16 EU military mission to contribute
to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision on the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)
|
| Legal base | Articles 42(4) and 43(2) TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document number | 36656, —
|
Summary and Committee conclusions
16.1 EUTM Somalia was launched in April 2010. The
mission is part of a wider, comprehensive EU approach to Somalia,
working with the wider international community. The EU is also
involved in EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, the operation to tackle
piracy off the coast of Somalia (of which the UK provides the
Operational Headquarters and the Operation Commander), and EU
CAP NESTOR aimed at increasing the capacity of the region to tackle
piracy themselves.
16.2 EUTM Somalia's objective was to strengthen the
Somali security forces through the provision of specific military
training, and support to the training provided by Uganda, of 2,000
Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including appropriate
modular and specialised training for officers and non-commissioned
officers.
16.3 The prior history of this mission is sketched
out below, and detailed in our previous relevant Reports.[43]
In sum, the Committee has been concerned over the tendency towards
"mission creep", both in scope and cost, and a lack
of prior information at each key stage.
16.4 This further Council Decision proposes to extend
EUTM Somalia's mandate until 31 December 2016. The budget for
years 2013 and 2014 was €17.1 million. The proposed budget
for the next 21 months is €17.5 million, with an estimated
UK contribution through of €2.7 million (=15.66%).
16.5 In submitting it for scrutiny, the Minister
for Europe (Mr David Lidington) said that Somalia is a top foreign
policy priority for the Government, which has taken a lead in
coordinating efforts in the international community to support
Somalia. Somalia had made progress against some of its peace and
state-building goals in 2014, and a new Council of Ministers was
approved by the Somali Parliament on 9 February 2015, following
the recent appointment of a new Prime Minister. Developing Somali
National Army (SNA) capacity was crucial if the Federal Government
of Somalia was to be able to take responsibility for security
in Somalia, enabling an eventual exit strategy for the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)[44]
— "though this is a long term goal and strategic patience
is required". Security gains in Somalia had to date been
largely due to AMISOM, to which the EU contributed significantly
in terms of troop stipends. But the SNA was playing an increasingly
important part in AMISOM offensives. For it to become an effective
force able to operate independently, continued investment and
support from the international community was required.
16.6 The Minister also noted various ways in which
the EU was playing a positive role in addressing the threat to
regional and international peace, security and development posed
by instability in Somalia, and how EUTM complemented these other
EU operations. The EUTM and other EU CSDP missions were important
elements of the overall framework for international engagement.
By demonstrating strong political commitment to the EUTM, the
Minister said, the UK could continue to leverage EU impact in
support of UK objectives. But the Mission had to be "well-conceived"
and "capable of delivering its objectives (hence our proactive
input into the Strategic Review)". The Mission's operational
performance had been hampered by being able to operate effectively
only in one location at one time due to force protection and transport
capacity constraints; additional force protection measures were
being deployed in March 2015 to address this (and cost increases
were therefore justified).
16.7 Other significant challenges (the Minister said)
included "the lack of capacity and collective political will
of the Federal Government of Somalia". However, the President
and new Prime Minister had assured the Government and EU that
progress on security sector reform would be their top priority.
16.8 Despite "these very serious challenges",
EUTM Somalia had had "genuine, if to date relatively modest",
impact. The Minister judged, however, that the Mission "has
the potential to make a significant difference in developing the
Somali Defence Sector, particularly if it continues to take positive
steps towards solving some of the challenges it faces, such as
strengthening its force protection capabilities".
16.9 Also, EUTM Somalia "provides EU Member
States with the opportunity to share costs and to work together
to create a mission which provides better results than if each
country were working towards the same goal individually";
provides the Government with "the ability to leverage international
resources for an area we are interested in [which] has benefits
for our foreign and security policy"; and is "fully
in line with the intentions behind the European External Action
Service to have a foreign policy structure which is more coherent
and able to develop policy on a more consistent basis —
getting the collective voice of the EU Member states heard throughout
the world".
Our assessment
16.10 The mission had now been running for five years.
Achievements thus far had been "relatively modest".
This further extension would take it to nearly seven. The cost
would by then have neared the €40 million mark. There was
still a "lack of capacity and collective political will"
on the part of the Federal Government of Somalia; assurances from
the President and another new prime minister were necessary, but
far from sufficient. Al Shabaab might well (as the Minister also
said) be increasingly embattled but (ditto) it was clearly still
capable — witness the attack carried out on 20 February
2015 on the Central Hotel in Mogadishu, which (according to the
UN) resulted in the death and injury of dozens of people, including
senior members of the Somali Federal Government.[45]
16.11 None of this was to say that the International
Community should abandon Somalia to its fate; on the contrary.
However, if national parliaments were genuinely to have any control
over CFSP, then exercises such as this needed more effective,
and consistent, parliamentary scrutiny — and that required
cooperation on the part of the Government.
16.12 As our earlier Reports relate, the Committee
considers that this has not always been the case here. The original
2010 Council Decision was never submitted for scrutiny. We noted
(and endorsed) the Minister's earlier view (from as long ago as
2012) that scrutiny is "an important part of open and transparent
government and .... the way of connecting British voters to EU
decision-making". The Committee accordingly found it all
the more regrettable that, once again, the Minister had failed
to provide any prior indication of the direction of travel —
notwithstanding his trumpeting of the UK having been "very
active in steering Mandate renewal discussions", and in steering
the EU's Strategic Review of the Mission in October 2014.
16.13 This was not a question of the Committee wishing
to have caveated documents deposited (assuming that the review
was either limité or restreint), but of having
a reasonable expectation — which the Minister acknowledged
in general terms — of being forewarned, once a review has
been completed and before the Committee is, once again, effectively
presented with a fait accompli. The Committee may well
have not have raised any questions: but the Committee is nonetheless
entitled to be given the opportunity to do so, which in this instance
it had been denied.
16.14 We therefore asked the Minister to explain
why no prior information was provided; and (given the time constraints)
to do so as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we retained
the draft Council Decision under scrutiny.[46]
16.15 The Minister now explains that, although the
review began in October, it was not concluded until early February.
The UK was "proactively involved …, including bearing
down on costs and ensuring a favourable outcome in line with UK
objectives". Despite "persistent lobbying of the EEAS
for an early draft version of the Council Decision", he did
not receive a copy until the end of January, which was finalised
on 10 February following conclusion of mandate negotiations on
9 February. He had immediately then prepared his 13 February 2015
EM. Prior to that, he could not be certain of the scope and content
of the EEAS proposals, and updating the Committee before receipt
of the Council Decision would have risked misleading it. At the
end of the day, the Council Decision "is designed to enable
the Mission to continue its positive progress"; the Minister
is "content that the Review and subsequent negotiations resulted
in the right outcome: a modest rebalancing of the way the mission
carries out its tasks", which "aligns with unchanged
UK objectives for the EUTM".
16.16 The Minister goes on to "recognise this
was not ideal", and to say that "had there been more
time we would have informed the Committee accordingly", and
that he has "reminded officials of the need to ensure the
committees are updated as early as possible". Looking forward,
he undertakes to update the Committee after the April Athena (financial)
Committee meeting,[47]
and looks to providing further summary updates "as and when
developments dictate".
16.17 As our earlier related Reports relate, we
have been here before. In this instance, although it is obvious
that the Minister could not have told the Committee all about
the review until it had been completed, we see no reason why he
could not have written to tell us that it was under way, and what
its terms of reference and the timeline were, and to outline what
his approach was going to be. This would have given the Committee
the opportunity to comment, and to judge how well the outcome
corresponded with his objectives.
16.18 The process also once again calls into question
whatever assurances the Minister may have received in response
to his representations to the new High Representative (Federica
Mogherini) in December 2014 about the importance of early publication
of documents to allow adequate time for scrutiny to take place.
16.19 Moreover, as our Report on the latest iteration
of the EU's restrictive measures against the Mugabe regime illustrates,[48]
this problem is far from confined to this particular mission.
Our conclusion is accordingly similar.
16.20 We look forward, of course, to receiving
a further update after the Athena meeting to which the Minister
refers. But something more systemic seems required.
16.21 Sometime this summer there will be a new
government, and a new Committee. In the meantime, we ask the Minister
to initiate a "lessons learned" review in his Department,
the purpose of which would be to ensure that the requirements
of the "upstream" scrutiny is embedded in all parts
of the FCO whose business is touched by the CSDP and ESDP process.
Even now, "as and when developments dictate" seems a
recipe for further misunderstanding.
16.22 We would suggest, as a starting point that,
when a Council Decision is presented to the Committee for scrutiny,
on restrictive measures or a mission, it should contain no surprises;
i.e., it has been preceded by correspondence that prepares the
ground and enables the Committee, if appropriate, to respond along
the way. In some instances, this happens; but the process is not
ingrained.
16.23 We therefore ask the Minister to do what
he can to ensure that a system is devised whereby this essentially
simple process — of keeping Committee requests under review,
and writing as and when requested, or because it is in other ways
timely to do so — is embedded in FCO policy departments
who handle this business, and becomes part of the overall scrutiny
process to which he has so often professed himself committed.
16.24 In the meantime, we now clear the document.
Full details of the documents:
Council Decision amending and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP
on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training
of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia): 36656, —.
Background
16.25 As explained in detail in our earlier relevant
Report,[49] developments
after the adoption of Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP[50]
effectively moved ahead "under the radar", as the Minister
for Europe maintained that the information in the 2011 progress
report embodied confidential information from the Crisis Management
Concept (one of the planning documents). A letter from the Minister
in December 2011 belatedly provided some information about the
Council Decision: but it was never submitted for scrutiny.
16.26 After a progress evaluation in July 2011, the
Council decided to extend it until December 2012 and refocus on
command and control and specialised capabilities, and on the self-training
capabilities of the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), with
the intention of transferring EU training expertise to local actors.
This was to be achieved by providing military training to commanders
and specialists up to company level, and through training trainers,
with a view to transferring basic and specialist training expertise
up to platoon level, under African ownership, back to Somalia.
16.27 Then, in December 2012, a further Council Decision
was put forward, which extended the mandate for a further 27 months;
took the total cost over the €20 million mark; shifted training
from Uganda to Mogadishu (reflecting welcome improvements in security);
and broadened the scope. The Committee noted that this was more
than academic: a mission that had begun with a short life in mind
had now morphed into one that would not only be, at least, nearly
five years long, but which — as it branched into security
sector reform, and political and strategic level mentoring that
(as the Minister for Europe, Mr David Lidington, put it at the
time) "ultimately" might "support moves towards
an exit strategy" — already had at least some of the
hallmarks of other such missions that had expanded their original,
limited role and proved costly, lengthy and of doubtful effectiveness,
as in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[51]
The Committee was also concerned over the lack of information
from the Minister during the preceding 18 months. Though there
might well be a compelling case for this expansion, the Committee
felt that the House was not being given the opportunity to examine
it properly, and recommended that it be debated in the European
Committee (which was combined with a similar "short notice"
draft Council Decision on a new military mission to Mali, EUTM
Mali, and took place on 16 January 2013[52]).
16.28 In 2013, the Minister provided further updates
on progress thus far and on the budget. Although the EU said previously
that €11.6 million would be a maximum amount, he had closely
scrutinised the Operation Commander's more detailed budget of
€13.394 million —an increase of 15.4% on the initial
estimate — and believed that it was justified. The Minister
nonetheless pledged himself to "continue to monitor and to
bear down on costs, where appropriate, and evaluate results, including
during the next annual review", and "to push for improvements
in the process for EU budgeting and forecasting of future requirements
for EU military operations".
16.29 At that time, the Committee were also considering
three other CSDP missions — in Mali, in Niger and in the
Horn of Africa — that, to varying degrees, demonstrated
challenges to the budgeting process. The Committee noted that
it would like to hear more about his success in these areas —
budgeting, evaluation and forecasting — at the time of the
next annual review, since the need was apparent.[53]
16.30 The Committee's consideration of this latest
Council Decision is set out above.
The Minister's letter of 6 March 2015
16.31 The Minister says:
"The UK was proactively involved in the Strategic
Review, including bearing down on costs and ensuring a favourable
outcome in line with UK objectives. Negotiations and discussions
on the review and Mandate renewal took between October and early
February. Despite persistent lobbying of the EEAS for an early
draft version of the Council Decision, to help inform the Parliamentary
Committees, we did not receive a copy until the end of January.
At this point we began the process of submitting for Parliamentary
scrutiny, which we finalised on 10 February following conclusion
of mandate negotiations on 9 February.
"Providing a detailed update before receipt
of the Council Decision would have risked misleading the Committee.
We could only be certain about the scope and content of the EEAS
proposals once that Decision was available. We are content that
the Review and subsequent negotiations resulted in the right outcome:
a modest rebalancing of the way the mission carries out its tasks.
This aligns with unchanged UK objectives for the EUTM. The Council
Decision is designed to enable the Mission to continue its positive
progress. As soon as we received the Council Decision we started
preparing the Explanatory Memorandum to inform the Parliamentary
Scrutiny Committee.
"I recognise this was not ideal, and had there
been more time we would have informed the Committee accordingly.
I have reminded officials of the need to ensure the committees
are updated as early as possible. Looking forward, I will update
the Committee after the April Athena (financial) Committee meeting,
and look to provide further summary updates for EUTM Somalia as
and when developments dictate."
Previous Committee Reports
Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter
8 (25 February 2014); also see (34518), —: Eighth Report
HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 16 (3 July 2013) and Twenty-fifth
Report HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 1 (19 December 2012).
43 (34518), -: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14),
chapter 16 (3 July 2013) and Twenty-fifth Report HC 86-xxv (2012-13),
chapter 1 (19 December 2012) for full background. Back
44
AMISOM is a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African
Union with the approval of the United Nations, which was created
by the AU's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with
an initial six month mandate. Back
45
UN News Centre. Back
46
Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter 8 (27 February
2014). Back
47
Athena. Back
48
See (36694), - and (36695), - at chapter 19 of this Report. Back
49
(34518),-: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 16 (3
July 2013). Back
50
Council Decision. Back
51
EUSEC RD Congo. Back
52
The record of the debate is available at Gen Co Deb, European
Standing Committee B, 16 January 2013, cols. 3-24. Back
53
(34518), -: Eighth Report HC 83-viii (2013-14), chapter 16 (3
July 2013) and Twenty-fifth Report HC 86-xxv (2012-13), chapter 1
(19 December 2012) for full background. Back
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