14 The EU and the Gulf of Guinea
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny
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| Document details | Draft EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015-2020
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| Legal base | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | 36652, 5442/15, SWD(15) 5
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
14.1 The Joint Communication 18099/13, Elements
for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf
of Guinea (a 6000 km coastline from Senegal to Angola, including
the islands of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, covering
two geographical, political and economic regions), set out a European
External Action Service (EEAS)/Commission proposal for a "Comprehensive
Approach" to the primary challenges faced in the region,
especially in the maritime domain. It was designed to serve as
the basis for a Strategic Framework.
14.2 It proposed general areas for action rather
than specific programmes, and is based on three principles: partnership
with the countries and organisations in the Gulf of Guinea region;
a comprehensive approach integrating security, development and
governance issues; and applying lessons learned from other strategies.
This Joint Communication led to the development of the EU's Strategy
on the Gulf of Guinea, which was developed to provide coherence
to the effort of the EEAS and the Commission in West and Central
Africa. The Committee's consideration of these precursor documents
is summarised in our previous Report and detailed in those other
Reports cited below.[28]
14.3 This Joint Staff Working Document, Draft
EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015-2020, will implement the
EU Gulf of Guinea Strategy.
14.4 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
noted that the UK was working proactively with the region to tackle
the threats, using a tailored approach — learning the lessons
from seeking to tackle piracy off the coast of Somalia whilst
recognising that the different and varied threats in the Gulf
of Guinea and the greater levels of regional capacity necessitated
a distinct response. In particular, he and his officials continued
to reinforce to partners that the Gulf of Guinea is different:
Somalia was a failed state and significant international action
was required; whereas the littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea
are not failed, and an international naval force would be inappropriate;
the international community's efforts were thus focused on building
these states' own law enforcement functions and capacity.
14.5 In particular, the Government's favoured approach
is assisting states in the region to implement the 2013 Yaoundé
Code of Conduct, which commits all the states to taking action
to combat maritime crime and piracy and provides the political
direction for the work currently underway in West and Central
African states.[29]
14.6 The Minister said that he wanted the Action
Plan to follow the Strategy's objectives, which he and his officials
had "worked hard to shape, to in turn achieve our national
objectives of a sustainable improvement in West African maritime
security, leading to improved economic growth and stability".
14.7 Thus far, the Minister said, the draft Action
Plan had followed the direction set by the Strategy, providing
more detail on suggested actions to achieve each of the four strategic
objectives and further information on methods of implementation,
funding and steering. However, the Minister:
— wanted greater clarity on the mention
of CSDP, "particularly the bias towards military capability",
where he saw a risk that a CSDP mission similar to EU Naval Force
Operation ATALANTA could be seen by either EU Member States or
West African states as a transferable solution for the Gulf of
Guinea, which he believed would not be appropriate;
— noted that CSDP is "one of many
instruments or mechanisms to be considered and must not be a default
response";
— wished instead to see the variety of
development instruments at the EU's disposal incorporated into
long term capacity building planning, with the aim of avoiding
the need for a reactionary CSDP mission;
— noted also that there had been little
interaction with African states specifically on the development
of the draft Action Plan; he would seek to ensure that it was
clear in the Action Plan "that there should be a pull from
the region rather than a push from Brussels", and that it
underlined the importance of maintaining "good dialogue"
in "ensuring expectations around the speed, quantity and
type of assistance available are managed"; and
— supported the appointment of a senior
coordinator in the EEAS to ensure monitoring and reporting to
the PSC,[30] but with
the caveat that it should not involve the creation of new structures
or incur new costs.
Our assessment
14.8 The EEAS's initial leaning towards a CSDP response
was still all too apparent, notwithstanding the clear message
given to it at the outset to think otherwise. Moreover, as we
feared, there had been insufficient engagement with the littoral
states themselves in the past year.
14.9 Though the Minister wanted an Action Plan that,
in line with UK and the Strategy's objectives, aimed at achieving
a sustainable improvement in West African maritime security, leading
to improved economic growth and stability, it was plainly not
thus at this juncture. Though he seemed to think that all this
could be sorted out in short order in the COAFRA Working Party,[31]
we were not so sure. We were concerned that there could not be
both "widespread support amongst Member States for this draft
action plan", and also many "who share our view on the
importance of regional buy-in and are keen to see the plan implemented
effectively", since regional buy-in was lacking and —
we suggested — something better than the current draft was
required for the proper implementation of the Strategy.
14.10 We therefore retained the draft Action Plan
under scrutiny, pending receipt from the Minister of evidence
that it had been satisfactorily revised, and that either it and/or
the Council Conclusions that were to endorse it incorporated the
approach that he supported and covered the points of concern that
he had highlighted. If that meant that it was not ready for the
March 2014 Foreign Affairs Council meeting, so be it: it was
much better to get this right, rather than to press ahead prematurely
on the wrong footing.[32]
14.11 The Minister has now provided both a revised
version of the draft Action Plan and a copy of the draft Council
Conclusions of which they will form the annex.
14.12 The draft Council Conclusions reassert the
importance that the EU attaches to continuing close cooperation
with partners across Western and Central Africa, in taking all
appropriate measures to contain maritime crime, including piracy,
illegal fishing, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human
beings, drugs, and arms, and to address the underlying causes
to foster long-term security and stability in the region. The
Council underlines that the Action Plan aims at supporting the
ongoing efforts of the ECOWAS, ECCAS, the GGC, as well as to the
Yaoundé Code of Conduct Signatory States. Implementation
should also aim to increase the level of coordination among the
EU and its Member States, and international partners, via an integrated
and cross-sectorial approach, linking the importance of good governance,
rule of law, and the development of the maritime domain to enable
greater trade cooperation, and job creation for the countries
in the region. The Council invites the EEAS and the Commission,
in close consultation with Member States, to start implementing
the Action Plan, in synergy with the EU Maritime Security Strategy
and its Action Plan, and in close cooperation with the region
itself, and key international partners; and looks forward to the
appointment of an EU Senior Coordinator for the Gulf of Guinea
(see paragraph 14.30 below for details).
14.13 With regard to the revised draft Action Plan,
the Minister says that significant revisions have now addressed
the concerns previously outlined to the Committee. He cites in
particular paragraph 19, concerning possible CSDP, which he describes
as "now far more balanced around both military and civilian
CSDP considerations, with a focus on learning lessons from existing
CSDP activity, rather than new action". The draft action
plan "further notes that planning is underway for funding
instruments for 2015-2020, which reduces the prospect of any CSDP
mission". There is, he says, "little Member State appetite
for a CSDP mission". Moreover, any such a future mission
"would be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny".
14.14 On the question of regional "buy-in",
the Minister say the EEAS "had previously missed opportunities
to communicate the work they had undertaken", noting that
the EEAS have embarked on high level discussions, including briefing
a number of African Ambassadors in Brussels and a maritime security
meeting in the margins of the EU-Africa summit in April 2014 hosted
by the then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy (Baroness Ashton). The draft action plan is
"now much clearer on the importance of ensuring regular dialogue
at various multilateral and bilateral levels", which will
"help achieve a shared understanding of the threats and opportunities
and enhance collective efforts towards implementation of the Action
Plan". This, "coupled with the strength of paragraph
two of the draft Council Conclusions", shows that "serious
effort will be put into understanding the assistance that is required,
rather than just offering what is convenient" (see paragraphs
14.31-14.33 below for details).
14.15 We are grateful to the Minister for having
responded so quickly and so fully. In particular, we welcome
his having provided the draft Council Conclusions by way of illustrating
how UK objectives have been achieved. We encourage him and his
counterparts elsewhere in Government, and their successors, to
follow suit, and thus both illuminate and speed up the scrutiny
process.
14.16 The Minister now regards the Action Plan
language as having removed the original focus on military CSDP,
which is now referred to as one of the many EU instruments available,
indicating a new focus on underlining the importance of situating
the Action Plan within the context of the EU's Comprehensive Approach,
and as properly reflecting the contribution of Member States and
that appropriate lessons should be learnt from on-going/previous
CSDP missions.
14.17 Attention is also drawn to the Critical
Maritime Routes for the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) programme, as
the type of activity that the Action Plan will seek to develop
in-line with the regionally agreed and internationally supported
Yaoundé Code of Conduct and build regional capacity as
it goes forward.
14.18 On the basis of this further information,
we now clear the draft Action Plan. However, this is, of course,
just the beginning.
14.19 Though the report in the March 2015 "Maritime
Security Review" is now somewhat dated, the fact that a special
GGC Council of Ministers meeting as recently August 2012 finds
the GCC executive secretary urging the organization to play a
more active role in the maritime security of that region, and
to initiate a civilian and military expert analysis of collaboration
between the GCC and the ECCAS, Angola's Foreign Minister having
to highlight the need for solutions to the recovery of the Commission's
economic and financial situation, illustrates just how big the
challenge will be in being able to provide the assistance that
is required, rather than "just offering what is convenient".[33]
14.20 Moreover, from the EU perspective, the draft
Action Plan notes that in the 11th EDF (2014-2020) programming
"Peace, Security and Regional Stability" has been identified
as one of the focal sectors in both the West and Central Africa
Regional Indicative Programmes, to the tune of €1.5 billion
combined; that discussions with ECOWAS and ECCAS include action
against money laundering, trafficking, maritime security capacity
building, and support to fisheries and aquaculture; and that "numerous"
National Indicative Programmes are already signed that are directly
or indirectly related to the implementation of the present Action
Plan. It is thus essential that a reality is made of the undertaking
that particular consideration will be given to synergies and complementarity
between EU and Member States funding, including through joint
programming at country level, as well as on concentration of resources
on the most urgent objectives.
14.21 The same considerations apply to what the
Action Plan refers to as the substantial engagement of other international
partners, and particularly the US Department of State Africa Bureau
and United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), whose initiatives
are "very useful in identifying capacity building and information
sharing gaps"; we agree that "activities under this
Action Plan will need to take these into account".
14.22 There is no mention of any progress reports.
We hope that the Minister will press for some form of regular
reporting, and that these are deposited for scrutiny (c.f. the
regular reports on similar capacity-building work in the pre-accession
countries and under the European Neighbourhood Policy).
14.23 Finally, we note that this Action Plan is
to be implemented "in synergy with the EU Maritime Security
Strategy and its Action Plan"; and that we do not appear
to have received any information from the Minister about that
Action Plan since we cleared the Strategy from scrutiny last July.
[34]
Full details of the documents:
Joint Staff Working Document: Draft EU Gulf of Guinea Action
Plan 2015-2020: 36652, 5442/15, SWD(15) 5.
Background
14.24 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 23 February
2015, the Minister for Europe recalled that the reasons for the
UK's interest in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea were
previously outlined in his 21 January 2014 Explanatory Memorandum
on Joint Communication 18099/13, "Elements for the EU's
Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea",
i.e., maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea increases economic
fragility, hinders development and poses a risk to seafarers and
businesses operating in the region. We set out his additional
comments in our most recent Report on this document.
The Minister's letter of 6 March 2015
14.25 The Minister has now provided a revised version
of the draft Action Plan and a copy of the draft Council Conclusions
of which they will form the annex.
14.26 The draft Council Conclusions read thus:
1. "The Council adopts today the annexed
Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015-2020 that outlines the European
Union's support to the efforts of the region and its coastal states
to address the many challenges of maritime security and organised
crime. As with the Strategy, adopted on 17 March 2014, this Action
Plan reasserts the importance which the European Union attaches
to continuing the close cooperation with partners across Western
and Central Africa, in taking all appropriate measures to combat
maritime crime, including piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal
fishing, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings,
drugs, and arms, and to address the underlying causes to foster
long-term security and stability in the region.
2. "The Council underlines that the Action
Plan aims at providing support both at the regional and national
levels, to the ongoing efforts of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), as well
as to the Signatory States to the Code of Conduct concerning the
repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illicit
maritime activity in West and Central Africa, adopted at the June
2013 Heads of State Summit in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The implementation
of the Action Plan is intended to reinforce intra-regional cooperation
as well as to increase the level of coordination among the EU
and its Member States, and international partners. The Council
stands ready to assist West and Central African coastal states
to achieve long lasting prosperity through an integrated and cross-sectorial
approach, linking the importance of good governance, rule of law,
and the development of the maritime domain to enable greater trade
cooperation, and job creation for the countries in the region.
3. "The Council invites the HR and the Commission,
in close consultation with Member States, to start implementing
the Gulf of Guinea Action Plan, taking into account the EU Maritime
Security Strategy and its Action Plan, and in close cooperation
with the region itself, and key international partners. In this
regards, it looks forward to the appointment of an EU Senior Coordinator
for the Gulf of Guinea. The Council will revert to the matter
as appropriate."
14.27 With regard to the revised draft Action Plan,
the Minister says that it contains some significant revisions
over the first draft and has addressed the concerns that he previously
outlined. He cites in particular paragraph 19, which now reads:
"The Action Plan also seeks to make the best
use of all EU instruments, including the combined efforts of the
Union and its Member States through CFSP/CSDP and the related
initiative to support capacity building of partner countries and
regional organisations in order to enable them to increasingly
manage and prevent crises by themselves. The Action Plan takes
into account the contribution of EU Member States' civilian and
military capabilities and expertise to the EU comprehensive approach
in the Gulf of Guinea, both on land and sea. Lessons learned,
where appropriate, from past experience and from other scenarios,
like the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, with ongoing CSDP missions
like EUCAP Nestor and EUCAP Sahel Niger, should also be taken
into consideration. Moreover, set-out in the Comprehensive
Approach, the Action Plan aims at enhancing civilian/military
synergies and information sharing."
14.28 The Minister says:
"I previously mentioned my desire for greater
clarity on the EEAS' intentions for CSDP's role in this action
plan. My officials have raised this issue in the Politico- Military
Group and the Council Working Group on Africa (COAFR) to ensure
that the UK's view is known. This is a difficult topic to negotiate
on, but paragraph nineteen (concerning possible CSDP) is now far
more balanced around both military and civilian CSDP considerations,
with a focus on learning lessons from existing CSDP activity,
rather than new action. The draft action plan further notes that
planning is underway for funding instruments for 2015-2020, which
reduces the prospect of any CSDP mission. There is little Member
State appetite for a CSDP mission and such a future mission would
be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny."
14.29 On the question of regional "buy-in",
the Minister says:
"The subject of 'regional buy-in' was raised
at the COAFR Working Group and it appears that the EEAS had previously
missed opportunities to communicate the work they had undertaken.
While it would be impossible to develop the action plan jointly
with the twenty two nations which it is intended to help, the
EEAS have embarked on high level discussions. In the last year
they have briefed a number of African Ambassadors in Brussels
and the HRVP hosted a maritime security meeting in the margins
of the EU-Africa summit in April 2014. The draft action plan is
now much clearer on the importance of ensuring regular dialogue
at various multilateral and bilateral levels. This will help
achieve a shared understanding of the threats and opportunities
and enhance collective efforts towards implementation of the Action
Plan. This, coupled with the strength of paragraph two of the
draft Council Conclusions, shows that serious effort will be put
into understanding the assistance that is required, rather than
just offering what is convenient."
Previous Committee Reports
Thirty-fifth Report HC 219-xxxiv (2014-15), chapter
6 (4 March 2015); also see (35684), 18099/13: Joint Communication:
Elements for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges
in the Gulf of Guinea: Fiftieth Report HC 83-xlv (2013-14),
chapter 13 (14 May 2014), Thirty-eighth Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14),
chapter 15 (5 March 2014) and Thirty-third Report HC 83-xxx (2013-14),
chapter 7 (29 January 2014); and (35857), 7537/14: Joint Communication:
For an open and secure global maritime domain — Elements
for a European Union maritime security strategy: Fifth Report
HC 219-v, chapter 14 (2 July 2014).
28 (35684), 18099/13: Joint Communication: Elements
for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf
of Guinea: Fiftieth Report HC 83-xlv (2013-14), chapter 13
(14 May 2014), Thirty-eighth Report HC 83-xxxv (2013-14), chapter 15
(5 March 2014) and Thirty-third Report HC 83-xxx (2013-14), chapter 7
(29 January 2014). Back
29
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Gulf of Guinea
Commission (GGC) created a code of conduct, modelled after the Djibouti Code of Conduct,
to increase regional cooperation in combatting piracy. The code
of conduct was signed on 25 June 2013, after a conference on maritime
safety and security in Yaoundé, Cameroon and is also known
as the Yaoundé Declaration. See http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/23-westandcentralafricacode.aspx#.VP17JNKsWSo
for further information. Back
30
Political and Security Committee: the committee of ambassador-level
officials from national delegations who, by virtue of article
38 TEU, under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the Council, monitor the
international situation in areas covered by the CFSP and exercise
political control and strategic direction of crisis management
operations, as set out in article 43 TEU. The chair is nominated
by the HR. Back
31
Before the ministers assemble in one of the Council configurations,
the meetings are prepared in more than 150 working parties and
committees. These committees are comprised of officials from the
28 Member States and are highly specialised, dealing with a number
of issues varying from the working party on technical harmonisation
of motor vehicles to the working party on fruit and vegetables. The
main responsibility of the COAFRA group is to follow and analyse
the development in the Sub-Saharan African countries, including
questions regarding prevention and management of conflicts, and
to secure a coordinated and coherent EU policy in relation to
the countries and regions concerned. Furthermore, the group is
in charge of communication with the African Union and other sub-regional
organisations. Finally, the group prepares Africa-related discussions
in the Political and Security Committee, the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (Coreper) and the Council (external affairs).See
http://eu2012.dk/en/EU-and-the-Presidency/About-EU/Arbejdsgrupper/Beskrivelser
for full information. Back
32
Thirty-fifth Report HC 219-xxxiv (2014-15), chapter 6 (4 March
2015). Back
33
See http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/08/gulf-of-guinea-security/. Back
34
(35857), 7537/14 Joint Communication: For an open and secure
global maritime domain - Elements for a European Union maritime
security strategy: Fifth Report HC 219-v, chapter 14 (2 July
2014). Back
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