21 The EU Special Representative for
the Sahel and wider issues
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
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| Document details | Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union's Special Representative for the Sahel
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| Legal base | Articles 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document number | (36629), —
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
21.1 The Sahel region is defined in this context as Mali, Mauritania
and Niger. The mandate was initiated in 2013. It is based on the
EU's policy objectives, i.e., to contribute actively to regional
and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and
development in the region. The EUSR's job involves enhancing the
quality, intensity and impact of the EU's multi-faceted engagement
in the Sahel region, including the EU Strategy for Security
and Development in the Sahel, and to participate in coordinating
all relevant instruments for EU actions. Initial priority was
given to Mali and to the regional dimensions of the conflict there.
The EUSR's specific tasks are detailed in our previous Report.[117]
21.2 Earlier this month, the Minister for Europe
(Mr David Lidington) said that Mr Reveyrand had continued to perform
effectively. With regard to what he describes as a "near-final
draft" the Minister said:
— the
proposed mandate was unchanged from 2014-15, which would provide
sufficient latitude for Mr Reveyrand to adapt his role to evolving
events in the Sahel region;
— the UK had proposed that Mr Reveyrand
should monitor the Mali negotiations even more closely in future,
and report back regularly to Member States in order that they
could formulate their positions accordingly;
— Mr Reveyrand's new mandate period of
eight months, rather than a year, was in tune with other EUSRs,
and had been proposed by the new High Representative/Vice President
(Federica Mogherini) "to allow her to become acquainted with
the individuals and evaluate their roles and performance".
21.3 As noted in the "Background" section
of our previous Report, the tying-in of most other EUSR mandate
renewals to end-February 2015 reflected a wider tussle between
the then High Representative and the European External Action
Service (EEAS), and Member States, about the future of the EUSR
"concept", resolution of which was postponed until the
arrival of the new HR last November. Although in this instance
the Minister provided an explanation, in the case of other EUSRs
whose mandate renewal we considered elsewhere in our previous
Report, he had spoken of the eight-month renewal period being
"under review". Moreover, the Committee thought it debatable
whether an eight-month renewal period, which was bound to include
a summer break, was sufficient to evaluate all EUSR roles and
performance. The Minister had also talked about the late circulation
of the text by the EEAS.
21.4 In terms of the need for the job and the performance
of the incumbent, no questions arose. However, we continued to
retain the Council Decision under scrutiny, pending clarification
of the final terms of the mandate, the timing issues and the proposed
budget.[118]
21.5 The Minister now says that:
— Mr
Reveyrand's finalised mandate has not changed substantially from
the previous version attached to his earlier Explanatory Memorandum;
— the budget remains the same, pro-rata,
as the budget for 2014-15; i.e., €900,000 in 2015-16, in
line with the €1,350,000 budget for March 2014 to February
2015, which represents good value for money.
21.6 The Minister comments thus:
"M Reveyrand can expect to have a busy time
in this period: the talks in Algiers between the Malian Government
and the northern groups have reached a critical stage, and there
are signs that, given the right encouragement (including from
external players such as the EU), an agreement could be reached
in the next few weeks. Should an agreement be found, the EU would
have a further important role to play in devising and monitoring
an implementation mechanism which would help to ensure that the
parties stick to the terms of any deal."
21.7 On the specific and general timing issues, the
Minister also says:
— Ms
Mogherini's decision to extend the mandates "is a positive
step, and one which the UK has welcomed";
— Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment
of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process;[119]
— Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on
27 January 2015, stating that the eight-month extension for those
EUSRs with a geographical remit was to allow her to "further
acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS
before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn
2015";
— Ms Mogherini has also announced that
she intends to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at
the "political objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction
with the EEAS, the resource implications and the ability of the
EEAS to take on some of the tasks";
— he supports the initiative to hold such
a "horizontal discussion";
— prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment,
Member States "once again fought off proposals by the EEAS
for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and
Security Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget";
— he will continue "to emphasise the
importance of Member State oversight of this important tool of
the CFSP"; and
— he will "continue to urge"
the EEAS to respect the need for early circulation of documents
to allow for the completion of national procedures. (See paragraph
21.16 below for details).
21.8 The questions regarding this particular mandate
extension having been satisfactorily answered, we now clear the
document.
21.9 More generally, it would seem that we were
over-optimistic. The importance of this issue is clear: the more
the EUSR role is absorbed into the EEAS, the less will the Member
States be able to control the mandates of what are effectively
the Council's special envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting
EU and UK interests, or the job holder. Instead, such "special
envoys" would more and more represent the HR/EEAS, and not
the Member States through the Council. "Oversight",
or supervision (OED), is significantly different from "control",
or "power of directing" (ibid). We therefore
intend to continue to follow this matter closely; and, in the
first instance, ask the Minister (or his successor), in early
September, to provide the Committee with an update on the timing
of the HR's "wider evaluation"; what he or she then
knows of the HR's thinking; and what views he or she will be taking
into the "horizontal discussion" to which the Minister
refers.
21.10 So far as the timely circulation of documents
is concerned, we have lost count of how many times the Minister
has written to the previous and, more recently, new HR on this
matter. When he writes to us in September, we should be grateful
for his, or his successor's, assessment of the extent to which
there has been any significant improvement in the EEAS's performance
in this regard.
Full details of
the documents: Council
Decision extending the mandate of the European Union's Special
Representative for the Sahel: (36629), —.
Background
21.11 Article 33 TEU provides that the Council may,
on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini), appoint
a special representative (EUSR) with a mandate in relation to
particular policy issue. The EUSR shall carry out his or her mandate
under the authority of the HR. EUSRs, assisted by the EEAS, and
acting in support of and in close coordination with the Council
and the HR, should contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness
of the Union's external action and representation. They should
help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions
are engaged consistently to attain the Union's policy objectives.
In particular, they should contribute to improving the effectiveness
of the EU's response to crisis situations, and to the implementation
of the EU's strategic policies. They provide the EU with an active
political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a "voice"
and "face" for the EU and its policies.[120]
21.12 Council Decision 2013/133/CFSP of 18 March
2013 appointed Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon as the new European
Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel. The Sahel region
is defined as in the EU Strategy for Security and Development
in the Sahel, i.e. Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Further background
is set out in our previous Reports.
21.13 A year on, the Minister supported renewal.
Mr Reveyrand had performed satisfactorily, and there was broad
consensus that his mandate be extended for a further 12 months.
It had been "tweaked" to reflect the subsequent (broadly
positive) political developments in the Sahel (the signing of
the Ouagadougou Accords in June, the deployment of the UN Mission
(MINUSMA) to Mali in July, and the successful presidential and
legislative elections in Mali) and now included language on the
need for the EUSR to push for further progress on the Malian peace
process, and to "keep a weather eye on Niger and Burkina
Faso, which will hold important elections in 2015-16." Following
what the Minister called a "light-touch "refresh"
of the EU's Sahel Strategy (which in future would also cover Chad
and Burkina Faso), a further (fifth) Policy Advisor would be funded
by savings made elsewhere in the budget. The Minister also noted
that the 12-month extension until February 2015 would bring it
into line with the majority of other EUSR mandates, which were
to be renewed "for only 8 months from June 2014 to February
2015".
21.14 As noted in the "Background" section
of our previous Report, the tying-in of most other EUSR mandate
renewals to end-February 2015 reflected a wider tussle between
the then High Representative and the European External Action
Service (EEAS), and Member States, about the future of the EUSR
"concept", resolution of which was postponed until the
arrival of the new HR last November. Although that seemed to have
been resolved, the Committee thought it debatable whether an eight-month
renewal period, which was bound to include a summer break, was
sufficient to evaluate all EUSR roles and performance. Moreover,
though the Minister provided this interpretation here, in the
case of other EUSRs whose mandate renewal we consider elsewhere
in this Report, he talks of the eight-month renewal period being
"under review".
21.15 In this instance, as well as the draft not
being final, and there being no budgetary information, in this
instance the Minister referred to the late circulation of documents
by the EEAS, which would result in a short gap between the mandates,
though a mechanism existed to allow the EUSR to continue operating
during this period. The questions thus arose: was this late circulation
the result of the EEAS having had to await the new HR's determination
of the wider policy issue, and then being faced with a lot of
work at the last minute? In that case, the new HR is guilty of
not taking sufficient cognisance of the need for timely parliamentary
scrutiny. Or was it, once again, the EEAS's failure alone?
The Minister's letter of 13 February 2015
21.16 Regarding the decision by Ms Mogherini to extend
a number of EUSRs' mandates (including the Sahel) for only eight
months as opposed to the normal 12, the Minister says:
"I believe that Federica Mogherini's decision
to extend the mandates is a positive step, and one which the UK
has welcomed. As you have noted in your reports, Ms Mogherini
has proposed extending all but the EUSR for Human Rights for an
initial period of eight months. She has proposed renewing the
mandate of the EUSR for Human Rights for two years in order to
align it with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Human
Rights and Democracy. Ms Mogherini wrote to Member States on 27
January 2015 outlining the reasons for the eight month extension
for those EUSRs with a geographical remit, stating it was to allow
her to 'further acquaint herself with their work and interaction
with the EEAS before making substantial proposals on the way ahead
in autumn 2015'.
"As you know, following the departure of Peter
Sorensen, Lars-Gunner Wigemark has been appointed EUSR for Bosnia
and Herzegovina and will take up his duties on 1 March 2015. His
initial mandate is until June, but we expect this to be extended.
"Ms Mogherini has proposed the reestablishment
of the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process.
She has invited Member States to propose candidates for the two
positions and hopes to make appointments in March. She told Member
States that 'a new EUSR for Central Asia would take up stewardship
at political level of vital regional issues at stake. It would
assure Central Asian partners that the region remains important
to the EU and provide us with a privileged channel of communication
at the highest level with the countries of the region. This would
be essential for pursuing our objectives there given the specificities
of Central Asia. It will also build on the ongoing exercise to
review our Strategy for Central Asia'. She said that the proposed
EUSR for MEPP 'would focus on enhancing the EU's engagement on
the peace process. This would include the development of close
contacts with all major players, including the parties to the
conflict themselves, members of the Quartet, Arab states and relevant
regional bodies. This engagement would also be underpinned by
the EU's clear position on the MEPP, including the parameters
set out in the July 2014 Conclusions'.
"Ms Mogherini has also announced that she intends
to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the 'political
objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the
resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some
of the tasks'. I support the initiative to hold such a horizontal
discussion. As you know, prior to Ms Mogherini's appointment,
Member States once again fought off proposals by the EEAS for
a transfer of the EUSR budget from the Common Foreign and Security
Budget (CFSP) to the EEAS budget. We will continue to emphasise
the importance of Member State oversight of this important tool
of the CFSP.
"As the Committee will recall, I wrote to Ms
Mogherini in December 2014 highlighting the importance of timely
circulation of draft mandates. What is more, during a negotiation
last year on revised EU Guidelines on the Appointment, Mandates
and Financing of EUSRs, the UK successfully argued for the inclusion
of a reference to the need for early circulation of documents
to allow for the completion of national procedures. I will continue
to urge the EEAS to respect the terms of the Guidelines."
The Minister's letter of 20 February 2015
21.17 The Minister says that the substance of Mr
Reveyrand's mandate has now been finalised and has not changed
substantially from the previous version that accompanied his Explanatory
Memorandum of 2 February 2015.
21.18 With regard to the budget for Mr Reveyrand's
next mandate, the Minister says:
"This remains the same, pro-rata, as the budget
for 2014-15. During the discussions in Brussels the UK was joined
by other Member States in calling for no increase in 2015-16,
and this has been agreed. Consequently, the EUSR will operate
with EUR 900,000 in 2015-16, in line with the EUR 1,350,000 budget
for the full 12 months from March 2014 to February 2015. We are
content that this represents good value for money, and the one
change in M Reveyrand's team structure will be achieved within
this funding envelope."
21.19 On our question relating to the decision by
Ms Mogherini to extend a number of EUSRs' mandates (including
the Sahel) for only eight months, the Minister says:
"I have written to you separately giving the
detailed background. Accordingly, M Reveyrand's new mandate will
be for eight months: from 1 March to 31 October 2015."
Previous Committee Reports
Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter
9 (4 February 2015); also see (35800), —: Thirty-seventh
Report HC 83-xxxiv (2013-14), chapter 21 (26 February 2014).
117 See Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15),
chapter 9 (4 February 2015). Back
118
See Thirty-second Report HC 219-xxxi (2014-15), chapter 9 (4 February
2015). Back
119
These two mandates fell vacant during the tenure of the previous
HR and were effectively absorbed, pro tem, into the EEAS. Back
120
See http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm
for full information. Back
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