to
become an effective force able to operate independently, continued
investment and support from the international community is required.
"Instability in Somalia also poses a threat
to regional and international peace, security and development.
The EU is playing a positive role in addressing these threats
under a Comprehensive Approach that includes three Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, enhanced political support,
including appointment of an EU Special Representative for the
Horn of Africa, and financial support through a number of Commission
led programmes. In addition to EUTM Somalia, the CSDP activity
includes EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, the operation to tackle
piracy off the coast of Somalia (of which the UK provides the
Operational Headquarters and the Operation Commander), and EU
CAP NESTOR aimed at increasing the capacity of the region to tackle
piracy themselves (for which the UK provides two secondees). The
EUTM complements other EU operations towards improving security
in Somalia, with a particular focus on developing the Defence
sector. The Brussels Conference on Somalia, on 16 September 2013,
triggered a mechanism for coordination and Somali ownership through
the Somalia 'New Deal' task force.
"The UK has taken a strong lead in galvanizing
international effort behind stabilisation and state-building in
Somalia. The EUTM and other EU CSDP missions are important elements
of the overall framework for international engagement. By demonstrating
strong political commitment to the EUTM, the UK can continue to
leverage EU impact in support of UK objectives. But we also need
to ensure that the Mission is well conceived and capable of delivering
its objectives (hence our proactive input into the Strategic Review).
In the long-term, international efforts to build Somali institutional
capacity aim to ensure that the Somali Government is able sustain
its instruments of state, including the security forces. After
the London Security Event, security sector reform has been taken
forward under the coordination of PSG2 and the Defence Working
Group.
"The operating environment in Somalia is complex,
which makes it particularly difficult to understand and function
in. This and the unstable security situation represent a key challenge
for the EUTM. The Mission's operational performance is hampered
due to the fact that it can only effectively operate in one location
at one time due to force protection and transport capacity constraints
— a major limitation. Additional force protection measures
are being deployed in March 2015 to address this (and cost increases
are therefore justified). Other significant challenges include
the lack of capacity and collective political will of the Federal
Government of Somalia. The recent political crisis (the result
of a fall-out between the President and (now) ex-Prime Minister)
resulted in stasis in Government and prevented further progress
against New Deal objectives. However the President and new Prime
Minister have assured us that progress on security Sector reform
will be their top priority. Despite these very serious challenges,
EUTM Somalia has had genuine, if to date relatively modest, impact,
in part due to its flexibility in being able to respond to the
changing needs of the SNA. We judge, however, that the Mission
has the potential to make a significant difference in developing
the Somali Defence Sector, particularly if it continues to take
positive steps towards solving some of the challenges it faces,
such as strengthening its force protection capabilities."
8.36 Unusually for missions of this nature, the Minister
then addresses the question of Subsidiarity:
"The EU, working with the wider international
community, is seeking to contribute to the strengthening of the
Somali authorities as a functioning government able to deliver
basic services to the population. The EU provides support to Somalia
— through AMISOM, humanitarian aid, and its three CSDP Missions
— and continues to discuss ways to promote peace and stability
in Somalia. EU Member States, particularly those with a significant
Somali Diaspora, are increasingly interested in Somalia and looking
to positively engage with the peace process.
"EUTM Somalia provides EU Member States with
the opportunity to share costs and to work together to create
a mission which provides better results than if each country were
working towards the same goal individually. For the UK, the ability
to leverage international resources for an area we are interested
in has benefits for our foreign and security policy. Within the
EU, we are seen as a leading voice for focussing attentions and
resources on Somalia. We have worked with international and regional
partners to influence and shape this mission, ensuring a well
organised initiative delivering positive results.
"This approach is fully in line with the intentions
behind the European External Action Service to have a foreign
policy structure which is more coherent and able to develop policy
on a more consistent basis — getting the collective voice
of the EU Member states heard throughout the world."
8.37 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says:
"The estimated Reference amount proposed for
the new mandate is €17.5 m for the 21 month period until
December 2016. The UK contribution through Athena is estimated
to be €2.7m based on a cost share of 15.66%. The budget for
years 2013 and 2014 was €17.1m. Increased costs are
due to increased force protection resources (e.g. more armoured
vehicles and barracks) and infrastructure investment costs. Another
driver is medical requirements to increase the Role 2 medical
clinic capacity. In addition the Mission is seeking an emergency
24/7 medical evacuation capability. The practicalities of this
capability are still being worked out and the cost will be additional
to the Reference amount but may be necessary in order to provide
full operating capability for the Mission. We judge the Reference
amount to be justified, reasonable and required in order to allow
the Mission to operate effectively. We will continue to seek VFM
on costs when the detail of the finalised budget is discussed
by Athena Committee in April. We propose sending an update letter
to the Scrutiny Committees after that meeting. The UK contribution
to the common funding of EU CSDP military missions are funded
from the Peacekeeping element of the Conflict Security and Stabilisation
Unit."
8.38 Finally, with regard to the Timetable,
the Minister says that the draft Council Decision "will be
discussed at the COREPER meeting on 18 February 2015, and is expected
to be adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council on 16 March 2015".
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (34518), —: Eighth Report HC
83-viii (2013-14), chapter 16 (3 July 2013); and Twenty-fifth
Report HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 1 (19 December 2012).
60 See (34518), -: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14),
chapter 16 (3 July 2013) and Twenty-fifth Report HC 86-xxv (2012-13),
chapter 1 (19 December 2012) for full background. Back
61
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a regional peacekeeping
mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the
United Nations, which was created by the AU's Peace and Security
Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate.
See http://amisom-au.org/# for full information. Back
62
See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50139#.VOslNeasWSo
for full information. Back
63
(34518), -: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 16 (3
July 2013). Back
64
Text available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:044:0016:0019:EN:PDF.
Back
65
Text available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013D0044&from=EN.
Back
66
See (34518), -: Twenty-fifth Report HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 1
(19 December 2012) for full information about the Council Decision. Back
67
The record of the debate is available at Gen Co Deb, European
Standing Committee B, 16 January 2013, cols. 3-24. Back
68
See (34518), -: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 16
(3 July 2013). Back
69
Political and Security Committee: the committee of ambassador-level
officials from national delegations who, by virtue of article
38 TEU, under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the Council, monitor the
international situation in areas covered by the CFSP and exercise
political control and strategic direction of crisis management
operations, as set out in article 43 TEU. The chair is nominated
by the HR. Back
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