18 EU Special Representative in Afghanistan
and wider issues
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision on mandate extension of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Afghanistan
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
| Department
Document number
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
36623, —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
18.1 The EU established a Special Representative for Afghanistan
in 2002. The mandate focuses on enhancing EU effectiveness and
visibility in Afghanistan. It aims to contribute to the strengthening
of democracy, rule of law, good governance, civilian capacity
building, economic growth and respect for human rights in Afghanistan.[91]
18.2 This mandate was last renewed in June 2014.
The incumbent since 2013 has been Ambassador Skjold Mellbin (a
senior Danish diplomat with more than 25 years of experience,
most recently as the Danish Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, with a prior ambassadorial posting in Kabul, and
a strong security policy and development cooperation background).
Looking ahead from last June, the Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) expected Ambassador Mellbin (who also heads the EU
Delegation) to have an important role in supporting the then Government
through transition and working with the new Government to shape
their priorities; in delivering the outcomes of the NATO Summit
and Afghan Development Conference later in 2014; and in delivering
a new EU strategy, focussing on promoting peace and stability
in the region, reinforcing democracy, encouraging economic development
and the rule of law and a yet-to-be-signed EU-Afghan Cooperation
Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD). But much uncertainty
surrounded them both.
18.3 In our report of 5 November 2014, we considered
a Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan
2014-16, and a related Commission Staff Working Document on
EU support in strengthening civilian policing and Rule of Law
post-2014.[92] This
latter centred on EUPOL Afghanistan.[93]
Then, on 3 December 2014, we reported further on the latter,
and cleared from scrutiny the latest Council Decision relating
to EUPOL Afghanistan, which a set out plans for a new budget of
€57,750,000 covering the period from 1 January 2015 to 31
December 2015 (by the end of 2014, the mission having cost over
€220 million).[94]
18.4 All of this is relevant because, earlier this
month, in underlining the importance of the EUSR's role and supporting
Mr Mellbin's continuation in it over the next eight months, the
Minister said that, with the country in the midst of a complex
political transition, security still a challenge and the economic
situation fragile, he would be pressing the EUSR on the need to
move at pace to build strong relationships with the new Government
and focus on the priorities set by the UK and wider international
community; the mandate also included the role of the EUSR in implementing
the new EU strategy for Afghanistan; also, if agreed in the next
eight months, the EUSR would be heavily involved in taking negotiations
on the EU-Afghan CAPD. With Afghanistan — an important foreign
policy priority for the UK — entering a crucial period in
its history, it was important that the gains made over the last
12 years were protected; the EU, through the work of the EUSR
and its long-term financial commitment, continued to be a critical
factor in supporting UK objectives (see paragraphs 18.25-18.26
below and our previous Report[95]
for full details).
18.5 Regarding the proposal to extend the EUSR's
responsibilities and oversight to include some Rule of Law activity
currently undertaken by EUPOL Afghanistan, the Minister said that
no decisions had been taken, and without release of the budget
figure for the 2015 mandate, it was not yet clear what impact
additional rule of law responsibilities would have on the size
and required resource of the EUSR's office, though he expected
any additional resource to be minimal.
18.6 That being so, when we considered this draft
Council Decision on 4 February, we did not find it easy to understand
quite how strengthening the EUSR's office as EUPOL Afghanistan
entered its final phase would lead to "a significant net
reduction in EU personnel in Afghanistan". Though in other
respects minded to clear this Council Decision from scrutiny,
pending receipt of greater clarity on this point and other budgetary
information, we continued to retain it under scrutiny.
18.7 We also reminded the Minister that the Joint
Communication, Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16,
remained under scrutiny, pending the report we had asked from
him on the outcome of the London Conference, including his assessment
in the light thereof of the prospects for the EU achieving its
objectives over the next three years, of the extent to which it
would depend on the commitments of the Afghan government and of
other members of the International Community, and of the likely
impact of the post-2014 security environment.[96]
Since it was now two months since the conference took place,
we were surprised not to have heard from him, and asked him to
respond within the next ten working days.[97]
18.8 On the specific and general timing issues, the
Minister also says:
— Ms
Mogherini's decision to extend the mandates "is a positive
step, and one which the UK has welcomed";
— Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment
of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process;[98]
— Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on
27 January 2015, stating that the eight month extension for those
EUSRs with a geographical remit was to allow her to "further
acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS
before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn
2015";
— Ms Mogherini has also announced that
she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at
the "political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction
with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the
EEAS to take on some of the tasks";
— he supports the initiative to hold such
a "horizontal discussion";
— prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment,
Member States "once again fought off proposals by the EEAS
for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and
Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget";
— he will continue "to emphasise the
importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of
the CFSP"; and
— he will "continue to urge"
the EEAS to respect the need for early circulation of documents
to allow for the completion of national procedures (see paragraph
18.27 below for details).
18.9 The Minister has now clarified the budgetary
aspects satisfactorily procedures (see paragraph 18.28 below for
details), and we now therefore clear the document — noting
that, should the final budget differ from the figures below, he
will update the committee accordingly, i.e., prior to its adoption
by the Council.
18.10 We deal with the Minister's response regarding
paragraph 18.7 above in Chapter 19 of this Report.
18.11 So far as the wider EUSR issues are concerned,
it would seem that we were over-optimistic. The importance of
this issue is clear: the more the EUSR role is absorbed into
the EEAS, the less will the Member States to control the mandates
of what are effectively the Council's special envoys to a variety
of trouble spots affecting EU and UK interests, or the job holder.
Instead, such "special envoys" would more and more represent
the HR/EEAS, and not the Member States through the Council. "Oversight",
or supervision (OED), is significantly different from "control",
or "power of directing" (ibid). The complexity and importance
of the EUSR to Afghanistan's role illustrates all too clearly
why continuing Member State control, rather than oversight, is
vital. We therefore intend to continue to follow this matter closely;
and, in the first instance, ask the Minister (or his successor),
in early September, to provide the Committee with an update on
the timing of the HR's "wider evaluation"; what he or
she then knows of the HR's thinking; and what views he or she
will be taking into the "horizontal discussion" to which
the Minister refers.
Full details of
the document: Council
Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative
in Afghanistan: (36623), —.
Background
18.12 Article 33 TEU provides that the Council may,
on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini), appoint
a special representative (EUSR) with a mandate in relation to
particular policy issue. The EUSR shall carry out his or her mandate
under the authority of the HR. EUSRs, assisted by the EEAS, and
acting in support of and in close coordination with the Council
and the HR, should contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness
of the Union's external action and representation. They should
help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions
are engaged consistently to attain the Union's policy objectives.
In particular, they should contribute to improving the effectiveness
of the EU's response to crisis situations, and to the implementation
of the EU's strategic policies. They provide the EU with an active
political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a "voice"
and "face" for the EU and its policies.[99]
18.13 Having been first established in 2002, the
mandate has been carried out since 22 July 2013 by Ambassador
Skjold Mellbin. At that time, the Minister for Europe said:
"Ambassador Skjold Mellbin will take over as
EUSR at a critical point in the security and political transition
in Afghanistan. The UK welcomes him as a very credible and well-qualified
candidate for this role. The EUSR will be important in trying
to deliver a stable and secure Afghanistan, in line with the aims
of the UK Government and wider international community. We anticipate
that Ambassador Skjold Mellbin will discharge this role effectively."
18.14 The most recent Council Decision authorised
the extension of his mandate until February 2015. The proposed
mandate did not alter the work of the EUSR substantially over
the following eight months but proposed some additional responsibilities,
specifically the delivery of the implementation of a new EU strategy.
The EUSR role was to continue to be a "double-hatted"
position, heading the EU Delegation and promoting the work of
the Union.
18.15 The Minister's "performance report"
on Ambassador Skjold Mellbin over the preceding year was, as he
put it, encouraging — especially as he envisaged an important
role for him in supporting the current Government through transition
and working with the new Government to shape their priorities,
and in delivering the outcomes of the NATO Summit and Afghan Development
Conference later in 2014.
18.16 The Minister also looked ahead to:
· the
afore-mentioned new EU Strategy, focussing on promoting peace
and stability in the region, reinforcing democracy, encouraging
economic development and the rule of law; and
· yet-to-be-signed
EU-Afghan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development
(CAPD).
18.17 The EUSR would be heavily involved in their
implementation. In separate correspondence, the Minister indicated
that he expected the Strategy to be ready for endorsement later
in the year; we looked forward to receiving it.[100]
But much uncertainty surrounded both it and the CAPD. He did
not expect the CAPD, upon which he said that little progress had
been made with the current Afghan Government, to be finalised
with the new Government until towards the end of year; he would
deposit the draft Council Decisions to sign and conclude the CAPD
for parliamentary scrutiny in the normal way, when drafts became
available.
18.18 Though the Minister did not say so, there was
a further uncertainty: the stand-off between the Council and the
then HR (Baroness Ashton) about whether, post-Lisbon, the EUSR
as a "concept" was to be continued or (as the then HR
had proposed) absorbed into the EEAS — the consequence being
that Member States would no longer be able to approve the mandate
of what are effectively the Council's special envoys to a variety
of trouble spots affecting EU and national interests, or the job
holder.
18.19 At that juncture, one key mandate — to
the Middle East Peace Process — had been terminated and
two others — to Central Asia and the Southern Mediterranean
— had been set aside; and, in the meantime, been effectively
replaced by what were in effect the HR's own Special Envoys —
in the latter two cases, apparently without discussion with the
Council and contrary to the arrangement whereby the bone of contention
between her and the Council would be set on one side until her
successor has been appointed. It was therefore not surprising
that the Minister and like-minded Member States had "highlighted
the need for greater transparency in the EUSR process and requested
a discussion on the future of the EUSRs for MEPP, Southern Mediterranean
and Central Asia in the near future". We asked the Minister
to tell us the outcome when this discussion had taken place.
18.20 The Government's position — which the
Committee endorsed — was crystal clear: Member States must
retain at least their present degree of control over the establishment
of each position, the mandate and the job-holder.[101]
18.21 The EUSR in Afghanistan (and other counterparts)
were accordingly "holding the fort", pending the resumption
of discussions when the next HR was appointed in November 2014;
hence the shortened mandate.
18.22 In the meantime, we cleared the draft Council
Decision.[102]
18.23 In our report of 5 November 2014 we considered
a Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan
2014-16, and a related Commission Staff Working Document on
EU support in strengthening civilian policing and Rule of Law
post-2014.[103] This
latter centred on EUPOL Afghanistan.[104]
Based on the evidence presented in the Commission Staff
Working Document, Member States agreed that the mandate extension
should continue EUPOL Afghanistan's current structure of three
broad lines of activity (advancing institutional reform in the
Ministry of Interior, professionalisation of Afghan National Police,
and connecting the police to the justice sector), within which
support could be prioritised as necessary: all three strands of
activity for the first year, with the third pillar (connecting
the police to the justice sector) discontinued at the end of 2015.
In its final year the mission would continue to support MOI reform
and police professionalisation, with all activity transitioned
to the Afghans or other multilateral actors by the mission end
date of 31 December 2016.
18.24 Then, on 3 December 2014, we reported further
on the latter, and cleared from scrutiny the latest Council Decision
relating to EUPOL Afghanistan, which set out plans for a new budget
of €57,750,000 covering the period from 1 January 2015 to
31 December 2015 (by the end of 2014, the mission having cost
over €220 million).[105]
18.25 All of this is relevant because, in his Explanatory
Memorandum of 29 January 2015, in underlining the importance of
the EUSR's role and supporting Mr Mellbin's continuation in it
over the next eight months, the Minister said that, with the country
in the midst of a complex political transition, security still
a challenge and the economic situation fragile:
— the
EUSR would play an important role in supporting the new Government
as it seeks to implement its reform agenda;
— in the wake of the London Conference
on Afghanistan, the EUSR would be a leading voice and ally as
he and his officials worked to ensure the delivery of agreements
ahead of a planned follow-up Senior Officials Meeting in June;
— he would be pressing the EUSR on the
need to move at pace to build strong relationships with the new
Government and focus on the priorities set by the UK and wider
international community;
— he would continue to be a "double-hatted"
position, heading the EU Delegation and promoting the work of
the Union;
— the mandate referred to the new EU strategy
for Afghanistan and the role of the EUSR in the implementation
of these objectives: the strategy focused on promoting peace,
stability and security in the region, reinforcing democracy, encouraging
economic development and the rule of law; alongside overseeing
the EU's political dialogue with Afghanistan, the strategy "broadly
dictates the day to day activities of the EUSR";
— the Afghan Government had stated their
readiness to resume negotiations on the EU-Afghan Cooperation
Agreement on Partnership and Development and, if agreed in the
next eight months, the EUSR would be heavily involved in taking
it forward; and
— with EUPOL Afghanistan being reduced
from 27 rule of law personnel in 2014 to zero in 2016, it had
been proposed that the EUSR'S office be augmented by up to three
personnel to continue EU strategic support to rule of law (described
as "deliberately minimal, to build on EUPOL's results",
and though requiring an increase to EUSR staffing, "a significant
net reduction in EU personnel in Afghanistan").
18.26 The Minister concluded by noting that:
— Afghanistan
remained an important foreign policy priority for the UK;
— entering a crucial period in Afghanistan's
history, the EUSR would be important in seeking to deliver a stable
and secure Afghanistan;
— it was important that, alongside the
international community, the gains made over the last 12 years
were protected; and
— the EU, through the work of the EUSR
and its long-term financial commitment, continued to be a critical
factor in supporting UK objectives.[106]
The Minister's letter of 13 February 2015
18.27 The Minister writes about the general issues
alluded to above, as follows:
"I believe that Federica Mogherini's decision
to extend the mandates is a positive step, and one which the UK
has welcomed. As you have noted in your reports, Ms Mogherini
has proposed extending all but the EUSR for Human Rights for an
initial period of eight months. She has proposed renewing the
mandate of the EUSR for Human Rights for two years in order to
align it with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Human
Rights and Democracy. Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27
January 2015 outlining the reasons for the eight month extension
for those EUSRs with a geographical remit, stating it was to allow
her to 'further acquaint herself with their work and interaction
with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead
in autumn 2015'.
"As you know, following the departure of Peter
Sorensen, Lars-Gunner Wigemark has been appointed EUSR for Bosnia
and Herzegovina and will take up his duties on 1 March 2015. His
initial mandate is until June, but we expect this to be extended.
"Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment
of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process.
She has invited Member States to propose candidates for the two
positions and hopes to make appointments in March. She told Member
States that 'a new EUSR for Central Asia would take up stewardship
at political level of vital regional issues at stake. It would
assure Central Asian partners that the region remains important
to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of communication
at the highest level with the countries of the region. This would
be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities
of Central Asia. It will also build on the ongoing exercise to
review our Strategy for Central Asia'. She said that the proposed
EUSR for MEPP 'would focus on enhancing the EU's engagement on
the peace process. This would include the development of close
contacts with all major players, including the parties to the
conflict themselves, members of the Quartet, Arab states and relevant
regional bodies. This engagement would also be underpinned by
the EU's clear position on the MEPP, including the parameters
set out in the July 2014 Conclusions'.
"Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends
to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the "political
objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the
resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some
of the tasks". I support the initiative to hold such a horizontal
discussion. As you know, prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment,
Member States once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for
a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security
Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget. We will continue to emphasise
the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool
of the CFSP.
"As the Committee will recall, I wrote to Ms
Mogherini in December 2014 highlighting the importance of timely
circulation of draft mandates. What is more, during a negotiation
last year on revised EU Guidelines on the Appointment, Mandates
and Financing of EUSRs, the UK successfully argued for the inclusion
of a reference to the need for early circulation of documents
to allow for the completion of national procedures. I will continue
to urge the EEAS to respect the terms of the Guidelines."
The Minister's letter of 23 February 2015
18.28 The Minister provides an update following receipt
of budgetary information, as follows:
"As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum, the
proposed EUSR Mandate does not make substantial changes and focuses
on the EU's visibility and role in Afghanistan over the next eight
months. However, it does propose an expansion of the EUSR responsibilities
to include EU strategic support to rule of law reform, activity
which is currently undertaken by the EU Policing Mission in Afghanistan
(EUPOL). EUPOL rule of law activity will be discontinued at the
end of 2015.
"This additional support includes an uplift
of two senior international advisors and two local staff to the
EUSR's office. The advisors will enable the EU to continue its
strategic level dialogue with the Afghan Government on advancing
rule of law reform, delivering on the objectives identified in
President Ghani's reform paper and the EU 2014-2017 Strategy for
Afghanistan. The continued presence of an EU rule of law expertise
will enable the EUSR to advance such priorities, consolidating
EUPOL's rule of law activity, particularly the provision of strategic
advice to the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General's Office.
"The increase of four personnel to the EUSR
office will result in an increase to the budget of €215,000.
Overall EU spending and personnel numbers in Afghanistan will
however reduce substantially due to reductions in EUPOL activity.
Staff numbers will reduce by over 100, from 235 international
staff in January 2015, to 100-150 international staff in January
2016. EUPOL rule of law support will draw down from 27 international
staff in January 2015 to zero by January 2016. This represents
a €14m reduction in the annual EUPOL budget on the previous
year.
"We have been vocal in Brussels on the need
to keep any additional incurred cost to a minimum. The final cost
of this additional activity represents a decrease from the initial
proposal. Initial drafts of the mandate proposed the EUSR's office
be augmented by six advisors (three international and three local);
four to support rule of law activity and two to support a strategic
dialogue with the MoI. Further scrutiny of this proposal by the
UK and other Member States has led to a reduction in personnel
and associated costs to the proposal.
"The budget is currently being negotiated in
Brussels. Should the final budget differ from the above figures
I will update your committee accordingly."
Previous Committee Reports
Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter
6 (4 February 2015); also see (36033), —: Second Report
HC 219-ii (2014-15), chapter 11 (11 June 2014); (35053), —,
chapter 16 and (35128), —, chapter 20: Ninth Report HC
83-ix (2013-14), (10 July 2013). Also see (35996), 9467/14 chapter
5 and (35190), 11109/13, chapter 8: Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii
(2014-15), (5 November 2014); and (35190), 11109/13, chapter 7
and (36514), —, chapter 10: Twenty-fourth Report HC 219-xxiii
(2014-15), (3 December 2014).
91 See Seventh Report HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 6
(26 June 2013), for the full background to this mandate. Back
92
See (35996), 9467/14, chapter 5 and (35190), 11109/13, chapter 8:
Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), (5 November 2014). Back
93
EUPOL Afghanistan was established on 30 May 2007 with a three-year
mandate; this was extended in 2010 for another three years, until
31 May 2013. It was set up to:
o assist the Government of Afghanistan
in implementing coherently its strategy towards sustainable and
effective civilian policing arrangements, especially with regard
to the Afghan Uniform (Civilian) Police and the Afghan Anti-Crime
Police, as stipulated in the National Police Strategy;
o improve cohesion and coordination
among international actors;
o work on strategy development, while
placing an emphasis on work towards a joint overall strategy of
the international community in police reform and enhance cooperation
with key partners in police reform and training, including with
the NATO-led mission ISAF and the NATO Training Mission and other
contributors; and
o support linkages between the police
and the wider rule of law. Back
94
See (35190), 11109/13, chapter 7 and (36514), -, chapter 10:
Twenty-fourth Report HC 219-xxiii (2014-15), (3 December 2014). Back
95
See Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 6 (4 February
2015). Back
96
See (35996), 9467/14: Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15),
chapter 5 (5 November 2014). Back
97
See Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 6 (4 February
2015). Back
98
These two mandates fell vacant during the tenure of the previous
HR and were effectively absorbed, pro tem, into the EEAS. Back
99
See http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
100
See (35996), 9467/14: Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15),
chapter 5 (5 November 2014) and the Committee's consideration
of the Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in
Afghanistan 2014-16: (35996). 9467/14: Third Report HC 219-iii
(2014-15), chapter 5 (18 June 2014). Back
101
See our Report on the EU Special Representative for the Middle
East Peace Process and wider EUSR issues: First Report HC 219-i
(2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014) for the full background to
this issue. Back
102
(36033), -: Second Report HC 219-ii (2014-15), chapter 11 (11
June 2014). Back
103
See (35996), 9467/14, chapter 5 and (35190), 11109/13, chapter 8:
Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), (5 November 2014). Back
104
EUPOL Afghanistan was established on 30 May 2007 with a three-year
mandate; this was extended in 2010 for another three years, until
31 May 2013. It was set up to:
o assist the Government of Afghanistan
in implementing coherently its strategy towards sustainable and
effective civilian policing arrangements, especially with regard
to the Afghan Uniform (Civilian) Police and the Afghan Anti-Crime
Police, as stipulated in the National Police Strategy;
o improve cohesion and coordination
among international actors;
o work on strategy development, while
placing an emphasis on work towards a joint overall strategy of
the international community in police reform and enhance cooperation
with key partners in police reform and training, including with
the NATO-led mission ISAF and the NATO Training Mission and other
contributors; and
o support linkages between the police
and the wider rule of law. Back
105
See (35190), 11109/13, chapter 7 and (36514), -, chapter 10:
Twenty-fourth Report HC 219-xxiii (2014-15), (3 December 2014). Back
106
See Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 6 (4 February
2015). Back
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