19 EU Special Representative for the
Horn of Africa and wider issues
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision on the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
| Department
Document number
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(36627), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
19.1 For these purposes, the Horn of Africa is defined as the
countries belonging to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) — Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,
South Sudan and Uganda.
19.2 Our 2013 Report and those referred to therein
provide full background on the rationale for the creation of this
EUSR role, and of the creditable performance of the incumbent,
Mr Alexander Rondos (a Greek diplomat with extensive experience
in African matters, and who had worked in East Africa during his
career).[107]
19.3 The EUSR has four policy objectives:
— support
the continued stabilisation process in Somalia, in particular
the regional dimension of the conflict;
— support the process towards the peaceful
coexistence of Sudan and South Sudan as two viable, stable and
prosperous states with robust and accountable political structures;
— resolve current conflicts and avoid potential
conflicts between or within countries in the region; and
— support political and economic regional
cooperation.
19.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
supported renewal of this mandate, which he again described as
closely aligned with the UK's policy objectives (the Horn of Africa
being a key UK foreign policy priority), and remained supportive
and appreciative of the EUSR's engagement to date. Balancing his
engagement between Somalia and the Sudans would remain a challenge:
but, given the expense and impracticality of separating the EUSR's
mandates, the Minister's "firm judgement" was that continuation
of the combined mandate would "bring continued, substantive
benefit to HMG objectives on both Somalia and Sudan"; he
would "continue to engage actively with the EUSR in order
to ensure he is dedicating sufficient time to each, alongside
continued co-operation with MS, UNSC members and the UN".
19.5 So far, so good. But, as with the other EUSR
mandate renewals that we considered elsewhere our 4 February 2015
Report, this draft Council Decision was (as the Minister put it)
"lacking full financial information"; in any event,
he would "ensure it represents good value to the taxpayer
while effectively resourcing the EUSR to deliver important UK
objectives in the Horn of Africa"; he would write again as
soon as further information was provided. Also, while expecting
the length of the mandate to be eight months, it was "under
ongoing review"; he would "update" the Committee
if there were any changes. Nonetheless, he expected the draft
Council Decision to be tabled for agreement at the 17 February
2015 Foreign Affairs Council.
19.6 As noted in the "Background" section
of our Report, the tying-in of most other EUSR mandate renewals
to end-February 2015 reflected a wider tussle between the then
High Representative (Baroness Ashton) and the European External
Action Service (EEAS), and Member States, about the future of
the EUSR "concept", resolution of which was postponed
until the arrival of the new HR last November. We thought it
debatable whether an eight-month renewal period, which was bound
to include a summer break, was sufficient to evaluate all EUSR
roles and performance. Moreover, though the Minister provided
this interpretation in connection with another EUSR mandate renewal,
in the case of both this and other EUSRs whose mandate renewal,
he had talked of the eight-month renewal period being "under
review".
19.7 In this instance, too, the Minister referred
to the late circulation of documents by the EEAS. Yet he seemed
to expect to complete the scrutiny process in less than two weeks.
The questions thus arose: was this late circulation the result
of the EEAS having had to await the new HR's determination of
the wider policy issue, and then being faced with a lot of work
at the last minute? In that case, the new HR was guilty of not
taking sufficient cognisance of the need for timely parliamentary
scrutiny. Or was it, once again, the EEAS's failure alone?
19.8 In terms of the need for the job and the performance
of the incumbent, no questions arose. But there was too much uncertainty
surrounding this proposal, and the other mandate renewals in question,
as to the reason for the short extension and how firm it was,
and about the cost. We therefore continued to retain the Council
Decision under scrutiny, pending clarification of the timing issues
and the proposed budget.
19.9 The Minister now confirms that the mandate will
cover an eight-month period beginning on 1 March 2015, "to
allow the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy a period for evaluation of all EUSR roles
and performances".
19.10 He also says that he has scrutinised the budget
very closely to ensure that the EUSR continues to represent value
for money in light of the impact of increased pressures on the
EUSR following the merger of mandates for the Horn of Africa and
for Sudan and South Sudan last year; and that the Office of the
EUSR has not requested any budgetary increase, which means the
total cost for this mandate for eight months is €1,770,000.
19.11 On the specific and general timing issues,
the Minister also says:
— Ms
Mogherini's decision to extend the mandates "is a positive
step, and one which the UK has welcomed";
— Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment
of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process;[108]
— Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on
27 January 2015, stating that the eight month extension for those
EUSRs with a geographical remit was to allow her to "further
acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS
before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn
2015";
— Ms Mogherini has also announced that
she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at
the "political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction
with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the
EEAS to take on some of the tasks";
— he supports the initiative to hold such
a "horizontal discussion";
— prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment,
Member States "once again fought off proposals by the EEAS
for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and
Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget";
— he will continue "to emphasise the
importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of
the CFSP"; and
— he will "continue to urge"
the EEAS to respect the need for early circulation of documents
to allow for the completion of national procedures (see paragraph
19.24 below for details).
19.12 The questions regarding this particular
mandate extension having been satisfactorily answered, we now
clear the document.
19.13 More generally, it would seem that we were
over-optimistic. The importance of this issue is clear: the more
the EUSR role is absorbed into the EEAS, the less will the Member
States to control the mandates of what are effectively the Council's
special envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and
UK interests, or the job holder. Instead, such "special
envoys" would more and more represent the HR/EEAS, and not
the Member States through the Council. "Oversight",
or supervision (OED), is significantly different from "control",
or "power of directing" (ibid). We therefore
intend to continue to follow this matter closely; and, in the
first instance, ask the Minister (or his successor), in early
September, to provide the Committee with an update on the timing
of the HR's "wider evaluation"; what he or she then
knows of the HR's thinking; and what views he or she will be taking
into the "horizontal discussion" to which the Minister
refers.
19.14 So far as the timely circulation of documents
is concerned, we have lost count of how many times the Minister
has written to the previous HR and, more recently, new HR on this
matter. When he writes to us in September, we should be grateful
for his, or his successor's, assessment of the extent to which
there has been any significant improvement in the EEAS's performance
in this regard.
Full
details of the document:
Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union
Special Representative for the Horn of Africa: (36627), —.
Background
19.15 Article 33 TEU provides that the Council may,
on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini), appoint
a special representative (EUSR) with a mandate in relation to
particular policy issue. The EUSR shall carry out his or her mandate
under the authority of the HR. EUSRs, assisted by the EEAS, and
acting in support of and in close coordination with the Council
and the HR, should contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness
of the Union's external action and representation. They should
help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions
are engaged consistently to attain the Union's policy objectives.
In particular, they should contribute to improving the effectiveness
of the EU's response to crisis situations, and to the implementation
of the EU's strategic policies. They provide the EU with an active
political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a "voice"
and "face" for the EU and its policies.[109]
19.16 In October 2013, the existing mandate was extended
for 12 months, to 31 October 2014, and expanded to include elements
of Sudan and South Sudan.[110]
19.17 Then, last July, the mandate was then extended
until 28 February 2015. The Minister provided a number of instances
of how the EUSR had added value, and how the EUSR had led the
EU response to several notable events in the Horn of Africa. Further
background is set out in our most recent relevant Report.[111]
19.18 We had reported previously on other similar
short-term EUSR mandate extensions — most recently in the
First Report of this session.[112]
They all played into the much wider issue considered there: whether,
post-Lisbon, the EUSR as a "concept" was to be continued
or (as the then EU High Representative had proposed) absorbed
into the European External Action Service (EEAS) — the consequence
being that Member States would no longer be able to approve the
mandates of what are effectively the Council's special envoys
to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and national interests,
or the job holder. Instead, such "special envoys" would
effectively represent the High Representative/EEAS, and not the
Member States through the Council. In the event, the final decision
had been put off until a new HR was in post (from 1 November 2014),
and virtually all the present mandates had been timed, like this
one, so that they came up for renewal in February 2015. In the
meantime, the Committee:
— noted
that some mandates had already effectively been taken over by
the EEAS pro tem, or have been effectively suspended while
the incumbent had been appointed as the HR's Special Envoy;[113]
and
— again endorsed what the Minister has
said thus far about the need for Member States to retain at least
their present degree of control over the establishment of each
position, the mandate and the job-holder; and
— cleared the Council Decision.[114]
19.19 This draft Council Decision further extended
the EUSR's mandate. The four policy objectives remained the same.
In his Explanatory Memorandum of 29 January 2015, the Minister
supported renewal, again describing the mandate as "closely
aligned with the UK's policy objectives for the Horn of Africa"
(the Horn of Africa being a key UK foreign policy priority). He
remained supportive and appreciative of the EUSR's engagement
to date — illustrating the positive role the EUSR has played
in galvanising EU member state support for action in the Horn
of Africa and as a member of the International Community (IC)
Troika in South Sudan, where he had successfully co-ordinated
EU engagement on Somalia, working closely with the UK; characterising
his excellent access to key partners, consistency in the role
and knowledge of complex issues as a real asset for EU member
states; and highlighting his use of his personal relationships
in the region, including within the IGAD and African Union, to
add analytical value and strengthen lobbying. Though Somalia had
made progress in 2014 on both the political and security tracks,
considerable challenges remained in 2015-16, which would continue
to require active, firm and consistent IC engagement, including
from the EU. Balancing his engagement between Somalia and the
Sudans would remain a challenge for the EUSR, and there were inevitable
tensions between the two roles: but, given the expense and impracticality
of separating the EUSR's mandates, the Minister's "firm judgement"
was that continuation of the combined mandate would "bring
continued, substantive benefit to HMG objectives on both Somalia
and Sudan"; he would "continue to engage actively with
the EUSR in order to ensure he is dedicating sufficient time to
each, alongside continued co-operation with MS, UNSC members and
the UN".
19.20 However, the draft Council Decision was "lacking
full financial information". But, as of 16 January, the indications
were that the EUSR would need to maintain current resources if
the very broad mandate was to be delivered; once received, the
financial information would be examined closely to "ensure
it represents good value to the taxpayer while effectively resourcing
the EUSR to deliver important UK objectives in the Horn of Africa".
Although he expected the length of the mandate to be eight months,
this was "under ongoing review", and he would update
the Committee if there were any changes.
19.21 We thought it debatable whether an eight-month
renewal period, which was bound to include a summer break, was
sufficient to evaluate all EUSR roles and performance. Moreover,
though the Minister provided this interpretation in connection
with another EUSR mandate renewal, in the case of both this and
other EUSRs whose mandate renewal, he had talked of the eight-month
renewal period being "under review".
19.22 In this instance, too, the Minister referred
to the late circulation of documents by the EEAS. Yet he seemed
to expect to complete the scrutiny process in less than two weeks.
The questions thus arose: was this late circulation the result
of the EEAS having had to await the new HR's determination of
the wider policy issue, and then being faced with a lot of work
at the last minute? In that case, the new HR was guilty of not
taking sufficient cognisance of the need for timely parliamentary
scrutiny. Or was it, once again, the EEAS's failure alone?
19.23 In terms of the need for the job and the performance
of the incumbent, no questions arose. But there was too much uncertainty
surrounding this proposal, and the other mandate renewals in question,
as to the reason for the short extension and how firm it was,
and about the cost. We therefore continued to retain the Council
Decision under scrutiny, pending clarification of the timing issues
and the proposed budget. [115]
The Minister's letter of 13 February 2015
19.24 The Minister provides the following information
on the length of this and the other mandate extensions:
"I believe that Federica Mogherini's decision
to extend the mandates is a positive step, and one which the UK
has welcomed. As you have noted in your reports, Ms Mogherini
has proposed extending all but the EUSR for Human Rights for an
initial period of eight months. She has proposed renewing the
mandate of the EUSR for Human Rights for two years in order to
align it with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Human
Rights and Democracy. Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27
January 2015 outlining the reasons for the eight month extension
for those EUSRs with a geographical remit, stating it was to allow
her to 'further acquaint herself with their work and interaction
with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead
in autumn 2015'.
"As you know, following the departure of Peter
Sorensen, Lars-Gunner Wigemark has been appointed EUSR for Bosnia
and Herzegovina and will take up his duties on 1 March 2015. His
initial mandate is until June, but we expect this to be extended.
"Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment
of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process.
She has invited Member States to propose candidates for the two
positions and hopes to make appointments in March. She told Member
States that 'a new EUSR for Central Asia would take up stewardship
at political level of vital regional issues at stake. It would
assure Central Asian partners that the region remains important
to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of communication
at the highest level with the countries of the region. This would
be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities
of Central Asia. It will also build on the ongoing exercise to
review our Strategy for Central Asia'. She said that the proposed
EUSR for MEPP 'would focus on enhancing the EU's engagement on
the peace process. This would include the development of close
contacts with all major players, including the parties to the
conflict themselves, members of the Quartet, Arab states and relevant
regional bodies. This engagement would also be underpinned by
the EU's clear position on the MEPP, including the parameters
set out in the July 2014 Conclusions'.
"Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends
to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the 'political
objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the
resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some
of the tasks'. I support the initiative to hold such a horizontal
discussion. As you know, prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment,
Member States once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for
a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security
Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget. We will continue to emphasise
the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool
of the CFSP.
"As the Committee will recall, I wrote to Ms
Mogherini in December 2014 highlighting the importance of timely
circulation of draft mandates. What is more, during a negotiation
last year on revised EU Guidelines on the Appointment, Mandates
and Financing of EUSRs, the UK successfully argued for the inclusion
of a reference to the need for early circulation of documents
to allow for the completion of national procedures. I will continue
to urge the EEAS to respect the terms of the Guidelines."
The Minister's letter of 20 February 2015
19.25 The Minister now confirms that the mandate
will cover an eight month period beginning on 1 March 2015, "to
allow the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy a period for evaluation of all EUSR roles
and performances".
19.26 The Minister then continues as follows:
"The UK has scrutinised the budget very closely
to ensure that the EUSR continues to represent value for money
in light of the impact of increased pressures on the EUSR following
the merger of mandates for the Horn of Africa and for Sudan and
South Sudan last year. The Office of the EUSR has not requested
any budgetary increase which means the total cost for this mandate
for eight months is €1,770,000. There are small changes within
the budget allocation. For example the EUSR's Office now sub-rents
from the EAAS in Mogadishu instead of the UN which means a reduction
of €1,250 per month in running costs. However, any savings
made are offset by the slight increase in the mission costs. This
is due to the increase in the frequency and extent of travel proposed
by the EUSR within the eight month period."
19.27 The Minister then provides the further budgetary
information that is set out in the Annex to this chapter of our
Report.
Previous Committee Reports
Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter
8 (4 February 2015); also see (36032), —: Sixth Report
HC 219-vi (2014-15), chapter 8 (9 July 2014) and (35337), —:
Seventeenth Report HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 22 (9 October
2013).
Annex: Detail of proposed budget
March-October 2015 inclusive
"Personnel expenditure - €1,295,068:
The budget covers the salaries and daily allowances of the EUSR
and fifteen staff.
"Missions - €396,940: This covers
travel, accommodation and daily expenses. This takes into account
lessons learnt from the previous mandate which saw an overspend
due to underestimating the amount of travel staff would need to
undertake, as well as underestimating flight and accommodation
costs. We judge that this is a realistic forecast for the new
mandate.
"Running expenditure - €446,804:
This covers costs for office support, including equipment and
supplies, IT services and office rent for offices in: Brussels,
Juba, Khartoum, Nairobi (co-located with the EU Delegation) and
Mogadishu (space sub-rented from the EEAS).
"Capital expenditure - €14,199:
This has been earmarked to pay for eventual replacement of communications
and security equipment.
"Representation - €9,600: This
covers costs related to dinners or functions with or for host
governments.
"Contingencies - €17,541: A contingency
reserve of 1% has been written into the budget. This is in line
with other EUSRs where the contingency reserve can only be used
with prior written approval by the EU Commission. We do not judge
that this contingency will be used, but will ensure that Member
States are consulted before the EU Commission provides written
approval".
107 See
(35337), -: Seventeenth Report HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 22
(9 October 2013). Back
108
These two mandates fell vacant during the tenure of the previous
HR and were effectively absorbed, pro tem, into the EEAS. Back
109
See http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
110
See (35337),-: Seventeenth Report HC 83-xvi (2013-14), chapter 22
(9 October 2013). Back
111
See (36032), -: Sixth Report HC 219-vi (2014-15), chapter 8 (9
July 2014). Back
112
See (35701),-: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4
June 2014). Back
113
The exception being the EUSR for Bosnia, whose mandate runs until
June 2015. Back
114
See (36032), -: Sixth Report HC 219-vi (2014-15), chapter 8 (9
July 2014). Back
115
See Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 8 (4 February
2015) for full details. Back
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