Documents considered by the Committee on 25 February 2015 - European Scrutiny Contents


19 EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa and wider issues

Committee's assessment Politically important
Committee's decisionCleared from scrutiny; further information requested
Document detailsCouncil Decision on the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa
Legal baseArticles 28, 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
Department

Document number

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(36627), —

Summary and Committee's conclusions

19.1 For these purposes, the Horn of Africa is defined as the countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) — Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.

19.2 Our 2013 Report and those referred to therein provide full background on the rationale for the creation of this EUSR role, and of the creditable performance of the incumbent, Mr Alexander Rondos (a Greek diplomat with extensive experience in African matters, and who had worked in East Africa during his career).[107]

19.3 The EUSR has four policy objectives:

—  support the continued stabilisation process in Somalia, in particular the regional dimension of the conflict;

—  support the process towards the peaceful coexistence of Sudan and South Sudan as two viable, stable and prosperous states with robust and accountable political structures;

—  resolve current conflicts and avoid potential conflicts between or within countries in the region; and

—  support political and economic regional cooperation.

19.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) supported renewal of this mandate, which he again described as closely aligned with the UK's policy objectives (the Horn of Africa being a key UK foreign policy priority), and remained supportive and appreciative of the EUSR's engagement to date. Balancing his engagement between Somalia and the Sudans would remain a challenge: but, given the expense and impracticality of separating the EUSR's mandates, the Minister's "firm judgement" was that continuation of the combined mandate would "bring continued, substantive benefit to HMG objectives on both Somalia and Sudan"; he would "continue to engage actively with the EUSR in order to ensure he is dedicating sufficient time to each, alongside continued co-operation with MS, UNSC members and the UN".

19.5 So far, so good. But, as with the other EUSR mandate renewals that we considered elsewhere our 4 February 2015 Report, this draft Council Decision was (as the Minister put it) "lacking full financial information"; in any event, he would "ensure it represents good value to the taxpayer while effectively resourcing the EUSR to deliver important UK objectives in the Horn of Africa"; he would write again as soon as further information was provided. Also, while expecting the length of the mandate to be eight months, it was "under ongoing review"; he would "update" the Committee if there were any changes. Nonetheless, he expected the draft Council Decision to be tabled for agreement at the 17 February 2015 Foreign Affairs Council.

19.6 As noted in the "Background" section of our Report, the tying-in of most other EUSR mandate renewals to end-February 2015 reflected a wider tussle between the then High Representative (Baroness Ashton) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and Member States, about the future of the EUSR "concept", resolution of which was postponed until the arrival of the new HR last November. We thought it debatable whether an eight-month renewal period, which was bound to include a summer break, was sufficient to evaluate all EUSR roles and performance. Moreover, though the Minister provided this interpretation in connection with another EUSR mandate renewal, in the case of both this and other EUSRs whose mandate renewal, he had talked of the eight-month renewal period being "under review".

19.7 In this instance, too, the Minister referred to the late circulation of documents by the EEAS. Yet he seemed to expect to complete the scrutiny process in less than two weeks. The questions thus arose: was this late circulation the result of the EEAS having had to await the new HR's determination of the wider policy issue, and then being faced with a lot of work at the last minute? In that case, the new HR was guilty of not taking sufficient cognisance of the need for timely parliamentary scrutiny. Or was it, once again, the EEAS's failure alone?

19.8 In terms of the need for the job and the performance of the incumbent, no questions arose. But there was too much uncertainty surrounding this proposal, and the other mandate renewals in question, as to the reason for the short extension and how firm it was, and about the cost. We therefore continued to retain the Council Decision under scrutiny, pending clarification of the timing issues and the proposed budget.

19.9 The Minister now confirms that the mandate will cover an eight-month period beginning on 1 March 2015, "to allow the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy a period for evaluation of all EUSR roles and performances".

19.10 He also says that he has scrutinised the budget very closely to ensure that the EUSR continues to represent value for money in light of the impact of increased pressures on the EUSR following the merger of mandates for the Horn of Africa and for Sudan and South Sudan last year; and that the Office of the EUSR has not requested any budgetary increase, which means the total cost for this mandate for eight months is €1,770,000.

19.11 On the specific and general timing issues, the Minister also says:

—  Ms Mogherini's decision to extend the mandates "is a positive step, and one which the UK has welcomed";

—  Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process;[108]

—  Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27 January 2015, stating that the eight month extension for those EUSRs with a geographical remit was to allow her to "further acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn 2015";

—  Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the "political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some of the tasks";

—  he supports the initiative to hold such a "horizontal discussion";

—  prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment, Member States "once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget";

—  he will continue "to emphasise the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of the CFSP"; and

—  he will "continue to urge" the EEAS to respect the need for early circulation of documents to allow for the completion of national procedures (see paragraph 19.24 below for details).

19.12 The questions regarding this particular mandate extension having been satisfactorily answered, we now clear the document.

19.13 More generally, it would seem that we were over-optimistic. The importance of this issue is clear: the more the EUSR role is absorbed into the EEAS, the less will the Member States to control the mandates of what are effectively the Council's special envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and UK interests, or the job holder. Instead, such "special envoys" would more and more represent the HR/EEAS, and not the Member States through the Council. "Oversight", or supervision (OED), is significantly different from "control", or "power of directing" (ibid). We therefore intend to continue to follow this matter closely; and, in the first instance, ask the Minister (or his successor), in early September, to provide the Committee with an update on the timing of the HR's "wider evaluation"; what he or she then knows of the HR's thinking; and what views he or she will be taking into the "horizontal discussion" to which the Minister refers.

19.14 So far as the timely circulation of documents is concerned, we have lost count of how many times the Minister has written to the previous HR and, more recently, new HR on this matter. When he writes to us in September, we should be grateful for his, or his successor's, assessment of the extent to which there has been any significant improvement in the EEAS's performance in this regard.

Full details of the document: Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa: (36627), —.

Background

19.15 Article 33 TEU provides that the Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini), appoint a special representative (EUSR) with a mandate in relation to particular policy issue. The EUSR shall carry out his or her mandate under the authority of the HR. EUSRs, assisted by the EEAS, and acting in support of and in close coordination with the Council and the HR, should contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's external action and representation. They should help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions are engaged consistently to attain the Union's policy objectives. In particular, they should contribute to improving the effectiveness of the EU's response to crisis situations, and to the implementation of the EU's strategic policies. They provide the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a "voice" and "face" for the EU and its policies.[109]

19.16 In October 2013, the existing mandate was extended for 12 months, to 31 October 2014, and expanded to include elements of Sudan and South Sudan.[110]

19.17 Then, last July, the mandate was then extended until 28 February 2015. The Minister provided a number of instances of how the EUSR had added value, and how the EUSR had led the EU response to several notable events in the Horn of Africa. Further background is set out in our most recent relevant Report.[111]

19.18 We had reported previously on other similar short-term EUSR mandate extensions — most recently in the First Report of this session.[112] They all played into the much wider issue considered there: whether, post-Lisbon, the EUSR as a "concept" was to be continued or (as the then EU High Representative had proposed) absorbed into the European External Action Service (EEAS) — the consequence being that Member States would no longer be able to approve the mandates of what are effectively the Council's special envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and national interests, or the job holder. Instead, such "special envoys" would effectively represent the High Representative/EEAS, and not the Member States through the Council. In the event, the final decision had been put off until a new HR was in post (from 1 November 2014), and virtually all the present mandates had been timed, like this one, so that they came up for renewal in February 2015. In the meantime, the Committee:

—  noted that some mandates had already effectively been taken over by the EEAS pro tem, or have been effectively suspended while the incumbent had been appointed as the HR's Special Envoy;[113] and

—  again endorsed what the Minister has said thus far about the need for Member States to retain at least their present degree of control over the establishment of each position, the mandate and the job-holder; and

—  cleared the Council Decision.[114]

19.19 This draft Council Decision further extended the EUSR's mandate. The four policy objectives remained the same. In his Explanatory Memorandum of 29 January 2015, the Minister supported renewal, again describing the mandate as "closely aligned with the UK's policy objectives for the Horn of Africa" (the Horn of Africa being a key UK foreign policy priority). He remained supportive and appreciative of the EUSR's engagement to date — illustrating the positive role the EUSR has played in galvanising EU member state support for action in the Horn of Africa and as a member of the International Community (IC) Troika in South Sudan, where he had successfully co-ordinated EU engagement on Somalia, working closely with the UK; characterising his excellent access to key partners, consistency in the role and knowledge of complex issues as a real asset for EU member states; and highlighting his use of his personal relationships in the region, including within the IGAD and African Union, to add analytical value and strengthen lobbying. Though Somalia had made progress in 2014 on both the political and security tracks, considerable challenges remained in 2015-16, which would continue to require active, firm and consistent IC engagement, including from the EU. Balancing his engagement between Somalia and the Sudans would remain a challenge for the EUSR, and there were inevitable tensions between the two roles: but, given the expense and impracticality of separating the EUSR's mandates, the Minister's "firm judgement" was that continuation of the combined mandate would "bring continued, substantive benefit to HMG objectives on both Somalia and Sudan"; he would "continue to engage actively with the EUSR in order to ensure he is dedicating sufficient time to each, alongside continued co-operation with MS, UNSC members and the UN".

19.20 However, the draft Council Decision was "lacking full financial information". But, as of 16 January, the indications were that the EUSR would need to maintain current resources if the very broad mandate was to be delivered; once received, the financial information would be examined closely to "ensure it represents good value to the taxpayer while effectively resourcing the EUSR to deliver important UK objectives in the Horn of Africa". Although he expected the length of the mandate to be eight months, this was "under ongoing review", and he would update the Committee if there were any changes.

19.21 We thought it debatable whether an eight-month renewal period, which was bound to include a summer break, was sufficient to evaluate all EUSR roles and performance. Moreover, though the Minister provided this interpretation in connection with another EUSR mandate renewal, in the case of both this and other EUSRs whose mandate renewal, he had talked of the eight-month renewal period being "under review".

19.22 In this instance, too, the Minister referred to the late circulation of documents by the EEAS. Yet he seemed to expect to complete the scrutiny process in less than two weeks. The questions thus arose: was this late circulation the result of the EEAS having had to await the new HR's determination of the wider policy issue, and then being faced with a lot of work at the last minute? In that case, the new HR was guilty of not taking sufficient cognisance of the need for timely parliamentary scrutiny. Or was it, once again, the EEAS's failure alone?

19.23 In terms of the need for the job and the performance of the incumbent, no questions arose. But there was too much uncertainty surrounding this proposal, and the other mandate renewals in question, as to the reason for the short extension and how firm it was, and about the cost. We therefore continued to retain the Council Decision under scrutiny, pending clarification of the timing issues and the proposed budget. [115]

The Minister's letter of 13 February 2015

19.24 The Minister provides the following information on the length of this and the other mandate extensions:

"I believe that Federica Mogherini's decision to extend the mandates is a positive step, and one which the UK has welcomed. As you have noted in your reports, Ms Mogherini has proposed extending all but the EUSR for Human Rights for an initial period of eight months. She has proposed renewing the mandate of the EUSR for Human Rights for two years in order to align it with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy. Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27 January 2015 outlining the reasons for the eight month extension for those EUSRs with a geographical remit, stating it was to allow her to 'further acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn 2015'.

"As you know, following the departure of Peter Sorensen, Lars-Gunner Wigemark has been appointed EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina and will take up his duties on 1 March 2015. His initial mandate is until June, but we expect this to be extended.

"Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process. She has invited Member States to propose candidates for the two positions and hopes to make appointments in March. She told Member States that 'a new EUSR for Central Asia would take up stewardship at political level of vital regional issues at stake. It would assure Central Asian partners that the region remains important to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of communication at the highest level with the countries of the region. This would be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities of Central Asia. It will also build on the ongoing exercise to review our Strategy for Central Asia'. She said that the proposed EUSR for MEPP 'would focus on enhancing the EU's engagement on the peace process. This would include the development of close contacts with all major players, including the parties to the conflict themselves, members of the Quartet, Arab states and relevant regional bodies. This engagement would also be underpinned by the EU's clear position on the MEPP, including the parameters set out in the July 2014 Conclusions'.

"Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the 'political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some of the tasks'. I support the initiative to hold such a horizontal discussion. As you know, prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment, Member States once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget. We will continue to emphasise the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of the CFSP.

"As the Committee will recall, I wrote to Ms Mogherini in December 2014 highlighting the importance of timely circulation of draft mandates. What is more, during a negotiation last year on revised EU Guidelines on the Appointment, Mandates and Financing of EUSRs, the UK successfully argued for the inclusion of a reference to the need for early circulation of documents to allow for the completion of national procedures. I will continue to urge the EEAS to respect the terms of the Guidelines."

The Minister's letter of 20 February 2015

19.25 The Minister now confirms that the mandate will cover an eight month period beginning on 1 March 2015, "to allow the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy a period for evaluation of all EUSR roles and performances".

19.26 The Minister then continues as follows:

"The UK has scrutinised the budget very closely to ensure that the EUSR continues to represent value for money in light of the impact of increased pressures on the EUSR following the merger of mandates for the Horn of Africa and for Sudan and South Sudan last year. The Office of the EUSR has not requested any budgetary increase which means the total cost for this mandate for eight months is €1,770,000. There are small changes within the budget allocation. For example the EUSR's Office now sub-rents from the EAAS in Mogadishu instead of the UN which means a reduction of €1,250 per month in running costs. However, any savings made are offset by the slight increase in the mission costs. This is due to the increase in the frequency and extent of travel proposed by the EUSR within the eight month period."

19.27 The Minister then provides the further budgetary information that is set out in the Annex to this chapter of our Report.

Previous Committee Reports

Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 8 (4 February 2015); also see (36032), —: Sixth Report HC 219-vi (2014-15), chapter 8 (9 July 2014) and (35337), —: Seventeenth Report HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 22 (9 October 2013).

Annex: Detail of proposed budget March-October 2015 inclusive

"Personnel expenditure - €1,295,068: The budget covers the salaries and daily allowances of the EUSR and fifteen staff.

"Missions - €396,940: This covers travel, accommodation and daily expenses. This takes into account lessons learnt from the previous mandate which saw an overspend due to underestimating the amount of travel staff would need to undertake, as well as underestimating flight and accommodation costs. We judge that this is a realistic forecast for the new mandate.

"Running expenditure - €446,804: This covers costs for office support, including equipment and supplies, IT services and office rent for offices in: Brussels, Juba, Khartoum, Nairobi (co-located with the EU Delegation) and Mogadishu (space sub-rented from the EEAS).

"Capital expenditure - €14,199: This has been earmarked to pay for eventual replacement of communications and security equipment.

"Representation - €9,600: This covers costs related to dinners or functions with or for host governments.

"Contingencies - €17,541: A contingency reserve of 1% has been written into the budget. This is in line with other EUSRs where the contingency reserve can only be used with prior written approval by the EU Commission. We do not judge that this contingency will be used, but will ensure that Member States are consulted before the EU Commission provides written approval".


107   See (35337), -: Seventeenth Report HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 22 (9 October 2013). Back

108   These two mandates fell vacant during the tenure of the previous HR and were effectively absorbed, pro tem, into the EEAS. Back

109   See http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm for full information. Back

110   See (35337),-: Seventeenth Report HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 22 (9 October 2013). Back

111   See (36032), -: Sixth Report HC 219-vi (2014-15), chapter 8 (9 July 2014). Back

112   See (35701),-: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014). Back

113   The exception being the EUSR for Bosnia, whose mandate runs until June 2015. Back

114   See (36032), -: Sixth Report HC 219-vi (2014-15), chapter 8 (9 July 2014). Back

115   See Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 8 (4 February 2015) for full details. Back


 
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