Documents considered by the Committee on 25 February 2015 - European Scrutiny Contents


17 EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia and wider issues

Committee's assessment Politically important
Committee's decisionCleared from scrutiny; further information requested
Document detailsCouncil Decision on the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
Legal baseArticles 28, 31 (2) and 33 TEU; QMV
Department

Document number

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(36616), —

Summary and Committee's conclusions

17.1 The EU established a Special Representative for South Caucasus (EUSR-SC) in 2003 and for the crisis in Georgia in September 2008. In 2011, the positions of EUSR for the South Caucasus and EUSR for the crisis in Georgia were combined. We considered the latest mandate renewal at our meeting on 4 February 2015.

17.2 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 29 January 2015, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) expected the current mandate to be extended for eight months; but said that this was under review, and that he would update the Committee if there was any change to this. He had also yet to receive a draft budget.

17.3 The Minister reaffirmed the Government's support for the work of the EUSR-SC, and for Ambassador Salber's continuation in the role. He also again underlined the strategic importance of the region, and its stability, to the UK's prosperity and energy security goals.

17.4 As noted in the "Background" section of our Report, Ambassador Selber's appointment in June 2014, after a five-month lacuna, reflected the wider tussle between the then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Baroness Ashton) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and Member States, about the future of the EUSR "concept". Though that seemed to have been resolved, at least for the time being, it was not clear why an eight-month renewal period had been proposed. Moreover, this was not the only mandate renewal that we dealt with at that meeting where there seemed to be uncertainty over the time period; or where no budgetary information was yet available.

17.5 In terms of the need for the job and the performance of the incumbent, no questions arose. However, we continued to retain the Council Decision under scrutiny, pending receipt of clarification on the timing issue and information about the proposed budget.

17.6 The Minister now says that the budget for March 2015-October 2015 is €1,350,000, "representing an overall decrease of €3,750 a month" on the previous eight-month budget of €1,380,000 (see paragraph 17.17 below for details).

17.7 On the specific and general timing issues, the Minister also says:

—  Ms Mogherini's decision to extend the mandates "is a positive step, and one which the UK has welcomed";

—  Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process;[86]

—  Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27 January 2015 outlining the reasons for the eight month extension for those EUSRs with a geographical remit, stating it was to allow her to "further acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn 2015";

—  Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the "political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some of the tasks";

—  he supports the initiative to hold such a "horizontal discussion";

—  prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment, Member States "once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget"; and

—  he will continue "to emphasise the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of the CFSP" (see paragraph 17.16 below for details).

17.8 The questions regarding this particular mandate extension having been satisfactorily answered, we now clear the document.

17.9 More generally, it would seem that we were over-optimistic. The importance of this issue is clear: the more the EUSR role is absorbed into the EEAS, the less will the Member States control the mandates of what are effectively the Council's special envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and UK interests, or the job holder. Instead, such "special envoys" would more and more represent the HR/EEAS, and not the Member States through the Council. "Oversight", or supervision (OED), is significantly different from "control", or "power of directing" (ibid). We therefore intend to continue to follow this matter closely; and, in the first instance, ask the Minister (or his successor), in early September, to provide the Committee with an update on the timing of the HR's "wider evaluation"; what he or she then knows of the HR's thinking; and what views he or she will be taking into the "horizontal discussion" to which the Minister refers.

Full details of the document: Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia: (36616), —.

Background

17.10 Article 33 TEU provides that the Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini), appoint a special representative (EUSR) with a mandate in relation to particular policy issue. The EUSR shall carry out his or her mandate under the authority of the HR. EUSRs, assisted by the EEAS, and acting in support of and in close coordination with the Council and the HR, should contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's external action and representation. They should help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions are engaged consistently to attain the Union's policy objectives. In particular, they should contribute to improving the effectiveness of the EU's response to crisis situations, and to the implementation of the EU's strategic policies. They provide the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a "voice" and "face" for the EU and its policies.[87]

17.11 The EUSR-SC was first appointed on 20 February 2006. The role involves supporting the HR and the Council in: assisting Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in carrying out political and economic reforms; preventing conflicts in the region and contributing to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, including through promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; engaging constructively with main interested actors concerning the region; encouraging and supporting further cooperation between States of the region, including on economic, energy and transport issues; and enhancing EU effectiveness and visibility in the region. In 2011, the "Georgia Crisis" mandate was incorporated into the EUSR-SC mandate.

17.12 The present mandate runs until 28 February 2015. The incumbent, Herbert Salber, was appointed in June 2014, following the unexplained resignation in January of his predecessor, Philippe Lefort (a senior and experienced French diplomat, most of whose career had been dedicated to the Caucasus and Russia, including as Ambassador to Georgia in 2004-2007). At that time, Mr Salber was Germany's Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO; he was described as having extensive knowledge of the former-Soviet region and the conflicts in the South Caucasus; and at one time had been the OSCE's Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which leads on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the OSCE, at the time of the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia.

17.13 In clearing the Council Decision that authorised Mr Salber's appointment and a budget for the remainder of the current mandate,[88] the Committee noted that this process played into the much wider issue of whether, post-Lisbon, the EUSR as a "concept" was to be continued or (as the then HR had proposed) absorbed into the EEAS — the consequence being that Member States would no longer be able to approve the mandates of what are effectively the Council's special envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and national interests, or the job holder. Instead, such "special envoys" would effectively represent the HR/EEAS, and not the Member States through the Council. Under Member State pressure, the final decision was put off until a new HR was in post, with virtually all the present mandate renewals being timed so that they expired in February 2015:[89] yet some mandates have already effectively been taken over by the EEAS pro tem, or effectively suspended with the incumbent being appointed as the HR's Special Envoy.[90]

17.14 The Minister expected the current mandate to be extended for eight months; but said that this is under review, and that he would update the Committee if there was any change to this. He had also yet to receive a draft budget.

17.15 The Minister reaffirmed the Government's support for the work of the EUSR-SC. With regard to Ambassador Salber's role and performance, the Minister noted in particular:

—  his regular access to the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, enabling him to relay Member States' concerns, counter periods of rising tensions and deliver messages of restraint;

—  how his role complements and supports the work of the OSCE Minsk Group, to try to encourage progress beyond the status quo, engaging as he does with key stakeholders in Moscow and Ankara and having responsibility for the EU Nagorno-Karabakh conflict prevention/reconciliation funds;

—  his good working relationship with UK counterparts on this issue in particular;

—  his lead role in the EU's work in respect of the conflicts in Georgia, where the EU continues to be the main international actor on the ground, and which helps to ensure that the EU's work in Georgia is "joined-up"; frequent trips to Georgia, including the breakaway regions, and being one of the co-chairs of the Geneva peace talks; and

—  his important role in keeping the Geneva peace talks operational (the only forum to bring together all the parties to the conflict), especially given the difficult circumstances of the signing of the Russia-Abkhazia "Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership".

The Minister's letter of 13 February 2015

17.16 The Minister deals with the eight-month mandate length at follows:

"I believe that Federica Mogherini's decision to extend the mandates is a positive step, and one which the UK has welcomed. As you have noted in your reports, Ms Mogherini has proposed extending all but the EUSR for Human Rights for an initial period of eight months. She has proposed renewing the mandate of the EUSR for Human Rights for two years in order to align it with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy. Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27 January 2015 outlining the reasons for the eight month extension for those EUSRs with a geographical remit, stating it was to allow her to 'further acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn 2015'.

"As you know, following the departure of Peter Sorensen, Lars-Gunner Wigemark has been appointed EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina and will take up his duties on 1 March 2015. His initial mandate is until June, but we expect this to be extended.

"Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process. She has invited Member States to propose candidates for the two positions and hopes to make appointments in March. She told Member States that 'a new EUSR for Central Asia would take up stewardship at political level of vital regional issues at stake. It would assure Central Asian partners that the region remains important to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of communication at the highest level with the countries of the region. This would be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities of Central Asia. It will also build on the ongoing exercise to review our Strategy for Central Asia'. She said that the proposed EUSR for MEPP 'would focus on enhancing the EU's engagement on the peace process. This would include the development of close contacts with all major players, including the parties to the conflict themselves, members of the Quartet, Arab states and relevant regional bodies. This engagement would also be underpinned by the EU's clear position on the MEPP, including the parameters set out in the July 2014 Conclusions'.

"Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the 'political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some of the tasks'. I support the initiative to hold such a horizontal discussion. As you know, prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment, Member States once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget. We will continue to emphasise the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of the CFSP.

"As the Committee will recall, I wrote to Ms Mogherini in December 2014 highlighting the importance of timely circulation of draft mandates. What is more, during a negotiation last year on revised EU Guidelines on the Appointment, Mandates and Financing of EUSRs, the UK successfully argued for the inclusion of a reference to the need for early circulation of documents to allow for the completion of national procedures. I will continue to urge the EEAS to respect the terms of the Guidelines."

Minister's letter of 20 February 2015

17.17 The Minister now says that, compared with the eight-month budget for June 2014-February 2015 of €1,380,000, the eight-month budget for March 2015-October 2015 is €1,350,000, "representing an overall decrease of €3,750 a month"

17.18 He continues as follows:

"Savings identified by us in the last budget, such as the reduction in one-off payments including funds for a 'team retreat', have been maintained in this budget. Other significant budget lines, such as staff salaries remain at the same level compared to the previously agreed budget.

"While overall running costs have increased, due mainly to a provision for new service contracts, we understand that this is to mitigate the risk of insufficient staffing around the time of the Geneva International Discussions. This increase has also been offset by a reduction in capital expenditure, and a more realistic assessment of personnel costs, by only budgeting for 6 months' salary for positions yet to be filled, factoring in time for recruitment campaigns. The contingency reserve has also been kept down, with only a 0.03% increase added, as an adjustment for inflation.

"Given that the new proposed budget represents an overall reduction in costs in comparison to the last mandate's agreed budget, we are therefore content to accept the proposed budget for the period March-October 2015."

17.19 Regarding the eight-month mandate length, the Minister says:

"we understand that this is due to the High Representative's desire to have time to acquaint herself with the Special Representatives and to adequately evaluate their work."

Previous Committee Reports

Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 5 (4 February 2015); also see (36143), —: Fourth Report HC 219-iv (2014-15), chapter 9 (25 June 2014) and (35626),—: Twenty-eighth Report HC 83-xxv (2013-14), chapter 17 (18 December 2013); also see (35701), —: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014).


86   These two mandates fell vacant during the tenure of the previous HR and were effectively absorbed, pro tem, into the EEAS. Back

87   See http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm for full information. Back

88   (36143), -: Fourth Report HC 219-iv (2014-15), chapter 9 (25 June 2014). Back

89   The exception being the EUSR for Bosnia, whose mandate runs until June 2015. Back

90   For the full background to this wider issue, see (35701), -: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014). Back


 
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Prepared 6 March 2015